

Project: **The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres**

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Table of contents

1. Introduction	3
2. Europeanisation of Public Spheres: A Theoretical Model	4
3. Data and methodology	11
4. Levels of Europeanisation of public claim-making	15
5. Trends in the Europeanisation of public claim-making	21
6. Support and opposition regarding European institutions and integration	24
7. Who profits? The winners and losers of Europeanisation of public claim-making	27
References	31

Appendix: Tables

Table 1: Actor scope all countries, by issue	33
Table 2: Actor scope all issues, by country	34
Table 3: Addressee scope all countries, by issue	35
Table 4: Addressee scope all issues, by country	36
Table 5: Issue scope all countries, by issue	37
Table 6: Issue scope all issues, by country	38
Table 7: European-level actors by issue and year	39
Table 8: Actors from other European countries by issue and year	39
Table 9: European-level actors by country and year	39
Table 10: Actors from other European countries by country and year	40
Table 11: European-level addressees by country and year	40
Table 12: Addressees from other European countries by country and year	40
Table 13: European issue scope by country and year (six substantive issues)	41
Table 14: Number of claims on European integration by country and year	41
Table 15: European issue scope by issue and year	41
Table 16: Evaluation by scope of addressee	42
Table 17: Position regarding the European integration process by country and year	43
Table 18: Position regarding the European integration process in 2002 by issue	43
Table 19: Position regarding the European integration process by actor scope and country	44
Table 20: Position regarding the European integration process by actor type and country	45
Table 21: Actors involved in public debates on European integration compared to the seven-issue average	45
Table 22: Share of protests by issue and country	46
Table 23: Share of protests by actor scope and country	46

1. Introduction

While policy decisions in Europe are increasingly taken in the supranational and inter-governmental arenas, the nation-state has remained the primary focus for collective identities, and public debates and citizens' participation in the policy process still seem mainly situated on the nation-state level and directed at national authorities. This discrepancy between Europe's institutional development, its increasing competences and influence on Europeans' conditions of life, on the one hand, and the continuing predominance of the national political space as the arena for public debates and the source for collective identification and notions of citizenship, on the other, is at the core of Europe's "democratic deficit". Since the beginning of the 1990s, the former "permissive consensus" on EU integration has eroded, increasingly after the Treaty on European Union of 1992, which was ratified only with great difficulty in those countries where it was subject to popular referenda. Trust in European institutions and support for the integration process have steadily declined, and so has in many countries voter participation in European elections (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). In addition, tendencies of a "re-nationalisation" of politics are observable, e.g., in the form of increasing support for xenophobic parties, which usually also have a strong anti-European profile.

The increasingly controversial nature of the integration process, the need to fundamentally reshape the EU's institutional structure and decision making process in the context of enlargement, as well as the heightened visibility of Europe in people's everyday life (e.g., the euro), make further advances in the integration process increasingly dependent on active engagement, acceptance, and legitimacy among the citizenry. Even more than on the national level, the communication flow between Europe and the public depends on the mass media. The mass media fulfil at least four crucial functions in the European policy process. First, in the absence of direct communicative links, European actors, issues, and policies have to be made visible by the mass media, and it is in this public forum that they may gain (or fail to obtain) public resonance and legitimacy (*legitimation* function). Second, with the partial exception of opinion polling – which provides only punctual, pre-structured, and non-discursive access to the public opinion – European policy makers must depend for their information about the desires and concerns of the citizenry on the communicative channels of the mass media (*responsiveness* function). Third and conversely, the public can build its opinion about the distant European institutions and the complexities of multi-level policies only to a very small extent on direct personal experience and therefore must also rely on how Europe becomes visible in the mass media (*accountability* function). Finally, participation of citizens in the European policy process usually also requires access to the mass media. Although a small number of resourceful and well-organized actors may gain access to European policy-makers directly (e.g., in the context of the Brussels lobbying circuit), most forms of citizens' participation through NGOs, civic initiatives, and social movements can only influence policy-makers by way of the visibility, resonance, and legitimacy they may mobilize in the mass media (*participation* function).

Given the growing dependence of advances in the integration process on the emergence of a European public sphere that can fulfil these functions, it is no wonder that the conditions for the emergence of a European public sphere have come to the foreground of the social-scientific debate about European integration (e.g., Gerhards 1993; Erbring 1995; Kopper 1997; Schlesinger 1995). However, so far this discussion suffers from insufficient empirical grounding, and has a tendency to remain highly speculative. In this report, we offer a more empirically grounded view on the extent and forms of Europeanisation of public spheres, more specifically referring to public debate and contestation as reported in the European print media.

Our approach does not focus on public opinion as it is often measured on the individual level of the perceptions and identities of European citizens, but on the degree of Europeanisation of public debates and collective political mobilisation as they become visible in the mass media (i.e., *publicised* opinion). We acknowledge that there are other forums than the mass media, where Europeanised political communication and mobilisation may occur, e.g. in interorganisational or interpersonal networks that cross national boundaries. However, ultimately the relevance of these networks will depend on the degree to which the incipient Europeanisation tendencies that emerge within them are able to penetrate the mass media and are thereby able to reach a wider audience.

2. Europeanisation of Public Spheres: A Theoretical Model¹

There has been a tendency in the literature to view the notion of a European public sphere in a narrow way, implicitly or explicitly derived from an ideal-typical conception of the national public sphere. Several authors have focused on the probability of the emergence of transnational mass media or transnational collective action on the European level. This way of approaching the problem usually results in a negative answer to the possibility of a European public sphere, and emphasizes linguistic and cultural boundaries as an insurmountable barrier to the Europeanisation of public debates, collective identities, and collective action. Although some authors reckon with the emergence of English as a true lingua franca in Europe that would allow direct transnational communication on a mass level (De Swaan 1993), for the moment this prospect seems to be very distant, not least because of strong resistance against such cultural homogenisation in many non-English speaking member states. In our view, this perspective on the Europeanisation of the public sphere is deficient because it views Europeanisation as a replication, on a higher level of spatial aggregation, of the type of unified public sphere that we know – or think we know – from the nation-state context. This perspective often presupposes a degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity and political centralisation that cannot be found in many well-functioning democratic nation-states. For instance, the Dutch consociational democracy has proved to be a successful way to politically integrate a population characterised by deep socio-cultural cleavages (Lijphart 1968). Similarly, Switzerland is one of the most stable and successful Western democracies, despite important cultural differences, not least of which the existence of four different language regions (Ernst 1998).

If one looks for a genuinely transnational European public sphere, there is not much to be found (see also Schlesinger 1999). There have been a few attempts to establish European-wide mass media, but most of these have either quickly disappeared (such as the newspaper *The European*) or lead a marginal (and often heavily EU-subsidized) existence (e.g., the television station *Euronews* or the independent, but in terms of expert readership limited, *European Voice*). In as far as transnational media have been able to carve out a niche in the media landscape, the successful examples have a global, rather than European profile and audience (e.g., *CNN*, *BBC World*, *International Herald Tribune*, *Le Monde diplomatique*, *Financial Times*). Regarding collective action and social movements, Imig and Tarrow (2001) have similarly shown that mobilisation on the European level by transnationally organised European actors is still a rare phenomenon.

Gerhards (1993, 2000) has rightly emphasized that the more realistic scenario is not that of a

¹ This section is drawn from Koopmans and Erbe forthcoming.

genuinely supranational European public sphere in the singular, but the Europeanisation of the various national public spheres. This view assumes that – also because of the language factor – nationally-based mass media are there to stay, but that their content may become less focused on the nation-state context and will increasingly include a European perspective. Gerhards (2000: 293) mentions two criteria for such Europeanisation of national public spheres: an increased proportion of coverage of European themes and actors, on the one hand, and the evaluation of these themes and actors from a perspective that extends beyond the own country and its interests, on the other. Using media content data drawn from Kepplinger (1998), he shows that between 1951 and 1995 there has in Germany hardly been an increase in European themes and only a very slight increase – at a very low level – in the coverage of European actors. These data, however, were gathered for other purposes and it is therefore questionable whether they accurately measure the European dimension of themes and actors, let alone the intricacies of multi-level politics that may result in varying mixtures of national and European dimensions in news coverage. These methodological reservations notwithstanding, we agree with Gerhards that an increased presence of European actors and themes in national media would be an important criterion for the Europeanisation of public spheres. However, Gerhards' second criterion seems unnecessarily restrictive in that it demands an orientation on a European common good in order for an act of public communication to qualify as "Europeanised" (for this criticism see also Trezz 2000). If we use this common good criterion of orientation on more than self-interest, we should also exclude much of the routine national claim making (e.g., of many socio-economic interest groups) from the national public sphere.

Even though Europeanisation in Gerhards' view does not require supranational mass media, it does presuppose a form of Europeanisation of policies and politics along similar lines as in the traditional nation-state. It is no wonder, therefore, that Gerhards (2000) arrives at the conclusion that the European public sphere deficit is a direct consequence of the democratic deficit, which he sees in the lack of the kind of government-opposition dynamics, and the direct accountability of office holders to the electorate that we know from the national level. This position has been criticized by Eder, Kantner, and Trezz (2000) as too restrictive. They assume that because of the complex nature of multi-level politics, we will not necessarily find a strong orientation of public communication on European institutions. In their view, the Europeanisation of policies and regulations may instead lead to a parallelisation of national public spheres in the sense that increasingly the same themes are discussed at the same time under similar criteria of relevance. An example would be the debates on asylum policies in different European countries during the 1990s, following European-level discussions and the Dublin Agreement. National political actors carried the ideas developed here into their national public spheres, and as a result discussions started more or less simultaneously in several member states about establishing lists of "safe third countries", a notion that was developed in Dublin. However, the fact that such policies had a European-level origin was hardly mentioned in the coverage of these debates on the national level. Although what we see in such cases is certainly a consequence of the Europeanisation of policy-making, it does not in our view constitute a Europeanisation of the public sphere. As long as the European dimension remains hidden from the public's view, one cannot call such debates "Europeanised". For the citizen, unaware of what was discussed in Dublin or of the similar discussions in other member states, these appear to be purely national debates. If anything, such examples illustrate the nature of the public sphere deficit rather than being a solution to it.


Nonetheless, Eder et al. are on the right track in insisting that direct references to the EU are not a necessary precondition for the Europeanisation of public spheres. What Gerhards'

perspective forgets is namely that although, particularly in the first pillar, the EU has some supranational features, much of its policies have an intergovernmental basis. These intergovernmental features of the EU polity are more likely to be expressed in an alternative form of Europeanisation of public spheres, which has thus far received almost no attention in the literature (a partial exception is Risse 2002). This type of Europeanisation would not consist of direct references to European actors and themes, but of increased attention for public debates and mobilisation in other member states. In an intergovernmental polity, the other member states can no longer be treated as foreign countries whose internal politics are not really relevant for one's own country. To the contrary, in an intergovernmental polity, it may matter a great deal who wins the elections in another member state, or what kind of new policy another member state develops in a particular policy field. Such tendencies are reinforced by the interdependencies created by common market policies and the freedom of movement within the EU. Under such conditions, policies in one country may become relevant for one's own country in a way that goes far beyond traditional international relations. For instance, if Germany liberalises its naturalisation policies, this is immediately relevant for other member states, because once naturalised, immigrants from Germany can freely travel to, and take up work in another EU country. Similarly, the Northern EU countries watch closely what measures countries such as Italy, Greece, and Spain undertake to prevent illegal immigration from Africa and the Middle East, which under the Schengen conditions is no longer just "their" problem.

We thus arrive at three theoretically possible forms of Europeanisation of public communication and mobilisation:

1. The emergence of a *supranational European public sphere* constituted by the interaction among European-level institutions and collective actors around European themes, ideally accompanied by (and creating the basis for) the development of European-wide mass media;
2. *Vertical Europeanisation*, which consists of communicative linkages between the national and the European level. There are two basic variants of this patterns, a bottom-up one, in which national actors address European actors and/or make claims on European issues, and a top-down one, in which European actors intervene in national policies and public debates in the name of European regulations and common interests;
3. *Horizontal Europeanisation*, which consists of communicative linkages between different member states. We may distinguish a weak and a strong variant. In the weak variant, the media in one country cover debates and contestation in another member state, but there is no linkage between the countries in the structure of claim making itself. In the stronger variant, actors from one country explicitly address, or refer to actors or policies in another member state.

Figure 1: Model of intra- and inter-sphere communication from the perspective of national media from EU member states



Areas mark the spheres to which actors belong. In this example, sphere 1 “national (own country)” corresponds to the national sphere whose mass media are analysed (in our case it corresponds to the German national sphere). **Each arrow** represents a possible communicative linkage between actors, as explained in the text.

It is important to note that we can only speak of “European”, “global”, “national”, or “local” public spheres in a relative sense. We propose that the spatial reach and boundaries of public communication can be determined by investigating patterns of *communicative flows* and assessing the *relative density of public communication* within and between different political spaces. In *figure 1*, we have drawn a set of concentric spheres delimiting different political spaces that are of interest to us in this study. At the centre, we find the national political space of a particular country (*sphere 1*, for illustrative purposes, we take the Germany political space as an example here). In the next sphere around it (2) are the respective national political spaces of other European countries. In the next sphere (3), we find the supranational European

political space, in which the European institutions and common policies are situated. Beyond that, the next circle (4) contains all other countries of the world and their national political spaces. Finally, the outer sphere (5) contains global supranational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the G-8, the International Court of Justice or the United Nations (UN), as well as international treaties and conventions.² The nature of public spheres, now, is constituted by the density of communicative linkages (symbolised by arrows a-r in *fig. 1*) within and between these spaces.

In terms of our model, the ideal-typical national public sphere is characterized by communicative linkages that remain completely confined to one national political space. An ideal-typical national claim would be a German claimant making demands on a German addressee in the name of the interests of a German beneficiary, referring to a set of aims and frames that refer only to the German political space. An example is when German media report a call by the German government on the German Trade Union Federation to cooperate in a reform of the (German) retirement system in order to secure pensions for future (German) generations (corresponding to *arrow a*). The degree to which we can speak of a nationally confined public sphere is then measured by the relative amount of all communicative action that conforms to this ideal-typical national pattern of claim making. A fully nationalised public sphere would have a density of 100% of such nationally confined communicative linkages. In a fully denationalised public sphere the density of purely national communicative linkages would be 0%. This would not imply that national actors, addressees, interests, and issues do not play a role any more, but that these always appear in combination with some sort of reference to political spaces beyond the country in question.

Along similar lines, we may speak of the emergence of a *supranational European public sphere* to the extent that we find claims that link European claimants to European addressees in the name of European interests, without referring to any other level of political space. An example is a motion passed by the European Parliament urging the Commission to undertake institutional reforms in the context of the enlargement of the Union (*arrow k*). Similar to the density scores for nationally confined political communication, we can conceptualise a supranational European public sphere as the percentage of all communicative action in which European actors refer to European addressees, interests, and issues.

This would be the replication of the classical pattern of the national public sphere on the level of the European Union. However, if Europe is indeed a new type of multi-level polity, this should not be the most frequent type of Europeanised claim. Within the model of *vertical Europeanisation*, we may distinguish a number of varieties in which vertical communicative linkages between the national and the European political space can be made. In the *bottom-up variant*, the simplest form is when national actors directly address European institutions (*arrow c*; e.g., when a national actor brings a case before the European Court of Justice, or German foreign minister Fischer demands that the European Parliament be strengthened in the next treaty revision), but there are also more complex patterns in which national actors address national authorities asking them to promote the group's interests on the European

² Within each of the national political spaces, one could of course have drawn additional regional, local, as well as sectoral political spaces. For the sake of clarity, we have left those out of the picture and treat these subnational spaces as part of the national political space. Another simplification in the figure is that in reality political spaces are not always nicely separated as the concentric spheres suggest, but may partially cross-cut and overlap. For instance, there is more than just one European public space, including apart from the EU also subsets of it (e.g., the euro zone), or larger European political spaces (e.g., the signatories of the European Human Rights Convention). Theoretically, it is of course possible to disentangle these political spaces and our data allow this. However, in this report we focus on the broader picture, and ignore these – as our data show relatively marginal – deviations.

level (a case with national claimant, addressee, as well as object actor, but an issue with a European scope). The *top-down variant* of vertical Europeanisation occurs when European actors address national actors, usually regarding common European issues and interests (e.g., when the Commission threatens sanctions against governments that do not meet the criteria of the stability pact).

The *weak variant of horizontal Europeanisation* occurs when German media report on what happens within the national political spaces of other member states, for instance that the French national assembly adopts stricter laws on begging in French streets (*arrow f*). In terms of the structure of claim making, this case is similar to the purely German claims, but the difference is that by their coverage the German media transport these non-German claims into the German public sphere. The degree to which such coverage represents a form of Europeanisation of the German public sphere can only be evaluated in a relative sense. Horizontal Europeanisation may be said to occur if coverage of other EU member states is over-represented in comparison to that of non-EU countries. If, on the other hand, references to France and Italy are not more frequent in the German public sphere than, say, to Japan or Mexico, we may perhaps still speak of a transnationalisation of the German public sphere in a wider sense (if such references have increased over the course of time relative to purely national coverage) but not of a more specific Europeanisation of public communication.

The *stronger variant of horizontal Europeanisation* is brought about by direct communicative linkages between two member states' political spaces (*arrow b*). Examples are Prime Minister Tony Blair issuing a statement in support of Gerhard Schröder's bid for the Chancellorship, or the German government criticising the French government's handling of the BSE epidemic. As in the case of vertical Europeanisation, there may be cases where all actors involved remain national (German) ones, but the issue is framed in a comparative way with one or more other member states, e.g., when the German opposition criticises the government's economic policies pointing out that Germany has the worst performance of all EU countries. In such a case, the policies and performances of other EU countries are deemed relevant as benchmarks or possible examples for German policies, thereby inserting a European dimension in the German public debate.

Of course, there can also be mixtures of horizontal and vertical Europeanisation. A common example is when government representatives of several member states issue a common statement on some European issue, e.g., when the Spanish, British, and Italian governments presented common proposals for institutional reform of the EU. Another common combination of vertical and horizontal dimensions occurs when the media of one country report on interactions between the EU and another member state, e.g., when the German media report about the FPÖ's warning that Austria can veto decisions in the Council of Ministers (*arrow h*).

All these forms of Europeanisation of public communication must not only carve out a communicative niche in competition with purely national public communication, but also relative to transnational communicative interaction that goes beyond Europe. It is after all possible that a de-nationalisation of public communication and mobilisation occurs, but that most of the resulting linkages beyond the national level refer to supranational institutions and regulations with a wider scope than Europe alone (e.g., the UN), or to national political spaces outside of the European Union, e.g., to the United States, Russia, or Japan. In as far as claim making referring to political spaces wider than or outside Europe involves the EU and its institutions, this would still be a form of Europeanisation, of the supranational variant to be more precise. Such claims constitute the foreign political dimension of the EU polity, e.g.,

when the EU and the US criticise each other's positions in the GATT negotiations (*arrow l*), or when the EU General Affairs Council agrees on embedding WEU in NATO structures (*arrow m*).

Another form of communicative interaction involving supranational political spaces or countries beyond Europe that might still constitute a form of Europeanisation, is when German media report on interaction between actors from other member states, on the one hand, and supranational institutions or non-European countries, on the other (e.g., when they report on Haider visiting Saddam Hussein in Iraq (*arrow i*), or on French human rights NGOs calling on the UNHCR to improve the protection for female refugees (*arrow j*). As in the case of coverage about other Member states' internal affairs, the coverage of such claims in the German media might indicate a growing awareness of the relevance of other EU countries' foreign relations to one's own country's (or Europe's) position in the world. Of course, a precondition would again be that such coverage of other member states' foreign politics would be over-represented compared to coverage of international and supranational politics in which other member states do not play a role (e.g., relations between the US and Russia) or in which they appear only as part of broader international coalitions or members of supranational institutions (e.g., claims made by the UN Security Council on Iraq).

Finally, there are two types of communicative linkages that are – like the purely nationally-confined claims we began with – clearly competitors to Europeanised political communication. The first are communications which link a particular national political space to non-European countries or to supranational institutions, and which bypass the European level. Examples are the debate about US-German relations in the context of the Iraq conflict (*arrow d*), or chancellor Schröder asking the UN Secretary General to mediate in a conflict (*arrow e*). Second, a substantial part of foreign political coverage consists of the internal affairs of non-European countries (*arrow n*), relations between such countries (such as president Bush's claims on regime change in Iraq, *arrow o*), between them and supranational institutions (e.g., the USA asking NATO for support after September 11, *arrow p*), or among supranational institutions (the UN, for instance, calling on the World Bank to include poverty reduction in its funding criteria, *arrow r*). If such forms of political communication and contestation receive prominent coverage that increases relative to other types of coverage over time, we may consider them as an indicator of a denationalisation or transnationalisation of the public sphere, but not of a more specific and delimited form of Europeanised public communication.

Summing up, we can speak of a Europeanised public sphere to the extent that a substantial – and over time increasing – part of public contestation neither stays confined to the own national political space (the European public sphere's inner boundary), nor extends beyond Europe without referring to it (the outer boundary of the European public sphere). Coverage of other member states' internal and foreign affairs constitutes a borderline case and can only be interpreted as a form of Europeanisation if such coverage is over-represented (and over time increasingly so) compared to the coverage of the internal and foreign affairs of non-EU countries.

In this report, we will present a cross-national, cross-time, and cross-issue analysis of patterns of Europeanisations from this theoretical perspective. We look at the actors that make claims that are reported in European print media, the addressees at which they direct their demands,

and the geopolitical frame of reference in which they discuss different issues.³ We present data on public claim-making in European print media in the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2002, in seven European countries: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.

The data refer to public claim-making in seven issue fields: monetary politics; agriculture (more specifically the sub-fields subsidies, quota, and livestock disease control); immigration (including asylum politics); troop deployment (for military as well as humanitarian purposes); pensions and retirement; (primary and secondary) education; and finally the meta-issue of European integration (general institutional and normative issues of European integration not referring to Europe's role in a specific substantive issue field, e.g., discussions on enlargement, a European constitution, institutional and governance issues, European values, etc.).

Given our research question, the inclusion of the topic of European integration requires no further explanation. The other issues were chosen in order to generate systematic variation in the degree and forms of institutional Europeanisation. Monetary politics and agriculture are fields where the EU has strong competencies of the supranational type. The next two policy fields, immigration and troop deployment are much less strongly institutionalised on the European level. To the extent that European decision making plays a role in these fields, it is of the intergovernmental type. In retirement and education politics, finally, the EU has virtually no formal competencies, and European institutions at most have a co-ordinating task.

We will discuss the issue of the Europeanisation of claim-making along four themes:

- Levels of Europeanisation of public claim-making;
- Temporal trends in the Europeanisation of public claim-making;
- Support for, and opposition to European integration and European institutions;
- Who profits? The winners and losers of Europeanisation of public claim-making.

3. Data and methodology

For the empirical data collection we use the methodology of political claim analysis (see Koopmans and Statham 1999), which goes beyond traditional media content analyses. The latter usually focus on newspaper articles as the unit of analysis, and use article-level variables to investigate the way in which journalists frame the news. Traditional approaches to content analysis are media-centric, and neglect the role of other political actors in shaping the nature of public discourse and contestation. Media professionals certainly contribute to shaping the public sphere, but to do so they have to draw on the raw material of communicative actions and events that are produced and staged by non-media actors such as politicians, interest groups, and NGO's. Traditional content analysis on the article-level offers no possibility to map fields of political communication in terms of actors, issues, and the relations between them. At most, traditional methods can tell us with which frequency certain actors and issues are mentioned, and perhaps to what extent certain actors and issues co-occur in news stories. But they tell us nothing about the relations between actors, their role in public debates, or the positions they take with regard to which issues. It is precisely such information about who addresses who on which issues and in the name of whose interests, which we need

³ At this stage, we analyse the extent and forms of Europeanisation of actors, addressees, and issues separately. In future analyses, we want to complicate this picture by investigating how different geopolitical levels may be linked within the structure of claims along the lines of the communicative linkages shown in Figure 1 (see Koopmans and Erbe forthcoming for such a type of analysis for the German case).

in order to answer questions about the Europeanisation of public spheres and the different forms it may take.

Europub.com's work package 2 deals with the analysis of public claim-making as represented in print media sources in the seven countries of our study. Obviously, many attempts at making public claims never reach the columns of the news media because they fail to pass the media's selection filters. For our research question, however, it is the publicly visible claims that count, since by definition only those that become public can contribute to a Europeanisation of public spheres.

In each of the seven countries, two quality newspapers, one more left-oriented, and one more right-oriented, have been chosen as our main sources.⁴ For the year 2000, we additionally include two other newspapers: a regional newspaper from a region with a specific regional identity,⁵ and a tabloid newspaper catering to a non-elite public.⁶ Where no genuine tabloid was present, we either chose a newspaper that is close in style to a tabloid,⁷ or another fourth newspaper, the choice of which depended on the particular composition of the national media landscape.⁸ We coded the years 1990, 1995 and 2000-2002. Given our limited resources and the labour-intensive nature of the type of content coding we employ, we were not able to code all issues of all newspapers for all years. For 2000-2002 we coded one issue per week of each of the two quality papers, for 1990 and 1995 the sample was half as dense, i.e. one issue per two weeks of each of the quality papers. To limit the coding effort, on half of the days for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2002 only claims with a European scope (in at least one of the basic aspects of the claim: actors, addressees, issue, or object actors) were coded. This restriction also pertains to the whole of the year 2001. The third and fourth newspapers for the year 2000 were each coded on the basis of a one issue per two weeks sample. The restriction to claims with a European reference applied to two out of three of these issues. For all issues of any of the four papers to which the "European reference" restriction did not apply, all claims were coded, regardless of whether they had a European aspect, as long as they referred to one of our seven issue fields.

In the analysis that follows, we control for biases related to different samples for different years by excluding the claims that were coded from issues where the European reference restriction applies from all analyses where we are interested in levels and trends in Europeanisation (including all claims in such analyses would lead to artificially inflated levels of claims with a European dimension). For analyses where data are aggregated across years, the data were weighed in such a way that each year contributes equally to the overall result (otherwise the results would be skewed towards the more recent years which have a denser sample). In a similar way, we control for the fact that we have larger numbers of cases for

⁴ The newspapers that were chosen are: Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (D); El País and Abc (E); Le Monde and Le Figaro (F); La Repubblica and Il Corriere della Sera (I); De Volkskrant and Algemeen Dagblad (NL); The Guardian and The Times (UK); and Le Temps (appearing from 1998 onwards), the Journal de Genève (which was taken instead of Le Temps for the years 1990 and 1995), and Neue Zürcher Zeitung (CH).

⁵ Leipziger Volkszeitung (former East Germany, D); La Vanguardia (Catalunya, E); Ouest France (Western France, F); Il Mattino and La Nazione (I, respectively from Campania in the South and from Tuscany in the Centre of the country); Leeuwarder Courant (Friesland, NL); The Scotsman (Scotland, UK); and Le Matin (French-speaking region, CH).

⁶ Bild-Zeitung (D); The Sun (UK); and Blick (CH).

⁷ De Telegraaf in the case of the Netherlands.

⁸ El Mundo (E) and L'Humanité (F). In Italy we chose a second regional newspaper as our fourth paper (see footnote 5).

some countries than for others. Where data were aggregated across countries, we weighed the data in such a way that each country contributes equally to the overall result.⁹

We defined an instance of claim making (shorthand: a claim) as a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of the expression of a political opinion or demand by way of physical or verbal action, regardless of the form this expression takes (statement, violence, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc. etc.) and regardless of the nature of the actor (governments, social movements, NGO's, individuals, anonymous actors, etc. etc.). Note that decisions and policy implementation are defined as special forms of claim-making, namely ones that have direct effects on the objects of the claim.

Claims are broken down into seven elements, for each of which a number of variables were coded:¹⁰

1. Location of the claim in time and space (WHEN and WHERE is the claim made?)
2. Claimant: the actor making the claim (WHO makes the claim?)
3. Form of the claim (HOW is the claim inserted in the public sphere?)
4. The addressee of the claim (AT WHOM is the claim directed?)
5. The substantive issue of the claim (WHAT is the claim about?)
6. Object actor: who would be affected by the claim if it is realised (FOR/AGAINST WHOM?)
7. The justification for the claim (WHY should this action be undertaken?)

The ideal-typical claim in the public sphere has all these elements, for instance (leaving out the WHEN and WHERE, which are pretty self-evident):

WHO (SUBJECT ACTOR)	HOW (FORM)	AT WHOM (ADDRESSEE)	WHAT (ISSUE)	FOR/AGAINST WHOM? (OBJECT ACTOR)	WHY (FRAME)
A group of asylum seekers	engage in a hunger strike	demanding the government	not to deport to their country of origin	themselves (the group of asylum seekers)	because this would be in violation of the Geneva Convention
The European Parliament	passes a resolution	criticizing the Turkish government and demanding	measures to improve the treatment of	political prisoners	arguing that respect for human rights is a core value of the European Union

In grammatical terms, we may write such claims as a SUBJECT-ACTION-ADDRESSEE-ACTION-OBJECT-JUSTIFICATION CLAUSE sequence: an actor, the subject, undertakes some sort of action in the public sphere to get another actor, the addressee, to do or leave something affecting the interests of a third actor, the object, and provides a justification for why this should be done. Many claims are not as differentiated as this type. The only

⁹ While differences among the other countries are smaller, Germany stands out with about 50% more claims than the other countries. This seems to be a result of the dense information content of German newspaper reporting rather than an indication of a greater intensity of public debates on our seven issues in Germany. In earlier projects on entirely different topics, in which the same (Koopmans et al. forthcoming) or a similar methodology (Kriesi et al. 1995) was used, similarly high numbers of claims were found in the German press compared to other European countries.

¹⁰ In this report, we will not address the last two elements, object actors and frames. Results for object actors were omitted because they did not add much to the patterns already identified on the basis of claimants, addressees, and issues. Our frame data require a more qualitative analysis that we leave for a future paper.

information that is always needed for coding is information on the FORM (some sort of act in the public sphere has to be identifiable) as well as information on ISSUE, OBJECT ACTOR, or FRAME that allows us to determine whether the action relates to one of our topical fields. Often several claim elements are missing, as indicated by the following examples.

WHO (SUBJECT ACTOR)	HOW (FORM)	AT WHOM (ADDRESSEE)	WHAT (ISSUE)	FOR/AGAINST WHOM? (OBJECT ACTOR)	WHY (FRAME)
The French agricultural minister	calls on	meat importers	to boycott the import of meat	from other EU countries in support of French farmers	
Joschka Fischer	holds a speech calling for		the drawing up of a European Constitution		
	sets fire to			an asylum seeker centre	
The Bavarian authorities	deport			a group of Kurdish refugees	
A group of British economists	publish a report stating that				British non-participation in the common currency will lead to lower economic growth

The first row illustrates a very common form of 'incompleteness' of claims. Frequently, no justification is given for a claim. The example in the second row illustrates that claims often have no explicit addressees or object actors (or at least the newspaper does not mention them). The third example illustrates a form of direct action, which contains no discursive elements, but where we can derive the issue at stake on the basis of the physical object of the action. In addition, the example illustrates that sometimes actors are unknown or anonymous. The fourth example is common for state actors, who do not have to make claims on others to do something, but can directly make binding claims. As in the third example, the aim of the action may not be specified in a discursive statement but can be derived from the action itself. The final example is not untypical for statements by scientists who usually express no explicit aims, but present frames referring to the consequences of certain policy actions.¹¹

Claims are included in our data regardless of who makes them and where they are made. I.e., our data include claims by state actors, economic actors, journalists and news media,¹² as well

¹¹ Note that, while inspired by the idea of linguistic grammar, the way we code claims does not usually literally coincide with the grammatical structure of the media text. In the case of "John hits Peter" such coincidence is given: John is subject actor/nominative case, Peter is object actor/accusative case. However, in: "John gives the book to Peter", the book is in accusative case, but we would still code Peter as the object actor because he benefits from John's action. In identifying who is subject actor, addressee and object actor in a media text, it is useful to refer to the following sentence as a model to: "John asks Jim to give the book to Peter": John is subject actor, Jim is addressee, Peter is object actor, "to give the book" is the issue, and "asks" is the form. Examples with similar structures: "George Bush (John) demanded from (asks) the Taliban government (Jim) to extradite (to give the book to) Osama Bin Laden (Peter)"; "Schröder (John) assured (asks) Bush (Jim) of his full support for military action against (to give the book to) the Afghan regime (Peter)"; "Chirac (John) criticized (asks) Blair (Jim) for blocking the decision-making process (to give the book to) in the European Union (Peter)".

¹² The only exception are editorials from the newspaper of coding. These are analysed in the separate work package 3. All other claims by journalists from the coded newspaper were included in the work package 2 data,

as representatives of civil society. Claims can be made by organizations and their spokespersons, as well as by diffuse collectivities (e.g., a group of farmers). The actors behind claims (claimants) may be from the European, other supranational, as well as national, regional, and local levels, and they can be from the country where the newspaper is published, as well as from any other country of the world. Likewise, no restriction applies to the location where a claim is made. E.g., claims on the situation of refugees in Australia, or the deployment of African troops in Liberia are just as much included as claims that are made in the countries of our study or on the level of the European Union. Thus, our data gathering strategy is completely neutral with regard to the geographical and political scope of claims. This allows us to make the question of the extent of Europeanisation (or broader supranationalisation) of public claim-making in the print media a matter for empirical investigation. This methodological strategy is not as self-evident as it may seem, since several past studies on the Europeanisation of the public sphere have employed data gathering strategies that bias the results in advance (e.g., by using keywords such as “Europe” or “EU” to search for articles).

For further detail on the delimitation of claims and the coding of individual variables, we refer to our codebook, which is available online.¹³

4. Levels of Europeanisation of public claim-making

To investigate levels of Europeanisation of claim-making, we look at several dimensions of claims and ask to what extent they have a European dimension: the actor who makes the claim (the claimant), the actors at whom demands, criticism or support are directed (the addressees), and the geo-political framing of the issue by the claimant (issue scope). In each of these cases, we distinguish between the vertical and horizontal forms of Europeanisation of public political communication that we have discussed above. The vertical variant of Europeanisation consists of direct references to the European Union or other European-level actors, in terms of the claimant (e.g., a statement by a Commissioner), the addressee (e.g., a demand addressed at the European Court of Justice), or the framing of the issue (e.g., a reference to the need to strive for common European asylum regulations). The horizontal variant consists of references to other European member states, be it in terms of the claimant (e.g., a statements by Tony Blair reported in the German press), addressee (e.g., a call by a German actor on the French government), or issue framing (e.g., a comparison of one’s own country to other member states).

We start in Table 1 by looking at the geopolitical scope of actors – i.e., the level at which an actor is organised – in the seven different issues fields. The data were aggregated across all seven countries. This is justified because the pattern of differences among the seven issue fields is very similar in the different countries (see the various country reports for work package 2). Our first attention naturally goes to the frequency with which actors from the European level appear in the media as speakers – an indicator of the degree of vertical Europeanisation. The table shows that European-level actors are almost always EU-level actors, since the role of other European supranational levels (e.g., European-wide organisations, or institutions within the context of other European supranational arrangements such as the Council of Europe) is negligible. EU-level actors are most strongly present in

as were any claims by other news media (including quotations from editorials) that were reported in the coded newspaper.

¹³ At <http://europub.wz-berlin.de/Data/Codebooks%20questionnaires/D2-1-claims-codebook.pdf> (Koopmans 2002).

discussions on European integration (28%), followed by the two fields where the EU has substantial supranational prerogatives: monetary politics (22%) and agriculture (16%). In the other four issue fields, by contrast, actors from the EU level play a marginal role. This is largely as expected for the two issue fields where European competencies are institutionally very weak: pensions and retirement (2%) and education (0%). More remarkable are the low levels for the two issue areas where the EU at least aspires to play an important role. Immigration is since the Treaty of Amsterdam scheduled to become part of the first pillar, but European-level actors have not played a large role in debates on this issue (4%). In the field of troop deployment, little is reflected of the EU's aspirations to set up a meaningful common foreign and security policy. The creation of a special Commission representative for these issue areas has not made much of an impact on public debates on troop deployment, where EU-level actors are responsible for only 2% of all claims.

Next, we may look at the extent of horizontal Europeanisation in the form of the appearance of actors from other European countries in the media of a particular country.¹⁴ For European integration, monetary politics, and agriculture, the results are almost identical to those for the vertical form of Europeanisation: 30%, 23%, respectively 16% of the actors in these three fields were actors from other European countries. In the fields of European integration and monetary politics this implies that a majority of claims can be considered Europeanised in one way or another: 59% and 55% of claims, respectively, were made by either actors from the EU level, or actors from another European country. In the other four issue fields, horizontal Europeanisation tendencies are clearly more outspoken than vertical ones. This is related to the fact that in as far as the EU plays a role in these fields, it is by way of intergovernmental rather than supranational forms of decision-making. As a result, attention is drawn toward actors from other member states, rather than actors from the EU level. Although still not at a high level, 6% of the reported claims on pensions and 8% on education were made by actors from another European country. In these two fields, coverage of claims by actors from European countries is about twice as frequent as that of actors from other parts of the world. In other words, what we see here cannot be simply explained as coverage of foreign affairs, but suggests a more specific attention for European countries. Although the levels of claims from other European countries are higher in troop deployment and immigration (19% in both cases), it is less clear in these cases that we can interpret this as a sign of Europeanisation. In the case of immigration, actors from other parts of the world appear almost as often (14%) as European ones, while in the field of troop deployment actors from the non-European world clearly dominate (43%), above all the USA (20%), which appears more often as the country of origin of speakers on this topic than all European countries taken together.

If we look from which other European countries the reported claimants stemmed, we see a predominance of German and French actors in the issue field of European integration – corresponding to these two countries' self-image as the “motor” of the integration process. The levels of French and German actors in this field (6% and 5%, respectively) are especially striking when compared to the much lower level of actors from the United Kingdom (2%). Austrian actors were also quite prominent, but this result is limited to one particular year, namely 2000, during which the intensive debate on the participation of the FPÖ in the Austrian government coalition took place. Otherwise, a broad spectrum of countries is represented among the speakers on European integration. Actors from the “big three” (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) are together responsible for only about 40% of the horizontally Europeanised claims. The rest is distributed across all member states, as well as

¹⁴ The figures in the table have been calculated in such a way that claims by German actors in the German media, claims by French actors in the French media, etc. were coded as “own country”. The figures for German actors in the table therefore refer only to German actors that were reported in the press of one of the other six countries.

the enlargement countries and Turkey. This indicates that Europeanisation in the integration field is not only quantitatively strong but also qualitatively broad.

The countries that most often appear in public debates in the other issue fields usually include the “big three”. In monetary politics, German actors appear most frequently, which is not unexpected given the size of the German economy and the formerly predominant position of the German mark in the European monetary system. In the other socio-economic field, pensions and retirement, German actors are also the most frequently cited ones, probably for similar reasons related to the weight of the German economy. French actors, by contrast, predominate in the agriculture field, not least because of the militant mobilisation strategies of French farmers. French actors together with those from the UK also appear most often in the education field. In public debate on troop deployment, actors from the UK are the most prominent – not so much, one might add, because the UK is at the forefront of European integration in this field, but because of the country’s intimate military alliance with the USA. The immigration field, finally, displays the most evenly spread pattern of coverage: here we find significant contributions to public debate from a wide range of countries, with only a small edge ahead for German actors.

The figures on the prominence of actors from the own country complement the picture that we have seen so far. Public debates on pensions and education are very strongly dominated by own national actors (86% and 88%, respectively). The least nationalised policy field in terms of actors turns out to be troop deployment – as we have seen not because of high levels of Europeanisation but because of strong internationalisation and supranationalisation beyond Europe, as is also indicated by the fact that this is the only policy field where actors from supranational arenas beyond the EU (such as the UN or NATO) play a significant role (10%). Immigration and agriculture are relatively strongly nationalised in terms of actors (59% and 58%, respectively), while in monetary politics and European integration, own national actors are only a minority of the speakers that are cited in the public debate.

Next we look in Table 2 at differences among our seven countries in the degrees of Europeanisation and nationalisation in terms of the makers of claims. Here we aggregate across the seven issue fields. Already at a quick inspection of the results in the table we can see that the United Kingdom is the deviant case. Only 7% of all claimants cited in the British press are from the EU-level, which is even less than in Switzerland (11%), which is not even an EU member¹⁵. The deviance of the United Kingdom is more pronounced still if we look at horizontal Europeanisation in the form of coverage of claims made by actors from other European countries, which make up only 8% of the British press content, against 15-30% in the other countries. The UK is the country that has the most strongly nationalised public sphere: two thirds of all statements that were reported stemmed from British actors. If the UK press reports statements from actors outside the UK, the focus tends to be not so much Europe, but the non-European world and the United States in particular. Actors from the latter country were more often cited (11%) than actors from all European countries taken together. Britain’s distant and sceptical relation with the EU and with the European “continent”, as well as its strong Atlantic orientation, are thus clearly visible in our data.

Switzerland also displays a particular pattern. Although vertical Europeanisation in the form of coverage of claims by EU-level actors (11%) is second-lowest after the UK, Switzerland has by far the highest level of horizontal Europeanisation in the form of claims by actors from other European countries (30%). Overall, the Swiss public sphere is the least nationalised of

¹⁵ As a result, Switzerland has the highest percentage (2%) for actors from other European-level arenas, e.g. EFTA.

the seven countries (only 41% of coverage concerns claims by Swiss actors). Thus, even though it is not an EU-member, Switzerland certainly forms part of Europe in terms of its public sphere. The fact that EU membership must not be decisive in this regard is made clearest by the contrast to Britain. In Switzerland, 43% of all claims come from actors either from the European level, or from other European countries. The corresponding level of Europeanisation of claim-making in the British public sphere is only 15%.

Among the other five countries, the differences are not so large. Italy perhaps comes closest to the Europe-distant, nationalised pattern of the UK: it has the second-lowest coverage of actors from other European countries (15%), and the second-highest level of own national actors (57%). Contrary to its (self-) image as a particularly European-minded and cosmopolitan country, the Netherlands also score somewhat below the average in terms of Europeanisation, and above average in terms of the focus on own national actors (53%). Spain has the highest overall levels of Europeanisation, on about the same level as Switzerland: 20% of claimants in the Spanish press are from the EU level, and another 22% are from other European countries. France (48%), Spain (45%), and Switzerland (41%) are the three countries where own national actors do not form a majority of claimants. In Germany they make up exactly half of the actors (50%).

In most countries, German actors are the most often cited foreign European actors. Switzerland, where French actors are a bit more prominent than German ones, is an exception, and in the UK actors from Germany and France are equally prominent. British actors come everywhere in third place. The smaller pre-1995 member states are especially prominent in the Netherlands, which is due to a greater attention for neighbouring Belgium (3% of all claims). There is also an interesting difference in the prominence of Austrian actors (who largely predominate the category of 1995 accession countries), which is highest in France. France and Belgium are the two countries that most clearly took position in favour of EU sanctions against Austria during the “Haider debate” in 2000, not least because for these countries the Haider issue had a greater resonance because they struggle themselves with powerful challengers from the extreme right (the *Vlaams Blok* and the *Front National*). This debate also seems to have had a significant impact in Germany, Switzerland, and Spain. The low percentages of Austrian actors in Italy, the UK, and the Netherlands suggest, however, that the Haider debate has not had the same significance in these countries. This may – especially for the UK and Italy – be linked to the fact that these are also more in general the countries with the most nationalised and least Europeanised public spheres.

In Table 3, we move on to the addressees of demands, i.e. the actors at whom demands, criticisms, proposals, or support are directed. Again, we first look at differences among the seven issue fields. These differences coincide to a very large extent with those that we found for the claimants. For pensions, education, and immigration, the figures are almost identical, suggesting that there is little “multi-levelling” in these fields: claimants from a certain level or country tend to address actors from the same level or country. In the other fields, however, there are some significant shifts. In the fields of European integration, monetary politics, and agriculture, we see a strong increase in the prominence of EU-level actors as addressees compared to their share among claimants. Although only 28% of claimants on European integration were from the European level, as much as 47% of the addressees are. Likewise we find almost a doubling of the share of European-level actors as addressees compared to their share among claimants in monetary politics and agriculture (40% against 22% in monetary politics: 31% against 16% in agriculture). This shows that in these three fields bottom-up forms of vertical Europeanisation (where national actors address the EU level) are much more frequent than the top-down opposite (where European-level actors address the national level).

Against this, there is a slight decline in horizontal Europeanisation if we look at the addressees compared to the claimants. Nevertheless, adding horizontal and vertical forms, the level of Europeanisation is higher among the addressees (ranging from 70% in European integration to 9% in education) than among the claimants (ranging from 58% in European integration to 8% in pensions and education). The difference between the overall degrees of Europeanisation is next to European integration strongest for monetary politics (59% among addressees, 45% among claimants) and agriculture (43% among addressees, 32% among claimants). In these fields, where the EU is institutionally strong, top-down forms of vertically Europeanised claim making play an important role.

Table 4 presents the results for addressees compared across the seven countries. The rank order of the countries in terms of vertical and horizontal Europeanisation does not change compared to the results for claimants. With the exception of Spain, which had the highest level of EU-level claimants (20%) and shows only a marginally higher figure for this level among the addressees (24%), all other countries display a strong increase in the share of EU actors among the addressees. This increase is strongest in the UK (from 7% among claimants to 15% among addressees), and in France (an increase from 16% to 32% - the highest level of EU-level addressees among the seven countries). In other words, in these two countries a relatively high share of Europeanised claim making consists of national actors addressing the EU.

To conclude our survey of levels of Europeanisation, we now look in Table 5 at the geopolitical frame of reference into which claimants situate an issue. Here, we omit the issue of European integration from the analysis because this issue has by definition a European frame of reference. To understand the results, it is important to know that our coding rules specified that if the framing of the issue referred to several geopolitical levels simultaneously, the “highest” of these should be coded. E.g., if an actor said that changes in a national policy were necessary because the country is lagging behind other European countries in this area, this was coded as a European frame of reference, and the national policy aspect was neglected in the coding.

For the two most nationalised policy fields, pensions and education, we again find almost the same pattern as for the claimants and the addressees: 84% and 86% of claims, respectively, had a purely national frame of reference, with no reference whatsoever to other countries or to European or other supranational contexts. In the field of troop deployment, we see that almost two thirds (65%) of the claims have a multi- or bilateral scope, implying that they are framed in a traditional international relations fashion, i.e., in terms of relations between two or more nation-states. Because we only considered issues of troop deployment outside the deploying country (i.e., not for instance the deployment of military for natural catastrophes within the own country), debates in this issue field by definition have a frame of reference beyond one single country. As a result, the categories referring to own national or foreign national frames of reference (own country, all other European countries, and non-European countries) are empty for this issue field. Next to the traditional international relations framework for debating troop deployment, we also find a significant number of claims (31%) that refer to supranational contexts such as the UN or NATO. Europe, however, remains marginal in this field: not more than 4% of troop deployment claims refer to the EU or other European contexts.

In the immigration field, we find a modest increase in the relevance of the European level. Whereas only 4% of claimants and 7% of addressees were situated on the European level, we now find 13% of immigration claims referring to European contexts. In interpreting this

result, we must keep in mind though that this shift may partly be a result of the way we coded issue scopes. Some of these 13% are claims whose main emphasis is on national contexts and concerns, but which sideways also refer to the European context.¹⁶ Purely national frames of reference become rarer in the immigration field compared to the results for claimants and addressees (44% of claims refer only to the context of the own country, against 57% of the addressees and 59% of the claimants who are from the own country). However, the main beneficiary of this trend is not the European level, but references to multi- and bilateral (most often the latter) contexts (25%). In most cases, this does not concern relations between European countries, but relations between countries of immigration and emigration (although sometimes, as in the case of Turkey, the country of origin of immigrants happens to be a European country).

In monetary politics and agriculture, finally, we find further strong increases in the relevance of the European level. In the agriculture field claims with a European frame of reference (40%) now surpass in importance those with an own national frame of reference (35%). Again, we must relativise this finding to the extent that what we are really comparing here are claims with at least *some* European reference (which may well also have national dimensions) to those that *only* have a national frame of reference. The same tendency can be found even more pronounced in monetary politics, where 66% of claims have a (vertical) European frame of reference, and only a small proportion of 10% remain which refer only to the own country.

In Table 6, we aggregate across issues and look at differences in issue scopes among the seven countries. In order to allow comparison with the results for claimants and addressees we again include the field of European integration.¹⁷ What we see is a strong increase in the relevance of claims with a vertical European frame of reference in all countries compared to the relevance of this level among claimants and addressees. Even in Britain, more than a third of all claims (35%) refer to the European context, and less than half can be classified as purely own national (41%). Interestingly, the UK is now surpassed narrowly by Italy (34% European and 42% own national frame of reference) as the country with the least Europeanised and most nationally focused public sphere. Generally speaking, the relative differences between more and less Europeanised countries are smaller for issue scopes (a range from 34% to 54%) than for addressees (a range from 15% to more than the double, 33%) and for claimants (a range from 7% to almost three times as much, 20%). This suggests that the public sphere of countries such as the UK and Italy, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands, qualify as less Europeanised only partly because they contain less discussion about European issues, but more because these discussions tend to be among own national actors with relatively little voice for actors from the EU-level or from other European countries. The UK displays this pattern most pronouncedly. The debate on European issues is in this country to a large extent an internal debate among British actors *about* Europe, rather than a genuinely Europeanised debate *among* European actors.

¹⁶ We find an opposite tendency regarding other supranational scopes. Only 1% of issue scopes in the immigration field refer to supranational contexts beyond Europe, whereas slightly more (3%) of the claimants were supranational. This is due to the fact that we coded organisations such as Amnesty International or Terre des Hommes, including their national branches in the countries of study, as supranational organisations. In practice, the claims the national branches of these organisations make often have a purely national frame of reference.

¹⁷ Since each issue field has the same weight and the issues scope of European integration is constant across countries, the inclusion or exclusion of this field does not influence cross-national differences, although it obviously raises the level of claims with a European frame of reference everywhere.

5. Trends in the Europeanisation of public claim-making

Europeanisation of political communication is not just a matter of relative degree, but it should also be judged as a developing process. Since 1990, there have been several important landmarks in the deepening of European integration, e.g., the abolition of border controls, the introduction of an – albeit embryonic – European citizenship, the introduction of the Euro, the 1995 enlargement with three countries and the upcoming extension with ten more countries, and the Convention on a European constitution. Normatively, it is important that political communication in the mass media follows suit and reflects these developments so as to enable citizens to remain informed about developments in European politics, and European policy-makers to remain informed about the demands and wishes of the citizenry and their organised representatives in interest groups, NGO's and social movements.

From the theoretical perspective of political opportunity structures that we take in this project (see Kriesi et al. 1995; Imig and Tarrow 2001), it is also to be expected that political communication and mobilisation react to shifts in competencies from the national to the European level. Such an effect is most likely in those fields where the expansion of the EU's prerogatives has been strongest. The introduction of the common currency Euro in twelve member states and the related transfer of decision-making power from national governments and central banks to the European Central Bank is certainly the most important transfer of power that has occurred in the period of study. In the other five substantive fields, institutional developments at the EU level have been less spectacular and one may even have doubts whether any significant transfer of power to the EU level has occurred in some fields. For instance, little of a common security and defence policy could be seen in the recent Iraq conflict, the EU's common agricultural policy is under increasing pressure and criticism, and attempts to formulate a common immigration and asylum policy have thus far failed. Nonetheless, even if they have not always been translated in the transfer of issue-specific competencies, the important developments in European institution-building cannot be denied. We should therefore expect an increasing relevance in contestation over these institutional issues, i.e. an increase in the absolute and relative (to the other issue fields) relevance of the meta-issue of European integration. The deepening of integration and the related growing interdependencies and exchanges of goods and people among member states may also imply an increase in levels of Europeanised political communication in all issue fields, even in the absence of concrete issue-specific transfers of power. However, such Europeanisation tendencies would then most likely be of the horizontal, inter-member state, type, rather than of the vertical, EU-level directed, type.

We begin investigating such temporal trends by looking in Table 7 at the presence of actors from the European level in each of the issue fields in the period 1990-2002. We indeed find the expected strong increase in the relevance of European-level claimants – above all the newly formed European Central Bank – in the field of monetary politics (from 10% of all claimants in 1990 to 31% in 2002). Less spectacularly, the debate about European integration is also becoming more vertically Europeanised over the course of the period of study: the share of European-level actors in debates on European integration steadily increases from 24% in 1990 to 34% in 2002.

However, in the other issue fields, no clear and strong Europeanisation tendencies can be observed. In agriculture, the share of European-level actors oscillates strongly, without a clear trend. On a much lower level, the same is true for the immigration field. In troop deployment and education politics, European actors are stably irrelevant. In the pensions field, finally, there is a steady increase in the share of European-level actors from 0% in 1990 to 3% in

2002, but these figures are on such a low level that it is hard to make much of a Europeanisation tendency out of this.

That Europeanisation tendencies are weak to inexistent in the majority of our issue fields is further borne out by Table 8, which shows the share of claimants from other European countries as an indicator of horizontal Europeanisation. In the pensions field, the slight increase in European-level claimants is more than offset by a decrease (from 11% in 1990 to 7% in 2002) of claims made by actors from other European countries. Such a decrease in attention for actors from other European countries can also be found in the field of education (from 11% in 1990 to 6% in 2002). In other words, claim-making in these already strongly nationalised policy fields has a tendency to become less rather than more Europeanised over time. A similar tendency – though less consistent and mainly due to higher levels of Europeanisation in the year 1990 – is also observable in the immigration field, where claimants from other European countries declined from 25% in 1990 to 18% in 2002. In the troop deployment field, we find erratic oscillation without a clear trend. In the agriculture field we do find indications for an increase in attention for actors from other European countries (from 12% in 1990 to 17% in 2002), although the trend is not linear and not very strong. The same is true for the slight increase in the prominence of actors from other European countries in debates on European integration (from 27% in 1990 to 29% in 2002). In monetary politics, finally, we find a decrease in the relevance of actors from European other countries (from 22% in 1990 to 18% in 2002). This decrease is easily explained by the fact that national governments and central banks have lost most of their powers in this field to the European Central Bank. In view of this, one may see the relatively modest decrease in the share of voices from other European countries in debates on monetary politics even as a positive sign of Europeanisation, for it indicates that the opinions of actors from other countries are deemed relevant even though they do not anymore have direct decision-making power in this field.

If we combine vertical and horizontal indicators of the Europeanisation of claimants, we arrive at a strong net increase in Europeanisation in debates on monetary politics (from 32% in 1990 to 49% in 2002) and on European integration (from 51% in 1990 to 63% in 2002). In the agriculture field, there is a sizeable increase in Europeanisation from 1990 (28%) to 1995 (38%), but stability after that. In immigration, we find a reverse pattern: a strong decline in Europeanisation from 1990 (32%) to 1995 (19%), and then a modest recovery until 2002 (23%). In troop deployment, not more than erratic shifts in levels of Europeanisation can be discerned, which is certainly related to the fact that debates in this field are strongly tied to particular deployment contexts, some of which may more strongly involve European actors than others. Europeanisation in the pensions field is stable and low at around 10%, whereas in education there is a consistent decline from 12% in 1990 to only 6% in 2002.

In Tables 9 and 10, we look at vertical and horizontal Europeanisation trends from a cross-national perspective. Across all countries, we observe a modest increase in vertical Europeanisation, from 9% European-level actors in 1990 to 13% in 2002. This trend can be found in all countries, although it is somewhat stronger in some (e.g., the Netherlands) than in others (e.g., France). For horizontal Europeanisation, we find a weak decreasing trend (from 18% across all countries in 1990 to 17% in 2002), which is mainly due to the decreasing relevance of this category of actors in monetary politics. This decline of actors from other European countries is more pronounced in some countries (particularly in the UK), while in some others there is even a net increase in the share of actors from other European countries (Spain and France).

If we combine vertical and horizontal indicators of Europeanisation, we find that in most countries there is an increase – though mostly not a very pronounced and not always a linear one – in the level of Europeanisation in 2002 compared to 1990. Only in Switzerland (a decline from 39% in 1990 to a still comparatively high 37% in 2002) and more importantly in the UK (from 22% in 1990 to 19% in 2002) do we observe decreases in the level of Europeanisation of claimants. The UK thus not only has by far the least Europeanised public sphere, but is also the only member state that tends to become *less* Europeanised over time.

In Tables 11 and 12, we look at the trends over time regarding the addressees of claims. Here we find a much stronger vertical Europeanisation tendency than among the claimants. Across all seven countries, European-level addressees increased from 15% in 1990 to 23% in 2002. This trend is found in all member states, including even the UK, but it is much stronger in some (Spain, Italy, France, and the Netherlands) than in others (Germany and the UK). In non-member state Switzerland we find an irregular pattern, with peaks in the percentage of European-level addressees in 1990 and 2000. These peaks are explained by two referenda campaigns that took place in these years, in 1990 on the European Economic Area, and in 2000 on bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU. Regarding horizontal forms of Europeanisation, we find relatively stable levels among the addressees if we aggregate across all seven countries (14% addressees from other European countries in both 1990 and 2002). However, these aggregate figures hide quite different trends in different countries, ranging from a strong decline among addressees from other European countries in Spain and Italy to substantial increases in France and the Netherlands.

The trend toward vertical Europeanisation receives further profile from the results on issue scopes displayed in Table 13.¹⁸ Across all countries, the share of claims with a vertical European frame of reference increased consistently from 15% in 1990 to 28% in 2002. This time the trend holds in all seven countries without any exception. Even in the UK we now find a substantial increase from 16% in 1990 to 25% in 2002. This confirms our earlier interpretation that the lack of Europeanisation of the British public sphere is less a question of a lack of debate about European issues, but rather of the low prominence that is given to non-British actors in these debates.

We have left the issue of European integration out of the previous table, because it by definition has a European issue scope. Europeanisation trends related to this issue can better be analysed by looking at the volume of claims. This we do in Table 14, where we have weighed the numbers according to the size of the sample for each of the years. Because claims in the European integration field were always included in our sample, we can here also use the data for the year 2001 and from the “European claims only” issues from the other years (see the methodological section above). What we want to compare here is the direction of trends across countries, and not so much the absolute numbers of claims. The latter are influenced by national reporting styles and are therefore not necessarily an indication of the salience of the European integration issue in a particular country. In all countries except one, we find by far the highest number of claims on European integration in the year 2000, among other things related to the intense “Haider debate” and debates around the Nice Summit. The only exception to this pattern is – one might have guessed by now – the United Kingdom, where the peak in the debate on European integration occurred in 1995. This is another indicator that

¹⁸ We do not provide data on trends in horizontal European issue scopes because as we saw above our rules for coding issue scopes tend to suppress national dimensions, and particularly those of other European countries. In other words: if issues relating to policies in other countries are discussed, these issues are usually also framed in relation to Europe. Because the latter reference prevails in the coding, we cannot trace the national issue scope anymore.

in as far as we can discern a common European public sphere, the UK is not a part of it. The other member states all follow a similar rhythm with a strong increase over the 1990 and 1995 levels in 2000, followed by moderate decline in 2001 and 2002. In all member states, also in the UK, the number of claims on European integration is clearly higher in 2002 than in 1990. Here the exception is non-member Switzerland, where the decline since 2000 has been very pronounced and the number of claims was by 2002 lower than in 1990. This is partly explained by the impacts of the two referenda campaigns in 1990 and 2000 that we referred to above. Partly, we may also see here the demobilising and de-Europeanising impact of a rejected popular initiative in 2001, which demanded the opening of negotiations on Swiss EU membership, and failed to mobilize the required double majority of voters and cantons. One can perhaps say that in recent years the Swiss press has adjusted its formerly strong European focus to the scepticism toward Europe among a large part of the Swiss population.

To conclude this section on trends in Europeanisation, we look in Table 15 at the development of issue scopes across issue fields (excluding again European integration because of its invariantly European scope). This is perhaps the table that provides the strongest support for (vertical) Europeanisation tendencies. Whereas in the education and immigration fields, we find no clear trends, there is a substantial increase in the share of claims with a vertical European issue scope in the other four fields. In line with our earlier results in this section, the trend is most pronounced in monetary politics, where claims with a European scope double from 40% in 1990 to 78% in 2002. In agriculture, there is a similarly strong increase from 36% in 1990 to 61% in 2002, although here there are strong ups and downs in the years in between. In troop deployment and pensions, the share of claims with a European issue scope is much more modest, but in both cases there is a consistent increase over time (from 2% in 1990 to 5% in 2002 for troop deployment, and from 0% to 5% in pensions).

6. Support and opposition regarding European institutions and integration

An increase in Europeanised political communication does not necessarily need to imply increasing support for European institutions or a growing consensus about the integration process. European integration is – perhaps increasingly – a contested issue, and it is therefore to be expected that different actors will take different positions regarding integration and European institutions.

We begin addressing these questions by looking (in Table 16) at the evaluation of addressees from different geopolitical levels and regions in our seven countries. When actors are the target of claims, this may entail criticism or support, or a more neutral appeal. We measure this by given each addressee each time it is addressed by another actor a score of +1 if it is the target of support, -1 if it is the target of criticism, and 0 if it is targeted in a neutral or ambivalent way. These scores are then averaged across claims per addressee. The resulting score on a range between +1 and -1 indicates to what extent a particular category of addressees is evaluated positively or negatively by other actors in the public sphere. Our results show that generally, criticism predominates in public political communication, as is suggested by the negative average evaluation in all seven countries. While the negative tendency is prevalent everywhere, it is most pronounced in the UK (-.33), and least in Switzerland (-.09).

If we compare the different categories of actors, we find that there is only one type of actors that on average receive a slightly positive evaluation, namely the UN (+ .09) and other

supranational actors (+.07). The only exception here is Italy, where no actor category at all is evaluated positively. Compared to these supranational actors, EU-level actors are more often the object of criticism (-.14). However, actors and institutions on the EU level systematically receive a more positive evaluation than own national actors (-.31 on average). In Spain (+.05) and France (+.01) the average evaluation of EU-level actors is even slightly positive.¹⁹ The most negative evaluation of EU actors is, perhaps surprisingly, found in the Netherlands, (-.26), which even beat the UK (-.24) in this respect. The difference to the benefit of EU-level actors compared to own national actors can be found in all seven countries, but it is strongest in France (+.01 for EU against -.33 for French actors) and weakest in Switzerland (-.10 for EU against -.12 for Swiss actors).

Further, it is interesting to look at the evaluation of actors from specific countries. The results indicate that the prospects for building a European identity in a “negative” way by emphasising differences with other parts of the world are not good. In spite of the USA’s impression that Europe has become largely hostile to this country, the USA actually come close to the top of the list of most positively (or better least negatively) evaluated countries. Russia is not disproportionately often an object of criticism, either. Although Japanese actors often receive a strongly negative evaluation, this country cannot serve as a negative backdrop for constructing a European identity, either, because it is not often mentioned as an addressee, and if so, almost exclusively in the field of monetary politics.

Focusing now on European countries, there is substantial variation in the evaluation of actors from different European countries. The upcoming enlargement countries, together with France, receive the most positive evaluation (both -.13). The Dutch public sphere is the most critical of both the enlargement countries (-.20), and especially of French actors (-.43). French actors are seen in a particularly positive light in Spain (+.38). After France, the other integration “motor” Germany is the second-best evaluated member country (-.19) In Switzerland (+.06) and France (.00), German actors are particularly well-evaluated. Interestingly, this comparatively positive evaluation of the Germans by the French is not reciprocated judging from the -.35 score (the second lowest after the Netherlands) that French actors receive in Germany. Regarding the evaluation of German actors, the Netherlands again show the most negative score (-.49). Further down in the table, we can see that the Dutch public sphere also shows the most negative evaluations of Italian and British actors. In sum, the indications in our data are cumulating that the pro-European image of the Netherlands is up for revision.

If we continue to move down in the table, we see that addressees from the various smaller EU member states receive evaluations around the overall average (-.26). Interestingly, this is also true for Turkey (-.27), which receives an evaluation that is slightly *less* negative than that given on average to actors from the own country. Above we saw that the UK and to a lesser extent Italy are the two member states with the least Europeanised public sphere. This euro-distant attitude seems to be paid back in kind, just like the positive stance toward the EU of Germany and France leads to more positive evaluations of actors from these countries in other member states. Unlike actors from most other European countries, Italian (-.45) and British (-

¹⁹ For Spain we must however be careful in giving too much weight to the results in this table, because in the Spanish case the number of claims where addressees were coded is very low compared to the other countries (34% of Spanish claims have an addressee compared to at least 62% in the other countries). Probably, the Spanish coders have used a more restrictive interpretation of what constitutes an addressee than the other teams. Inspection of the data suggests that this is above all due to the fact that neutral addressees of demands were less often coded in Spain (opponents and supporters are not coded less often than elsewhere). As a result, the average scores for Spain reported in the table may be biased.

.39) actors are evaluated more negatively than actors from the own country. Against this interpretation, however, the average evaluation of Spanish actors is even more negative (-.49), even though we saw before that the Spanish public sphere displays particularly high levels of Europeanisation. We will come back to this puzzling result below.

We now shift the focus from the evaluation of concrete institutions to that of the European integration process. We coded these evaluations in a similar way as the evaluations of addressees. A score of +1 was given if a claimant expressed support for the European integration process or if the claim implied extensions in the rights and prerogatives of European institutions (or a rejection of restrictions in these prerogatives). A score of -1 indicates opposition to the integration process or implications of the claim that restrict the rights and prerogatives of European institutions. A score of 0, finally, indicates positions that are neutral or ambivalent toward the integration process.

In Table 17, we look at the development of the average evaluation of the integration process in the various countries over the period of study. We again include the year 2001 because we are here only interested in those claims that have some kind of European dimension. The table makes clear that the evaluation of the European integration process is much more positive than that of concrete EU institutions (compare the table average of +.26 in Table 17 to the -.14 for EU-level actors in Table 16). In fact, the evaluation of the integration process has been on balance positive in each of the seven countries during each of the five years under study. While this is encouraging evidence for supporters of European integration, the fact that there is also a strong decline in support over time in all seven countries provides less reason for optimism. The average cross-country position score declined steadily from +.39 in 1990 to +.15 in 2001. In 2002 there has been a slight recovery of support in all countries, but the magnitude of this improvement is marginal (+.19). The decline has been most pronounced in the two countries that were in 1990 the most ardent supporters of further European integration, Switzerland and Germany. Of course, the meaning of support is not the same in these two countries. For Swiss actors, support for the integration process may not mean more than support for bilateral agreements with the EU and may stop short of support for EU membership. In the other countries, to the contrary, membership is no longer a significant issue of debate, which is more about the kind of Europe one wants to see, one with extended prerogatives for the supranational European level, or alternatively an intergovernmental “Europe of nation-states”.

In more recent years, France has taken over the position of the country where support in the public sphere for the integration process is strongest. Not surprisingly, the United Kingdom turns out to be the country where support in the public sphere for European integration is weakest (+.10) across the whole period. More revealing is the fact that Spain comes second in this regard, closely after the UK (+.12). This may be the answer to our question about the reasons behind the negative evaluation of Spanish actors in the public spheres of other countries that we encountered in Table 16. While the UK and less pronouncedly also Italy combine relatively little attention for European actors and issues with limited support for the integration process, in Spain we find, especially under the conservative Aznar government, a combination of high levels of attention for European actors and issues with limited support for the integration process. It is striking to see that apart from France surpassing Germany and Switzerland as the strongest supporters of integration, the rank order of the countries is remarkably stable. With a few minor exceptions, the list of EU-supporters is topped in each year by France, followed by Germany and Switzerland, then the Netherlands, then Italy, then Spain, and finally the United Kingdom.

In the next Table 18, we look at differences in support for an extension of European rights and prerogatives across the issue fields. We do this only for the most recent year 2002, because in most issue fields this is the only year where the number of cases allows such an issue-specific analysis, and even in this year not for troop deployment, pensions, and education (this is due to the fact that the position score can only be computed across those cases that have a reference to the European level). The table shows that there is little support for further European prerogatives in the agriculture field (+.04). Since the introduction of the euro there is also only limited support for further steps toward integration in monetary politics (+.15). The European integration process as such can however still count with a healthy level of support (+.24). In the as yet still little Europeanised field of immigration, the support for more rights and prerogatives for European institutions is strongest (+.28).

The negative relation that is suggested by the results in Table 19 between the level of European integration that has already been achieved on the one hand, and the amount of support for further-going steps, on the other, may also explain the overall decline in the level of support for the integration process that we saw in Table 18. The fact that even in 2002 positive evaluations still predominated across all issues and countries, suggests that the integration process has not yet reached its limits, but it does seem to be quickly using up its credit.

In Table 19, we complete the picture of positions regarding the European integration process by looking at the positions taking in the seven national public spheres by actors from different geopolitical levels and origins. This allows us to link positions on European integration more directly to specific categories of actors than the results in Table 18. In the latter table, we gave average scores for national public spheres, which, however, also contain statements by actors that are not from that country. In Table 20, we can more directly link positions toward the integration process to particular countries or levels of the polity.

Actors from those countries that are not yet part of the EU, but aspire to become members tend to give the most positive evaluations of the EU, as suggested by the +.58 evaluation among actors from Eastern European countries that are not (yet) accession candidates, the +.32 score of the upcoming enlargement countries, and the +.29 score of Turkey. Not surprisingly given the fact that they would be beneficiaries of deepened integration, actors from the EU-level itself also tend to be supportive of further integration (+.32). Among the member states, we by and large find the familiar picture. German (+.29) and French (+.26) actors are most supportive of the integration process. In this table, they are followed by Italian (+.20) and only then Spanish and Dutch (+.18) actors. The UK again closes the ranks with a score of -.01, indicating that the still somewhat positive position scores in Table 17 were due to the contributions of actors from outside Britain to the public debate in the UK press.

7. Who profits? The winners and losers of Europeanisation of public claim-making

The erosion of the permissive consensus and growing contestation over European integration are linked to the fact that European integration is not – or at least not always – a “win-win game”, in which every actor stands to win, and nobody suffers any losses. The transfer of competencies from the national to the intergovernmental and supranational European arenas opens up opportunities and makes resources available for some categories of actors, but not – or not to the same extent – for others. Similarly, the erosion of undivided national sovereignty may improve the opportunities of some actors, but may also negatively affect those of actors

who had obtained institutionalised access to national resources and opportunity structures. Thus, European integration unavoidably also implies a redistribution of power. About the question what form this redistribution takes, opinions in the literature are divided. Some see Europe as an ally of weaker players in the political game, i.e. civil society interests such as human rights organisations, migrants, consumer organisations and other NGO's. Others see the EU as further strengthening the position of those who are already strong on the national level, i.e. executive actors and business interests.

Next to differential opportunity structures on the national and European levels, the chances of actors to intervene in public debates may also be affected by possible differences in the news selection process between national coverage, on the one hand, and international or European news coverage, on the other. National news reporting may literally be "closer to the people" and subject to less strict selection pressures as international news coverage. In international news coverage, international press agencies play a much more important role, and it has been argued that among foreign correspondents there is a stronger tendency to rely on institutional sources and news routines. Such differences between national and international news selection processes would imply greater difficulties for less institutionalized actors to get access to European and foreign news coverage, and a greater reliance in such news on institutional actors, especially executive and governmental actors such as the European Commission, or national foreign ministers or heads of state.

We begin addressing the question of the "winners" and "losers" of Europeanised claim making by looking in Table 20 at support for the European integration process by different categories of actors. The main results in the different countries are strikingly similar. Everywhere support for the integration process is stronger among state and party actors (+.26 across all seven countries) than among the various categories of civil society actors: economic interest groups (+.12), the media (+.13), and other civil society groups (+.13). Within the category of state and party actors, support is highest among the most powerful, governmental actors (+.34), and clearly lower among those actors that can be directly held accountable by the electorate, i.e., the legislative (+.24) and political parties (+.02). The stronger socio-economic actors, employers and business organisations, are in most countries more supportive of the integration process (+.20) than the trade unions (+.12). Across the board then, these results suggests that European integration finds most support among actors that are already powerful on the national level, namely those of the executive within the state sector, and powerful economic interests within civil society. For all the idealist talk in certain pro-European circles about the EU as a protector of the weak against the encroachments of the evil nation-state, the results indicate that the more weakly institutionalised civil society actors, as well as those actors within the core of the political system that depend more closely on a mandate of the populace tend to be much more sceptical about European integration than the "powers that be" from which Europe is supposed to protect them.

But is this perhaps a form of "false consciousness" that prevents actors from doing justice to the opportunities that European integration offers them? The following Table 21 does not suggest this interpretation. Here we look at the participation of different categories of actors in public debates on European integration compared to the average of the seven issue fields. If Europe indeed opens up new opportunities for actors whose interests are more weakly represented on the national level, then these actors should be more visible in debates on European integration than in the other fields where the nation-state context is still important or even predominant. However, debates on European integration turn out to be highly elitist. State and party actors dominate each issue field, but nowhere as strongly as in debates on European integration, where 81% of the speakers are state or party actors. Within that

category, moreover, governmental actors occupy a much stronger position in debates on European integration than in the other issue fields, where legislatives and parties are comparatively more prominent. Economic interest groups (2% in European integration, against 10% on average), and other civil society groups (5% in integration debates against 11% average) are much less prominent in debates on European integration than in the other issue fields. Only the media appear somewhat more often than average as speakers on European integration issues – a finding which, by the way, corrects another popular misperception, namely that the democratic deficit would be related to a lack of media interest in European affairs (for an elaboration, see Koopmans and Pfetsch 2003).

These results seem to be indeed due to a combination of the effects of more closed political opportunity structures on the European level for less institutionalised actors, on the one hand, and differences among selection routines in national compared to foreign news coverage, on the other. We can illustrate this with results for the German case, for which we have done a more detailed analysis of the impact of Europeanisation on the balance of discursive power among different types of actors (Koopmans 2004). This analysis shows that as much as 87% of all European-level actors who appeared in public debates in the six substantive issue fields were government/executive actors, i.e., in this context primarily the European Commission and the European Council. Among German actors, the national executive was with a share of only 44% of all claims much less predominant. Conversely, (non-media) civil society actors made up 4% of claimants on the European level, but 24% among German actors.

The degree to which these differences are due to opportunity structures or to news gathering and selection routines can be gauged by comparing these figures to those for actors from other countries than Germany. If the emphasis on the executive and the neglect of civil society actors in coverage of European-level actors are due to the different features of foreign compared to national news gathering, we should find a similar bias in the coverage of claims of actors from countries outside Germany. However, if more closed opportunity structures on the European compared to the national level are the most important factor, we should find that actors from other national contexts resemble German actors, and that they include less executive and more civil society actors than we find among European-level actors. The answer seems to lie in between these two extremes, since the profile of national actors from other countries lies almost exactly in between that of German and European-level actors, with a share of 67% for government/executive, and of 13% for (non-media) civil society actors.

In the field of European integration, we find a very similar pattern. Executive actors make up 71% of all European-level actors that intervene in debates in this field, against 51% among German actors, and 63% among national actors from other countries. Among European-level actors that appear in debates on European integration, civil society actors have a meagre share of 0.4%, which compares negatively both with their 13% share among German actors, and with their 9% share among national actors from other countries.

We can conclude, then, that part of the reason why coverage of European-level actors focuses more strongly on the executive and less strongly on civil society actors lies in the characteristics of foreign news gathering and selection routines, which also affect coverage of actors from outside the own country. However, the results also show that this cannot be the whole story since the bias against civil society actors and in favour of executive actors is much stronger among European-level actors than among foreign national actors. Since there is no reason intrinsic to journalists' routines that would give a plausible account why correspondents in Brussels would be so much more focused on the executive arena than German correspondents in national capitals such as London, Paris, or Washington, we must

conclude that an important part of the answer must also lie in the nature of political opportunity structures within the EU. The EU political process apparently puts up important barriers for less institutionalised civil society groups, and seems to be especially suited to the publicity needs of actors from the executive.

To further investigate how Europeanisation alters the power balance among actors we look, in Tables 22 and 23, at the prevalence of protest as a form of action to diffuse opinions in the public sphere. The reason why we look at protest here is not so much an intrinsic interest in such action forms, but the fact that the actors who employ protest strategies tend to be the most weakly institutionalised ones who lack institutionalised, regular access to political decision-making. In Table 22 we first look at differences among the seven issue fields. As the table shows, the two most Europeanised fields – monetary politics and European integration are also those where protest is least prevalent (1% of all claims). Conversely, the most entrenched national bastion, education politics, displays the highest level of protest (6%).

More revealing still is the prevalence of protest in the repertoires of actors from different geopolitical levels, which we show in Table 23. Instead of differences among individual countries as in the earlier tables, we look here at variation within countries between actors on the national, regional, and local levels. The prevalence of protest, the data show, is strongly related to the level at which actors are organised. Local groups and organisations use protest most often (in 10% of the claims by actors from this level), followed by regional (7%) and national (2%) actors. Actors that are organised supranationally are not very protest-prone, although significantly this tendency is even weaker among European-level actors (0%) than it is among other supranational actors (1%).

If we combine these results with those on the position of actors toward the integration process, it becomes understandable why state and executive actors tend to be more in favour of European integration and why civil society actors are only lukewarm in their support. The results in this section suggest that these differences in evaluation of the EU integration process correspond to the varying degrees to which these actor types stand to win or lose from further European integration. Thus far, the Europeanisation of public contention seems to have above all strengthened the hand of state actors – above all the executive – who have almost exclusive hegemony in debates over European issues. Civil society actors, on the contrary, have hardly gained any foothold on the European level and are much better represented in the national political arena.

In order to draw more secure conclusions on these issues, we will have to extend the kind of analysis we reported above for the German case to the other countries. Nevertheless, the results of our analyses so far already provide quite consistent support for the suggestion that Europeanisation tends to make public debates less inclusive and less egalitarian. In spite of – or perhaps one should even say: because of – Europeanisation tendencies in certain issue fields, there seems to be a clear democratic deficit in Europeanised public communication. The nature of this deficit is not – as is often supposed – that the media give us little information about Europe or that such information is nationally focused. This view is contradicted by the strong correlation between EU competencies in a field and the amount of Europeanised coverage of claims, as well as by the strong presence – with the exception of the UK – of both EU institutions and actors from other European countries in debates on European integration. The true nature of the democratic deficit of Europeanised political communication seems to lie in who gets access to this emerging Europeanised public arena.

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Table 1: Actor scope all countries, by issue

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Pensions	Education	European integration
Supranational: UN	0	0	2	6	1	-	0
Other supranational	3	1	1	4	1	0	1
<i>All non-European supranational</i>	3	1	3	10	2	0	1
EU	22	16	4	2	2	0	28
Other European supranational	0	-	0	0	0	-	1
<i>All European supranational</i>	22	16	4	2	2	0	29
Multi- and bilateral	2	2	2	3	1	0	1
<i>Own country</i>	38	58	59	24	86	88	35
Germany	8	3	3	3	2	0	6
France	3	6	2	3	1	3	5
UK	4	3	2	5	1	2	2
Italy	1	-	2	1	0	0	1
Spain	1	1	2	1	0	1	1
Netherlands	0	1	0	0	-	0	0
Other pre-1995 members	2	1	2	0	1	0	4
Austria, Finland, Sweden	2	0	2	0	1	0	6
Switzerland	0	0	1	0	-	-	0
Upcoming enlargement countries	1	1	1	1	0	0	3
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	1	0	2	3	0	0	1
Turkey	-	-	0	2	-	0	1
<i>All European countries except own country</i>	23	16	19	19	6	8	30
Russia	0	1	2	4	1	0	2
USA	7	2	2	20	0	2	1
Japan	2	1	0	0	-	-	-
Middle East	0	-	2	11	0	0	0
Rest of the world	3	3	8	8	1	1	1
<i>All non-European countries</i>	12	7	14	43	2	4	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N=	2,272	997	1,573	1,716	933	1,997	2,969

Table 2: Actor scope all issues, by country

	DE	CH	ES	IT	UK	FR	NL
Supranational: UN	1	2	1	1	1	2	1
Other supranational	1	1	1	2	1	1	2
All non-European supranational	2	3	2	3	2	3	3
EU	12	11	20	14	7	16	13
Other European supranat.	0	2	0	0	0	1	0
All European supranational	12	13	20	14	7	17	13
Multi- and bilateral	1	1	1	2	3	1	1
Own country	50	41	45	57	67	48	53
Germany	-	5	6	5	3	5	5
France	4	6	5	3	3	-	3
UK	3	4	3	2	-	4	3
Italy	1	2	1	-	0	1	1
Spain	1	1	-	1	0	1	1
Netherlands	1	0	1	0	0	0	-
Other pre-1995 members	2	2	1	1	1	2	4
Austria, Finland, Sweden	3	4	3	1	0	5	1
Switzerland	1	-	0	0	0	0	0
Upcoming enlargement countries	3	3	1	0	1	-	1
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	1	2	1	1	0	1	1
Turkey	2	1	0	1	0	1	0
All European countries except own country	22	30	22	15	8	22	20
Russia	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
USA	5	4	4	6	11	5	4
Japan	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Middle East	2	1	2	1	1	3	2
Rest of the world	3	5	5	1	3	5	2
All non-European countries	13	13	12	9	16	15	10
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N=	2,803	1,661	1,130	2,017	2,069	1,417	1,360

Table 3: Addressee scope all countries, by issue

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Pensions	Education	European integration
Supranational: UN	0	0	1	12	-	0	0
Other supranational	2	1	1	7	0	0	1
<i>All non-European supranational</i>	2	1	2	19	0	0	1
EU	40	31	7	3	3	0	47
Other European supranat.	0	-	0	0	-	0	2
<i>All European supranational</i>	40	31	7	3	3	0	49
Multi- and bilateral	4	3	5	7	2	1	2
<i>Own country</i>	26	50	57	13	86	87	22
Germany	5	2	3	2	2	1	4
France	2	5	2	1	2	2	4
UK	5	3	2	2	0	3	2
Italy	1	-	2	-	1	0	1
Spain	0	1	1	0	-	1	0
Netherlands	0	1	0	-	-	0	0
Other pre-1995 members	3	0	2	0	1	0	1
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1	-	2	0	1	0	5
Switzerland	0	-	0	0	-	-	0
Upcoming enlargement countries	1	1	1	1	0	0	3
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	0	-	4	4	0	1	1
Turkey	-	-	1	2	-	0	2
<i>All European countries except own country</i>	19	12	18	12	7	9	23
Russia	0	0	1	3	1	0	2
USA	4	2	3	22	1	1	1
Japan	2	0	0	1	-	-	-
Middle East	0	-	2	13	0	0	0
Rest of the world	3	1	7	6	1	1	1
<i>All non-European countries</i>	10	4	12	46	2	3	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N=	1,216	656	994	1,128	658	1,424	1,966

Table 4: Addressee scope all issues, by country

	DE	CH	ES	IT	UK	FR	NL
Supranational: UN	2	2	1	1	2	3	2
Other supranational	2	1	1	2	1	1	1
<i>All non-European supranational</i>	4	3	2	3	3	4	3
EU	20	18	24	20	15	32	22
Other European supranat.	1	2	0	0	0	1	0
<i>All European supranational</i>	21	20	24	20	15	33	22
Multi- and bilateral	1	4	1	2	3	3	5
<i>Own country</i>	40	39	44	58	60	35	44
Germany	-	3	7	2	2	2	4
France	3	4	4	3	2	-	2
UK	2	3	5	1	-	4	2
Italy	1	2	1	-	0	1	1
Spain	1	1	-	1	0	1	0
Netherlands	0	1	0	0	0	0	-
Other pre-1995 members	1	1	0	1	1	1	3
Austria, Finland, Sweden	2	4	2	1	0	2	2
Switzerland	1	-	-	-	0	0	0
Upcoming enlargement countries	3	3	-	0	1	-	1
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	1	2	2	1	1	0	1
Turkey	2	1	0	1	0	1	1
<i>All European countries except own country</i>	17	25	21	11	7	12	17
Russia	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
USA	7	4	1	4	4	6	4
Japan	1	1	-	1	0	1	0
Middle East	2	1	2	1	2	4	3
Rest of the world	4	3	3	0	3	3	3
<i>All non-European countries</i>	15	11	7	7	10	14	11
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N=	1,932	1,041	363	1,285	1,308	1,120	1,002

Table 5: Issue scope all countries, by issue

	Monetary politics	Agri- culture	Immi- gration	Troop deployment	Pensions	Education
Supranational: UN	0	0	1	21	0	0
Other supranational	2	5	0	10	0	0
<i>All non-European supranational</i>	2	5	1	31	1	0
EU	66	40	13	3	4	1
Other European supranat.	0	0	0	1	0	0
<i>All European supranational</i>	66	40	13	4	4	1
Multi- and bilateral	5	10	25	65	2	2
<i>Own country</i>	10	35	44	-	84	86
Germany	1	1	2	-	2	1
France	1	4	1	-	1	3
UK	1	2	1	-	1	2
Italy	0	0	2	-	0	0
Spain	0	0	1	-	1	1
Netherlands	0	0	0	-	-	0
Other pre-1995 members	0	0	1	-	1	0
Austria, Finland, Sweden	0	0	1	-	1	0
Switzerland	0	0	1	-	-	-
Upcoming enlargement countries	1	0	0	-	0	-
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	0	0	1	-	0	0
Turkey	0	0	0	-	-	0
<i>All European countries except own country</i>	6	8	12	-	6	8
Russia	1	0	0	-	1	0
USA	6	0	2	-	0	2
Japan	2	0	0	-	-	-
Middle East	0	0	1	-	-	0
Rest of the world	3	1	3	-	1	1
<i>All non-European countries</i>	11	1	5	-	3	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N=	2,307	999	1,579	1,721	934	1,993

Table 6: Issue scope all issues, by country

	DE	CH	ES	IT	UK	FR	NL
Supranational: UN	3	2	2	2	4	3	6
Other supranational	2	3	1	5	2	1	3
<i>All non-European supranational</i>	5	5	3	7	6	4	8
EU	41	38	52	30	35	45	42
Other European supranat.	2	4	1	4	0	1	1
<i>All European supranational</i>	43	42	54	34	35	46	43
Multi- and bilateral	16	12	14	11	15	15	14
<i>Own country</i>	27	25	23	42	41	26	29
Germany	-	1	1	1	1	1	1
France	1	3	1	1	1	-	1
UK	1	1	1	0	-	2	1
Italy	1	1	0	-	0	1	0
Spain	0	1	-	0	0	1	0
Netherlands	0	-	0	0	0	0	-
Other pre-1995 members	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Switzerland	0	-	0	0	0	0	0
Upcoming enlargement countries	1	1	0	0	0	0	-
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
<i>All European countries except own country</i>	5	11	4	2	2	5	5
Russia	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
USA	2	1	2	2	1	2	1
Japan	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Middle East	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Rest of the world	1	3	2	1	1	1	0
<i>All non-European countries</i>	3	6	4	3	2	5	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N=	2,818	1,678	1,133	2,017	2,073	1,420	1,364

Table 7: European-level actors by issue and year

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Average 1990- 2002
Monetary politics	10	7	26	31	19
Agriculture	16	28	17	21	21
Immigration	7	5	3	5	5
Troop deployment	2	2	2	3	2
Pensions	0	1	2	3	2
Education	1	0	1	0	1
European integration	24	28	29	34	29

Table 8: Actors from other European countries by issue and year

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Average 1990- 2002
Monetary politics	22	32	20	18	23
Agriculture	12	10	20	17	15
Immigration	25	14	18	18	19
Troop deployment	17	27	10	21	19
Pensions	11	8	6	7	8
Education	11	10	8	6	9
European integration	27	33	31	29	30

Table 9: European-level actors by country and year

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Average 1990-2002
Germany	8	8	10	13	10
Switzerland	11	7	9	12	10
Spain	15	12	16	19	16
Italy	7	18	14	17	14
United Kingdom	5	6	7	8	7
France	11	15	11	13	13
Netherlands	6	5	10	11	8
<i>Seven-country average</i>	9	10	11	13	11

Table 10: Actors from other European countries by country and year

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Average 1990-2002
Germany	21	25	16	18	20
Switzerland	28	28	28	25	27
Spain	13	15	16	17	15
Italy	16	20	12	13	15
United Kingdom	17	13	9	11	12
France	13	15	16	14	15
Netherlands	18	17	17	18	18
<i>Seven-country average</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>17</i>

Table 11: European-level addressees by country and year

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Average 1990-2002
Germany	14	13	26	19	18
Switzerland	28	15	24	14	21
Spain	9	7	28	27	18
Italy	8	10	26	24	17
United Kingdom	11	15	18	15	15
France	19	32	34	37	31
Netherlands	10	17	28	25	20
<i>Seven-country average</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>20</i>

Table 12: Addressees from other European countries by country and year

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Average 1990-2002
Germany	17	21	15	18	18
Switzerland	21	30	24	21	24
Spain	26	29	22	14	23
Italy	13	13	10	7	11
United Kingdom	5	10	8	7	8
France	8	11	13	13	11
Netherlands	10	14	18	20	16
<i>Seven-country average</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>16</i>

Table 13: European issue scope by country and year (six substantive issues)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Average 1990-2002
Germany	11	24	22	27	21
Switzerland	8	6	15	19	12
Spain	30	20	30	33	28
Italy	9	25	19	28	20
United Kingdom	16	19	25	25	21
France	15	28	18	29	23
Netherlands	14	22	20	33	22
Seven-country average	15	21	21	28	21

Table 14: Number of claims on European integration by country and year

	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Germany	312	262	562	396	415
Switzerland	322	192	485	307	268
Spain	156	122	278	144	235
Italy	126	76	251	218	215
United Kingdom	136	226	177	101	172
France	164	186	335	155	280
Netherlands	150	160	241	113	161
SUM	1,366	1,224	2,329	1,434	1,746

Note: Because of varying newspaper samples, cases have been weighed as follows: 2001, 2002=1; 1990, 1995=2; 2000 = country specific weighing factor depending on % articles from regional and tabloid: FR 0,82; UK 0,75; CH 0,90; IT 0,70; ES 0,73; NL 0,67; DE 0,90.

Table 15: European issue scope by issue and year

	1990	1995	2000	2002
Monetary politics	40	43	73	78
Agriculture	36	51	34	61
Immigration	8	18	9	17
Troop deployment	2	4	4	5
Pensions	0	3	5	5
Education	2	0	1	1

Table 16: Evaluation by scope of addressee

	DE	CH	ES	IT	UK	FR	NL	Average
Supranational: UN	.00	.18	-	-.06	.19	.03	.22	.09
Other supranational	.06	.15	-	-.25	.13	.00	.33	.07
Upcoming enlargement countries	-.12	.10	-	-	-.10	-	-.20	-.13
USA	-.16	.18	-	-.27	-.23	-.20	-.05	-.13
France	-.35	.00	.38	-.19	-.16	-	-.43	-.13
EU	-.20	-.10	.05	-.12	-.24	.01	-.26	-.14
Germany	-	.06	-.13	-.29	-.30	.00	-.49	-.19
Russia	-.40	.16	-	-.63	.00	-.10	-.25	-.20
Other pre-1995 members	-.13	-.14	-	-.57	.00	-.40	-.31	-.26
Austria, Finland, Sweden	-.63	-.08	.17	-.46	-	-.44	-.12	-.26
Turkey	-.17	-.56	-	.00	-	-.10	-.50	-.27
<i>Own country</i>	-.33	-.12	-.32	-.37	-.39	-.33	-.34	-.31
Rest of the world	-.35	-.29	-.17	-	-.32	-.25	-.53	-.32
UK	-.35	.00	-.56	-.54	-	-.33	-.57	-.39
Italy	-.38	-.38	-	-	-	-.46	-.57	-.45
Middle East	-.20	-.29	-.29	-.53	-.56	-.56	-.53	-.44
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	-.30	-.24	-1.00	-.13	-.43	-	-.80	-.48
Spain	.17	-.87	-	-.50	-	-.75	-	-.49
Japan	-.50	-.78	-	-.57	-	-.17	-	-.53
Netherlands	.43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other European supranat.	-.32	-.05	-	-	-	.25	-	-
Switzerland	-.33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	-.26	-.09	-.19	-.30	-.33	-.18	-.31	-.24
N=	1,924	1,401	363	1,285	1,308	1,120	1,002	8,403

Note: Position scores have been computed only for > 5 cases per cell; averages only for rows with maximum 3 missing values.

Table 17: Position regarding the European integration process by country and year

	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	Average 1990-2002
France	.49	.52	.31	.29	.31	.38
Germany	.52	.34	.28	.25	.26	.34
Switzerland	.53	.40	.25	.23	.27	.34
Netherlands	.40	.39	.34	.10	.24	.29
Italy	.30	.24	.31	.09	.11	.21
Spain	.25	.08	.17	.04	.07	.12
United Kingdom	.23	.10	.11	.03	.05	.10
<i>Seven-country average</i>	<i>.39</i>	<i>.30</i>	<i>.25</i>	<i>.15</i>	<i>.19</i>	<i>.26</i>

Table 18: Position regarding the European integration process in 2002 by issue

	2002
Monetary politics	.15
Agriculture	.04
Immigration	.28
Troop deployment	-
Pensions	-
Education	-
European integration	.24

Note: - = insufficient cases.

Table 19: Position regarding the European integration process by actor scope and country

	DE	CH	ES	IT	UK	FR	NL	Average
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	.71	.59	.29	-	-	.73	-	.58
Upcoming enlargement countries	.38	.45	.06	.53	.18	-	-	.32
EU	.34	.43	.17	.24	.25	.43	.41	.32
Turkey	.41	.26	-	.09	-	.06	.63	.29
<i>Germany</i>	.30	.26	.14	.19	.33	.38	.42	.29
France	.33	.25	.23	.21	.20	.31	.28	.26
Rest of the world	.42	.13	-.07	.00	.13	.43	.62	.24
Other pre-1995 members	.31	.19	.05	.07	.33	.33	.22	.21
USA	.12	.50	.18	.09	.00	-.07	.67	.21
Italy	.24	.30	.17	.17	.35	.31	-.13	.20
Spain	.11	-.13	.10	.23	.00	.61	.33	.18
Netherlands	.06	.13	.10	-	.00	.60	.20	.18
Other supranational	.30	.29	.00	.13	-.08	-.13	.33	.12
Austria, Finland, Sweden	.04	.03	.06	.12	.00	.16	.20	.09
Russia	.23	-.24	.00	.14	.13	-.14	-.14	-.00
UK	.01	.06	-.04	-.06	-.01	-.07	.01	-.01
Other European supranat.	.15	.62	-	-	-	.50	-	-
Supranational: UN	.33	.25	-	-	-	-	-	-
Middle East	-	-	-	.17	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	-.08	.24	-	-.38	-	-	-	-
Japan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	.29	.29	.12	.19	.10	.34	.29	.23
N=	3,004	1,904	1,433	1,938	1,647	1,748	1,392	13,066

Note: Position scores have been computed only for > 5 cases per cell; averages only for scopes with maximum 3 missing values.

Table 20: Position regarding the European integration process by actor type and country

	DE	CH	ES	IT	UK	FR	NL	Average
<i>State and party actors</i>	.33	.32	.14	.21	.13	.38	.33	.26
- government	.37	.40	.17	.24	.22	.48	.38	.34
- legislative	.32	.28	.12	.26	.06	.32	.31	.24
- judiciary	.06	.67	.40	.36	.00	.38	.14	.29
- parties	.10	.07	-.02	.09	-.28	-.03	.19	.02
<i>Economic interest groups</i>	.10	.20	.09	.09	.12	.14	.10	.12
- unions	.00	.33	.15	-.13	.15	.23	-	.12
- employers	.15	.22	.00	.11	.26	.22	.43	.20
- farmers	-.22	.00	.00	.04	-.07	.07	.00	-.03
<i>Media and journalists</i>	.24	.18	.05	.09	-.04	.23	.19	.13
<i>Other civil society actors</i>	.19	.14	.00	.14	.04	.18	.22	.13
Total	.29	.29	.12	.19	.10	.34	.29	.23
N=	3,031	1,926	1,435	1,938	1,654	1,763	1,398	13,145

Table 21: Actors involved in public debates on European integration compared to the seven-issue average

	European integration	Average all seven issues
State and party actors	81	70
Economic interest groups	2	10
Media and journalists	10	8
Other civil society actors	5	11
Unknown /unspecified	2	2
Total	100%	100%
N=	2,969	12,515

Table 22: Share of protests by issue and country

	DE	CH	ES	IT	UK	FR	NL	Average
Monetary politics	1	-	-	2	0	-	1	1
Agriculture	2	1	5	4	1	4	6	3
Immigration	4	1	5	3	4	8	7	5
Troop deployment	2	-	5	-	0	4	-	2
Pensions and retirement	1	3	-	2	1	5	-	2
Education	5	5	3	10	1	15	2	6
European integration	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Total	2	2	3	3	1	5	2	3
N=	2,545	1,582	1,041	1,941	1,868	1,344	1,231	11,552

Table 23: Share of protests by actor scope and country

	DE	CH	ES	IT	UK	FR	NL	Average
Supranational: UN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Other supranational	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	1
EU	1	-	-	1	1	0	-	0
Other European supranational	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
National	2	1	3	3	1	4	3	2
Regional	3	3	1	6	5	33	-	7
Local	7	10	13	20	3	18	2	10
Total	2	1	2	4	1	4	2	2
N=	2,545	1,582	1,041	1,941	1,868	1,344	1,231	11,552