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Report **Final case report of political claims analysis**

Case report **Switzerland ¹**

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Table of contents

Part I: Analytic Summary	5
Introduction	5
Forms of Europeanisation	7
Results	9
Results – part one: bivariate analyses of the forms of political claims-making.....	9
Results – part two: multivariate analysis of the forms of political claims-making	18
Part II: Commented Tables	24
Article level	24
Table 1.1 Number of articles coded per year: European sample, full sample (in %)	24
Table 1.2 Articles by paper (in %).....	24
Table 1.3 Section from which articles were coded by paper (in %).....	25
Table 1.4a Source of article by paper (in %).....	26
Table 1.4b Source of article by year (in %).....	27
Table 1.5 Articles with and without claims (in %)	28
Claim-level: General	29
Table 2.1 Number of claims coded per year: European sample, full sample, total (in %) ..	29
.....	29
Claim-level: Location	30
Table 2.2a Country where claim was made by year (in %)	30
Table 2.2b Country where claim was made by issue field (in %)	32
Table 3.1 Region in own country where claim was made by issue field (in %)	33
Claim-level: Actors	34
Table 4.1 Actors of claims by issue field (in %)	34
Table 4.2 Actor type by issue field (in %).....	36
Table 4.3 Twenty-five most often mentioned spokespersons*	37
Table 4.4 Recoded actor scope by broad actor categories (in %).....	39
Table 4.5a Monetary policy: actor scope by year (in %).....	40
Table 4.5b Agriculture: actor scope by year (in %).....	42
Table 4.5c Immigration: actor scope by year (in %)	43
Table 4.5d Troop deployment: actor scope by year (in %).....	45
Table 4.5e Retirement and pension schemes: actor scope by year (in %).....	46
Table 4.5f Actor scope by year - education (in %)	47
Table 4.5g European integration: actor scope by year (in %)	48
Claim-level: Action forms	50
Table 5.1a Forms of action by issue field (in %).....	50
Table 5.1b Forms of action by broad actor categories (in %)	51
Table 5.1c Forms of action by actor scope (in %).....	52
Claim-level: Addressees	53
Table 6.1 Presence of addressee by issue field (in %)	53

Table 6.2a	Addressees by issue field (in %)	54
Table 6.2b	Addressees by year (in %)	56
Table 6.3a	Mean evaluation by category of addressees	58
Table 6.3b	Mean evaluation by broad addressee scope	59
Table 6.4a	Addressee scope by issue field (in %)	61
Table 6.4b	Addressee scope by year (in %)	62
Table 6.4c	Addressee scope by broad addressee categories (in %)	64
Claim-level: Issues and aims		
Table 7.1	Issue field by year (in %)	65
Table 7.2a	Monetary politics: issues within issue field by year (in %)	66
Table 7.2b	Agriculture: issues within issue field by year (in %)	66
Table 7.2c	Immigration: issues within issue field by year (in %)	67
Table 7.2d	Troop deployment: issues within issue field by year (in %)	68
Table 7.2e	Retirement and pension schemes: issues within issue field by year (in %)	69
Table 7.2f	Issues within issue field by year – education (in %)	70
Table 7.2g	Issues within issue field by year – European integration (in %)	71
Table 7.3a	Issue scope by policy field (in %)	72
Table 7.3b	Issue scope by year (in %)	74
Table 7.4a	Monetary politics: issue scope by year (in %)	76
Table 7.4b	Agriculture: issue scope by year (in %)	77
Table 7.4c	Immigration: issue scope by year (in %)	78
Table 7.4d	Troop deployment: issue scope by year (in %)	79
Table 7.4e	Pensions and retirement: issue scope by year (in %)	80
Table 7.4f	Education: issue scope by year (in %)	81
Table 7.4g	European Integration: issue scope by year (in %)	82
Claim-level: Position regarding European integration		
Table 8.1	Position regarding European integration by policy field and year	83
Table 8.2	Position regarding European integration by actor type	85
Table 8.3	Position regarding European integration by actor scope	86
Table 8.4	Position regarding European integration by party affiliation and by year	87
Claim-level: Object actors		
Table 9.1	Presence of object actor by policy field (in %)	90
Table 9.2a	Object actor type by policy field (in %)	91
Table 9.2b	Object actor type by year (in %)	92
Table 9.3a	Evaluation by object actor type	94
Table 9.3b	Evaluation by object actor scope	95
Table 9.4a	Object actor scope by policy field (in %)	96
Table 9.4b	Object actor scope by year (in %)	98
Claim-level: Frames		
Table 10.1a	Presence of frame by policy field (in %)	99
Table 10.1b	Presence of frame by broad actor type (in %)	99
Table 10.2a	Frame type by policy field (in %)	100
Table 10.2b	Frame type by year (in %)	101
Table 10.2c	Frame type by broad actor type (in %)	101
Table 10.3	Twenty-five most often mentioned frames	102
Table 10.4a	What the EU should not be/lead to: ten most often mentioned frames	103
Table 10.4b	What the EU is not / does not lead to: ten most often mentioned frames	103

Table 10.4c	What the EU is / leads to: ten most often mentioned frames	104
Table 10.4d	What the EU should be / should lead to: ten most often mentioned frames..	104
Appendix I:	Types of claims-making in the Swiss public sphere, 1990-2002 (in %)	105
Appendix II:	Types of claims-making by issue field (in %)..	106
Appendix IIIa:	Types of claims-making by year (in %)..	107
Appendix IIIb:	Types of claims-making by year (in %, excl. EU integration)..	107
Appendix IV:	Types of claims-making by issue field and year (in %)	108
References	110

Part I: Analytic Summary

Introduction

Europeanisation has become a key concept in political science and European studies over the last years, even though by far not all authors refer to the same phenomena when speaking of Europeanisation. Numerous studies have investigated – theoretically as well as empirically – the Europeanisation of public policies (e.g. Börzel, Risse 2000, Héritier 2001; Green Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001). Studies of the latter type have also taken into account the case of Switzerland, exploring effects of common European policies on national Swiss policy making (e.g. Mach, Häusermann, Papadopoulos 2001; Fischer, Nicolet, Sciarini 2002). The concept of Europeanisation is however twofold, or – put differently – Europeanisation could be said to have two faces: While interactions between the European level and the national or sub-national level can be observed as far as public policies and politics are concerned, political communication and its forum – the public sphere¹ – might also be subject to changes due to the more recently incorporated additional supranational “*niveau*” in a structure of multi-level governance. Moreover, the sketched second face of Europeanisation – the Europeanisation of the public sphere – implies normative expectations: Europeanisation of politics and policy should be accompanied by an “extension” of the public sphere to the new supranational level, in order to guarantee democratic policymaking and the therefore necessary implication of civil society into the democratic process. The absence of a genuine European public sphere, despite the increased shift of competences to the supranational European level, is being seen as a core element of the often cited “democratic deficit” of the EU (e.g. Koopmans, Erbe 2003).

Switzerland, as non-EU member state, constitutes a special case in this respect. Undoubtedly, political linkages between Switzerland and the EU do exist and subsequently a certain degree of Europeanisation of the Swiss public sphere might be observable or even expected. Several reasons for such expectations can be given: firstly, Switzerland maintains strong economic relations with the EU and its member countries, so that it could be expected that the Swiss public (sphere) pays much attention to European policies as well as political decisions and measures in the member states, whereof four are additionally neighbouring states of Switzerland. Secondly, the issue of Swiss European integration has been part of the Swiss national political agenda since more than a decade: particularly intensively since the late

¹ By public sphere we refer to a forum of communication or an arena of public debate in which mass media is the predominant locus of communication.

1980s, early 1990s concerning membership in the European Economic Area (EEA), which was refused in popular vote in December 1992; almost simultaneously, in May 1992, Switzerland made its demand for accession, which was not followed up nor withdrawn until today; the way of bilateral negotiations and agreements has been chosen subsequently and led to the conclusion of a series of seven agreements in a first round; further bilateral negotiations (II) are ongoing as this report is written; the initiative “Yes to Europe!” called for an immediate start of accession negotiations, but was refused in popular vote in 2001. The question of the future of Switzerland within Europe and/or the EU has been an issue which divided the political elite as well as citizens, which in itself provoked high visibility of Europe in public debate.

Other than in EU member states however – and this is the crucial point –, a low level of Europeanisation of the public sphere does not represent an immediate sign of democratic deficit or of an unsatisfactory adaptation to the new additional dimension of multi-level governance.

Independently from the Swiss context, researchers investigating the phenomenon of Europeanisation of the public sphere assume in many cases implicitly that a European public sphere would have to develop along the lines of national public spheres: including trans-national, genuine European media, trans-national political mobilization and trans-national organisations of interest mediation. Results of studies undertaken so far however (e.g. Schlesinger 1999), have to reject such assumptions. A genuine European public sphere, a common communicative space for Europe, does not or only marginally exist, e.g. via print media such as European Voice addressing an elite public. Frequently, the main reason given for the non-existence of a European public sphere is the linguistic diversity within Europe (e.g. Grimm 1995 in: Van de Steeg 2002).

Gerhards (2000) accepts that a genuine supranational European public sphere has not developed so far and will not evolve in the near future. He suggests however to introduce a new conceptualisation of the European public sphere. In his view, the arenas of communication – the public spheres – remain national, while Europeanisation of national public spheres takes place in two ways: firstly, European issues and actors are covered more and more frequently and secondly, covered issues are being discussed and evaluated in a way which exceeds a pure focus on nation state. For the analysis presented here, we accept Gerhard’s first criterion insofar as we adhere to the idea that Europeanisation can be observed within national public spheres. Concerning Gerhard’s second criterion, we join Koopmans

and Erbe (2003) in their interpretation and assert it to be too restrictive. Rather – as we will argue further on – we consider that we can also speak of Europeanisation if national media focus increasingly on national affairs in respectively between (other) EU member states.

Forms of Europeanisation

With respect to these very brief theoretical considerations, we can distinguish three possible forms of Europeanisation (each of which includes a series of possible sub-forms!) (Koopmans, Statham 2002).

1. *Supranational Europeanisation*: As mentioned above, the development of a genuine trans-national public sphere can not yet be observed and seems thus far not realistic in the short term. While European institutions as well as parties are an acknowledged fact and other European groups of interest mediation are evolving, the major obstacle for a genuine supranationalisation of public debate is the lack of European mass media and therewith an institutionalisation of a genuine European arena of communication. Nonetheless, it is imaginable that political debates and negotiations taking place amongst European institutions, European parties and other European groups of interest mediation enter national public spheres via national media. We shall consider this phenomenon as a case of supranational Europeanisation.
2. *Vertical Europeanisation*: Comparatively, we expect vertical Europeanisation, defined as communicative linkages between the national and European level, to be a much more frequent form of Europeanisation. For the Swiss case of particular interest are communicative linkages between Switzerland itself and the EU. Nonetheless this category also comprises cases of communicative linkages between EU member states and the EU. From a theoretical point of view, it is important to emphasise that two possible versions of vertical Europeanisation can be distinguished. On the one hand, national political actors can address, criticise and/or support European actors (bottom-up version), on the other hand, European actors can intervene in national debates in the name of the EU and its common interests and address, criticise and/or support national actors (top-down version).
3. *Horizontal Europeanisation*: By horizontal Europeanisation we no longer refer to direct references to European actors and issues, but to an increased interest in public political debate in and between (other) EU member states reflected in Swiss mass media. Even though Switzerland is not institutionally linked to EU member states, we

can assume horizontal Europeanisation to be particularly frequent, given that the formulation of policies in neighbouring countries becomes increasingly important for Switzerland, as an export-oriented country in the centre of a Europe that is growing closer together.

Speaking of Europeanisation and its different forms, we have however to be aware of the fact that this phenomenon can only be judged relative to other forms characterising the public sphere. In order to do so we have to distinguish Europeanisation from pure national debate on the one hand and internationalisation of public debate on the other hand.

4. *National politics*: The category “national politics” comprises firstly pure national Swiss debates, but secondly also communicative linkages between Switzerland and non-EU countries or supranational institutions.
5. *International politics*: Another form of de-nationalisation of political debate besides Europeanisation is Internationalisation. The latter phenomenon or more precisely speaking process, is characterised by an increasing prominence of public debate within and between non-EU countries or communicative linkages between non-EU countries and supranational institutions (other than the EU).

Only when looking at relative shares of national, European and international debate we can make statements about the characteristics of the Swiss public sphere. The latter can only be labelled Europeanised if the three forms of Europeanisation account for a greater share in public debate than national and international politics.

As the terminology suggests, our dependant variable (Europeanisation) is to be understood as a dynamic concept. In order to accurately answer our core interest question we therefore inevitably have to take into account the time dimension. Moreover, we assume that degree and form of Europeanisation vary over different policy fields. We suggest policy domains with strong EU competences to have a stronger tendency towards Europeanisation than policies where competences remain at the national level. Common European policies such as monetary politics or agricultural policy should therefore be found to show more evidence of supranational or vertical forms of Europeanisation than policy domains based on intergovernmental decision making (e.g. asylum policy or Troop deployment) (Koopmans, Statham 2002).

Results

In order to answer our central research question on the forms and degrees of Europeanisation we will proceed in two steps. In a first stage we will look at actor scopes and issue scopes independently, taking these variables as preliminary indicators of forms and degrees of Europeanisation. In a second step we will combine all three actor variables (subject actor scope, indirect object actor scope, object actor scope) as well as the issue scope in order to distinguish the forms of Europeanisation introduced above.

Results – part one: bivariate analyses of the forms of political claims-making

Before addressing the central variables – scopes of actors and issue – we will briefly take into account the **location of claims-making** which might also give hints about the degree of Europeanisation of claims-making. As our analysis shows, claims made within Switzerland predominate amongst all claims entering the Swiss public sphere. Looking at trends over time (*table 2.2a*) we even notice a steady increase (31 per cent in 1990, 45 per cent in 2002), which has to be considered a consequence of the prevailing themes of public debate. The fact that 86 per cent of all claims concerning retirement and pension schemes and 73 per cent of claims on education policy (see *table 2.2b*) were made within Switzerland can be seen as a strong indicator for the persisting principally national focus of these policy fields. In contrast, it is the claims-making on troop deployment which is the least domesticated. The data on the location of claims-making shows on the contrary indirect evidence for a slight internationalisation, since 20 per cent of claims on troop deployment were made in the USA alone, which is largely due to its interference within conflicts worldwide. The fact that amongst claims on troop deployment Switzerland still accounts for a relatively big share is owed, as we will see later concerning issue fields themselves, to the debate in the context of army reform about the deployment of armed Swiss soldiers. Concerning agricultural policy, it is worthwhile noting that the country of claims-making seems to deliver an indicator for the importance of the EU and its core member states France and Germany. The two countries and the European level (EU seats) taken together account for almost one third of localities of claims-making – and therewith not for much less than Switzerland itself (39 per cent). The relative importance of the EU for the Swiss economy might also be deduced from the location of claims-making in monetary policy: 14 per cent of claims reported in Swiss newspapers were made at an EU seat, further 19 per cent of monetary claims were made in one of the three core EU nations (Germany, France and the United Kingdom), while only 9 per cent of reported claims were made in the USA.

Apart from the location of claims-making, which we introduced as preliminary indicator, our analysis focuses at this step on the actors of claims-making in their different roles as subject actors, addressees (indirect object actors), and object actors as well as on the scope of the debate itself (issue scope).

An analysis of **claimant's scopes** regardless of the policy field offers a rather fragmented picture. Apart from showing clear evidence of a significant increase of Swiss claimants over the period of study, no clear other trends are observable. In terms of Europeanisation and internationalisation we might however retain the following results: EU actors account for about the same share of claims-makers (~ 12 per cent) in all years of study except for 1995 where they are of minor importance. Taking actors from EU member states (EU 15) as indicator for Europeanisation our data offers evidence for a fairly high though changing level over the period of study. While actors of EU member state origin account for 27 and 28 per cent in 1990 and 2000 respectively, they account for only 19 per cent in 1995 as well as 2002. A somewhat reverse picture is offered concerning national non-EU and supranational actors which account for 25 per cent in 1990, 28 per cent in 1995, only 14 per cent in 2000 and 18 per cent in 2002. This empirical evidence might incite the interpretation that horizontal Europeanisation and internationalisation of Swiss public sphere are alternating phenomena or trends.

In order to get deeper insight, a closer look at our seven policy fields is required. Monetary policy e.g. does not confirm the above mentioned results. Rather *table 4.5a* reflects in a quite impressive way the growing importance of European actors as claims-makers in monetary politics over the years: while 1990 only 6 per cent of claims-makers were European, 31 per cent were so in 2002. National EU member state actors (particularly German, French and British actors) become in tendency less visible over the same period. This is undoubtedly due to a shift of competences to the European level in this policy field within the period of study. Monetary politics therewith is the perfect example of a case where the public sphere “follows” the institutional development – even though Switzerland itself is not immediately concerned by these institutional changes. Swiss actors themselves account for about the same share of claims-makers in 1990 as in 2002, although accounting for a lesser share in 1995 and 2002. The US being an important point of reference within this policy field, it is not astonishing that US actors account for a share of about 11 per cent of claims-makers over the years with the exception of 1995. The fact that in 1995 about 23 per cent of all claimants are actors from upcoming enlargement countries can partly be explained by the debate about the

decision to liberalise the Czech Crown. This example emphasises the importance of particular instances and debates within the total of our claims.

A couple of things can also be highlighted in relation to claims-makers in the field of agricultural policy. Analysed over time agricultural policy seems to become less Europeanised in terms of claims-makers, on the contrary a tendency towards a (re-)nationalisation seems to be observable. While in 1990 27 per cent of claims-makers within this policy field were European actors, none were so in 1995 and only 16 per cent were so in 2000 as well as 2002. 1995 is an exceptional year dominated by a national discussion about the reform of the subsidies system as well as BSE crisis, putting almost exclusively national Swiss actors into the spotlight of the media. In the year 2000 on the other hand, a strong “horizontal Europeanisation” dimension is observable, which is very much due to German and French actors being reported as claims-makers on BSE issues. Remarkable is furthermore that – although agriculture was a major obstacle in the negotiations of Eastern enlargement of the EU – actors from upcoming enlargement countries are hardly present as claims-makers in the Swiss public sphere – as is the issue of subsidies and enlargement itself (see *table 7.2b*).

No clear pattern of development can be seen concerning the claims-makers on immigration policy (exist and entry), suggesting the responsiveness of the policy field to varying time specific issues and development. Focussing on the degree of Europeanisation, we have to acknowledge that European actors play a fairly marginal role in the years under study. EU member state actors – although in different compositions – account for a share of about 17 up to 28 per cent of claims-makers and are therewith the largest group apart Swiss claims-makers themselves. Swiss actors are particularly dominant in the year 2000 due to a popular vote on an initiative (“18% initiative”) calling for a limitation of the proportion of foreigners residents in Switzerland. Taking the overall picture, it is however worth noting that – just as in the case of monetary politics – a high consistency between actual distribution of power and actors present in the public sphere is observable.

As far as subject actors on troop deployment are concerned, Europeanisation proves to be a marginal phenomenon, which once again is in line with actual policy. The figures show clearly the predominance of the US-American actors within this policy, together with an important share hold by British actors in 2002 due to the debate of deployment of troops to Iraq. Remarkable exception within this pattern is the year 2000 where 44 per cent of claimants are of national Swiss scope. This can be considered to be entirely the result of a national

debate about army reform foreseeing the deployment of armed Swiss soldiers for purposes of peace keeping within international mandates.

In line with our assumption of retirement and pension policy remaining a national policy, figures about claims-makers show clearly the national character of this policy. 75 per cent (1995) up to 100 per cent (1990) of claims-makers present in the debate about retirement and pension schemes are of Swiss origin. EU claimants on this issue are – with the exception of one single case – inexistent. Remarkably little attention is being paid also to foreign national claims-makers, making the dimension of “horizontal Europeanisation” as well as internationalisation almost inexistent phenomena.

A very similar picture can be discovered looking at claimants in the policy field of education. Over our period of study about 75 per cent of all claims-makers within this field are Swiss actors of all actor types. French actors are fairly present within the Swiss public sphere (particularly in 1990 due to demonstrations in the context of resource scarcity at a school in the Parisian suburban area) which is due to the relative high level of attention being paid to French politics by the French-speaking main newspapers of analysis (Journal de Genève in 1990 and 1995; Le Temps in 2000 and 2002). Taking the evidence of claims-makers, vertical (top-down) Europeanisation can be assumed to be completely inexistent in the policy field of education. Given that education policy remains a core topic of national or even sub-national politics such results are not at the least surprising.

European integration as meta-issue constitutes a very particular case. Still focusing on subject actors our data provides coherent evidence for the declining importance of “other supranational European actors” (a category comprising institutions such as e.g. the Council of Europe and EFTA) over our period of study. While such actors accounted for 14 per cent of claims-makers in 1990, they did so for only about 2 per cent in the year 2002. EU actors themselves hold a share of about 25 per cent of all claimants in that same year. We do suggest that this development is due to the relative loss of importance of other forms of European integration after the fall of the Iron Curtain and a strong reinforcement of the EU as the central actor and avenue of European integration. The share of EU actors was however relatively less in the year 2000 due to very vivid debates within Switzerland about Swiss EU integration (debate in the context of the popular vote on bilateral agreements I between the EU and Switzerland as well as the parliamentary debate concerning the initiative “Yes to Europe!” in Autumn 2000) putting forward a large number of Swiss national actors as claimants in the public sphere. The generally high share of Swiss claims-makers indicates and

reflects the vivid national / internal debates about Switzerland's future integration into (EU-) Europe over the whole period of study. Austrian, Finnish and Swedish actors were relatively present in the year 1995 (their accession year) and in 2000 – in the latter year mostly due to the conflict between Austria and the EU 14 concerning FPÖ's participation in Austrian government. While claimants representing the largest European member states are more or less constantly present over the years, upcoming enlargement countries could make their voices heard especially in 1990 (right after the fall of the Iron Curtain) and more recently in 2002 – the enlargement process getting to its final phase.

Results concerning subject actors show all in all a fairly coherent picture of actors of certain levels (spatial scopes) being present in the public sphere and the predominant level of policy in terms of competences. The same results show however also the sensitivity of our data to certain focalised debate concerning very particular issue at a certain point in time. This characteristic makes it inevitable to have a detail look at each of our seven policy fields. In our attempt to sketch the forms and degrees of Europeanisation we will now have a look at those actors being addressed – either in a neutral way or as supported or opposed actors.

The **scopes of addressees** reflect to a large extent the scopes of the issue fields themselves (see below). The presumably most Europeanised policy fields (monetary politics and agriculture) also show the highest share of EU addressees. The same holds – not surprisingly – for the issue of European integration itself. Within education policy European addressees are entirely absent (as are European claimants), in retirement policy completely marginal. These results go once again in line with our presumption concerning these policy fields as remaining nationally dominated. The latter interpretation is being sustained by the fact that 70 and 80 per cent respectively of addressees in these two policy fields are national Swiss actors. The complete absence of European actors in the policy field of troop deployment reflects once again the low “profile” (presence) of this policy field at the European level as expressed in the issue scopes as well as claimant's scopes, as shown above. Not surprisingly on the other hand, US actors figure as the most important group of addressees in troop deployment just as they are also a central group of claims-makers. In terms of “horizontal Europeanisation” of the Swiss public sphere we might note that a considerable number of addressees are of German, French or British origin – principally in the presumably Europeanised policy fields of monetary politics and agriculture.

Looking at addressees over the different years of study, it is difficult to identify clear trends for any addressee scope or level. Swiss actors seem to constitute the sole exception: our data

shows a constant increase in importance of national Swiss addressees from 1990 to 2002. This is most probably the consequence of issues being discussed during the different years, e.g. considerable debates about agricultural reform in Switzerland in 1995 (10 out of 11 addressees have a Swiss scope), Swiss European integration debate, immigration law reform in 2000 or again debates about pension reform in 2002. Furthermore our data shows that non-EU supranational addressees who accounted for about 8 per cent of addressees in 1990 have lost significance as addressees by 2002, which replicates the results concerning subject actors presented above and might similarly indicate the declining importance of non-EU forms of European integration. The high presence of the spatial category “Austria, Sweden and Finland” as addressee in 2000 is certainly due to the debates around the participation of the FPÖ in Austrian government and therewith time specific. Taking into account all addressees of EU member state origin (EU 15) a fairly important dimension of “horizontal Europeanisation” at the level of addressees can be observed over the years (1990: 17 per cent; 2000: 14 per cent; 2002: 14 per cent) even though recent stability was preceded by a minor degree of presence of EU member state addressees in 1995 (10 per cent).

In the conceptualisation of Europeanisation – as distinguished from national and internationalised debate – used in our project, the **spatial frames of debates** (issues) play a central role. In preceding our step by step “rapprochement” of the characteristics of the public sphere, we will therefore devote the following remarks and interpretations to this dimension.

Since the process of European integration has accelerated and deepened over the past decade we would expect an increased trend towards Europeanisation in political claims-making to be observable over our years of study. Our analyses (disregarding differences between policy fields) however give a contradictory picture in this respect. Whereas claims referring to foreign countries inside or outside the EU remain relatively stable over time, internationalisation (i.e. supranational scopes) is only half as important in 2002 than in 1990. In this latter year, claims in the context of GATT negotiations alone account for almost half of all the cases in this category. As far as Europeanisation is concerned, no clear trend can be discerned. Europeanised claims (EU-scope and other European supranational) amount to about 40 per cent in 1990 and 2002, but their share clearly declines in 1995 (28 per cent) and reaches a peak in the year 2000 with 48 per cent of all claims. This culmination is due to several very intensively debated European integration topics in 2000 (such as the sanctions against Austria or the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU). While the scope of the actors (claimants and addressees) involved in these same debates might vary between Swiss national, national EU member state and EU it is worthwhile noting that the debate as

such (issue scope) per definition refers to the EU. Note also the relative decline of claims with a scope that refers to European supranational institutions other than the EU (e.g. Council of Europe, OSCE) over the years which is in perfect harmony with the declining presence of actors of the same scope over the period of study, as depicted already above.

By contrast, national claims confined to Switzerland steadily increase during the last decade, and amount to almost one third of all claims in the year 2002. This finding contradicts our assumption that a process of de-nationalisation (either towards more internationalisation or more Europeanisation) is taking place over the years. This unexpected trend is though also reflected in the results concerning claims-makers and addresses, as we could already see above. The reason behind this pattern is to be found within the issue cycle putting different themes at the forefront of public debate during the single years of our study. The topic of European integration for example is relatively less important in 2002 than in previous years whereas the fields of education and pension schemes hold a comparatively high share of claims in the year 2002 and are predominantly restricted to Switzerland. Forms and degrees of de-nationalisation therewith depend highly upon the political agenda and the prevalent political controversies of the moment.

Apart from the field of European integration which is per definition Europeanised, three other policy fields are characterised by a relatively high degree of Europeanised claims: monetary politics, and – to a lesser extent – agriculture and immigration. Not surprisingly given the formal competences of the EU in this field, almost half of the claims regarding monetary politics have a European scope whereas claims referring either to Switzerland or an EU-member state are clearly less important and even outweighed by claims referring to countries outside Europe. Taking into account the time perspective, monetary politics provides the perfect case of a steady and strongly growing Europeanisation which reflects nicely the progressive creation of the European Monetary Union that entered the first stage in 1990 (in that same year 30 per cent of claims refer to an EU scope) and was completely realised in 2002 with the introduction of the single European currency (reflected by 58 per cent of claims referring to an EU scope).

Contrary to monetary politics, non-European countries play almost no role in the field of agriculture. Claims in this policy field still have quite a strong national focus – be it on Switzerland or on EU-member states. Claims-making on agricultural matters is particularly illustrative of our earlier conclusion that the degree and forms of de-nationalisation vary according to the predominant public debates in specific years. E.g. in 1995 the Swiss national

debate concerning the reform of the subsidies system outweighs all other scopes. The strong focus on EU member states (particularly in the year 2000) can probably be explained by the high share of claims on animal diseases, and most notably BSE – issues which are above all regulated by national agencies. There is, however, also a considerable degree of both supranational Europeanisation and internationalisation in claims-making on agricultural policy to be found in the Swiss public sphere (16 per cent and 22 per cent² respectively). This finding can be explained by the European prerogatives in the field of agriculture on the one hand, and the GATT/WTO negotiations in the period of our study (principally in 1990), on the other hand.

As in the field of agriculture, claims on immigration topics predominantly refer to Switzerland. With the exception of the year 2000, national claims-making on the topic of immigration does not fluctuate a lot. The peak of nationally confined claims-making in 2000 can largely be explained by a federal vote on the already above mentioned “18% initiative” calling for a “control of immigration” in Switzerland. Simultaneously to the high level of national claims-making the share of claims referring to EU member states is also relatively high. Claims with an EU-scope, for their part, are somewhat less important than in agricultural policy or monetary politics, but still exceed 10 per cent of all claims on immigration. Looking at trends over time we can observe that claims with an EU scope or referring to an EU member state become even increasingly important. The growing attention devoted to national claims-making in EU countries or at the EU level may be related to the integration of the Schengen acquis into the legal and institutional framework of the EU by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and a sort of “footrace” between Western European countries, leading towards more restrictive laws on the one hand, but also a growing interest in public debates in other European countries on the other hand. Contrary to this latter trend, claims involving two or several countries (bilateral/multilateral scopes) or countries from outside the EU decrease over time.

Just as seen above concerning subject actors and addressees, Europeanisation is virtually absent in claims-making on troop deployment, pensions and educational matters. Troop deployment in particular can rather be seen to be subject to internationalisation (about 30 per cent of claims have a supranational scope). An analysis over time confirms to some extent this result; in explaining the peak of internationalisation in the year 2000 one also has to consider the internal Swiss debate about the deployment of armed Swiss soldiers under the condition of UN mandates for such action. Analysing claims on troop deployment two further scope

² Total of other supranational, other European countries (ex. CIS), Russia and rest of the world.

categories prove to be essential, even predominant: multilateral and bilateral, suggesting the involvement of two or more countries. This is partly due to the nature and practice of troop deployment; to some extent these results are however also an effect of the definition of troop deployment as an issue which can't possibly be national.

As our analysis shows, claims-making on retirement and pension schemes as well as education is clearly nationally confined – in the majority of cases to Switzerland – and therewith not subject to de-nationalisation. These results are not surprising since both policy fields remain to date in the hands of the national legislators, a fact also reflected above concerning claimants as well as addressees. Over all years under study, claims in the policy field of retirement predominantly concern questions related to the Swiss pension scheme whereas only a handful of claims refer to other European countries. This result might astonish: although most Western European countries have to face similar problems (retirement age, demographic decline, problems of financing etc.), Switzerland does not seem to “look across its borders”. Rather the public debate on pension schemes concentrated on federal votes on the issue which have been held in all years under study except for 1990.

In Switzerland, educational matters still are in the hands of national (higher education) and regional (primary and secondary school) agencies. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the lion's share of claims-making in this policy field is related to Switzerland, just as actors present in these debates. Interestingly enough, more than a fifth of all claims on educational matters however refer to an EU-country, which points to a certain degree of horizontal Europeanisation. An analysis over time however shows that the part of national claims is growing over the years, whereas educational matters in EU member states get slightly less attention in the year 2002 as compared to 1990. In the light of recent controversies in most Western countries about the PISA-study, this relative reinforcement of national claims-making is somewhat unexpected.

One final variable shall be singled out, in order to get a rough picture of the forms and degree of Europeanisation of the Swiss public sphere: the **scope of object actors**. By object actors, we understand those actors whose interests and rights would be affected if the claim were realised – either in a beneficial or a negative way.

Part of the results concerning this aspect, resonate well with our earlier findings: claims-making on e.g. monetary politics, agricultural policy and European integration topics involves a considerable proportion of EU actors and therefore seems to be subject to a certain level of Europeanisation. Public discourse on immigration and education, on the contrary, predominantly affects national Swiss actors and can be considered as (Swiss) home politics.

Troop deployment and immigration, for their part, show a strong tendency towards foreign or international politics as far as object actors are concerned since claims-making in these fields impact most often on non-European national (or multilateral) actors. This latter result is particularly the result of e.g. immigration regulations affecting “third country nationals” from outside Europe and, concerning troop deployment, the fact that the countries where troops are sent to, and which have inevitably to be seen as object actors, are mostly non-European countries, given actual conflicts during the years under study.

An analysis accounting for the time dimension (regardless of policy fields), to some extent relativises the above mentioned results. In fact, claims-making pertains to the interests and competences of EU actors in about the same proportion in 1990 than in 2002 whereas other European supranational actors are less and less concerned by political claims – a trend which already could be seen with respect to subject actors (claimants), addressees and the issue scope itself. Conversely, but also in line with previous results, claims increasingly have consequences upon Swiss actor’s interests in the same time span. This finding can once again only be understood as the result of the relative importance of public debate on pension and educational matters and shows therefore once again the great influence of certain concrete debates on overall trends.

Results – part two: multivariate analysis of the forms of political claims-making

Having analysed all scope variables one by one in the first section, we now wish to combine them in a multivariate analysis. Following the example of Koopmans and Erbe (2003: 13), we look for “*co-occurrences of different geo-political levels (scopes) within claims*” in order to identify the types of communicative interactions among actors and, consequently, the forms of political claims-making. Such a multivariate analysis has the advantage to consider a claim in its entirety and thus to reveal the communicative flows between different political spaces. In fact, mere frequencies of scope variables only show the relative importance of the national, European and supranational levels and give hints about the forms of claims-making in a public sphere, but only the interaction between these levels within a claim provides evidence for the types of political claims-making. For instance, a claim on the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU in which a Swiss actor addresses the European commission is to be considered as Europeanised claims-making. A second claim where the European parliament addresses the European commission about the institutional reforms in the EU can undoubtedly also be considered as a Europeanised claim. However, according to the

theoretical distinction above, the first claim would be classified as vertical Europeanisation whereas the latter is an example of supranational Europeanisation. An additional and related problem is that simple frequencies do not show whether there is an interaction at all between different levels of governance within a single claim. For instance, if we have two claims each of which with a Swiss and a European claimant and a Swiss and a European addressee, we ignore whether the Swiss (European) actor addresses the Swiss (European) addressee – meaning that one claim is purely national and the other one completely Europeanised – or whether both claims are Europeanised due to the interaction between European and Swiss actors in each claim. These simple examples show that the particular combination of different scope variables determine the forms of political claims-making in a public sphere. For the subsequent analysis, we considered the interaction between the scope of the actor who makes a claim, the scope of the addressee / indirect object actor, the spatial reach of the issue and the scope of the object actors, i.e. the actors whose interests are affected by a claim.

Appendix I depicts the share of the five forms of political claims-making in the Swiss public sphere over the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2002 and indicates which types of communicative linkages account for the respective forms of claims-making. Taking all claims together irrespectively of the policy field, three quarters of all claims in the Swiss public sphere are Europeanised. Conversely, only one fifth of all claims have a purely national frame of reference, and only 14 per cent of all claims are qualified as international politics, i.e. claims without any reference to Switzerland, the EU or an EU member state. This very high level of Europeanisation in the Swiss public sphere is to be attributed to different factors. As a small country with an open economy in the heart of the European continent, Switzerland is politically and economically dependent on the outside world. According to a realistic approach of international relations, this interest in and openness towards the world markets is likely to lead to the development of a European discourse (Della Porta 2003: 9). The traditional openness towards the outside world is also reflected in the structure of some Swiss newspapers. In the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, for instance, the front page is always entirely dedicated to foreign news, and international politics appear in the first section of the paper even before the national pages. Another explanatory factor for the high degree of Europeanisation in the Swiss public sphere is the ambiguous attitude of Switzerland towards the EU. Over the past decade, Swiss citizens had to vote on different European issues (EEA agreement in 1992, first bilateral agreements with the EU in 2000, popular initiative “Yes to Europe!”) that were accompanied by intense and controversial debates among the elite and the citizenry. These repeated and contentious public debates about the nature of Switzerland’s

relationships with the EU ultimately lead to a Europeanisation of the public sphere, which is mirrored in the relative importance of vertically Europeanised claims-making. On the one hand, this vertical Europeanisation consists of the above-mentioned relations between Switzerland and the EU and, on the other hand, of a relative high attention for relations between EU member countries and the EU itself. However, the large part of vertical Europeanisation in the Swiss public sphere is boosted by the inclusion of the meta-field of European integration that is by definition Europeanised and that is very prominently represented in the Swiss data.

If we exclude the field of European integration from our analysis, vertical and supranational forms of Europeanisation decline as expected whereas other non-Europeanised forms of claims-making gain in importance. But, still, non-Europeanised claims account for less than half of all claims in the Swiss public sphere, leaving it with a relatively high degree of Europeanisation.

Given that the relative importance of the respective forms of claims-making change once we exclude a policy field from our analysis, it seems as if the predominant forms of claims-making are dependent upon the policy field under study. In particular, we can expect a higher degree of supranational Europeanisation in the policy fields that are incorporated into the first, supranational pillar of the EU (monetary policy and agriculture) whereas horizontal and vertical forms of Europeanisation are likely to prevail in immigration matters. Non-Europeanised forms of claims-making, for their part, probably dominate in the fields of education and pensions as well as with respect to troop deployment where an internationalisation seems most likely.

Appendix II confirms these assumptions to a large extent. As expected, monetary policy is the most Europeanised issue field of our study: cases of vertical or supranational Europeanisation amount to almost 50 per cent and, in addition, horizontal Europeanisation – a somewhat weaker and less evident form of Europeanisation – accounts for another fifth of all claims in this policy field. The most prominent cases of vertical Europeanisation are public debates about the common currency in several EU member countries and ongoing discussions about the stability pact and the trespassing of the convergence criteria namely by Portugal, Germany and France. Supranational Europeanisation, for its part, can above all be attributed to decisions of the European Central Bank (not) to adjust its main interest rates.

Supranational Europeanisation is even more dominant in agricultural policy; a “communitarised” issue field since the very beginning of the EU. Despite the strong

regulative prerogatives of the EU in this field, agricultural matters show a rather surprisingly high degree of horizontally Europeanised claims. Taken together with purely national Swiss claims, this means that more than half of all claims in the field of agriculture (58 per cent) do not involve the EU level at all, but remain confined to Switzerland or EU member states. The relatively high share of horizontal Europeanisation of claims-making in the field of agriculture can almost entirely be explained by (national) public debates about the animal disease BSE that ravaged in several EU countries – especially in the year 2000 – and that got attention in the Swiss public sphere – probably because Switzerland was particularly concerned by the same problem.

With respect to the remaining four policy fields – immigration, troop deployment, pensions and education – we can confirm the trend that was already visible in the bivariate analyses in the first part above: their degree of Europeanisation is less important than non-Europeanised forms of claims-making (i.e. national and international politics together). Among these policy fields, troop deployment is the least Europeanised, but is above all to be considered as international politics. The EU level is most present in the field of immigration as reflected by vertical and supranational Europeanisation. However, taken the three forms of Europeanisation together, Europeanised claims-making is more important in educational matters than in the field of immigration! The high levels of horizontal Europeanisation in education, but also in the field of pensions, are rather surprising or at least unexpected. In fact, our bivariate analyses presented above suggested a very low degree of openness of these policy fields towards the outside world. This result was in harmony with the assumption that policy fields in the hands of national legislators do not undergo a process of Europeanisation. However, the multilevel analysis contradicts this finding and shows that communicative linkages between Switzerland and EU member countries do exist even in these national policy fields. This result also underlines the importance of a multivariate analysis that looks for co-occurrences between different scope variables in order to filter out the forms of political claims-making.

These forms of political claims-making are not only likely to vary across issue fields, but also over time. In fact, Europeanisation is to be understood as a process; a process that has gained in importance as European integration has accelerated, widened and deepened over the last decade. However, the bivariate analyses tend to refute this intuitive assumption. Rather than a linear trend towards more Europeanisation, we find that the predominant forms of claims-making in the Swiss public sphere are strongly affected by the scope of a particular public debate in a certain year. *Appendix IIIa* partly confirms this conclusion. As far as horizontal

and vertical Europeanisation as well as international politics are concerned, the figures change from one year to the other without following a clearly identifiable pattern. On the contrary, supranational Europeanisation is slightly decreasing between 1990 and 2002 whereas national politics steadily rises from 12 per cent to 23 per cent over the same period. Today, the Swiss public sphere is clearly more closed than a decade ago, but is still very open towards the outside world³. The trend towards increasing nationalisation is, however, surprising and at odds with our hypotheses. This unexpected result might be related to the astonishing success of the national-conservative Swiss People's Party (SVP) since the early 1990s. It actually reflects the general political climate in Switzerland, which has become more inward-looking and sceptical about European integration. A new wave of national pride and patriotism seems to come over the country after the national identity crisis in the 1990s. The electoral campaign to the federal elections in autumn 2003 also illustrates this point. Contrary to previous election campaigns, the issue of European integration was strikingly absent from the agenda in 2003 and even the Socialists tried to stress patriotic values by wearing T-shirts with the Swiss national emblem.

Despite this general trend towards more purely national claims-making, we should not forget that the predominant forms of claims-making vary across policy fields. *Appendix IV* shows the forms of political claims-making by issue field and year. The previously observed trend towards more nationally-confined public discourse is in fact present in the fields of immigration and education. In the first case, the high level of national claims in recent years can be explained by the so-called "18% initiative" and a repatriation program for refugees from Kosovo in the year 2000, and by an "asylum initiative" that was down-voted in November 2002. In the field of monetary politics, on the contrary, there is an unambiguous trend towards vertical and supranational Europeanisation over the years. This development of claims-making in the public sphere nicely reflects the progressive creation of the European Monetary Union from 1990 until 2002, which was accompanied by the transfer of national competences to the supranational (European) level.

Overall, we can draw three conclusions from our analyses. First, the Swiss public sphere is characterised by a rather high level of Europeanisation even though Switzerland is not a member of the EU. Thus, other factors than EU membership must be taken into account to explain the Europeanisation of public spheres. In the Swiss case, the political and economic interweavement with other European countries and the traditional dependence on the worlds

³ The overall pattern does not change significantly if we exclude the field of European integration from our analysis (*Appendix IIIb*).

markets can at least partly explain the openness of the Swiss public sphere towards Europeanised public discourse. Second, our analyses show that the forms of political claims-making are strongly affected by the political agenda in a particular year. Finally, despite some variations across policy fields, there is a clearly visible trend towards more nationally-confined claims over the years that could be a mirror-image of the success of the national-conservative SVP and growing patriotism in Switzerland.

Part II: Commented Tables

Article level

Table 1.1 Number of articles coded per year: European sample, full sample (in %)

	European sample	Full sample	Total (N)
1990	7.8	14.7	11.6 (237)
1995	7.2	16.8	12.5 (255)
2000	24.2	35.4	30.4 (620)
2001	42.8	-	19.1 (390)
2002	18.0	33.0	26.3 (536)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (912)	<i>100.0</i> (1126)	<i>100.0</i> (2038)

As can be seen from *table 1.1*, in terms of total number of articles coded as well as in terms of articles coded from the full sample the years 2000 and 2002 are the most extensive ones, providing the large majority of coded articles. The minor importance of the historical years 1990 and 1995 – which are meant to purely provide the possibility of a historical comparison – is however partly the product of the application of a reduced (half) sampling scheme. For the year 2001, by definition only claims with European scope have been coded.

Table 1.2 Articles by paper (in %)

PAPER	
Neue Zürcher Zeitung	52.0
Le Temps*	45.1
Le Matin	1.1
Blick	1.8
Total (N)	100.0 (2038)

* For the years 2000, 2001, 2002 Le Temps; for the years 1990 and 1995 the predecessor edition named Journal de Genève.

Most articles have been coded from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, which reflects the newspapers strong focus on foreign and home politics as well as economy. The same holds to a somewhat lesser extent for the French speaking equivalent Le Temps, although in total this journal provides a somewhat less extensive reporting. Note also that Le Matin and Blick have been

included in our analysis only for the year 2000 as reference points. Furthermore, the tabloid format and editorial line of both Le Matin and Blick can be held accountable for the fact that little priority is being given to political events which constituted our main interest. Additionally, as Le Matin is a regional paper, main attention is being paid to local politics which are – as consequence of the definition of our policy fields – of minor magnitude.

Table 1.3 Section from which articles were coded by paper (in %)

	Neue Zürcher Zeitung	Le Temps*	Le Matin	Blick	Total (N)
Mixed international/national news section	2.6	21.7	-	16.2	11.4 (233)
Regional/local news section	0.1	0.3	-	-	0.2 (4)
Commentary pages	0.2	3.0	-	-	1.5 (30)
Business/Economy section	24.9	21.0	-	-	22.4 (457)
International news section	38.4	21.8	-	-	29.8 (607)
National news section	33.7	32.2	-	-	32.0 (653)
No differentiation between sections	-	-	-	83.8	1.5 (31)
Section unknown	-	-	100.0	-	1.1 (23)
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (1059)</i>	<i>100.0 (919)</i>	<i>100.0 (23)</i>	<i>100.0 (37)</i>	<i>100.0 (2038)</i>

* For the years 2000, 2001, 2002 Le Temps; for the years 1990 and 1995 the predecessor edition named Journal de Genève.

The distribution of sources as displayed in *table 1.3* reflects partly the a priori selection of sections to be included in the sampling process, as well as the newspapers' structures. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung provides clearly separated newspaper sections; in terms of reporting it has a strong focus on international news, national news and an important economy/business section. This editorial line is well reflected in the distribution of our articles from different sections (e.g. 38.4 per cent of articles stem from the international news section). Le Temps provides separated sections, but additionally publishes a couple of pages within the first "bunch" (*Bund*) which take up current issues in feature-like form. This section can not clearly be classified as either national or international news section and has therefore been coded in the category "mixed section". Le Matin is divided into different sections, which were however not visible in the online-archive we used for the selection of articles. Therefore all these

articles had to be coded as “section unknown”. The Blick – as fairly typical for tabloids – does not spell out sections systematically, which made a classification in most of the cases impossible.

Table 1.4a Source of article by paper (in %)

	Neue Zürcher Zeitung	Le Temps*	Le Matin	Blick	Total (N)
Own coverage: foreign correspondent's report	46.7	21.3	-	-	33.9 (691)
Own coverage: article by nat. office editor or journalist	23.3	45.9	95.7	100.0	35.7 (728)
National press agency	11.3	17.6	-	-	13.8 (282)
Other EU press agency	5.3	11.3	4.3	-	7.9 (161)
Non-EU press agency	13.2	2.3	-	-	7.9 (161)
Other national media source	0.1	0.2	-	-	0.1 (3)
Other EU media source	-	0.4	-	-	0.2 (4)
Non-EU media source	-	0.3	-	-	0.1 (3)
Other source	-	0.5	-	-	0.2 (5)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (1059)	<i>99.8</i> (919)	<i>100.0</i> (23)	<i>100.0</i> (37)	<i>100.0</i> (2038)

* For the years 2000, 2001, 2002 Le Temps; for the years 1990 and 1995 the predecessor edition named Journal de Genève.

Totals inferior to 100per cent are due to rounding errors.

As the results in *table 1.4a* indicate, more than twice as many articles concerning our seven topics were written by a foreign correspondent (47 per cent) in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung as compared to Le Temps. This is probably largely due to the very well developed network of correspondents which the Neue Zürcher Zeitung subsists. Almost the same share of articles in Le Temps (46 per cent) is written by national office editors or journalists, while foreign correspondents have much less “weight”. The total share of articles taken over from press agencies does almost not vary between the two quality newspapers. Although the contracting with press agencies is the same for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung as for Le Temps, national press agency articles are visibly of greater importance for Le Temps (18 per cent), while the Neue Zürcher Zeitung publishes a considerably greater number of articles deriving from international (non-EU-country) agencies, such as Reuters or Associated Press. Even though

Le Matin as well as the Blick have foreign correspondents (Le Matin: 4, Blick: 3) all the articles of interest to us – with the exception of one single article – have been written by national office editors or journalists, which most probably were the office editors themselves or so called “Bundeshauskorrespondenten” covering political news from Bern. All other media sources are of entirely marginal importance and basically only used by Le Temps.

Table 1.4b Source of article by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	Total (N)
Own coverage: foreign correspondent’s report	30.0	36.1	27.7	41.3	36.4	33.9 (691)
Own coverage: article by nat. office editor or journalist	18.6	29.0	45.2	33.3	37.3	35.7 (728)
National press agency	25.3	18.8	13.1	9.7	10.3	13.8 (282)
Other EU press agency	14.8	8.2	7.6	6.7	6.0	7.9 (161)
Non-EU press agency	10.5	6.7	6.3	8.5	8.8	7.9 (161)
Other national media source	0.8	-	-	0.3	-	0.1 (3)
Other EU media source	-	-	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.2 (4)
Non-EU media source	-	1.2	-	-	-	0.1 (3)
Other source	-	-	-	-	0.9	0.2 (5)
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (237)</i>	<i>100.0 (255)</i>	<i>100.0 (620)</i>	<i>100.0 (390)</i>	<i>100.0 (536)</i>	<i>100.0 (2038)</i>

Table 1.4b shows a trend over time, which is remarkable, even though its reasons remain unclear: articles from press agencies tend to become less important over the years – at least concerning those articles covering the seven policy fields of interest to us. While in 1990 more than a quarter of articles originated from national press agencies, only 10 per cent did in 2002. All press agencies’ articles taken together account for over half of all articles in 1990 and for only about a quarter of all articles in 2002. In terms of own coverage the year 2001 is an exception insofar as only articles with a European scope have been considered. It is therefore not surprising that the number of articles written by foreign correspondents is particularly high compared to other years. In the year 2000 coverage by national office editors and journalists is probably particularly induced by a series of strongly nationally focused discussions such as the one on bilateral agreements between the EU and Switzerland (popular

vote May 2002) and the beginning debate about the initiative “Ja zu Europe”. At the same time, significantly more articles than in other years have been written by national office editors or journalists on the issues of troop deployment, pension and immigration, the latter also being subject to popular vote in September 2000 (“18% initiative” suggesting a limitation of foreign population resident in Switzerland).

Table 1.5 Articles with and without claims (in %)

No	16.8
Yes, but only already coded ones	1.6
Yes, includes new claims	81.6
<i>Total</i>	<i>100.0</i>
<i>(N)</i>	<i>(2038)</i>

As *table 1.5* shows, the vast majority of articles contain claims. The proportion of articles repeating already reported (main) claims without mentioning new ones is negligible (2 per cent).

Claim-level: General

Table 2.1 Number of claims coded per year: European sample, full sample, total (in %)

	European sample	Full sample	Total (N)
1990	8.5	15.4	12.4 (369)
1995	6.9	13.2	10.4 (310)
2000	29.1	39.5	35.0 (1040)
2001	38.6	-	16.8 (500)
2002	17.0	31.9	25.4 (755)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (1296)	<i>100.0</i> (1678)	<i>100.0</i> (2974)

Similarly to the results in *table 1.1*, *table 2.1* shows that the year 2000 has been the most important year in terms of number of claims coded, followed by the year 2002. Within the period of recent years (2000-2002) the year 2001 is somewhat in a special position, since only articles and claims with a European dimension have been considered: it therefore holds for a big share of claims within the European sample, while in total it is of minor importance. The years 1990 and 1995 are underrepresented insofar as only a reduced (half) sampling scheme has been applied.

Claim-level: Location

Table 2.2a Country where claim was made by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Germany (incl. GDR)	5.8	1.8	5.6	3.4	4.4 (74)
France	8.5	7.7	6.8	4.9	6.6 (110)
United Kingdom	9.3	2.3	3.3	3.0	4.0 (67)
Italy	3.1	0.5	1.1	3.0	1.9 (32)
Spain	-	-	2.3	1.7	1.4 (24)
Netherlands	0.4	-	0.3	-	0.2 (3)
Other pre-1995 EU members	3.1	4.1	2.9	2.6	3.0 (50)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1.5	2.7	6.2	2.8	3.9 (66)
EU seats (Brussels, Luxemburg, Strasbourg, Frankfurt etc.)	12.7	9.0	9.5	9.0	9.8 (164)
Switzerland	30.9	38.0	43.4	45.0	41.3 (693)
Upcoming enlargement countries	1.9	9.5	1.8	4.9	3.8 (64)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	3.5	1.8	1.5	1.1	1.7 (29)
Turkey	0.8	0.9	0.3	1.1	0.7 (12)
Russia (incl. USSR)	2.3	1.8	2.0	2.6	2.2 (37)
USA	5.4	4.5	1.7	4.9	3.6 (61)
Japan	1.9	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8 (14)
Middle East	1.9	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.8 (14)
UN seats	0.4	2.7	0.9	0.9	1.1 (18)
NATO seats	0.4	0.5	0.3	-	0.2 (4)
Rest of the world	6.2	11.3	8.9	7.9	8.5 (142)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (259)	<i>100.0</i> (221)	<i>100.0</i> (663)	<i>100.0</i> (535)	<i>100.0</i> (1678)

As shown in *table 2.2a*, the most important country of claims-making for the Swiss public sphere is Switzerland itself. This is true for all four years of study (taking into consideration only “full sample days”), and seems quite self-evident since claims about domestic issues tend to be made within the country. A trend towards an increase of claims being made in Switzerland over the years (31 per cent in 1990, 45 per cent in 2002) can be observed, which

has to be considered a consequence of the actual subjects of public debate. Germany, France and the United Kingdom are fairly well represented in terms of locations where claims entering the Swiss public sphere were made. This might be due to their important status as international players, as well as – for the first two – their role as neighbouring countries of Switzerland, which receive particular attention. Interestingly enough, almost 10 per cent of all claims in 1995 have been made in upcoming enlargement countries, which could be considered as an effect of the debate about (their) future membership (5 countries – Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria – applied for EU membership in 1995).

The fact that 86 per cent of all claims concerning retirement and pension schemes and 73 per cent of claims on education policy (see *table 2.2b*) were made within Switzerland can be seen as a strong indicator for the persisting principally national focus of these policy fields. On the opposite side it is the claims-making on troop deployment which is the least domesticated. The data shows on the contrary indirect evidence via the locus of claims-making for the predominant role of the USA (20 per cent of claims on troop deployment), which is largely due to its interference within conflicts worldwide. The fact that amongst claims on troop deployment Switzerland still accounts for a relatively big share is owed, as we will see later concerning issue fields themselves, to a debate about the deployment of armed Swiss soldiers in the context of army reform. Especially in terms of agricultural policy it is interesting to see that the country of claims-making seems to deliver an indicator for the importance of the EU and within it particularly France followed by Germany. The two countries and the European level (EU seats) taken together account for almost one third of places of claims-making – and therewith not for much less than Switzerland itself (39 per cent). The relative importance of the EU for Swiss economy might also be deduced from the locus of claims-making in monetary policy: 14 per cent of claims reported in Swiss newspapers were made at an EU seat, further 19 per cent of monetary claims were made in one of the three big EU nations (Germany, France and United Kingdom), while only 9 per cent of reported claims were made in the USA.

Table 2.2b Country where claim was made by issue field (in %)

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Retirement	Education	European integration	Total (N)
Germany (incl. GDR)	7.3	8.2	4.1	4.8	1.2	1.0	4.0	4.4 (74)
France	5.7	11.3	2.1	4.8	2.4	10.8	7.5	6.6 (110)
United Kingdom	5.7	4.6	2.1	5.6	0.6	3.4	4.8	4.0 (67)
Italy	1.6	-	6.2	1.6	-	-	2.2	1.9 (32)
Spain	0.4	1.0	2.1	0.8	-	6.9	0.2	1.4 (24)
Netherlands	-	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	0.2 (3)
Other pre-1995 EU members	4.5	2.1	4.5	4.0	1.8	0.5	3.0	3.0 (50)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	2.4	0.5	4.5	-	3.0	-	8.7	3.9 (66)
EU seats (Brussels, Luxemburg, Strasbourg, ...)	14.2	11.9	3.7	-	0.6	-	19.4	9.8 (164)
Switzerland	20.6	39.2	37.9	15.9	85.8	72.5	32.5	41.3 (693)
Upcoming enlargement countries	6.5	1.5	3.7	4.0	0.6	1.0	5.7	3.8 (64)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	2.0	0.5	2.5	3.2	-	1.5	2.0	1.7 (29)
Turkey	-	-	0.4	3.2	-	0.5	1.2	0.7 (12)
Russia (incl. USSR)	-	1.5	2.5	4.8	3.6	-	3.2	2.2 (37)
USA	8.5	2.1	3.7	19.8	-	-	0.4	3.6 (61)
Japan	4.5	1.0	0.4	-	-	-	-	0.8 (14)
Middle East	0.4	-	2.1	5.6	-	0.5	-	0.8 (14)
UN seats	0.4	-	4.9	3.2	-	-	0.2	1.1 (18)
NATO seats	-	-	-	3.2	-	-	-	0.2 (4)
Rest of the world	15.4	12.9	12.8	15.9	0.6	1.5	4.8	8.5 (142)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (247)	<i>100.0</i> (194)	<i>100.0</i> (243)	<i>100.0</i> (126)	<i>100.0</i> (169)	<i>100.0</i> (204)	<i>100.0</i> (495)	<i>100.0</i> (1678)

Table 3.1 Region in own country where claim was made by issue field (in %)

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Retirement	Education	European integration	Total (N)
Capital city	39.2	50.0	57.6	55.0	50.3	34.5	42.2	45.3 (314)
Other four largest cities	17.6	9.2	15.2	15.0	11.0	20.3	20.5	16.2 (112)
Other localities	43.1	40.8	27.2	30.0	38.6	45.3	37.3	38.5 (267)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (51)	<i>100.0</i> (76)	<i>100.0</i> (92)	<i>100.0</i> (20)	<i>100.0</i> (145)	<i>100.0</i> (148)	<i>100.0</i> (161)	<i>100.0</i> (693)

Table 3.1 shows a general trend towards a high-ranking position of the capital city as locus of claims-making, which is not surprising given the fact that the administration and political elite exercising their political mandate are located in Bern. The case of education, which somewhat differs from other policy fields might precisely reflect the de-central power distribution and federalist character of education policy concerning schools as well as higher education. Interestingly, claims on agriculture seem to be made slightly less often than claims on other policy fields in large cities other than the capital. Whether or not this reflects the “rural” character of this policy has to be left open. It has however to be kept in mind that e.g. the main seat of the most important agricultural organisation, the Swiss Farmers Union, is located in a small city classified amongst “other localities”.

Claim-level: Actors

Table 4.1 Actors of claims by issue field (in %)

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Retirement	Education	European integration	Total (N)
Politicians	1.2	-	-	0.8	-	0.5	1.4	0.7 (12)
Former states(women)	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.8	1.2	-	2.0	1.0 (17)
Government/executive	33.2	44.3	30.9	55.6	15.4	22.5	52.3	38.4 (644)
Legislative	0.4	4.1	10.7	10.3	24.3	13.7	12.5	10.7 (179)
Judiciary	-	1.0	1.6	-	2.4	2.5	0.4	1.0 (17)
Police and internal security agencies	-	1.0	10.3	-	-	-	-	1.6 (27)
Military	-	-	-	18.3	-	-	0.2	1.4 (24)
Central Banks	40.5	1.0	-	-	-	0.5	1.4	6.6 (110)
Social security executive organisations	-	-	-	-	1.8	-	-	0.2 (3)
Other state executive agencies	0.4	11.9	16.5	0.8	4.1	9.3	2.8	6.3 (105)
Political parties	2.0	2.1	7.4	4.0	16.0	1.5	7.7	6.0 (100)
<i>State and party actors</i>	<i>78.5</i>	<i>66.0</i>	<i>77.8</i>	<i>90.5</i>	<i>65.1</i>	<i>50.5</i>	<i>80.8</i>	<i>73.8</i> <i>(1238)</i>
Unions and employees	0.8	1.0	0.4	0.8	7.7	1.5	0.4	1.4 (24)
Employers organisations and firms	5.7	3.1	1.2	-	8.3	2.5	2.4	3.2 (54)
Farmers and agricultural organisations	-	8.2	0.4	-	0.6	-	0.2	1.1 (19)
Economic and financial experts	10.1	-	-	-	6.5	0.5	0.6	2.4 (40)
<i>Economic interest groups</i>	<i>16.6</i>	<i>12.4</i>	<i>2.1</i>	<i>0.8</i>	<i>23.1</i>	<i>4.4</i>	<i>3.6</i>	<i>8.2</i> <i>(137)</i>
<i>Media and journalists</i>	<i>3.6</i>	<i>4.1</i>	<i>5.8</i>	<i>4.0</i>	<i>5.3</i>	<i>3.9</i>	<i>7.7</i>	<i>5.4</i> <i>(91)</i>
Churches and religious organisations and groups	-	-	1.2	-	-	-	0.6	0.4 (6)
Education professionals and organisations	-	1.5	0.8	-	0.6	24.5	0.4	3.5 (58)
Other scientific and research professionals or organisations	-	3.6	0.4	0.8	1.2	2.5	1.4	1.4 (23)
Students, pupils, and their parents	-	0.5	-	-	-	7.8	-	1.0 (17)
Other professional organisations and groups	-	0.5	1.2	-	0.6	0.5	0.2	0.4 (7)
Consumer organisations and groups	-	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	0.1 (2)

Migrant organisations and groups	-	-	2.5	-	-	1.0	-	0.5 (8)
Pro- and anti-European campaign organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.4	0.7 (12)
Solidarity and human rights organisations	-	-	3.3	-	0.6	0.5	-	0.6 (10)
Welfare organisations	-	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	0.1 (1)
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Peace movement organisations and groups	-	-	-	0.8	-	-	-	0.1 (1)
Organisations and groups of the elderly	-	-	-	-	1.8	-	-	0.2 (3)
Women's organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	0.6	-	-	0.1 (1)
Environmental organisations and groups	-	0.5	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.1 (2)
Terrorist groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rebel forces / guerrilla	-	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	0.1 (1)
Other civil society organisations and groups	-	0.5	0.4	-	1.2	1.5	1.2	0.8 (13)
<i>Other civil society actors</i>	-	8.2	10.7	1.6	6.5	38.7	6.3	9.8 (165)
Whole polities	0.4	7.7	2.5	1.6	-	1.0	0.8	1.8 (30)
Whole economies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
The general public	0.4	-	-	0.8	-	1.0	0.2	0.4 (6)
Unknown/unspecified actors	0.4	1.0	1.2	0.8	-	0.5	0.6	0.7 (11)
<i>General / unknown / unspecified</i>	1.2	9.3	3.7	3.2	-	2.5	1.6	2.8 (47)
Total (N)	100.0 (247)	100.0 (194)	100.0 (243)	100.0 (126)	100.0 (169)	100.0 (204)	100.0 (495)	100.0 (1678)

Table 4.1 depicts the claims-makers by detailed and summarised groups of actors. It shows clearly that state actors – although the by large most important group of actors – play the smallest role in education policy (51 per cent) which might mostly be due to discussions about university-restructuring lead by educational professionals and organisations themselves rather than by state or party actors. With the predominance of educational professionals the group of “other civil society actors” represents therefore a very high share (39 per cent) of claims-makers in this policy field.

The issue of troop deployment delivers an example of the opposite extreme: almost 91 per cent of claims are being made by state actors, military being – not surprisingly – very present (18 per cent). Civil society actors other than economic interest groups and media – which themselves are of marginal importance – are hardly present as claims-makers on troop deployment issues in Swiss print media.

The issue of retirement and pension schemes presents an interesting case concerning claims-makers since – contrary to all other 6 policy fields – the government/executive is less important than the legislative (24 per cent). This is mainly the consequence of vivid debates about pension scheme reform (particularly second pillar) and debates about the investment of gold reserves into the state pension scheme (first pillar) within parliament as well as in the context of a popular vote (September 2002). It is most probably in the latter context that particularly economic interest groups as well as parties gained an important position and high visibility in the public sphere (23 per cent and 16 per cent respectively).

As far as monetary politics is concerned, the results with regard to claims-makers can be seen as reflecting the actual situation of competence distribution: central banks play a key role (41 per cent), followed by government actors. Just as other civil society actors (other than economic interest groups) are completely absent as claims-makers in public debate about monetary politics, they also remain marginal in the issue of European integration (6 per cent). Yet again, state actors dominate in this issue field, with the government/executive as the most predominant actors. At the same time it is noteworthy that European integration is the issue field where journalists are most present as claims-makers within regular news coverage (8 per cent).

Table 4.2 Actor type by issue field (in %)

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Retirement	Education	European integration	Total (N)
Unorganised collectivity	2.0	2.1	1.3	0.8	-	7.8	0.6	1.9 (32)
Named representative(s) of an unorganised collective	-	-	0.4	-	1.8	0.5	1.2	0.7 (11)
Organisation or institution	37.0	51.0	45.4	41.3	45.0	32.8	24.5	36.7 (614)
Anonymous spokesperson(s)	6.9	9.9	11.7	6.3	3.0	6.4	7.5	7.6 (127)
Named spokesperson(s)	54.1	37.0	41.3	51.6	50.3	52.5	66.2	53.1 (887)
Total (N)	100.0 (246)	100.0 (192)	100.0 (240)	100.0 (126)	100.0 (169)	100.0 (204)	100.0 (494)	100.0 (1671)

In terms of types of actors *table 4.2* shows that a very large share of actors is named personally. The most “personalised” issue field in that sense is European integration (66 per cent of claims-makers are mentioned by name); the least personalised policy field is

agricultural policy (37 per cent). This result might be interpreted as European integration being communicated by “leading heads”, meaning concrete persons, who are identifiable – either within the Swiss political elite or outside Switzerland. – The latter being “European leaders” entering of course also the Swiss public sphere. On the other extreme side, agricultural policy is visibly led by organisations and institutions rather than by “charismatic leaders”.

Table 4.3 Twenty-five most often mentioned spokespersons*

	ACTNAME1	N	%
1	Villiger, Kaspar	13	0.8
2	Prodi, Romano	12	0.7
3	Couchepin, Pascal	11	0.7
4	Chirac, Jacques	9	0.5
5	Duisenberg, Wim	9	0.5
6	Metzler, Ruth	8	0.5
7	Schröder, Gerhard	8	0.5
8	Ferrero-Waldner, Benita	7	0.4
9	Schüssel, Wolfgang	7	0.4
10	Deiss, Joseph	7	0.4
11	Dreifuss, Ruth	7	0.4
12	Blair, Tony	7	0.4
13	Delamuraz, Jean-Pascal	7	0.4
14	Solbes, Pedro	6	0.4
15	Fabius, Laurent	5	0.3
16	Putin, Vladimir	5	0.3
17	Védrine, Hubert	5	0.3
18	Clinton, Bill	5	0.3
19	Fischler, Franz	5	0.3
20	Girardin, Michel	5	0.3
21	Jospin, Linonel	5	0.3
22	Kohl, Helmut	5	0.3
23	Thatcher, Margaret	4	0.2
24	Haider, Jörg	4	0.2
25	Mac Sharry, Ray	4	0.2
	Total	170**	10.1

* The following seven actors were also mentioned 4 times: Riess-Passer, Susanne; Roth, Jean-Pierre; Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry; Bush, George sr.; Reimann, Maximilian; Howard, John; Guterres, Antonio.

** total mentions

Table 4.3 shows that the twenty-five most often mentioned spokespersons account for only 10 per cent of all mentions of named representatives. Only 7 out of the 25 most often mentioned persons are Swiss political actors; with one exception (Gerardin) all of them were or still are members of government. All other actors in the top 25 list are national (13 actors) or European (5 actors) members of government – again with just one exception: Jörg Haider not being personally member of government, but being fairly present in the context of his party’s participation in Austrian government and the EU 14’s reaction to this development in early

2000. The same instance gives such high visibility to Wolfgang Schüssel and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, head of Austrian government and Austrian foreign minister respectively. Let apart the dimension that not surprisingly here again governmental actors dominate, the list of the 25 most mentioned claims-makers could be seen as an indicator for a fairly high degree of horizontal as well as vertical Europeanisation of the Swiss public sphere.

State and party actors are particularly predominant as claims-makers at the UN-supranational, the EU and the “other European supranational” level, as *table 4.4* indicates. Economic interest groups as well as other civil society actors are almost absent at these levels or at least do not make their way into the media-transmitted Swiss public sphere. Generally the results seem to indicate that in the reporting about external affairs other actors than state actors seem to be either very little present or – put differently – have difficulty in gaining visibility as claims-makers in Swiss media. Amongst Swiss actors chances for non-state actors to enter the public sphere seem to be remarkably different. Particularly Swiss economic interest groups gain much more visibility as claims-makers than their foreign counterparts. To what extent this is due to selection criteria of Swiss newspapers and / or communication strategies of public actors remains open and might partly be answered by information gathered in work packages 5 and 6 (interviews with collective actors and journalists).

Table 4.4 Recoded actor scope by broad actor categories (in %)

	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society actors	General / unknown / unspecified	Total (N)
Supranational: UN	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0 (25)
Other supranational	77.3	4.5	-	18.2	-	100.0 (22)
EU	96.3	0.5	-	0.5	2.6	100.0 (189)
Other European supranational	96.9	-	-	3.1	-	100.0 (32)
Multilateral	41.7	-	-	8.3	50.0	100.0 (12)
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany (incl. GDR)	78.5	6.3	7.6	6.3	1.3	100.0 (79)
France	77.2	6.5	-	15.2	1.1	100.0 (92)
United Kingdom	68.7	6.0	11.9	10.4	3.0	100.0 (67)
Italy	82.1	7.1	7.1	-	3.6	100.0 (28)
Spain	70.8	4.2	4.2	12.5	8.3	100.0 (24)
Netherlands	66.7	33.3	-	-	-	100.0 (3)
Other pre-1995 EU members	75.8	6.1	3.0	9.1	6.1	100.0 (33)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	81.8	1.5	9.1	4.5	30.	100.0 (66)
Switzerland	62.2	12.7	8.1	15.7	1.2	100.0 (675)
Upcoming enlargement countries	88.2	2.0	3.9	3.9	2.0	100.0 (51)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	89.3	3.6	3.6	3.6	-	100.0 (28)
Turkey	85.7	-	-	-	14.3	100.0 (14)
Russia (incl. USSR)	76.3	7.9	10.5	5.3	-	100.0 (38)
USA	87.3	5.6	2.8	-	4.2	100.0 (71)
Japan	93.3	-	-	-	6.7	100.0 (15)
Middle East	80.0	-	6.7	13.3	-	100.0 (15)
Rest of the world	72.0	9.8	2.4	9.8	6.1	100.0 (82)
Total (N)	74.5 (1238)	7.6 (127)	5.5 (91)	9.8 (163)	2.5 (42)	100.0 (1661)

Table 4.5a Monetary policy: actor scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational: UN	-	-	-	1.3	0.4 (1)
Other supranational	5.9	5.1	2.3	1.3	3.8 (9)
EU	5.9	2.6	21.8	31.2	19.2 (46)
Other European supranational	-	-	-	-	-
Multilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Germany (incl. GDR)	11.8	2.6	9.2	7.8	7.9 (19)
France	-	12.8	4.6	1.3	4.2 (10)
United Kingdom	17.6	5.1	4.6	3.9	6.3 (15)
Italy	-	-	2.3	1.3	1.3 (3)
Spain	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU members	2.9	5.1	6.9	1.3	4.2 (10)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	-	-	3.4	3.9	2.5 (6)
Switzerland	20.6	15.4	13.8	20.8	17.2 (41)
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	23.1	-	7.8	6.3 (15)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	8.8	-	2.3	-	2.1 (5)
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-
Russia (incl. USSR)	-	-	-	-	-
USA	11.8	2.6	9.2	11.7	9.2 (22)
Japan	14.7	2.6	5.7	1.3	5.0 (12)
Middle East	-	-	1.1	-	0.4 (1)
Rest of the world	-	23.1	12.6	5.2	10.0 (24)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (34)	<i>100.0</i> (39)	<i>100.0</i> (87)	<i>100.0</i> (77)	<i>100.0</i> (237)

Table 4.5a reflects in a quite impressive way the growing importance of European actors as claims-makers in monetary politics over the years: while 1990 only 6 per cent of claims-makers were European, 31 per cent were so in 2002. National EU member state actors (particularly German, French and British actors) become in tendency less visible over the same period. This is undoubtedly due to a shift of competences to the European level in this

policy field within the period of study. Monetary politics therewith is the perfect example of a case where the public sphere “follows” the institutional development – even though Switzerland itself is not immediately concerned by these developments. Swiss actors themselves account for about the same share of claims-makers in 1990 as in 2002, although showing a lesser share in 1995 and 2002. The US being an important point of reference within this policy field, it is not astonishing that US actors account for a share of about 11 per cent of claims-makers over the years – 1995 being an unexplained exception.

A couple of things can be highlighted in relation to claims-makers in the field of agricultural policy (*table 4.5b*). Analysed over time agricultural policy seems to become less Europeanised in terms of claims-makers, on the contrary a tendency towards a re-nationalisation seems to be observable. While in 1990 27 per cent of claims-makers within this policy field were European actors, none were so in 1995 and only 16 per cent were so in 2000 as well as 2002. 1995 is an exceptional year dominated by a national discussion about the reform of the subsidies system as well as BSE crisis, putting almost exclusively national Swiss actors into the spotlight of the media. In the year 2000 on the other hand, a strong “horizontal Europeanisation” dimension is observable, which is very much due to German and French actors being reported as claims-makers on BSE issues within their countries. Remarkable is furthermore that – although agriculture was a major obstacle in the negotiations of eastern enlargement of the EU – actors from upcoming enlargement countries are hardly present as claims-makers in the Swiss public sphere – as is the issue of subsidies and enlargement itself which will be seen later (*table. 7.2b*).

Table 4.5b Agriculture: actor scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational: UN	-	4.3	-	-	0.5 (1)
Other supranational	3.0	-	1.2	2.0	1.6 (3)
EU	27.3	-	16.3	15.7	16.1 (31)
Other European supranational	-	-	-	-	-
Multilateral	3.0	-	-	7.8	2.6 (5)
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Germany (incl. GDR)	3.0	-	15.1	2.0	7.8 (15)
France	9.1	-	19.8	2.0	10.9 (21)
United Kingdom	6.1	4.3	4.7	2.0	4.1 (8)
Italy	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	2.3	2.0	1.6 (3)
Netherlands	-	-	2.3	-	1.0 (2)
Other pre-1995 EU members	3.0	-	1.2	-	1.0 (2)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	-	-	1.2	-	0.5 (1)
Switzerland	24.2	91.3	19.8	45.1	35.8 (69)
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	-	1.2	3.9	1.6 (3)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	-	-	1.2	-	0.5 (1)
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-
Russia (incl. USSR)	3.0	-	1.2	2.0	1.6 (3)
USA	12.1	-	1.2	5.9	4.1 (8)
Japan	-	-	-	3.9	1.0 (2)
Middle East	-	-	-	-	-
Rest of the world	6.1	-	11.6	5.9	7.8 (15)
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (33)</i>	<i>100.0 (23)</i>	<i>100.0 (86)</i>	<i>100.0 (51)</i>	<i>100.0 (193)</i>

Table 4.5c Immigration: actor scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational: UN	4.8	19.0	7.0	3.3	6.3 (15)
Other supranational	2.4	-	1.2	1.1	1.3 (3)
EU	7.1	-	2.3	6.7	4.6 (11)
Other European supranational	2.4	4.8	-	-	0.8 (2)
Multilateral	-	-	2.3	2.2	1.7 (4)
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Germany (incl. GDR)	9.5	4.8	4.7	2.2	4.6 (11)
France	-	4.8	-	3.3	1.7 (4)
United Kingdom	-	-	1.2	2.2	1.3 (3)
Italy	11.9	-	3.5	5.6	5.4 (13)
Spain	-	-	4.7	1.1	2.1 (5)
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU members	-	9.5	1.2	4.4	2.9 (7)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	7.1	4.8	1.2	6.7	4.6 (11)
Switzerland	28.6	14.3	55.8	33.3	38.9 (93)
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	4.8	2.3	4.4	2.9 (7)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	2.4	4.8	2.3	1.1	2.1 (5)
Turkey	-	-	-	1.1	0.4 (1)
Russia (incl. USSR)	9.5	-	-	4.4	3.3 (8)
USA	-	9.5	3.5	3.3	3.3 (8)
Japan	-	-	-	1.1	0.4 (1)
Middle East	7.1	-	-	3.3	2.5 (6)
Rest of the world	7.1	19.0	7.0	8.9	8.8 (21)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (42)	<i>100.0</i> (21)	<i>100.0</i> (86)	<i>100.0</i> (90)	<i>100.0</i> (239)

No clear pattern of development can be seen concerning the claims-makers on immigration policy (exist and entry) at all, suggesting the responsiveness of the policy field to varying time specific issues and development (*table 4.5c*). Focussing on “Europeanisation”, we have to acknowledge that European actors play a fairly marginal role in the years under study. EU

member state actors – although in different compositions – account for a share of about 17 up to 28 per cent of claims-makers and are therewith the largest group apart Swiss claims-makers themselves. Swiss actors are particularly dominant in the year 2000 due to a popular vote on an initiative (“18% initiative”) calling for a limitation of the proportion of foreigners residents in Switzerland. Generally speaking, the figures in *table 4.5c* show however – in fact in line with the case of monetary politics – a high consistency between actual distribution of power and actors present within the public sphere.

As *table 4.5d* shows, no Europeanisation of the debate about troop deployment seems to be identifiable at least in terms of claims-makers – here again in line with actual policy. The figures show clearly the predominance of the USA and therewith US actors within this policy together with an important share held by British actors in 2002 due to the debate of deployment of troops to Iraq. Remarkable exception within this pattern is the year 2000 where 44 per cent of claimants had a national Swiss scope. This can be considered to be entirely the consequence of a national debate about army reform foreseeing the deployment of armed Swiss soldiers generally for purposed of peace keeping within international mandates.

Table 4.5d Troop deployment: actor scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational: UN	4.2	8.6	6.3	2.9	5.6 (7)
Other supranational	4.2	2.9	6.3	-	1.6 (2)
EU	-	2.9	-	2.9	1.6 (2)
Other European supranational	-	2.9	-	-	0.8 (1)
Multilateral	-	5.7	-	-	1.6 (2)
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Germany (incl. GDR)	8.3	5.7	6.3	-	4.8 (6)
France	4.2	-	-	8.6	3.2 (4)
United Kingdom	4.2	2.9	6.3	11.4	6.5 (8)
Italy	-	-	-	5.7	1.6 (2)
Spain	-	-	-	2.9	0.8 (1)
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU members	-	-	-	2.9	0.8 (1)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	-	-	3.1	-	0.8 (1)
Switzerland	-	2.9	43.8	8.6	14.5 (18)
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	-	3.1	-	0.8 (1)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	4.2	11.4	-	2.9	4.8 (6)
Turkey	4.2	5.7	-	2.9	3.2 (4)
Russia (incl. USSR)	20.8	2.9	3.1	2.9	6.5 (8)
USA	29.2	34.3	6.3	22.9	23.4 (29)
Japan	-	-	-	-	-
Middle East	8.3	-	12.5	2.9	5.6 (7)
Rest of the world	8.3	11.4	3.1	20.0	11.3 (14)
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (24)</i>	<i>100.0 (35)</i>	<i>100.0 (32)</i>	<i>100.0 (35)</i>	<i>100.0 (126)</i>

Table 4.5e Retirement and pension schemes: actor scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational: UN	-	-	-	-	-
Other supranational	-	-	1.7	-	0.6 (1)
EU	-	-	1.7	-	0.6 (1)
Other European supranational	-	-	-	-	-
Multilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Germany (incl. GDR)	-	6.3	1.7	1.2	1.8 (3)
France	-	12.5	1.7	1.2	2.4 (4)
United Kingdom	-	-	-	1.2	0.6 (1)
Italy	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU members	-	-	-	3.7	1.8 (3)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	-	-	6.7	1.2	3.0 (5)
Switzerland	100.0	75.0	85.0	85.2	85.1 (143)
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	6.3	-	-	0.6 (1)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-
Russia (incl. USSR)	-	-	1.7	6.2	3.6 (6)
USA	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	-	-	-	-	-
Middle East	-	-	-	-	-
Rest of the world	-	-	-	-	-
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (11)</i>	<i>100.0 (16)</i>	<i>100.0 (60)</i>	<i>100.0 (81)</i>	<i>100.0 (168)</i>

In line with our assumption of retirement and pension policy remaining a national policy, figures about claims-makers (*table 4.5e*) show clearly the national character of this policy. EU claims-makers on this issue are with the exception of one single case inexistent. Remarkably little attention is being paid even to foreign national claims-makers, leaving even “horizontal Europeanisation” an almost inexistent phenomenon. The claims-makers present in the debate about retirement and pension schemes over the years are to 75 up to 100 per cent Swiss.

Table 4.5f Actor scope by year - education (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational: UN	-	-	-	-	-
Other supranational	-	2.8	-	1.4	1.0 (2)
EU	-	-	-	-	-
Other European supranational	-	-	-	-	-
Multilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Germany (incl. GDR)	-	-	-	1.4	0.5 (1)
France	23.3	11.1	7.8	6.8	10.3 (21)
United Kingdom	16.7	-	-	1.4	2.9 (6)
Italy	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	15.6	2.7	5.9 (12)
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU members	-	-	-	1.4	0.5 (1)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	-	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	56.7	75.0	76.6	74.3	72.5 (148)
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	8.3	-	-	1.5 (3)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	-	2.8	-	1.4	1.0 (2)
Turkey	-	-	-	1.4	0.5 (1)
Russia (incl. USSR)	-	-	-	-	-
USA	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	-	-	-	-	-
Middle East	-	-	-	1.4	0.5 (1)
Rest of the world	3.3	-	-	6.8	2.9 (6)
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (30)</i>	<i>100.0 (36)</i>	<i>100.0 (64)</i>	<i>100.0 (74)</i>	<i>100.0 (204)</i>

A very similar picture can be discovered looking at data of claims-makers concerning education policy (*table 4.5f*). Over the years about 75 per cent of all claims-makers within this field are Swiss actors of all actor types. French actors are fairly present within the Swiss public sphere (particularly in 1990 due to demonstrations in the context of resource scarcity at a school in the Parisian suburban area) which is due to the relative high level of attention being paid to French politics by the French speaking main newspapers of analysis (Journal de

Genève in 1990 and 1995; Le Temps in 2000 and 2002). Speaking in terms of claims-makers, vertical (top-down) Europeanisation is completely inexistent in the policy field of education.

Table 4.5g European integration: actor scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational: UN	-	-	-	0.8	0.2 (1)
Other supranational	1.2	2.0	-	-	0.4 (2)
EU	18.8	24.0	16.7	24.8	19.8 (98)
Other European supranational	14.1	8.0	4.3	2.4	5.9 (29)
Multilateral	-	-	-	0.8	0.2 (1)
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Germany (incl. GDR)	4.7	4.0	5.1	4.8	4.9 (24)
France	2.4	8.0	7.3	4.0	5.7 (28)
United Kingdom	9.4	4.0	5.1	3.2	5.3 (26)
Italy	1.2	-	-	7.2	2.0 (10)
Spain	1.2	2.0	0.4	-	0.6 (3)
Netherlands	-	-	-	0.8	0.2 (1)
Other pre-1995 EU members	4.7	2.0	1.3	0.8	1.8 (9)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	3.5	10.0	12.4	4.0	8.5 (42)
Switzerland	25.9	20.0	39.3	31.2	33.0 (163)
Upcoming enlargement countries	5.9	2.0	2.1	8.0	4.3 (21)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	3.5	2.0	0.9	2.4	1.8 (9)
Turkey	1.2	-	0.9	4.0	1.6 (8)
Russia (incl. USSR)	-	6.0	4.3	-	2.6 (13)
USA	2.4	2.0	-	0.8	0.8 (4)
Japan	-	-	-	-	-
Middle East	-	-	-	-	-
Rest of the world	-	4.0	-	-	0.4 (2)
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (85)</i>	<i>100.0 (50)</i>	<i>100.0 (234)</i>	<i>100.0 (125)</i>	<i>100.0 (494)</i>

Data in *table 4.5g* shows nicely the declining importance of other supranational European actors (other than EU actors) over our period of study. While such actors accounted for 14 per cent of claims-makers in 1990, they did so for only about 2 per cent in the year 2002. EU actors themselves hold a share of about 25 per cent of all claims-makers in that same year. We do suggest that this development is due to the relative loss of importance of other forms of European integration after the fall of the iron curtain and a strong reinforcement of the EU as the central actor and way of European integration. The share of EU actors was however relatively less in the year 2000 due to a very vivid debate within Switzerland about Swiss EU integration putting forward a large share of Swiss national actors as claims-makers in the public sphere. Austrian, Finnish and Swedish actors were relatively present in the year 1995 (their accession year) and in 2000 – in the latter year mostly due to the conflict between Austria and the EU 14 concerning FPÖ's participation in Austrian government. While claimants representing the largest European member states are more or less constantly present over the years, upcoming enlargement countries could make their voices heard especially in 1990 (right after the fall of the Iron Curtain) and more recently in 2002 – the enlargement process getting to its final phase. As already indicated above, the share of Swiss claimants was particularly high in 2000 due to, on the one hand, the debate in the context of the popular vote on bilateral agreements I between the EU and Switzerland as well as, on the other hand, due to the parliamentary debate concerning the initiative “Yes to Europe!” in Autumn 2000. Nonetheless the important share of Swiss claims-makers indicates and reflects the vivid national / internal debate about Switzerland's future integration into (EU-)Europe.

Claim-level: Action forms

Table 5.1a Forms of action by issue field (in %)

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Retirement	Education	European integration	Total (N)
Political decision	33.2	22.6	23.1	17.4	23.8	24.0	11.8	21.0 (334)
Executive action	2.9	7.0	15.7	15.7	0.6	2.0	1.1	5.4 (85)
Judicial action	-	0.5	-	-	-	2.0	-	0.3 (5)
Non-specified statement	30.3	37.1	27.1	30.6	23.1	30.6	33.0	30.7 (488)
Other verbal statement	24.4	23.1	16.6	16.5	23.8	24.5	24.9	22.6 (359)
Meeting	8.8	8.6	12.2	17.4	16.3	10.7	24.7	15.5 (246)
Direct-democratic action	0.4	0.5	3.9	2.5	10.0	1.5	3.7	3.2 (50)
Protest action	-	0.5	1.3	-	2.5	4.6	0.7	1.3 (20)
Total (N)	100.0 (238)	100.0 (186)	100.0 (229)	100.0 (121)	100.0 (160)	100.0 (196)	100.0 (457)	100.0 (1587)

As *table 5.1a* shows political decisions are most frequent as form of claims-making in monetary politics compared to all other policy fields. 33 per cent of claims are being made as political decisions, compared to the other extreme of only 12 per cent in the issue of European integration. Although this has nothing to do with a specificity of the Swiss national public sphere, one might conclude that European integration is an issue with “nothing to decide”, but rather a “forum for debate”. This interpretation seems to be supported by the high number of claims taking the form of political meetings (25 per cent), which exceeds again all other policy fields. Generally speaking, between 44 per cent (immigration) and 60 per cent (agriculture) of all claims are being made as verbal statements – either in a non-specified way or as press releases, interviews and the like. The only result particular to the Swiss case is the relative high number of claims being made in forms of direct democratic action in the fields of immigration and retirement policy. This is due to actual events – especially popular votes – within these two policy fields during our period of study. The relatively high degrees of claims taking the form of executive action (16 per cent) in the two domains of immigration and troop deployment is inherent to the logic of functioning within these policy fields.

Table 5.1b Forms of action by broad actor categories (in %)

	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Other civil society actors	General / unknown / unspecified	Total (N)
Political decision	24.6	2.2	9.7	23.4	21.0 (334)
Executive action	5.9	1.5	1.2	17.0	5.4 (85)
Judicial action	0.1	-	2.4	-	0.3 (5)
Non-specified statement	28.4	45.3	39.4	19.1	30.7 (488)
Other verbal statement	20.9	38.7	27.3	4.3	22.6 (359)
Meeting	17.8	6.6	5.5	17.0	15.5 (246)
Direct-democratic action	2.2	3.6	6.7	14.9	3.2 (50)
Protest action	0.2	2.2	7.9	4.3	1.3 (20)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (1238)	<i>100.0</i> (137)	<i>100.0</i> (165)	<i>100.0</i> (47)	<i>100.0</i> (1587)

It is inherent to the definition of political decision that state and party actors are the group of actors “using” this form of claims-making most frequently. Verbal statements remain the predominant form of claims-making not only for state and party actors but particularly for economic interest groups (84 per cent) as well as other civil society actors (67 per cent). In its majority these are verbal statements which can not further be specified. Again referring to the Swiss context it is interesting to not that in tendency it is civil society actors other than economic interest groups who use direct democratic action most often for claims-making (see *table 5.1b*).

Table 5.1c shows the absence of direct-democratic action as well as protest action at any level exceeding the national level. In terms of Europeanisation this might be interpreted as an absence of involvement of civil society (citizens) in European and more generally supranational politics/policies. Verbal statements dominate once again all levels of claims-making.

Table 5.1c Forms of action by actor scope (in %)

	Political decision	Executive action	Judicial action	Non-specified statement	Other verbal statement	Meetings	Direct-democratic act	Protest action	Total (N)
Supranational: UN	16.0	12.0	-	28.0	28.0	16.0	-	-	100.0 (25)
Other supranational	-	4.5	-	31.8	54.4	9.1	-	-	100.0 (22)
EU	24.9	4.8	-	30.2	20.1	20.1	-	-	100.0 (189)
Other European supranational	31.3	-	-	15.6	18.8	34.3	-	-	100.0 (32)
Multilateral	25.0	-	-	25.0	8.3	41.7	-	-	100.0 (12)
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
National	20.6	5.7	0.2	30.5	22.9	15.4	3.5	1.3	100.0 (1178)
Regional	22.8	1.1	3.3	41.3	14.1	5.4	8.7	3.3	100.0 (92)
Local	30.0	5.0	-	30.0	25.0	-	-	10.0	100.0 (20)
Unclassifiable	-	-	-	41.7	58.3	-	-	-	100.0 (12)
Total (N)	<i>21.1 (334)</i>	<i>5.2 (82)</i>	<i>0.3 (5)</i>	<i>30.8 (487)</i>	<i>22.7 (359)</i>	<i>15.5 (246)</i>	<i>3.1 (49)</i>	<i>1.3 (20)</i>	<i>100.0 (1582)</i>

Claim-level: Addressees

Table 6.1 Presence of addressee by issue field (in %)

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Retirement	Education	European integration	Total (N)
No indirect object actor	51.4	44.3	42.4	38.1	25.4	32.8	32.7	37.9 (636)
Addressee	20.2	19.6	26.7	22.2	32.5	32.8	31.3	27.3 (458)
Supported actor	16.2	16.0	14.8	23.0	23.7	14.2	19.6	18.0 (302)
Opponent	12.1	20.1	16.0	16.7	18.3	20.1	16.4	16.8 (282)
Total (N)	100.0 (247)	100.0 (194)	100.0 (243)	100.0 (126)	100.0 (169)	100.0 (204)	100.0 (495)	100.0 (1678)

The number of claims without the presence of an indirect object actor varies fairly strongly across issue fields (see *table 6.1*). That 51 per cent of claims in monetary politics do neither include an addressee nor a supported actor nor an opponent, is of little surprise taking into account that most claims are decisions or the communication of decisions by their very nature not calling on anyone and not being contested immediately. The contrary holds in particular for retirement policy, where only 25 per cent of claims do not involve one or several indirect object actors. Agriculture is the only policy field where the number of claims including an addressee equals the number of claims including an opponent. Whether or not this can be seen as indicator for a certain “openness” of discussion has to be left unanswered. Retirement and education policy as well as European integration prove to be those policy fields, where claims are most frequently directed at an addressee calling on him or her to leave or undertake something. Here on the other hand the speculative interpretation might be that within these policy fields, actors (with clear competences) can (more easily) be identified and called upon.

Table 6.2a shows very well the issue specific importance of certain addressees. E.g. 52 per cent of addressees in monetary politics are central banks; 35 per cent of addressees in troop deployment are the military itself. Generally speaking, the central actor being called upon, supported or opposed is the actor group government/executive with the sole exception of monetary politics.

Table 6.2a Addressees by issue field (in %)

	Monetary politics	Agri-culture	Immi-gration	Troops deployment	Retirement	Education	European integration	Total (N)
Politicians	0.8	0.9	0.7	-	0.8	-	2.7	1.2 (13)
Former states(wo)men	0.8	-	-	-	0.8	-	1.2	0.6 (6)
Government/executive	38.3	58.3	47.1	50.0	39.7	40.1	55.9	48.5 (505)
Legislative	1.7	4.6	12.9	7.7	24.6	14.6	9.9	11.0 (115)
Judiciary	-	-	2.1	-	0.8	2.2	0.3	0.8 (8)
Police and internal security agencies	-	-	1.4	-	-	-	-	0.2 (2)
Military	-	0.9	-	34.6	-	-	0.3	2.8 (29)
Central Banks	51.7	0.9	-	-	0.8	-	1.2	6.5 (68)
Social security executive organisations	-	-	-	-	0.8	-	-	0.1 (1)
Other state executive agencies	-	6.5	7.9	-	-	8.0	1.2	3.2 (33)
Political parties	-	-	4.6	1.3	12.7	2.2	3.0	3.5 (36)
<i>State and party actors</i>	<i>93.3</i>	<i>72.2</i>	<i>76.4</i>	<i>93.6</i>	<i>81.0</i>	<i>67.2</i>	<i>75.7</i>	<i>78.3 (816)</i>
Unions and employees	-	-	2.1	-	6.3	-	-	1.1 (11)
Employers organisations and firms	-	-	1.4	-	10.3	-	0.6	1.6 (17)
Farmers and agricultural organisations	-	4.6	-	-	-	-	-	0.5 (5)
Economic and financial experts	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	0.6	0.3 (3)
<i>Economic interest groups</i>	-	<i>4.6</i>	<i>3.6</i>	-	<i>17.5</i>	-	<i>1.2</i>	<i>3.5 (36)</i>
<i>Media and journalists</i>	-	<i>0.9</i>	<i>0.7</i>	-	-	<i>0.7</i>	<i>0.3</i>	<i>0.4 (4)</i>
Churches and religious organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	0.3	0.3 (3)
Education professionals and organisations	-	3.7	-	-	-	22.6	-	3.4 (35)
Other scientific and research professionals or organisations	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	-	0.1 (1)
Students, pupils, and their parents	-	0.9	-	-	-	3.6	-	0.6 (6)
Other professional organisations and groups	-	0.9	-	-	-	-	-	0.1 (1)
Consumer organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Migrant organisations and groups	-	-	6.4	-	-	0.7	-	1.0 (10)
Pro- and anti-European campaign organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.3	1.1 (11)

Solidarity and human rights organisations	-	-	-	1.3	-	-	-	0.1 (1)
Welfare organisations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Peace movement organisations and groups	-	-	-	1.3	-	-	-	0.1 (1)
Organisations and groups of the elderly	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Women's organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Environmental organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Terrorist groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rebel forces / guerrilla	-	-	-	0.7	-	-	-	0.1 (1)
Other civil society organisations and groups	-	-	-	2.1	-	-	0.6	0.5 (5)
<i>Other civil society actors</i>	-	5.6	9.3	2.6	-	29.2	4.2	7.2 (75)
Whole polities	6.7	16.7	10.0	3.8	1.6	2.9	18.6	10.7 (111)
Whole economies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
The general public	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unknown/unspecified actors	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>General / unknown / unspecified</i>	6.7	16.7	10.0	3.8	1.6	2.9	18.6	10.7 (111)
Total (N)	100.0 (120)	100.0 (108)	100.0 (140)	100.0 (78)	100.0 (126)	100.0 (137)	100.0 (333)	100.0 (1042)

Apart from being the result of actual distribution of competences this can be seen to go in line with the idea that the state has become the ultimate “responsible” for a wide range of policy domains within society.

Interestingly, in retirement policy 25 per cent of addressees are (members of) the legislative. Knowing that the debate on this policy field is almost entirely a Swiss national one, this result can be interpreted as reflecting the actual parliamentary debates concerning this policy in recent years. We might further note that employers’ and employees’ organisations as well as political parties play an oversized role in this policy field compared to other issues. This result is however not surprising, since firstly employers and employees are directly concerned by the policy and any changes of it and secondly, the issue of retirement has been a major concern of party policy in recent years. Concerning agricultural policy it is interesting to note that farmers and agricultural organisations are a marginal group of addressees, although first results from interviews with political actors suggest a central role for agricultural organisations.

Table 6.2b Addressees by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Politicians	-	1.7	2.4	0.3	1.2 (13)
Former states(wo)men	0.6	-	0.5	0.9	0.6 (6)
Government/executive	58.1	55.0	43.1	48.4	48.5 (505)
Legislative	6.3	6.7	11.8	13.9	11.0 (115)
Judiciary	1.3	-	1.2	0.3	0.8 (8)
Police and internal security agencies	-	-	0.2	0.3	0.2 (2)
Military	4.4	4.2	2.1	2.4	2.8 (29)
Central Banks	8.1	3.3	8.5	4.5	6.5 (68)
Social security executive organisations	-	-	0.2	-	0.1 (1)
Other state executive agencies	1.3	3.3	4.9	1.8	3.2 (33)
Political parties	1.9	1.7	4.0	4.2	3.5 (36)
<i>State and party actors</i>	<i>81.9</i>	<i>75.8</i>	<i>78.8</i>	<i>76.9</i>	<i>78.3 (816)</i>
Unions and employees	-	2.5	1.2	0.9	1.1 (11)
Employers organisations and firms	0.6	-	0.7	3.9	1.6 (17)
Farmers and agricultural organisations	-	1.7	0.5	0.3	0.5 (5)
Economic and financial experts	0.6	-	0.5	-	0.3 (3)
<i>Economic interest groups</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>4.2</i>	<i>2.8</i>	<i>5.0</i>	<i>3.5 (36)</i>
<i>Media and journalists</i>	-	-	<i>0.7</i>	<i>0.3</i>	<i>0.4 (4)</i>
Churches and religious organisations and groups	0.6	-	0.2	0.3	0.3 (3)
Education professionals and organisations	3.8	2.5	4.0	2.7	3.4 (35)
Other scientific and research professionals or organisations	-	-	0.2	-	0.1 (1)
Students, pupils, and their parents	-	1.7	0.5	0.6	0.6 (6)
Other professional organisations and groups	-	-	0.2	-	0.1 (1)
Consumer organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-
Migrant organisations and groups	0.6	3.3	0.5	0.9	1.0 (10)
Pro- and anti-European campaign organisations and groups	0.6	-	2.1	0.3	1.1 (11)
Solidarity and human rights organisations	-	-	0.2	-	0.1 (1)
Welfare organisations	-	-	-	-	-

Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-
Peace movement organisations and groups	-	-	-	0.3	0.1 (1)
Organisations and groups of the elderly	-	-	-	-	-
Women's organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-
Environmental organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-
Terrorist groups	-	-	-	-	-
Rebel forces / guerrilla	-	-	0.2	-	0.1 (1)
Other civil society organisations and groups	-	0.8	0.7	0.3	0.5 (5)
<i>Other civil society actors</i>	5.6	8.3	8.9	5.3	7.2 (75)
Whole polities	11.3	11.7	8.7	12.5	10.7 (111)
Whole economies	-	-	-	-	-
The general public	-	-	-	-	-
Unknown/unspecified actors	-	-	-	-	-
<i>General / unknown / unspecified</i>	11.3	11.7	8.7	12.5	10.7 (111)
Total (N)	100.0 (160)	100.0 (120)	100.0 (425)	100.0 (337)	100.0 (1042)

Figures in *table 6.2b* suggest that the importance of government/executive as addressee decreases over the years, while the importance of legislative increases over the same period of time. This however has to be seen as an effect of actual debate and issues on the agenda rather than a shift in institutional importance. Generally speaking the different groups of actors remain at stable levels in terms of their role as addressees. Given the small number of cases it seems unsustainable to speak even of an increase in the importance of economic interest groups or other civil society actors in the years 1995 and 2000.

The interpretation of *table 6.3a* has to be undertaken carefully because of the very low number of cases in most of the categories. Amongst state actors we can note however that government/executive as well as other state executive agencies get on average a slightly negative evaluation, while the legislative, central banks as well as more particularly military are on average positively evaluated. It is interesting to note that unions and employees though also on average negatively evaluated are so fairly less than employers organisations and firms which figure more frequently as criticised actors amongst addressees. Taking into account all categories of actors we note that more addressees are mentioned in a criticising way than in a supporting way, which might be due to a general tendency in political discussion as well as news reporting to focus on problems and “contradictions” rather than on “agreements”.

Table 6.3a Mean evaluation by category of addresses

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
Politicians	.00	13	0.91287
Former states(wo)men	.33	6	1.03280
Government/executive	-.10	505	0.84591
Legislative	.01	115	0.69454
Judiciary	.13	8	0.64087
Police and internal security agencies	.00	2	1.41421
Military	.28	29	0.75103
Central Banks	.03	68	0.91375
Social security executive organisations	-1.00	1	0.00000
Other state executive agencies	-.06	33	0.89928
Political parties	-.50	36	0.84515
<i>State and party actors</i>	<i>-.07</i>	<i>816</i>	<i>0.83830</i>
Unions and employees	-.09	11	1.04447
Employers organisations and firms	-.41	17	0.93934
Farmers and agricultural organisations	.20	5	1.09545
Economic and financial experts	-1.00	3	0.00000
<i>Economic interest groups</i>	<i>-.28</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>0.97427</i>
<i>Media and journalists</i>	<i>-.50</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>1.00000</i>
Churches and religious organisations and groups	.33	3	1.15470
Education professionals and organisations	-.11	35	0.83213
Other scientific and research professionals or organisations	-1.00	1	0.00000
Students, pupils, and their parents	.67	6	0.81650
Other professional organisations and groups	.00	1	0.00000
Consumer organisations and groups	-	-	-
Migrant organisations and groups	-1.00	10	0.87560
Pro- and anti-European campaign organisations and groups	-.45	11	0.82020
Solidarity and human rights organisations	1.00	1	0.00000
Welfare organisations	-	-	-
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-	-	-
Peace movement organisations and groups	-1.00	1	0.00000
Organisations and groups of the elderly	-	-	-
Women's organisations and groups	-	-	-
Environmental organisations and groups	-	-	-
Terrorist groups	-	-	-
Rebel forces / guerrilla	-1.00	1	0.00000
Other civil society organisations and groups	-.40	5	0.89443

<i>Other civil society actors</i>	<i>-.12</i>	<i>75</i>	<i>0.86930</i>
Whole polities	-.11	111	0.83504
Whole economies	-	-	-
The general public	-	-	-
Unknown/unspecified actors	-	-	-
<i>General / unknown / unspecified</i>	<i>-.11</i>	<i>111</i>	<i>0.83504</i>
<i>Total</i>	<i>-.09</i>	<i>1042</i>	<i>0.84533</i>

Table 6.3b Mean evaluation by broad addressee scope

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
Supranational: UN	.18	17	0.80896
Other supranational	.15	13	0.55470
EU	-.10	188	0.77486
Other European supranational	-.05	22	0.72225
Multilateral	.30	23	0.76484
Bilateral	-.13	15	0.83381
Germany (incl. GDR)	.06	35	0.93755
France	.00	40	0.90582
United Kingdom	.00	28	0.86066
Italy	-.38	16	0.95743
Spain	-.87	15	0.51640
Netherlands	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU members	-.14	14	0.86444
Austria, Finland, Sweden	-.08	37	0.95389
Switzerland	-.12	405	0.83297
Upcoming enlargement countries	.10	30	0.88474
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	-.24	17	0.90342
Turkey	-.56	9	0.72648
Russia (incl. USSR)	.16	25	0.94340
USA	.18	44	0.92190
Japan	-.78	9	0.44096
Middle East	-.29	7	0.75593
Rest of the world	-.29	23	0.92403
<i>Total</i>	<i>-.09</i>	<i>1401</i>	<i>0.84526</i>

Table 6.3b depicts the mean evaluation of addressees according to their scope (origin). It shows that EU addressees are on average slightly criticised, as are to a minimally lesser extent other European supranational actors, while UN or other supranational actors figure on average more frequently as supported actors. Even though here again number of cases are partly very low, it is interesting to note that German actors on average get a slightly positive evaluation, French and British actors are on average neutrally evaluated, while Italian and Spanish actors as well as actors of all other member states of the EU 15 figure more frequently as criticised than as supported actors. The total of Swiss actors, across all policy fields and all actor groups is – contrary to US actors or Russian actors – negatively evaluated.

The scopes of addressees (*table 6.4a*) reflect to a large extent the scopes of the issue fields themselves (see *table 7.3a*). Those policy fields presumable most Europeanised (monetary politics and agriculture) also show the highest share of EU addressees. The same holds – not surprisingly – for the issue of European integration itself. Within education policy European addressees are entirely absent (as are claims-makers themselves); in retirement policy completely marginal. These results go in line with our presumption concerning these policy fields as remaining nationally dominated. This interpretation is being sustained by the fact that 70 and 80 per cent respectively of addressees in these two policy fields are national Swiss actors. More surprisingly with view to the Europeanisation of policy fields European actors are completely absent in the field of troop deployment. This however also reflects the low “profile” (presence) of this policy field at the European level as expressed in the issue scopes. Not surprisingly on the other hand, US actors figure in *table 6.4a* as the most important group of addressees in troop deployment. In terms of horizontal Europeanisation of the Swiss public sphere we might note that a considerable number of addressees are of German, French or British origin – principally in the presumably Europeanised policy fields of monetary politics and agriculture. Compared to all other policy fields, least attention to national EU member state actors as addressees is being paid concerning retirement policy.

Table 6.4a Addressee scope by issue field (in %)

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Retirement	Education	European integration	Total (N)
Supranational: UN	-	-	5.0	11.5	-	0.7	-	1.6 (17)
Other supranational	1.7	2.8	-	9.0	-	-	0.3	1.2 (13)
EU	30.0	27.1	5.7	-	1.6	-	33.9	18.1 (188)
Other European supranational	-	-	2.1	-	-	-	5.7	2.1 (22)
Multilateral	5.0	2.8	4.3	-	0.8	0.7	1.8	2.2 (23)
Bilateral	3.3	4.7	3.6	1.3	-	-	-	1.4 (15)
Germany (incl. GDR)	5.8	4.7	5.0	5.1	1.6	-	3.0	3.4 (35)
France	3.3	9.3	1.4	-	3.2	8.8	2.4	3.8 (40)
United Kingdom	4.2	3.7	2.9	2.6	-	4.4	2.1	2.7 (28)
Italy	1.7	-	2.9	-	-	-	3.0	1.5 (16)
Spain	-	-	1.4	1.3	-	8.8	-	1.4 (15)
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU members	5.0	-	0.7	-	3.2	0.7	0.6	1.3 (14)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	-	-	2.9	1.3	4.0	-	8.1	3.6 (27)
Switzerland	10.0	32.7	41.4	11.5	80.2	70.1	28.2	38.9 (405)
Upcoming enlargement countries	5.8	0.9	2.1	1.3	1.6	0.7	4.5	2.9 (30)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	-	-	3.6	3.8	-	2.2	1.8	1.6 (17)
Turkey	-	-	-	5.1	-	0.7	1.2	0.9 (9)
Russia (incl. USSR)	-	0.9	2.9	6.4	4.0	-	3.0	2.4 (25)
USA	7.5	8.4	0.7	30.8	-	-	0.3	4.2 (44)
Japan	6.7	0.9	-	-	-	-	-	0.9 (9)
Middle East	0.8	-	2.9	2.6	-	-	-	0.7 (7)
Rest of the world	9.2	0.9	8.6	6.4	-	2.2	-	3.1 (32)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (120)	<i>100.0</i> (107)	<i>100.0</i> (140)	<i>100.0</i> (78)	<i>100.0</i> (126)	<i>100.0</i> (137)	<i>100.0</i> (333)	<i>100.0</i> (1041)

Table 6.4b Addressee scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational: UN	0.6	2.5	2.4	0.9	1.6 (17)
Other supranational	3.1	-	0.9	1.2	1.2 (13)
EU	20.0	14.2	21.7	13.9	18.1 (188)
Other European supranational	7.5	0.8	1.9	0.3	2.1 (22)
Multilateral	5.0	3.3	0.9	2.1	2.2 (23)
Bilateral	2.5	1.7	-	2.7	1.4 (15)
Germany (incl. GDR)	3.8	1.7	4.5	2.4	3.4 (35)
France	2.5	6.7	4.2	3.0	3.8 (40)
United Kingdom	7.5	0.8	1.4	2.7	2.7 (28)
Italy	1.9	-	0.2	3.6	1.5 (16)
Spain	-	-	2.6	1.2	1.4 (15)
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	--
Other pre-1995 EU members	1.3	0.8	1.4	1.5	1.3 (14)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	-	-	7.8	1.2	3.6 (27)
Switzerland	23.8	38.3	40.6	44.2	38.9 (405)
Upcoming enlargement countries	1.9	6.7	1.4	3.9	2.9 (30)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	2.5	5.8	0.7	0.9	1.6 (17)
Turkey	-	4.2	0.2	0.9	0.9 (9)
Russia (incl. USSR)	3.1	3.3	1.7	2.7	2.4 (25)
USA	8.1	5.0	1.7	5.3	4.2 (44)
Japan	0.6	-	1.2	0.9	0.9 (9)
Middle East	3.8	-	0.2	-	0.7 (7)
Rest of the world	0.6	4.2	2.4	4.7	3.1 (32)
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (160)</i>	<i>100.0 (120)</i>	<i>100.0 (424)</i>	<i>100.0 (337)</i>	<i>100.0 (1041)</i>

While it is difficult to identify a clear trend for any addressee scope or level, *table 6.4b* seems to suggest a constant increase in importance of national Swiss addressees from 1990 to 2002. This is most probably the consequence of issues being discussed during the different years, e.g. considerable debates about agricultural reform in Switzerland in 1995, Swiss European

integration debate and immigration law reform in 2000 or again debates about pension reform in 2002. Furthermore our data shows that non-EU supranational addressees who accounted for about 8 per cent of addressees in 1990 have lost significance as addressees by 2002, which might indicate the loss of importance within politics itself. The high presence of Austria, Sweden and Finland as addressee in 2000 is certainly due to the debates around the participation of the FPÖ in Austrian government and therewith time specific. Taking into account all addressees of EU member state origin (pre-1995) a fairly important dimension of horizontal Europeanisation at the level of addressees can be observed over the years (1990: 17 per cent; 2000: 14 per cent; 2002: 14 per cent) even though recent stability was preceded by a minor degree of presence of EU member state addressees in 1995 (10 per cent).

Most interestingly *table 6.4c* shows that it is state actor addressees who enter the Swiss public sphere most frequently as addressees regardless of their scope (even though with very large differences) while other specific actor groups are less present as addressees. To an important degree this is certainly the consequence of the above mentioned distribution of power as well as the tendency of holding the state responsible as the main player in public life. To what degree however this result also reflects access difficulties of foreign civil society actors to the Swiss public sphere remains open to speculation and further investigation. 72 per cent of all economic interest group addressees as well as 61 per cent of other civil society actors are of Swiss origin. Among all addressees from EU member states it is French economic interest groups which are most often addressed, supported or opposed.

Table 6.4c Addressee scope by broad addressee categories (in %)

	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society actors	General / unknown / unspecified	Total (N)
Supranational: UN	1.5	-	-	1.3	3.6	1.6 (17)
Other supranational	1.3	-	-	-	1.8	1.2 (13)
EU	18.0	2.8	-	1.3	35.1	18.1 (188)
Other European supranational	2.3	-	-	-	2.7	2.1 (22)
Multilateral	1.6	2.8	-	2.7	6.3	2.2 (23)
Bilateral	1.0	-	-	2.7	4.5	1.4 (15)
Germany (incl. GDR)	3.7	2.8	25.0	-	2.7	3.4 (35)
France	3.4	8.3	25.0	6.7	2.7	3.8 (40)
United Kingdom	2.5	2.8	25.0	6.7	0.9	2.7 (28)
Italy	1.8	-	-	-	0.9	1.5 (16)
Spain	1.3	-	-	4.0	0.9	1.4 (15)
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU members	1.6	-	-	-	0.9	1.3 (14)
Austria, Finland, Sweden	3.8	5.6	-	-	3.6	3.6 (27)
Switzerland	38.0	72.2	25.0	61.3	19.8	38.9 (405)
Upcoming enlargement countries	2.6	-	-	2.7	6.3	2.9 (30)
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	2.0	-	-	1.3	-	1.6 (17)
Turkey	1.0	-	-	-	0.9	0.9 (9)
Russia (incl. USSR)	2.8	-	-	1.3	0.9	2.4 (25)
USA	5.0	-	-	-	2.7	4.2 (44)
Japan	0.9	-	-	-	1.8	0.9 (9)
Middle East	0.9	-	-	-	-	0.7 (7)
Rest of the world	2.9	2.8	-	8.0	0.9	3.1 (32)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (815)	<i>100.0</i> (36)	<i>100.0</i> (4)	<i>100.0</i> (75)	<i>100.0</i> (111)	<i>100.0</i> (1041)

Claim-level: Issues and aims

Table 7.1 Issue field by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Monetary politics	13.1	17.6	14.5	14.6	14.8 (247)
Agriculture	12.7	10.4	13.1	9.5	11.6 (194)
Immigration	16.2	10.0	13.3	17.0	14.5 (243)
Troop deployment	9.3	15.8	4.8	6.5	7.4 (126)
Retirement and pension schemes	4.2	7.2	9.2	15.1	10.1 (161)
Education	11.6	16.3	9.7	13.8	12.2 (204)
European integration	32.8	22.6	35.4	23.4	29.5 (495)
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (259)</i>	<i>100.0 (221)</i>	<i>100.0 (663)</i>	<i>100.0 (535)</i>	<i>100.0 (1678)</i>

Amongst the 7 issue fields under study, the meta-issue of European integration accounts clearly for the largest share of claims. This was particularly so in 1990 due to, on the one hand, general debate about Europe getting closer together after the fall of the Iron Curtain – either in an EU or other supranational form and secondly due to the starting debate about Swiss membership in the European Economic Area. In the year 2000 the issue of European integration reached high visibility due to the popular vote on bilateral agreements as well as a starting parliamentary discussion concerning the initiative “Yes to Europe!” later in that year. In order to get a more detailed insight we shall now look at the different sub-issues figuring in public debate over the years of study.

Table 7.2a suggests that the issue of exchange rate interventions has lost importance over the years falling from 35 per cent of all claims within monetary politics in 1990 to 19 per cent in 2002. Contrary to this development the presence of the issue “common currency” follows fairly well the actual policy development (introduction of the common European currency) becoming more present also in the Swiss public sphere over the years of study and accounting for 21 per cent of claims in 2002. This result is not particularly surprising, as Switzerland – as an export-oriented economy – has a vivid interest in the economic performance of its most important business partners. At the same time, and inherently to the issue, the debate about European monetary system and European exchange rate mechanism loose significance and disappear completely. Hand in hand with the significant presence of issues concerning

common currency in 2002, issues of European Monetary Union convergence criteria and stability pact account also for almost one fourth of claims on monetary politics in 2002. The extraordinary importance of interest rate adjustments in the year 2000 may only be explained with the actual economic development during this year.

Table 7.2a Monetary politics: issues within issue field by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
General unspecific	5.9	7.7	3.1	6.4	5.3 (13)
Interest rate adjustments	20.6	33.3	53.1	24.4	36.4 (90)
EMU convergence criteria and stability pact	-	12.8	1.0	23.1	9.7 (24)
EMS / ERM	14.7	2.6	-	-	2.4 (6)
Exchange rate intervention	35.3	28.2	22.9	19.2	24.3 (60)
Independence central banks	2.9	-	1.0	1.3	1.2 (3)
Eurozone-outsiders: relations with “pre-ins” (ERM2) and accession states		-	2.1	-	0.8 (2)
Common Currency (ECU, Euro)	5.9	10.3	14.6	20.5	14.6 (36)
Dynamics of Euro campaigns	-	-	-	-	-
Other specific	14.7	5.1	2.1	5.1	5.3 (13)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (34)	<i>100.0</i> (39)	<i>100.0</i> (96)	<i>100.0</i> (78)	<i>100.0</i> (247)

Table 7.2b Agriculture: issues within issue field by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Reform of the system of subsidies	18.2	56.5	-	23.5	16.0 (31)
Subsidies and enlargement of the European Union	-	-	4.6	5.9	3.6 (7)
Subsidies and international trade	69.7	-	3.4	39.2	23.7 (46)
BSE	9.1	34.8	71.3	7.8	39.7 (77)
Foot and mouth disease	3.0	-	13.8	2.0	7.2 (14)
Other diseases	-	-	2.3	13.7	4.6 (9)
Quotas for livestock and dairy production	-	8.7	4.6	7.8	5.2 (10)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (33)	<i>100.0</i> (23)	<i>100.0</i> (87)	<i>100.0</i> (51)	<i>100.0</i> (194)

Agriculture proves to be a very little incremental policy domain, but rather characterised by large shifts of attention from certain issues to others. While in 1990 70 per cent of claims are concerned with subsidies and international trade largely due to the GATT negotiations including agriculture, the 1995 debate is dominated almost exclusively by two issues: a national debate about the reform of the subsidies system in the context of popular votes on an agricultural constitutional article and BSE. The latter is the predominant issue in the year 2000, however with a focus “across the borders”, particularly Germany, France and the United Kingdom, touched by a major BSE crisis. In 2002 once again subsidies in the context of international trade as well as a reform of the subsidies system resurface in public debate accounting together for 63 per cent of all claims. This is on the one hand due to public debate following the Doha Round of WTO negotiations and on the other hand it is the reflection of Swiss internal debate about the continuation of the subsidies reform as foreseen in the agricultural programme “AP 2007”.

Table 7.2c Immigration: issues within issue field by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
General evaluation or policy direction	7.1	-	1.1	3.3	2.9 (7)
Institutional framework, responsibilities, procedures, costs	7.1	4.8	10.2	12.1	9.9 (24)
Entry and border controls	19.0	33.3	9.1	22.0	17.8 (43)
Expulsion/deportation	16.7	42.9	29.5	17.6	24.0 (58)
Migration programs and quotas	21.4	4.8	20.5	13.2	16.5 (40)
Role of third parties in preventing migration	-	4.8	-	4.4	2.1 (5)
Visa and consular policy	23.8	9.5	9.1	17.6	14.9 (36)
Actions relating to smuggling and illegal entry	2.4	-	12.5	9.9	8.7 (21)
Other specific issues	2.4	-	8.0	-	3.3 (8)
<i>Total (N)</i>	<i>100.0 (42)</i>	<i>100.0 (21)</i>	<i>100.0 (88)</i>	<i>100.0 (91)</i>	<i>100.0 (242)</i>

Also in immigration policy, sub-issues vary largely between the different years of study. E.g. the issue of expulsion/deportation accounts for 43 per cent in 1995 due to and still for 30 per cent of claims within the issue of immigration in the year 2000 while it was much less important in 1990 and 2002. The importance of this issue limited in time is most probably due to public discourse about the repatriation of asylum seekers from Ex-Yugoslavia, who had

been granted temporary admission in Switzerland. It is important to note that Switzerland saw two popular votes on migration issues in 2000 as well as 2002. The debates around the “18% initiative” (2000) as well as the “asylum initiative” (2002) made reference to different aspects which accounts at least partly for the irregular pattern of sub-issues, as portrayed in *table 7.2c*.

Table 7.2d Troop deployment: issues within issue field by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
General unspecific reference to deployment of troops	-	2.9	15.6	-	4.8 (6)
Deployment of troops for military aggression against / attack on foreign sovereign territory	-	2.9	-	60.0	17.5 (22)
Deployment of troops for military invasion of foreign sovereign territory	12.5	-	15.6	2.9	7.1 (9)
Deployment of troops in covert aggressive operations against perceived hostile regimes/groups	12.5	8.6	-	11.4	7.9 (10)
Deployment of troops for peace-keeping	4.2	82.9	50.0	11.4	39.7 (50)
Deployment of troops to rescue/protect civilians facing aggression	-	2.9	3.1	2.9	2.4 (3)
Deployment of troops in times of crisis, civil emergency or in response to catastrophic events	-	-	-	-	-
Deployment of troops for non-military humanitarian purposes	-	-	3.1	-	0.8 (1)
Deployment of troops in the context of military alliances	62.5	-	-	-	11.9 (15)
Other specific reference to deployment of troops	8.3	-	12.5	11.4	7.9 (10)
<i>Total (N)</i>	<i>100.0 (24)</i>	<i>100.0 (35)</i>	<i>100.0 (32)</i>	<i>100.0 (35)</i>	<i>100.0 (126)</i>

Concerning troop deployment, *table 7.2d* points out particular situations and actions undertaken in each of the years under study. Only a small part of these events are being caused by Swiss internal policy. This is the case in 2000 in the discussion about the reform of Swiss army foreseeing the deployment of armed Swiss military for peace keeping. The absolute predominance of peace keeping in 1995 is related to vivid public debate about potential the engagement of US and British troops in Bosnia. The sub-issue deployment of troops in the context of military alliances highlights clearly its historical dimension due to the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the cold war: 63 per cent of claims in 1990 treated this issue, while none did so, neither in 1995, nor in 2000 or 2002. 2002 on the other hand is dominated by claims concerning the deployment of troops for military aggression against or attack on foreign sovereign territory – which reflects of course the debate and action

concerning Iraq – and via the deployment of troops in covert aggressive operations against perceived hostile regimes action and debate under the title of fight against terrorism.

Table 7.2e Retirement and pension schemes: issues within issue field by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
General	-	-	-	1.2	0.6 (1)
Demographic changes: ageing population	18.2	6.3	1.6	1.2	3.0 (5)
Retirement age	-	25.0	21.3	9.9	14.8 (25)
Income levels in retirement, poverty in retirement	9.1	-	1.6	1.2	1.8 (3)
State versus private pension schemes	18.2	-	-	-	1.2 (2)
State pension scheme	54.5	56.3	65.6	50.6	56.8 (96)
Private pension scheme	-	-	6.6	35.8	19.5 (33)
Other specific	-	12.5	3.3	-	2.4 (4)
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (11)</i>	<i>100.0 (16)</i>	<i>100.0 (61)</i>	<i>100.0 (81)</i>	<i>100.0 (169)</i>

While several sub-issues come into play in the debate about retirement and pension schemes the predominant aspect within all years is the theme of state pension scheme(s). Generally this high level is largely due to national Swiss debates, as the predominance of Swiss actors in this issue field suggests. In 2002 e.g. the debate about the state pension scheme is dominated by a discussion about the usage of gold reserves for the financing of first pillar pension schemes. As well in 2002 a second theme gains importance: private pension schemes. This is largely the effect of discussions about the lowering of minimal interest rate in second pillar pension schemes taking place in this particular year. The issue of retirement age gained surface in public debate in 1995 in the context of the 10th revision of pension law which introduced a higher retirement age for women. In the year 2000 two popular initiatives – one suggesting more flexible retirement ages, the other opposing the raise of retirement age for women – have been subject to federal vote.

Table 7.2f Issues within issue field by year – education (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
General unspecific	-	-	1.6	2.7	1.5 (3)
Structural issues	3.3	27.8	10.9	9.5	12.3 (25)
Resource allocation	30.0	25.0	29.7	17.6	24.5 (50)
Private education	10.0	-	1.6	2.7	2.9 (6)
Administrative power allocation	-	13.9	-	13.5	7.4 (15)
Curriculum	3.3	8.3	21.9	12.2	13.2 (27)
Information and communication technologies	-	2.8	-	1.4	1.0 (2)
Scholarships and fees	-	2.8	-	2.7	1.5 (3)
Problems at school	40.0	-	7.8	2.7	9.3 (19)
Other specific issues	13.3	19.4	26.6	35.1	26.5 (54)
<i>Total (N)</i>	<i>100.0 (30)</i>	<i>100.0 (36)</i>	<i>100.0 (64)</i>	<i>100.0 (74)</i>	<i>100.0 (204)</i>

Table 7.2f offers a fairly fragmented picture. It shows however that public discourse about resource allocation is an important issue in all years of study, though to varying degrees. The second most important category, particularly in recent years, is however the “other specific issues” dimension, containing a large variety of issues such as e.g. the promotion of female education in developing countries. Neither the issue of information and communication technologies nor the topic scholarships and fees is of any significant importance in any of the years under study.

Debates about European identity or the balance between different policy areas and tasks within the EU are of marginal importance in the Swiss public sphere (see *table 7.2g*). In terms of debate about Swiss European integration it is particularly the debate about membership in the European Economic Area which accounts for the high level of debate concerning associational agreements with the EU in 1990. In the year 2000 in terms of Swiss European policy, the bilateral agreements I between the EU and Switzerland are the predominant issue, since a popular vote took place in the middle of the mentioned year. By 2002 it is particularly the large debate about a second round of bilateral agreements which engenders the high score in this sub-issue. Two more interesting trends can be observed in the data presented in *table*

7.2g. First, non-EU forms of European integration become more and more marginalised, particularly from 1995 onwards. Second, and contrary to the first, the issue of EU enlargement (including genuine Swiss debate about eventual EU membership) increases over the years of study and accounts for 34 per cent of claims within the field of European integration. Surprisingly neither the EU internal debate about a future constitution, nor about institutional structure and the relationship between EU institutions are very present in the Swiss public sphere. The same holds generally speaking for questions of the role of specific countries within the EU – except in the year 2000: The debate about Haider and FPÖ’s participation in Austrian government had found high resonance within the Swiss media transmitted public sphere.

Table 7.2g Issues within issue field by year – European integration (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
General European integration, not specific	2.4	14.0	2.6	8.0	5.1 (25)
National versus European identity, shared values	-	-	0.4	0.8	0.4 (2)
Role of a specific country and balance of power between member states	9.4	2.0	27.2	3.2	15.6 (77)
Relationship between EU and national/regional levels, future constitution	3.5	10.0	6.8	6.4	6.5 (32)
Institutional structure and relationship between EU institutions	-	8.0	3.4	4.0	3.4 (17)
Defending the EU’s core tasks / balance between different policy areas	4.7	-	0.4	-	1.0 (5)
Relationship between EU institutions and public	-	-	0.4	3.2	1.0 (5)
Enlargement	12.9	18.0	20.4	34.4	22.4 (111)
Budget: Financing the EU and spending EU funds	-	4.0	0.4	-	0.6 (3)
Other specific EU integration	2.4	6.0	2.6	-	2.2 (11)
Associational agreements and treaties between the EU and non-EU countries	40.0	18.0	26.4	32.0	29.3 (145)
Personnel issues within the EU / discussions about candidates for EU positions	-	-	0.4	3.2	1.0 (5)
Non-EU forms of European integration	24.7	20.0	8.5	4.8	11.5 (57)
<i>Total (N)</i>	<i>100.0 (85)</i>	<i>100.0 (50)</i>	<i>100.0 (235)</i>	<i>100.0 (125)</i>	<i>100.0 (495)</i>

Table 7.3a Issue scope by policy field (in %)

	Monetary policy	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Pensions and retirement	Education	EU Integration	Total (N)
Supranational UN	-	-	2.9	22.2	-	-	-	2.1 (35)
Other supranational	0.8	18.6	0.4	10.3	-	-	-	3.1 (52)
EU	49.0	16.0	13.6	1.6	2.4	1.0	88.1	37.5 (629)
Other European supranational	-	-	1.2	-	-	-	11.9	3.7 (62)
Multilateral	3.2	4.1	6.6	27.0	1.8	1.5	-	4.3 (72)
Bilateral	6.5	10.8	11.9	38.9	-	2.9	-	7.2 (121)
Germany	0.8	5.2	2.9	-	1.2	1.0	-	1.4 (23)
France	1.2	9.3	1.6	-	1.8	10.8	-	3.0 (50)
UK	2.0	3.1	1.2	-	0.6	3.4	-	1.3 (22)
Italy	-	-	4.9	-	-	-	-	0.7 (12)
Spain	-	0.5	1.6	-	-	6.9	-	1.1 (19)
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU-members	0.8	-	1.6	-	1.8	-	-	0.5 (9)
AUT, SF, SWE	0.4	-	4.1	-	4.7	-	-	1.1 (19)
Switzerland	8.1	29.4	28.4	-	81.1	70.1	-	25.4 (426)
Upcoming enlargement countries	5.7	-	0.8	-	1.2	-	-	1.1 (18)
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	0.8	0.5	4.5	-	-	-	-	0.8 (14)
Turkey	-	-	0.4	-	-	0.5	-	0.1 (2)
Russia	-	0.5	0.8	-	3.6	-	-	0.5 (9)
USA	6.9	-	2.5	-	-	-	-	1.4 (23)
Japan	5.3	-	0	-	-	-	-	0.8 (13)
Middle East	0.4	-	1.2	-	-	0.5	-	0.3 (5)
Rest of the world	8.1	2.1	6.6	-	-	1.5	-	2.6 (43)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (247)	<i>100.0</i> (194)	<i>100.0</i> (243)	<i>100.0</i> (126)	<i>100.0</i> (169)	<i>100.0</i> (204)	<i>100.0</i> (495)	<i>100.0</i> (1678)

Apart from the field of European integration that is per definition Europeanised, three other policy fields are characterised by a relatively high degree of Europeanised claims: monetary politics, and – to a lesser extent – agriculture and immigration (*table 7.3a*). Not surprisingly given the formal competences of the EU in this field, almost half of the claims regarding monetary politics have a European scope whereas claims referring either to Switzerland or an EU-member state are clearly less important and even outweighed by claims referring to countries outside of Europe. By contrast, non-European countries play almost no role in the field of agriculture. Claims in this policy field still have quite a strong national focus – be it on Switzerland or on EU-members. This can probably be explained by the many claims on animal diseases, and most notably BSE (*see table 7.2b*), which were above all regulated by national agencies. There is, however, also a considerable degree of both Europeanisation and internationalisation in claims-making on agricultural policy in Swiss newspapers (16 per cent and 18.6 per cent respectively). This finding can be explained by the European prerogatives in the field of agriculture on the one hand, and the GATT/WTO negotiations in the period of our study, on the other hand. As in the field of agriculture, claims on immigration topics predominantly refer to Switzerland, but the share of claims referring to EU-member states is also relatively high. Claims with an EU-scope, for their part, are somewhat less important than in the two other policy fields, but still exceed 10 per cent of all claims on immigration. On the contrary, Europeanisation is virtually absent in claims-making on troop deployment, pensions and educational matters. Whereas troop deployment is subject to internationalisation (about 30 per cent of claims have a supranational scope) or at least involves a coalition of several countries (bilateral and multilateral scopes), claims-making on pensions and education is clearly nationally-confined, and in the majority of cases to Switzerland. This result is not surprising since both policy fields remain to date in the hands of the national legislators. Interestingly enough, more than a fifth of all claims on educational matters refer to an EU-country, which points to a certain degree of horizontal Europeanisation.

Table 7.3b Issue scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational UN	0.4	5.0	2.3	1.5	2.1 (35)
Other supranational	9.7	1.4	1.2	3.0	3.1 (52)
EU	30.9	23.1	44.8	37.6	37.5 (629)
Other European supranational	8.9	5.0	3.2	1.3	3.7 (62)
Multilateral	5.0	9.0	3.0	3.6	4.3 (72)
Bilateral	13.1	9.5	5.3	5.8	7.2 (121)
Germany	1.5	0.5	2.1	0.7	1.4 (23)
France	2.7	4.5	3.5	1.9	3.0 (50)
UK	2.3	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.3 (22)
Italy	1.5	-	0.5	0.9	0.7 (12)
Spain	-	-	2.0	1.1	1.1 (19)
Other pre-1995 EU-members	0.4	-	0.2	1.3	0.5 (9)
AUT, SF, SWE	0.8	0.5	1.1	1.7	1.1 (19)
Switzerland	16.6	29.0	23.2	30.8	25.4 (426)
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	5.4	0.2	0.9	1.1 (18)
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	1.5	-	1.4	0.2	0.8 (14)
Turkey	-	-	-	0.4	0.1 (2)
Russia	0.8	0.5	0.2	0.9	0.5 (9)
USA	0.8	0.5	1.5	1.9	1.4 (23)
Japan	0.8	0.5	0.9	0.7	0.8 (13)
Middle East	0.8	-	0.2	0.4	0.3 (5)
Rest of the world	1.5	5.0	2.6	2.1	2.6 (43)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (259)	<i>100.0</i> (221)	<i>100.0</i> (663)	<i>100.0</i> (535)	<i>100.0</i> (1678)

The process of integration in Europe has accelerated and deepened over the past decade and we therefore would expect an increased trend towards Europeanisation in political claims-making. The figures reported in *table 7.3b* however give a contradictory picture in this respect. Whereas claims referring to foreign countries inside or outside the EU remain

relatively stable over time, internationalisation (i.e. supranational scopes) is only half as important in 2002 than in 1990. This finding can to a large extent be related to the high degree of claims on agricultural policy during the GATT negotiations in 1990 (see *tables 7.2b* above and *7.4b* below). As far as Europeanisation is concerned, no clear trend can be discerned. Europeanised claims (EU-scope and European supranational) amount to about 40 per cent in 1990 and 2002, but their share clearly declines in 1995 (28 per cent) and reaches with 48 per cent of all claims a peak in the year 2000. This culmination is due to several very intensively debated European integration topics in 2000 (such as the sanctions against Austria or the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU, see *table 7.2g*) and is also reflected in the relative importance of European integration compared to other policy fields in the year 2000 (see *table 7.1*). Note also the relative decline of claims with a scope that refers to European supranational institutions other than the EU (e.g. Council of Europe, OSZE) over the years (see also *table 7.2g*). By contrast, national claims confined to Switzerland steadily increase during the last decade and amount to almost one third of all claims in the year 2002. This finding contradicts our assumption that a process of de-nationalisation (either towards more internationalisation or more Europeanisation) is taking place over the years. The reason behind this pattern in the scope variable is to be found in *table 7.1* above. In fact, the topic of European integration is relatively less important in 2002 than in previous years whereas the fields of education and pensions hold a comparatively high share of claims in the year 2002 and are predominantly confined to Switzerland.

In conclusion, the changing pattern points to the fact that the degree and forms of de-nationalisation over the years are dependent upon the political agenda and the prevalent political controversies of the moment (e.g. referendum vote on bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU in 2000, parliamentary debates and vote on popular initiative regarding the Swiss pension scheme in 2002 etc.).

As reported in *table 7.4a*, there is a clear trend towards Europeanisation in the field of monetary politics, European scopes rising from 29 per cent in 1990 up to 58 per cent in 2002. This trend nicely reflects the progressive creation of the European Monetary Union that entered the first stage in 1990 and was completely realised in 2002 with the introduction of the single European currency. Whilst claims involving two or more countries (bilateral and multilateral scopes) decrease during the period from 1990-2002, Swiss national claims-making on monetary politics has at the same time been reinforced. This could be due to the

recent economic recession in Switzerland that prompted many claimants to ask the Swiss National Bank to adjust its monetary policy in order to boost the economy.

Table 7.4a Monetary politics: issue scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational UN	-	-	-	-	-
Other supranational	5.9	-	-	-	0.8 (2)
EU	29.4	25.6	58.3	57.7	49.0 (121)
Other European supranational	-	-	-	-	-
Multilateral	17.6	5.1	-	-	3.2 (8)
Bilateral	26.5	5.1	2.1	3.8	6.5 (16)
Germany	2.9	-	1.0	-	0.8 (2)
France	-	7.7	-	-	1.2 (3)
UK	-	2.6	2.0	2.6	2.0 (5)
Italy	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU-members	2.9	-	1.0	-	0.8 (2)
AUT, SF, SWE	-	-	1.0	-	0.4 (1)
Switzerland	2.9	5.1	8.3	11.5	8.1 (20)
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	25.6	-	5.1	5.7 (14)
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	-	-	2.1	-	0.8 (2)
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-
Russia	-	-	-	-	-
USA	5.9	2.6	7.3	9.0	6.9 (17)
Japan	5.9	2.6	6.3	5.1	5.3 (13)
Middle East	-	-	1.0	-	0.4 (1)
Rest of the world	-	17.9	9.4	5.1	8.1 (20)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (34)	<i>100.0</i> (39)	<i>100.0</i> (96)	<i>100.0</i> (78)	<i>100.0</i> (247)

Table 7.4b Agriculture: issue scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational UN	-	-	-	-	-
Other supranational	66.7	-	-	27.5	18.6 (36)
EU	9.1	-	17.2	25.5	16.0 (31)
Other European supranational	-	-	-	-	-
Multilateral	3.0	4.3	6.9	-	4.1 (8)
Bilateral	3.0	-	18.4	7.8	10.8 (21)
Germany	-	-	11.5	-	5.2 (10)
France	-	-	20.7	-	9.3 (18)
UK	-	4.3	4.6	2.0	3.1 (6)
Italy	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU-members	-	-	1.1	-	0.5 (1)
AUT, SF, SWE	-	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	15.2	91.3	13.8	37.3	29.4 (57)
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	-	-	-	-
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	-	-	1.1	-	0.5 (1)
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-
Russia	3.0	-	-	-	0.5 (1)
USA	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	-	-	-	-	-
Middle East	-	-	-	-	-
Rest of the world	-	-	4.6	-	2.1 (4)
Total	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>
(N)	<i>(33)</i>	<i>(23)</i>	<i>(87)</i>	<i>(51)</i>	<i>(194)</i>

Claims-making on agricultural matters is particularly illustrative of our earlier conclusion that the degree and forms of de-nationalisation vary according to the predominant public debates in a specific year. In 1990, claims-making about agriculture is strongly internationalised whereas national Swiss claims are dominant in 1995. In 2000, the strong focus on EU-member states is striking whereas the part of internationalised, Europeanised and national claims is quite balanced in the year 2002. These trajectories can easily be related to the prevalent agricultural “events” in each year under study: GATT negotiations in 1990, a referendum vote on a federal law on agriculture in Switzerland in 1995, and the BSE crisis in several European countries in 2000. The year 2002, finally, was characterised by a public

debate about milk quotas in Switzerland, the post-Doha agenda of the WTO, and a debate about the reform of the CAP at the EU level.

Table 7.4c Immigration: issue scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational UN	-	4.5	5.7	1.1	2.9 (7)
Other supranational	-	-	-	1.1	0.4 (1)
EU	7.1	4.5	9.1	23.1	13.6 (33)
Other European supranational	4.8	-	-	1.1	1.2 (3)
Multilateral	-	13.6	6.8	7.7	6.6 (16)
Bilateral	16.7	22.7	9.1	9.9	11.9 (29)
Germany	7.1	4.5	1.1	2.2	2.9 (7)
France	-	4.5	-	3.3	1.6 (4)
UK		-	1.1	2.2	1.2 (3)
Italy	9.5	-	3.4	5.5	4.9 (12)
Spain	-	-	3.4	1.1	1.6 (4)
Other pre-1995 EU-members	-	-	.	4.4	1.6 (4)
AUT, SF, SWE	-	4.5	1.1	6.6	4.1 (10)
Switzerland	23.8	13.6	43.2	19.8	19.8 (18)
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	4.5	1.1	-	0.8 (2)
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	9.5	-	6.8	1.1	4.5 (11)
Turkey	-	-	-	1.1	0.4 (1)
Russia	2.4	4.5	-	-	0.8 (2)
USA	-	-	3.4	3.3	2.5 (6)
Japan	-	-	-	-	-
Middle East	4.8	-	-	1.1	1.2 (3)
Rest of the world	9.5	18.2	4.5	4.4	6.6 (16)
<i>Total (N)</i>	<i>100.0 (42)</i>	<i>100.0 (22)</i>	<i>100.0 (88)</i>	<i>100.0 (91)</i>	<i>100.0 (243)</i>

Claims-making in the field of immigration seems to be subject to a trend towards more Europeanisation over the period 1990-2002 (*table 7.4c*). On the one hand, claims involving

two or several countries (bilateral/multilateral scopes) or countries from outside the EU decrease over time. On the other hand, claims with an EU-scope or referring to an EU-member state become increasingly important over the same period. The growing attention devoted to national claims-making in EU-countries or at the EU level may be related to the integration of the Schengen Acquis into the legal and institutional framework of the EU by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and a sort of “footrace” between Western-European countries, leading towards more restrictive laws and a growing interest in public debates in other European countries. With the exception of the year 2000, national claims-making on the topic of immigration does not fluctuate a lot. The peak of nationally-confined claims-making in 2000 can largely be explained by a federal vote on a popular initiative calling for a “control of immigration” in Switzerland.

Table 7.4d Troop deployment: issue scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational UN	4.2	28.6	31.3	20.0	22.2 (28)
Other supranational	4.2	8.6	25.0	2.9	10.3 (13)
EU	-	-	-	5.7	1.6 (2)
Other European supranational	-	-	-	-	-
Multilateral	25.0	34.3	15.6	31.4	27.0 (34)
Bilateral	66.7	28.5	28.1	40.0	38.9 (49)
Germany	-	-	-	-	-
France	-	-	-	-	-
UK	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU-members	-	-	-	-	-
AUT, SF, SWE	-	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	-	-	-	-	-
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	-	-	-	-
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-
Russia	-	-	-	-	-
USA	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	-	-	-	-	-
Middle East	-	-	-	-	-
Rest of the world	-	-	-	-	-
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (24)</i>	<i>100.0 (35)</i>	<i>100.0 (32)</i>	<i>100.0 (35)</i>	<i>100.0 (126)</i>

In all years, claims-making on troop deployment predominantly is a bilateral or multilateral matter involving two or more countries, but is also subject to a process of internationalisation

because the UN as well as Nato are increasingly implicated in claims on troop deployment over the years.

Table 7.4e Pensions and retirement: issue scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational UN	-	-	-	-	-
Other supranational	-	-	-	-	-
EU	-	-	6.6	-	2.4 (4)
Other European supranational	-	-	-	-	-
Multilateral	-	6.3	3.3	-	1.8 (3)
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	-	-	1.6	1.2	1.2 (2)
France	-	12.5	-	1.2	1.8 (3)
UK	-	-	-	1.2	0.6 (1)
Italy	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU-members	-	-	-	3.7	1.8 (3)
AUT, SF, SWE	-	-	8.2	3.7	4.7 (8)
Switzerland	100	75.0	78.7	81.5	81.1 (137)
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	6.3	-	1.2	1.2 (2)
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-
Russia	-	-	1.6	6.2	3.6 (6)
USA	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	-	-	-	-	-
Middle East	-	-	-	-	-
Rest of the world	-	-	-	-	-
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (11)</i>	<i>100.0 (16)</i>	<i>100.0 (61)</i>	<i>100.0 (81)</i>	<i>100.0 (169)</i>

As shown in *table 7.4e*, de-nationalisation does not affect claims-making on retirement and pension schemes. Over all years under study, claims in this policy field predominantly concern questions related to the Swiss pension scheme whereas only a handful of claims refer to other European countries. This is to say that debates on other countries' pension systems are of no relevance in Switzerland even though most Western-European countries have to face similar problems in this policy field (retirement ages, demographic decline, problems of financing etc.). This predominance of claims referring to Switzerland can be explained by fact

that federal votes on the Swiss pension system were held in all years under study except from 1990⁴.

Table 7.4f Education: issue scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational UN	-	-	-	-	-
Other supranational	-	-	-	-	-
EU	-	2.8	-	1.4	1.0 (2)
Other European supranational	-	-	-	-	-
Multilateral	-	2.8	1.6	1.4	1.5 (3)
Bilateral	3.3	11.1	-	1.4	2.9 (6)
Germany	-	-	1.6	1.4	1.0 (2)
France	23.3	11.1	7.8	8.1	10.8 (22)
UK	20.0	-	-	1.4	3.4 (7)
Italy	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	14.1	6.8	6.9 (14)
Other pre-1995 EU-members	-	-	-	-	-
AUT, SF, SWE	-	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	53.3	72.2	75.0	71.6	70.1 (143)
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	-	-	-	-
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	-	-	-	1.4	0.5 (1)
Russia	-	-	-	-	-
USA	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	-	-	-	-	-
Middle East	-	-	-	1.4	0.5 (1)
Rest of the world	-	-	-	4.1	1.5 (3)
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (30)</i>	<i>100.0 (36)</i>	<i>100.0 (64)</i>	<i>100.0 (74)</i>	<i>100.0 (204)</i>

In Switzerland, educational matters still are in the hands of national (higher education) and regional (primary and secondary school) agencies. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the lion's share of claims-making in this policy field is related to Switzerland. Interestingly enough, the part of these national claims is growing over the years (*table 7.4f*) whereas educational matters in

⁴ 22.9.2002: federal vote on the "Gold initiative" and the counter-project "Gold for pensions, cantons and foundation"; 26.11.2000: federal votes on the popular initiatives "For flexible retirement ages for men and women as of the age of 62" and "For a more flexible old age insurance – against an increase of female retirement ages up to 65"; 25.6.1995: federal vote on the popular initiative "For the expansion of old age and invalidity insurances" and on the federal law on the old age insurance.

EU-member states get slightly less attention in the year 2002 as compared to 1990. In the light of recent controversies in most Western countries about the PISA-study, this relative reinforcement of national claims-making on education is somewhat unexpected.

Table 7.4g European Integration: issue scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational UN	-	-	-	-	-
Other supranational	-	-	-	-	-
EU	75.3	78.0	91.1	95.2	88.1 (436)
Other European supranational	24.7	22.0	8.9	4.8	11.9 (59)
Multilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	-	-	-	-	-
France	-	-	-	-	-
UK	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU-members	-	-	-	-	-
AUT, SF, SWE	-	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	-	-	-	-	-
Upcoming enlargement countries	-	-	-	-	-
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-
Russia	-	-	-	-	-
USA	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	-	-	-	-	-
Middle East	-	-	-	-	-
Rest of the world	-	-	-	-	-
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(85)	(50)	(235)	(125)	(495)

Table 7.4g confirms the above-mentioned results (table 7.2g): as shown by the growing importance of EU-scopes, the EU becomes more and more important compared to other supranational European institutions such as the Council of Europe, OSCE or the EBRD. This move is above all due to the changing position of the Eastern European countries of the former Warsaw pact in Europe. Whereas Western European countries excluded the possibility of EU membership of these countries in 1990 and looked for alternative forms of association, Eastern enlargement of the EU became increasingly important in claims-making on European integration topics (see table 7.2g), shifting the scope of the debate from other forms of European integration to the EU level.

Claim-level: Position regarding European integration

Table 8.1 Position regarding European integration by policy field and year

Issue field	Year	Mean position	N
Monetary politics	1990	.21	19
	1995	.12	33
	2000	.23	81
	2001	.07	87
	2002	.26	82
	<i>Total</i>	<i>.18</i>	<i>302</i>
Agriculture	1990	.40	5
	1995	-.25	4
	2000	.21	29
	2001	.00	28
	2002	-.05	20
	<i>Total</i>	<i>.07</i>	<i>86</i>
Immigration	1990	.55	11
	1995	.33	9
	2000	.08	13
	2001	.13	46
	2002	.05	42
	<i>Total</i>	<i>.15</i>	<i>121</i>
Troop deployment	1990	-	-
	1995	.00	2
	2000	.71	7
	2001	.75	4
	2002	.17	6
	<i>Total</i>	<i>.47</i>	<i>19</i>
Retirement and pension schemes	1990	-	-
	1995	1.00	1
	2000	.17	6
	2001	.00	2
	2002	.33	3
	<i>Total</i>	<i>.25</i>	<i>12</i>
Education	1990	-	-
	1995	1.00	3
	2000	.00	2
	2001	.25	8
	2002	.00	2
	<i>Total</i>	<i>.33</i>	<i>15</i>
European integration	1990	.57	161
	1995	.51	96
	2000	.25	539
	2001	.30	307
	2002	.33	268
	<i>Total</i>	<i>.33</i>	<i>1371</i>
Overall total	1990	.53	196
	1995	.40	148
	2000	.25	677
	2001	.23	482
	2002	.27	423
	<i>Total</i>	<i>.29</i>	<i>1926</i>

Table 8.1 indicates the mean position regarding the European integration process over time and policy fields. In general, claims in Swiss newspapers rather advocate a deepened integration process and extended rights and competences of EU institutions. However, this overall support for increasing European integration is declining over the years; a pattern that is most visible in the field of European integration itself. This trend can be explained in two ways. On the one hand, recent years have brought about conflictive debates such as the sanctions against Austria or the reform of the European institutions prior to Eastern enlargement whereas at the beginning of the '90ies, the political agenda was dominated by a broad consensus to associate in some form or another the former countries of the Warsaw pact. On the other hand, more and more issues have been incorporated in the supranational institutional framework of the EU over the last years (i.e. realisation of the EMU, asylum and immigration matters), making a further transfer of national prerogatives to the EU level more and more difficult to realise. In other policy fields, the absence of clear trends either in favour or against a deepened integration process suggests that the positions towards EU integration are rather unstable and dependent upon the political agenda of the moment.

Claims-makers appearing in Swiss newspapers are overall in favour of extended rights and competences of EU institutions (*table 8.2*). However, this mean support for a deepened integration process varies according to the degree of institutionalisation of public actors. Thus, state and party actors most often make claims that positively refer to the EU whereas civil society actors and organisations are more sceptical, but still in favour of deepened European integration. This finding can probably be related to the fact that national state actors in general and executives in particular are – according to the literature (see for example Moravcsik 1994 in Della Porta 2003: 24) – the primary beneficiaries of European integration whereas new constraints are imposed upon national civil society actors, which could result in more reticent attitudes and claims towards the integration process.

Table 8.2 Position regarding European integration by actor type

Actor type	Mean position	N
Politicians	-.31	32
Former states(wo)men	.29	28
Government/executive	.40	928
Legislative	.28	207
Judiciary	.67	9
Police and internal security agencies	.25	4
Military	1.00	3
Central banks	.21	104
Other state executive agencies	.20	74
Political parties	.07	134
<i>State and party actors</i>	.32	1523
Unions and employees	.33	15
Employers organisations and firms	.22	41
Farmers and agricultural organisations	.00	10
Economists and financial experts	.18	50
<i>Economic interest groups</i>	.20	116
<i>Media and journalists</i>	.18	130
Churches and religious organisations	-.75	4
Educational professionals and organisations	.33	6
Other scientific research professionals and institutions	.21	33
Students, pupils, and their parents	.00	1
Other professional organisations and groups	.50	8
Consumer organisations and groups	.00	2
Migrant organisations and groups	.00	1
Pro- and anti-European campaign organisations and groups	.20	30
Solidarity and human rights organisations	.25	4
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-1.00	1
Environmental organisations and groups	.50	2
Other civil society organisations and groups	-.12	17
<i>Other civil society actors</i>	.14	109
Whole polities	.39	28
Whole economies	-	-
The general public	.00	6
Unknown/unspecified actors	.07	14
<i>General/unknown/unspecified</i>	.25	48
<i>Overall total</i>	.29	1926

Not surprisingly, European claimants and upcoming enlargement countries that aspire membership in the EU most often plead for an extension of the integration process and the competences of EU institutions (*table 8.3*). Swiss actors' positions are comparable to those of German, French or Italian claimants even though Switzerland has had a more ambiguous attitude towards the EU than the core members of the EU, and has witnessed many controversies about its future in Europe during the last decade (referendum vote on bilateral agreements with the EU in May 2000, vote on the popular initiative "Yes to Europe" in March 2001). Only Russian claimants can be said to be sceptical about European integration because they most often negatively refer to the EU. This challenging attitude of Russian actors is probably to be explained by the quarrels between Russia and the EU concerning transit rights

of Russians who have to travel through the future Eastern European member countries of the EU in order to get from the enclave Kaliningrad to their motherland.

Table 8.3 Position regarding European integration by actor scope

Actor scope	Mean position	N
Supranational: UN	.25	12
Other supranational	.29	17
EU	.43	457
Other European supranational	.62	66
Multilateral	.67	9
Bilateral	-	-
Germany	.26	133
France	.25	80
UK	.06	82
Italy	.30	27
Spain	-.13	8
Netherlands	.13	8
Other pre-1995 EU-members	.19	59
AUT, SF, SWE	.03	113
Switzerland	.24	624
Upcoming enlargement countries	.45	85
Other European countries (ex CIS)	.59	41
Turkey	.26	23
Russia	-.24	25
USA	.50	8
Japan	-.33	3
Middle East	.00	1
Rest of the world	.13	23
<i>Total</i>	.29	<i>1904</i>

Table 8.4 shows the average position of Swiss party actors⁵ towards European integration as well as its evolution over time. Two findings deserve to be commented in more detail. First, support for European integration is clearly related to the left-right cleavage in Switzerland. The period of our study covers three major political debates about Switzerland's relations with the EU: the preparation of the EEA-agreement throughout the year 1990, the referendum vote on the bilateral agreements in May 2000, and the vote on the popular initiative "Yes to Europe!" that called for the immediate opening of membership negotiations with the EU⁶. Among the parties forming the governmental coalition – SPS, CVP, FDP and SVP – the Social-Democrats have always been advocating Swiss membership in the EU and thus also campaigned for the EEA-agreement, the bilateral agreements with the EU and the popular initiative "Yes to Europe!".

⁵ Note that "party actor" does not exclusively refer to claims made by political parties, but also by each other person with a party affiliation.

⁶ Note that a 2nd round of bilateral agreements with the EU was opened in June 2001 on ten further subjects. These negotiations are still ongoing and all governmental parties but the SVP in general endorse them.

Table 8.4 Position regarding European integration by party affiliation and by year

Party affiliation	Year	Mean position regarding EU integration	N
None or irrelevant	1990	.43	23
	1995	.33	18
	2000	.39	132
	2001	.12	86
	2002	.15	66
	<i>Total</i>	.27	325
Grüne Partei der Schweiz	1990	-	0
	1995	-	0
	2000	1.00	1
	2001	1.00	1
	2002	-	-
	<i>Total</i>	1.00	2
Sozialdemokratische Partei	1990	.00	2
	1995	1.00	2
	2000	.87	16
	2001	.88	8
	2002	.40	10
	<i>Total</i>	.71	38
Evangelische Volkspartei	1990	-	0
	1995	-	0
	2000	1.00	2
	2001	-	0
	2002	-	0
	<i>Total</i>	1.00	2
Christlich-soziale Partei	1990	-	0
	1995	-	0
	2000	-	0
	2001	1.00	1
	2002	-	0
	<i>Total</i>	1.00	1
Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei	1990	.80	10
	1995	.67	3
	2000	.47	30
	2001	.19	21
	2002	.25	8
	<i>Total</i>	.42	72
Freisinnig-demokratische Partei	1990	.38	16
	1995	.80	10
	2000	.18	33
	2001	.15	26
	2002	.00	14
	<i>Total</i>	.24	99
Schweizerische Volkspartei	1990	.33	3
	1995	-1.00	4
	2000	-.25	28
	2001	-.64	11
	2002	-.50	10
	<i>Total</i>	-.39	56
Libérale Partei der Schweiz (LPS)	1990	1.00	1
	1995	-	0
	2000	1.00	1
	2001	1.00	2
	2002	-	0
	<i>Total</i>	1.00	4

Schweizer Demokraten	1990	-	0
	1995	-	0
	2000	-.67	3
	2001	-	0
	2002	-	0
	<i>Total</i>	-.67	3
Freiheits-Partei	1990	-	0
	1995	-	0
	2000	.00	1
	2001	-	0
	2002	-	0
	<i>Total</i>	.00	1
Lega dei Ticinesi	1990	-	0
	1995	-	0
	2000	-1.00	1
	2001	-	0
	2002	-	0
	<i>Total</i>	-1.00	1
Other left-wing parties	1990	-	0
	1995	-	0
	2000	-1.00	1
	2001	-	0
	2002	-	0
	<i>Total</i>	-1.00	1
Other right-wing parties	1990	-	0
	1995	-	0
	2000	-1.00	2
	2001	-	0
	2002	-	0
	<i>Total</i>	-1.00	2
Other	1990	.00	2
	1995	-	0
	2000	-	0
	2001	-	0
	2002	-	0
	<i>Total</i>	.00	2
Missing	1990	.50	2
	1995	-	0
	2000	.00	3
	2001	-	0
	2002	.00	1
	<i>Total</i>	.17	6
Overall total	1990	.46	63
	1995	.38	39
	2000	.28	261
	2001	.15	163
	2002	.12	119
	<i>Total</i>	.24	645

The CVP, a bourgeois party situated in the centre of the political spectrum, took a more ambiguous position towards the EU than the SPS. While siding with the pro-Europeans at the occasion of the three “European votes” and pleading for EU-membership at a party congress in April 1998, the Christian-Democrats had to face the problem of factionalism within their party. In fact, not less than 17 out of 26 cantonal sections of the CVP rejected the initiative

“Yes to Europe” against the recommendation of the national party. The FDP, a liberal party on the centre-right, also took a primarily pro-European stance by supporting both the EEA-agreement and the bilateral agreements with the EU ten years later. However, all but two cantonal sections (Geneva and Vaud) combated the popular initiative “Yes to Europe”. The SVP, finally, has distinguished itself as the major anti-European party in Switzerland since the tentative of the Swiss government to join the EEA agreement. This anti-European profile notwithstanding, the national party recommended a yes-vote to the bilateral agreements in 2000, but 14 cantonal sections diverged from this voting recommendation.

Second, *table 8.4* nicely reflects that the party support for European integration has eroded over time. Against their earlier support for EU membership, CVP and FDP became increasingly sceptical and now exclude to join the EU in the middle run. Even the pro-European Social-Democrats seem to be more reticent towards the European integration process than ten years ago. Whereas the shift of the bourgeois parties has to be seen in the light of the euro-scepticism of their constituencies and the electoral success of the SVP’s campaign for an independent and neutral Switzerland, the leftist parties’ growing reticence is rather the result of disenchantment with the EU and its achievements.

Claim-level: Object actors

Table 9.1 Presence of object actor by policy field (in %)

	Monetary policy	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Pensions and retirement	Education	EU Integration	Total (N)
No object actor	24.7	23.7	5.3	11.1	16.6	12.3	16.6	16.0 (269)
Object actor present	75.3	76.3	94.7	88.9	83.4	87.7	83.4	84.0 (1409)
Total (N)	100.0 (247)	100.0 (194)	100.0 (243)	100.0 (126)	100.0 (169)	100.0 (204)	100.0 (495)	100.0 (1678)

As shown by *table 9.1*, more than four fifth of all claims have an object actor, i.e. they imply consequences on the rights and competences of other actors. Object actors are even more often present in claims-making on immigration topics whereas monetary policy and agricultural matters have less often consequences on clearly identifiable actors. This is because the immediate effects of interest rate adjustments, for instance, are difficult to evaluate and can concern the whole economy, firms, consumers, or the public in general whereas decisions on immigration almost always have some consequences on the rights of migrants.

Table 9.2a confirms our above-mentioned remark that many instances of claims-making on monetary policy do not affect clearly identifiable actors since more than 80 per cent of all claims have an unspecified object actor. Similar are the findings in the field of European integration and, to a lesser extent, troop deployment where claims however often have some effect on the military. In all other policy fields – agriculture, immigration, pensions and education – particular social groups and organisations are generally concerned by claims-making: farmers, migrants, elderly people, educational professionals and students respectively. These policy fields involve thus more often civil society actors than claims on monetary or European topics that are less directed towards a specific social group.

Table 9.2a Object actor type by policy field (in %)

	Monetary policy	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Pensions and retirement	Education	EU Integration	Total (N)
Politicians	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	0.3 (4)
Former states(wo)men	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.1 (1)
Government/executive	3.8	2.7	0.9	3.6	4.3	4.5	11.1	5.5 (77)
Legislative	-	-	0.4	-	0.7	1.7	2.2	1.0 (14)
Judiciary	-	-	0.4	-	0.7	-	-	0.1 (2)
Police and internal security agencies	-	-	4.8	-	-	-	-	0.8 (11)
Military	1.1	-	0.4	25.9	-	-	0.2	2.2 (31)
Central banks	7.0	7.4	-	-	-	-	0.2	1.8 (25)
Social security executive organisations	-	-	-	-	12.8	-	-	1.3 (18)
Other state executive agencies	-	-	1.7	-	0.7	1.1	0.5	0.6 (9)
Political parties	-	-	0.9	0.9	0.7	-	0.2	0.4 (5)
<i>State and party actors</i>	<i>10.8</i>	<i>10.1</i>	<i>9.6</i>	<i>30.4</i>	<i>19.9</i>	<i>7.3</i>	<i>15.7</i>	<i>14.0</i> <i>(197)</i>
Unions and employees	0.5	-	0.9	-	14.9	0.6	1.0	2.1 (29)
Employers organisations and firms	4.3	4.7	0.9	-	7.1	1.1	2.7	2.8 (40)
Farmers and agricultural organisations	0.5	56.1	0.9	-	0.7	-	0.2	6.2 (88)
Economists and financial experts	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Economic interest groups</i>	<i>5.4</i>	<i>60.8</i>	<i>2.6</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>22.7</i>	<i>1.7</i>	<i>3.9</i>	<i>11.1</i> <i>(157)</i>
<i>Media and journalists</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>2.6</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>0.2</i>	<i>0.5</i> <i>(7)</i>
Churches and religious organisations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Educational professionals and organisations	-	-	-	-	0.7	36.3	-	4.8 (67)
Other scientific research professionals and institutions	-	-	-	-	-	1.7	-	0.2 (3)
Students, pupils, and their parents	-	4.7	-	-	-	42.5	0.2	6.0 (84)
Other professional organisations and groups	-	0.7	0.9	-	-	0.6	0.2	0.4 (5)
Consumer organisations and groups	-	7.4	-	-	0.7	-	0.5	1.0 (14)
Migrant organisations and groups	-	-	63.0	-	-	0.6	-	10.4 (146)

Pro- and anti-European campaign organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	0.3 (4)
Organisations and groups of the elderly	-	-	-	-	39.0	-	-	3.9 (55)
Women's organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	5.7	1.1	-	0.7 (10)
Solidarity and human rights organisations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Environmental organisations and groups	-	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	0.1 (1)
Rebel forces/guerilla	-	-	0.9	4.5	-	-	-	0.5 (7)
Other civil society organisations and groups	0.5	0.7	3.0	-	3.5	1.1	1.2	1.5 (21)
<i>Other civil society actors</i>	<i>0.5</i>	<i>14.2</i>	<i>68.3</i>	<i>4.5</i>	<i>49.6</i>	<i>83.8</i>	<i>3.1</i>	<i>29.6</i> <i>(417)</i>
Whole politics	37.6	6.8	9.6	62.5	2.8	4.5	68.8	33.2 (468)
Whole economies	41.9	-	1.3	-	2.1	2.8	1.9	6.9 (97)
The general public	3.8	8.1	6.1	2.7	2.8	-	6.3	4.7 (66)
Unknown/unspecified actors	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>General/unknown/unspecified</i>	<i>83.3</i>	<i>14.9</i>	<i>17.0</i>	<i>65.2</i>	<i>7.8</i>	<i>7.3</i>	<i>77.0</i>	<i>44.8</i> <i>(631)</i>
Overall total (N)	<i>100.0</i> <i>(186)</i>	<i>100.0</i> <i>(148)</i>	<i>100.0</i> <i>(230)</i>	<i>100.0</i> <i>(112)</i>	<i>100.0</i> <i>(141)</i>	<i>100.0</i> <i>(179)</i>	<i>100.0</i> <i>(413)</i>	<i>100.0</i> <i>(1409)</i>

Table 9.2b Object actor type by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Politicians	-	0.5	0.5	-	0.3 (4)
Former states(wo)men	-	-	-	0.2	0.1 (1)
Government/executive	4.1	2.1	7.7	4.8	5.5 (77)
Legislative	0.9	1.6	0.4	1.6	1.0 (14)
Judiciary	-	-	0.4	-	0.1 (2)
Police and internal security agencies	0.9	-	1.3	0.5	0.8 (11)
Military	1.4	3.7	3.0	0.9	2.2 (31)
Central banks	5.9	1.1	0.7	1.4	1.8 (25)
Social security executive organisations	-	-	1.4	2.3	1.3 (18)
Other state executive agencies	0.9	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.6 (9)
Political parties	-	-	0.4	0.2	0.4

					(5)
<i>State and party actors</i>	14.0	9.5	16.8	12.2	14.0 (197)
Unions and employees	0.9	1.6	1.4	3.6	2.1 (29)
Employers organisations and firms	2.3	1.1	3.2	3.4	2.8 (40)
Farmers and agricultural organisations	6.8	6.3	5.9	6.3	6.2 (88)
Economists and financial experts	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Economic interest groups</i>	10.0	9.0	10.6	13.4	11.1 (157)
<i>Media and journalists</i>	-	-	1.1	0.2	0.5 (7)
Churches and religious organisations	-	-	-	-	-
Educational professionals and organisations	2.7	5.8	3.9	6.3	4.8 (67)
Other scientific research professionals and institutions	0.5	0.5	0.2	-	0.2 (3)
Students, pupils, and their parents	9.0	7.4	5.4	4.5	6.0 (84)
Other professional organisations and groups	-	-	0.7	0.2	0.4 (5)
Consumer organisations and groups	-	-	2.2	0.5	1.0 (14)
Migrant organisations and groups	12.2	8.5	8.4	12.7	10.4 (146)
Pro- and anti-European campaign organisations and groups	-	0.5	0.5	-	0.3 (4)
Organisations and groups of the elderly	3.6	3.7	4.3	3.6	3.9 (55)
Women's organisations and groups	-	2.1	0.4	0.9	0.7 (10)
Solidarity and human rights organisations	-	-	-	-	-
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-	-	-	-	-
Environmental organisations and groups	-	0.5	-	-	0.1 (1)
Rebel forces/guerilla	-	1.6	0.4	0.5	0.5 (7)
Other civil society organisations and groups	0.5	1.6	2.3	0.9	1.5 (21)
<i>Other civil society actors</i>	28.5	32.3	28.7	30.2	29.6 (417)
Whole polities	37.1	34.9	32.3	31.7	33.2 (468)
Whole economies	4.5	11.1	5.4	8.2	6.9 (97)
The general public	5.9	3.2	5.2	4.1	4.7 (66)
Unknown/unspecified actors	-	-	-	-	-
<i>General/unknown/unspecified</i>	47.5	49.2	42.8	44.0	44.8 (631)
Overall total (N)	100.0 (221)	100.0 (189)	100.0 (558)	100.0 (441)	100.0 (1409)

Table 9.2b shows the object actors of political claims-making over time. In almost all categories, the figures are quite stable over time and do not follow a clear trend. Minor fluctuations seem to correlate with table 7.1 that displays the proportion of claims in a policy field over the years. Since some groups of actors are the object of claims-making in only one specific policy field (for instance migrants in immigration policy), they appear to be frequent object actors in the years when the respective policy field happens to be particularly prominent (f.ex. immigration in 1990 and in 2002).

Table 9.3a Evaluation by object actor type

Actor type	Mean evaluation	N
Politicians	-.50	4
Former states(wo)men	-1.00	1
Government/executive	.06	77
Legislative	.50	14
Judiciary	.00	2
Police and internal security agencies	.55	11
Military	.03	31
Central banks	.16	25
Social security executive organisations	.39	18
Other state executive agencies	-.22	9
Political parties	-.40	5
<i>State and party actors</i>	.12	197
Unions and employees	.48	29
Employers organisations and firms	.08	40
Farmers and agricultural organisations	.05	88
Economists and financial experts	-	-
<i>Economic interest groups</i>	.13	.13
<i>Media and journalists</i>	-.29	7
Churches and religious organisations	-	-
Educational professionals and organisations	.31	67
Other scientific research professionals and institutions	1.00	3
Students, pupils, and their parents	.54	84
Other professional organisations and groups	.00	5
Consumer organisations and groups	.64	14
Migrant organisations and groups	-.10	146
Pro- and anti-European campaign organisations and groups	.25	4
Solidarity and human rights organisations	-	-
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-	-
Organisations and groups of the elderly	.25	55
Women's organisations and groups	.70	10
Environmental organisations and groups	-1.00	1
Rebel forces / guerilla	.00	7
Other civil society organisations and groups	.29	21
<i>Other civil society actors</i>	.22	417
Whole polities	.42	468
Whole economies	.66	97
The general public	.47	66
Unknown/unspecified actors	-	-
<i>General/unknown/unspecified</i>	.46	631
<i>Overall total</i>	.30	1409

With the exception of migrants, all types of actors are positively affected by claims-making (*table 9.3a*)⁷. This is especially true for the legislative, students and educational professionals as well as for consumer organisations, unions and employees, the elderly and women's groups. The latter three groups of actors are the privileged beneficiaries of claims-making in the field of pensions and retirements, which – as we have seen in *table 7.4e* – is a debate predominantly confined to the Swiss borders. This result might be related to a vote on two popular initiatives in November 2000, one of them calling for flexible retirement ages for men and women, the other combating a planned rise of women's retirement ages.

Table 9.3b Evaluation by object actor scope

Object actor scope	Mean evaluation of object actor	N
Supranational: UN	-.43	7
Other supranational	-.14	14
EU	.40	207
Other European supranational	.33	24
Multilateral	.13	115
Bilateral	-	0
Germany	.05	41
France	.36	53
UK	.26	27
Italy	-.33	9
Spain	-.25	4
Netherlands	-	0
Other pre-1995 EU-members	.14	21
AUT, SF, SWE	.29	51
Switzerland	.46	472
Upcoming enlargement countries	.33	61
Other European countries (ex CIS)	.36	56
Turkey	.05	19
Russia	.26	38
USA	.63	24
Japan	.40	20
Middle East	-.12	50
Rest of the world	-.03	95
<i>Total</i>	<i>.30</i>	<i>1408</i>

Claims-making not only is beneficial to almost all types of actors, but profits to most actors independently of their geographical origin (*table 9.3b*). Interestingly enough, European actors and actors from outside the EU (such as Swiss, US-Americans and Japanese) are more positively affected by claims-making than are actors from EU member states or from countries aspiring at EU accession whereas claims seem to imply rather negative

⁷ The mean evaluation is also negative as far as politicians, former states(wo)men, other state executives, political parties, journalists and environmental groups are concerned, but these figures should not be interpreted because of the very small number of cases.

consequences for supranational actors and other non-European actors (Middle East, rest of the world).

Table 9.4a Object actor scope by policy field (in %)

	Monetary policy	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Pensions and retirement	Education	EU Integration	Total (N)
Supranational UN	-	-	-	6.3	-	-	-	0.5 (7)
Other supranational	-	7.4	0.4	1.8	-	-	-	1.0 (14)
EU	25.3	16.9	2.6	-	1.4	-	30.8	14.7 (207)
Other European supranational	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.8	1.7 (24)
Multilateral	1.6	6.1	30.6	8.9	2.1	2.2	3.9	8.2 (115)
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	8.1	5.4	2.2	4.5	1.4	1.1	1.0	2.9 (41)
France	2.2	14.2	-	-	2.8	10.6	1.2	3.8 (53)
UK	3.8	3.4	0.4	1.8	0.7	3.4	1.2	1.9 (27)
Italy	-	0.7	1.3	0.9	-	-	1.0	0.6 (9)
Spain	-	-	0.4	1.8	-	0.6	-	0.3 (4)
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU-members	7.0	0.7	0.4	-	2.8	0.6	0.2	1.5 (21)
AUT, SF, SWE	2.2	-	-	-	2.8	-	10.4	3.6 (51)
Switzerland	12.4	31.8	13.5	7.1	80.1	74.3	28.3	33.5 (472)
Upcoming enlargement countries	7.0	2.0	3.9	2.7	1.4	1.7	6.8	4.3 (61)
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	2.2	-	9.6	17.9	-	-	2.4	4.0 (56)
Turkey	-	-	1.7	-	-	0.6	3.4	1.3 (19)
Russia	-	1.4	6.1	1.8	4.3	-	3.4	2.7 (38)
USA	9.1	0.7	-	5.4	-	-	-	1.7 (24)
Japan	9.7	1.4	-	-	-	-	-	1.4 (20)
Middle East	0.5	-	8.3	25.9	-	0.6	-	3.6 (50)
Rest of the world	9.1	8.1	18.3	13.4	-	4.5	0.2	6.7 (95)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (186)	<i>100.0</i> (148)	<i>100.0</i> (229)	<i>100.0</i> (112)	<i>100.0</i> (141)	<i>100.0</i> (179)	<i>100.0</i> (413)	<i>100.0</i> (1408)

Table 9.4a resonates well with our earlier findings: claims-making on monetary politics, agriculture and European integration topics involves a considerable portion of EU actors and therefore seems to undergo a process of Europeanisation. Public discourse on immigration and education, on the contrary, predominantly affect national Swiss actors and can be considered as (Swiss) home politics. Troop deployment and immigration, for their part, should rather be classified as foreign or international politics since claims-making in these fields impact most often on non-European national (or multilateral) actors.

The literature on the Europeanisation of national public spheres assumes that European topics and actors increasingly become part of national public debates (see for example Gerhards 2000). *Table 9.4b* shows whether this holds true for the object actors of political claims-making, i.e. the actors whose interests and rights would be affected if the claim were realised. However, our findings do not provide evidence for an increased involvement of European actors over time. In fact, claims-making pertains to the interests and competences of EU actors in about the same proportion in 1990 than in 2002 whereas other European supranational actors are less and less concerned by political claims. Conversely, claims increasingly have consequences upon Swiss actor's interests in the same time span. This finding is coherent with the results reported in *table 7.3b* where claims confined to Switzerland augmented as a result of the relative importance of public discourse on pensions and educational matters.

Table 9.4b Object actor scope by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Supranational UN	-	3.7	-	-	0.5 (7)
Other supranational	5.0	0.5	0.4	-	1.0 (14)
EU	13.6	10.1	18.8	12.0	14.7 (207)
Other European supranational	6.3	1.6	0.7	0.7	1.7 (24)
Multilateral	13.1	4.2	6.5	9.5	8.2 (115)
Bilateral	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	3.6	-	3.4	3.2	2.9 (41)
France	4.1	5.3	5.0	1.4	3.8 (53)
UK	4.1	0.5	2.2	1.1	1.9 (27)
Italy	0.5	-	0.2	1.6	0.6 (9)
Spain	-	-	0.4	0.5	0.3 (4)
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-
Other pre-1995 EU-members	0.5	1.1	2.3	1.1	1.5 (21)
AUT, SF, SWE	0.5	0.5	8.4	0.5	3.6 (51)
Switzerland	20.8	33.3	36.2	36.6	33.5 (472)
Upcoming enlargement countries	4.5	7.9	1.3	6.6	4.3 (61)
Other European countries (ex. CIS)	4.5	9.5	3.9	1.4	4.0 (56)
Turkey	1.8	0.5	0.4	2.7	1.3 (19)
Russia	5.4	3.2	1.6	2.5	2.7 (38)
USA	1.8	1.6	1.4	2.0	1.7 (24)
Japan	4.1	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.4 (20)
Middle East	2.7	1.6	1.1	8.0	3.6 (50)
Rest of the world	3.2	13.8	5.0	7.7	6.7 (95)
Total (N)	<i>100.0</i> (221)	<i>100.0</i> (189)	<i>100.0</i> (558)	<i>100.0</i> (440)	<i>100.0</i> (1408)

Claim-level: Frames

Table 10.1a Presence of frame by policy field (in %)

	Monetary policy	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Pensions and retirement	Education	EU Integration	Total (N)
No frame	91.7	92.0	92.6	100.0	91.7	86.7	76.7	81.2 (1570)
Frame present	8.3	8.0	7.4	0.0	8.3	13.3	23.3	18.8 (364)
Total (N)	100.0 (303)	100.0 (87)	100.0 (121)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (12)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (1377)	100.0 (1934)

Since frames were only coded for claims referring to the topic of European integration itself or if one of the six substantive policy fields had a European issue scope, the presence of frames is highest in the field of European integration (*table 10.1a*). In general, it is also worth noting that most claims do not have any frame at all. This means that most claimants do not have a clear idea about what the EU should (not) be or what it is good for, but they rather keep the topic in perspective.

Table 10.1b Presence of frame by broad actor type (in %)

	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society actors	General/unknown/unspecified	Total (N)
No frame	81.5	86.4	76.3	74.3	87.5	81.2 (1570)
Frame present	18.5	13.6	23.7	25.7	12.5	18.8 (364)
Total (N)	100.0 (1528)	100.0 (118)	100.0 (131)	100.0 (109)	100.0 (48)	100.0 (1934)

Table 10.1b provides two interesting results. Since frames were only coded if a claim had a European issue scope, *table 10.1b* reveals the agents of Europeanised claims. In fact, eight out of ten Europeanised claims stem from state and party actors whereas civil society actors are only in 6 per cent of the cases at the origin of Europeanised claims ($109/1934 \cdot 100$). Thus, this finding provides support for those who assert that the relative resources of different actors at

the national level define their attitudes towards Europeanisation and their tendency to voice them in the public sphere (see for a discussion Della Porta 2003: 24-25). Civil society actors who have relatively few resources seem to have fewer opportunities to voice their opinions on Europeanisation than the powerful state actors. But *if* civil society actors can voice their concerns about Europeanisation, then they more often frame their claims than state actors, thus answering the question what Europe is or should be.

Table 10.2a Frame type by policy field (in %)

	Monetary policy	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Pensions and retirement	Education	EU Integration	Total (N)
Identity, normative and value frames	8.3	14.3	33.3	-	-	50.0	25.5	24.5 (89)
Constitutional and governance frames	16.7	14.3	22.2	-	-	-	26.2	25.0 (91)
Economic frames	54.2	71.4	11.1	-	-	-	13.4	17.0 (62)
Other instrumental frames	8.3	-	33.3	-	100.0	50.0	17.8	17.6 (64)
Historical frames	4.2	-	-	-	-	-	4.7	4.4 (16)
Frames internal to the integration process	8.3	-	-	-	-	-	12.5	11.5 (42)
Total (N)	<i>100.0 (24)</i>	<i>100.0 (7)</i>	<i>100.0 (9)</i>	<i>- (0)</i>	<i>100.0 (1)</i>	<i>100.0 (2)</i>	<i>100.0 (321)</i>	<i>100.0 (364)</i>

As *table 10.2a* indicates, claims on monetary politics put forward the concrete economic (dis)advantages of European integration such as price stability or economic growth whereas identity and constitutional frames are dominant in the field of European integration. Further analysis show that these frames are above all linked to debates about the legal framework of the EU before and after the Nice summit on the one hand, and to controversies following the sanctions against Austria and its role in the EU on the other hand. Associational agreements between EU and non-EU countries (among which the bilateral negotiations between Switzerland and the EU figure most prominently), on the contrary, are mostly framed in economic terms. This also explains to a large part why economic frames peak in the year 2000, the time of the Swiss referendum vote against the bilateral agreements with the EU, as can be seen in *table 10.2b* below⁸.

⁸ Note that the distribution of other frame types cannot be interpreted correctly because of the very small number of cases.

Table 10.2b Frame type by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	Total (N)
Identity, normative and value frames	32.7	11.4	24.4	25.4	24.6	24.5 (89)
Constitutional and governance frames	22.4	34.3	19.4	28.8	32.8	25.0 (91)
Economic frames	14.3	11.4	21.9	15.3	11.5	17.0 (62)
Other instrumental frames	20.4	22.9	18.1	11.9	16.4	17.6 (64)
Historical frames	8.2	2.9	3.1	6.8	3.3	4.4 (16)
Frames internal to the integration process	2.0	17.1	13.1	11.9	11.5	11.5 (42)
<i>Total (N)</i>	<i>100.0 (49)</i>	<i>100.0 (35)</i>	<i>100.0 (160)</i>	<i>100.0 (59)</i>	<i>100.0 (61)</i>	<i>100.0 (364)</i>

Over the years, economic and other instrumental frames seem to slightly loos in importance as compared to identity and constitutional frames (*table 10.2b*). Thus, claimants more and more ask what the EU is and should (not) be than what the EU is good or bad for. This relative shift in the importance of different frame types might be due to the upcoming enlargement of the EU. In this context, the Europeans have to think of how this wider union can be governed, how the institutions have to be reformed and what can be done to increase the legitimacy of the EU on the background of growing scepticism in many member states.

Table 10.2c Frame type by broad actor type (in %)

	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society actors	General/unkno wn/unspecified	Total (N)
Identity, normative and value frames	24.4	6.3	35.5	17.9	50.0	24.5 (89)
Constitutional and governance frames	26.1	25.0	19.4	25.0	-	25.0 (91)
Economic frames	14.5	62.5	12.9	21.4	16.7	17.0 (62)
Other instrumental frames	18.7	-	9.7	21.4	33.3	17.6 (64)
Historical frames	4.6	-	3.2	7.1	-	4.4 (16)
Frames internal to the integration process	11.7	6.3	19.4	7.1	-	11.5 (42)
<i>Total (N)</i>	<i>100.0 (283)</i>	<i>100.0 (16)</i>	<i>100.0 (31)</i>	<i>100.0 (28)</i>	<i>100.0 (6)</i>	<i>100.0 (364)</i>

As mentioned above, the EU increasingly has to deal with institutional reforms in the light of Eastern enlargement, with the future legal framework of the EU such as a Constitution or a Basic treaty, and the democratic deficit of the union. It is therefore not surprising to see that state and party actors, who are most important player in these reform processes, most often use identity and constitutional frames, or frames internal to the integration process (*table 10.2c*). But the same is also true for journalists whereas economic interest groups tend to frame the integration process in economic terms.

Table 10.3 Twenty-five most often mentioned frames

Frame	N
Institutional reforms > enlargement	34
Democracy	22
National interest	19
Own (national) economy	16
Equality among countries/member states/regions	14
Diversity	10
Political stability	10
Community of values	9
Human rights	9
Economic growth	9
Peace	8
Subsidiarity	8
Security	8
Opportunity space for citizens	7
National exports	7
Unity	6
Federalism	6
Racism/xenophobia	5
Sovereignty	5
Acceptance of the EU by citizens	5
Prices	5
Freedom, liberty	4
Bureaucracy	4
Transparency	4
Cope with transnational social problems	4
Consumer protection	4
Cross-border transport/traffic	4
Other*	29

* Sum of several “other” categories

Five frames are quite recurrent in political claims-making about European topics (*table 10.3*). Consonant with recent political discussions within the EU, the most prominent frame points to the need of institutional reforms before the Eastern enlargement of the union. Democracy, the second-most often frame, is a primary concern within the EU and this independently of the fact whether one considers that the EU is already, is not yet, or should become democratic (see tables below). Third, the EU is often linked to the national (economic) interest of a

country. This is not surprising given that support for the integration process is generally said to vary with the perceived national interests of EU-membership (see Della Porta 2003). Another important preoccupation is whether the EU leads to equality among member states. This was often disputed in the context of the sanctions against Austria, when many claimants asserted that the fourteen would never have behaved in the same way against a large member country such as Germany, France or the UK. The same argument was also made regarding the institutional reforms of the EU (redistribution of voices in the Council and Parliament etc.).

Table 10.4a What the EU should not be/lead to: ten most often mentioned frames

Frame	N
Nationalism	2
Racism / xenophobia	1
Fascism / nazism	1
Orthodox Christianity	1
Federalism	1
Corruption	1
National interest	1
Cross-border transport / traffic	1
Fascist / Nazi rule	1
Cold war	1
Other	1

The very small number of cases in *table 10.4a* illustrates that most claimants say what the EU is or should be instead of criticising what the EU should not be. Thus claims are most often positively framed.

Table 10.4b What the EU is not / does not lead to: ten most often mentioned frames

Frame	N
Democracy	7
Equality among countries/member states/regions	6
Racism / xenophobia	4
Sovereignty	4
Credibility (in citizens perspective)	3
Own (national) economy	3
Communist / Stalinist rule in Eastern Europe	3
Opportunity space for citizens	2
Acceptance of the EU by citizens	2
National interest	2
Other	2

Table 10.4b highlights what is called the democratic deficit of the EU: for many claimants, the EU lacks of democracy, credibility, acceptance, and opportunities for citizens. Second, if the EU is sometimes perceived as contrary to national (economic) interests, *table 10.4c* below shows that the opposite occurs much more often.

Table 10.4c What the EU is / leads to: ten most often mentioned frames

Frame	N
National interest	13
Democracy	8
Political stability	8
Economic growth	8
Own (national) economy	8
National exports	7
Human rights	6
Community of values	5
Peace	5
Opportunity space for citizens	5
Security	5
Prices	5
Other*	14

* Sum of several “other” categories

European integration seems to serve national interests in general and the interest of national economies in particular (*table 10.4c*). The predominance of economic and instrumental frames underlines what is often been heard: today, the EU is an economic union whereas political and social elements are still lagging behind.

Table 10.4d What the EU should be / should lead to: ten most often mentioned frames

Frame	N
Equality among countries/member states/regions	7
Democracy	7
Diversity	6
Subsidiarity	5
Community of values	4
Federalism	4
Peace	3
Unity	3
Human rights	3
Legitimacy	3
Acceptance of EU by citizens	3
Security	3

If the EU is today associated with economic attributes (*table 10.4c*), political and identity values should become predominant in the future as claimants want the EU to become a democratic, federalist, legitimate union on the basis of common values, and that puts guarantees security, human rights, diversity and equality among its members in order to become accepted by EU citizens.

Appendix I: Types of claims-making in the Swiss public sphere, 1990-2002 (in %)

Types of claims-making and type of multi-level linkage		All policy fields	6 policy fields (excl. European integration)
Non-Europeanised types of claims-making	National politics	20.1	28.6
	Purely Swiss national	15.5	22.0
	Relations between CH and non-EU countries or supranational actors	4.6	6.6
	International politics	14.0	19.9
	International politics without reference to CH, EU, or EU member countries	14.0	19.9
Europeanised types of claims-making	Supranational	12.1	7.1
	Purely supranational European	6.6	4.1
	Relations between EU and non-EU countries or supranational actors	5.5	3.0
	Vertical	30.2	11.1
	Relations between CH and the EU	11.9	2.3
	Relations between EU member countries and the EU	15.1	6.8
	Relations between CH, EU member countries, and the EU	0.6	0.1
	Other combinations of vertical Europeanisation	2.6	1.9
	Horizontal	22.7	32.0
	Relations between CH and EU member countries	9.0	12.8
	Relations within and between EU member countries	1.8	2.5
	Relations between EU member countries and non-EU countries or supranational actors	11.5	16.3
	Relations between CH, EU member countries and non-EU countries	0.4	0.4
	Missing cases	0.9	1.3
	Total (N)	100.0 (1678)	100.0 (1167)

Note: Appendix I only shows multi-level linkages that were found in the Swiss data even though other types of linkages are theoretically possible.

Appendix II: Types of claims-making by issue field (in %)

	Monetary policy	Agriculture	Immigration	Troop deployment	Pensions and retirement	Education	EU Integration	Total (N)
National politics	6.3	19.7	30.5	13.5	58.3	47.5	-	20.3 (338)
Horizontal Europeanisation	20.3	38.3	28.0	23.8	36.3	48.5	0.2	22.9 (380)
Vertical Europeanisation	33.3	10.4	11.7	0.8	1.2	1.0	75.3	30.3 (504)
Supranational Europeanisation	14.3	17.1	5.0	2.4	0.6	-	24.5	12.3 (204)
International politics	25.7	14.5	24.7	59.5	3.6	2.9	-	14.1 (235)
Total (N)	100.0 (237)	100.0 (193)	100.0 (239)	100.0 (126)	100.0 (168)	100.0 (204)	100.0 (494)	100.0 (1661)

Cramer's V 0.478***

Appendix IIIa: Types of claims-making by year (in %)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
National politics	11.6	16.8	22.7	23.3	20.3 (338)
Horizontal Europeanisation	23.6	29.5	19.7	23.6	22.9 (380)
Vertical Europeanisation	30.1	20.5	35.6	28.1	30.3 (504)
Supranational Europeanisation	17.4	8.6	12.2	11.4	12.3 (204)
International politics	17.4	24.5	9.9	13.5	14.1 (235)
Total (N)	100.0 (259)	100.0 (220)	100.0 (649)	100.0 (533)	100.0 (1661)

Eta 0.133***

Appendix IIIb: Types of claims-making by year (in %, excl. EU integration)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
National politics	17.2	21.8	35.4	30.4	29.0 (338)
Horizontal Europeanisation	35.1	38.2	30.8	30.6	32.5 (379)
Vertical Europeanisation	12.1	6.5	10.1	14.2	11.3 (132)
Supranational Europeanisation	9.8	1.8	8.2	7.1	7.1 (83)
International politics	25.9	31.8	15.4	17.6	20.1 (235)
Total (N)	100.0 (174)	100.0 (170)	100.0 (415)	100.0 (408)	100.0 (1167)

Eta 0.153***

Appendix IV: Types of claims-making by issue field and year (in %)

		1990	1995	2000	2002	Total (N)
Monetary politics	National politics	14.7	5.1	1.1	9.1	6.3 (15)
	Horizontal Europeanisation	29.4	38.5	13.8	14.3	20.3 (48)
	Vertical Europeanisation	26.5	25.6	33.3	40.3	33.3 (79)
	Supranational Europeanisation	2.9	-	21.8	18.2	14.3 (34)
	International politics	26.5	30.8	29.9	18.2	25.7 (61)
	Total (N)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (87)	100.0 (77)	100.0 (237)
Agriculture	National politics	9.1	47.8	15.1	21.6	19.7 (38)
	Horizontal Europeanisation	15.2	47.8	53.5	23.5	38.3 (74)
	Vertical Europeanisation	21.2	-	4.7	17.6	10.4 (20)
	Supranational Europeanisation	39.4	-	14.0	15.7	17.1 (33)
	International politics	15.2	4.3	12.8	21.6	14.5 (28)
	Total (N)	100.0 (33)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (86)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (193)
Immigration	National politics	14.3	4.8	52.3	23.3	30.5 (73)
	Horizontal Europeanisation	35.7	38.1	18.6	31.1	28.0 (67)
	Vertical Europeanisation	11.9	-	8.1	17.8	11.7 (28)
	Supranational Europeanisation	7.1	4.8	2.3	6.7	5.0 (12)
	International politics	31.0	52.4	18.6	21.1	24.7 (59)
	Total (N)	100.0 (42)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (86)	100.0 (90)	100.0 (239)
Troop deployment	National politics	-	2.9	40.6	8.6	13.5 (17)
	Horizontal Europeanisation	25.0	8.6	28.1	34.3	23.8 (30)
	Vertical Europeanisation	-	-	-	2.9	0.8 (1)
	Supranational Europeanisation	-	5.7	-	2.9	2.4 (3)
	International politics	75.0	82.9	31.3	51.4	59.5 (75)
	Total (N)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (32)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (126)

Retirement and pension schemes	National politics	72.7	31.3	70.0	53.1	58.3 (98)
	Horizontal Europeanisation	27.3	68.8	23.3	40.7	36.3 (61)
	Vertical Europeanisation	-	-	3.3	-	1.2 (2)
	Supranational Europeanisation	-	-	1.7	-	0.6 (1)
	International politics	-	-	1.7	6.2	3.6 (6)
	Total (N)	100.0 (11)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (81)	100.0 (168)
Education	National politics	26.7	47.2	51.6	52.7	47.5 (97)
	Horizontal Europeanisation	73.3	47.2	48.4	39.2	48.5 (99)
	Vertical Europeanisation	-	2.8	-	1.4	1.0 (2)
	Supranational Europeanisation	-	-	-	-	-
	International politics	-	2.8	-	6.8	2.9 (6)
	Total (N)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (36)	100.0 (64)	100.0 (74)	100.0 (204)
European Integration	National politics	-	-	-	-	-
	Horizontal Europeanisation	-	-	-	0.8	0.2 (1)
	Vertical Europeanisation	67.1	68.0	80.8	73.6	75.3 (372)
	Supranational Europeanisation	32.9	32.0	19.2	25.6	24.5 (121)
	International politics	-	-	-	-	-
	Total (N)	100.0 (85)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (234)	100.0 (125)	100.0 (494)

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