

**Project:** **The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres**

Project acronym: Europub.com  
Project website: <http://europub.wz-berlin.de>

Funded by: 5th Framework Programme of the European Commission

Contract No. HPSE-CT2000-00046  
Work package: **WP 2 (Content coding of claim-making)**  
WP Coordinator: Ruud Koopmans  
Deliverable number: **D 2.3**

**Report** **Final case report of political claims analysis**

**Case report** **Germany**

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Date: 26 February 2003 (Version 2)

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**PART I:**  
**Analytic Summary**

This analytic summary of the results of work package 2 for the German case is structured along four themes:

1. Levels of Europeanisation of public claim-making;
2. Trends in the Europeanisation of public claim-making over time;
3. Support for, and opposition to European integration and European institutions;
4. Who profits? The winners and losers of Europeanisation of public claim-making.

## 1. Levels of Europeanisation of public claim-making

To investigate levels of Europeanisation of claim-making as found in German print media, we look at several dimensions of claims and ask to what extent they have a European dimension: the location where a claim is made; the actor who makes the claim (the claimant), the actors at whom demands, criticism or support are directed (the addressees), the geo-political framing of the issue by the claimant (issue scope), and finally the actors whose interests are or would be affected by (the realization of) a claim (the object actors). In each of these cases, we distinguish two fundamental forms which a Europeanisation of public political communication may take. The first is the *vertical* variant of Europeanisation, which consists of direct references to the European Union or other European-level actors, in terms of the location of a claim (within or in front of one of the EU seats, e.g., in Brussels), the claimant (e.g., a statement by a Commissioner), the addressee (e.g., a demand addressed at the European Court of Justice), the framing of the issue (e.g., a reference to the need to strive for common European asylum regulations), and/or the object actor (e.g., a call for more competencies for the European Parliament). The second variant we label *horizontal* and it consists in a similar way of references to other European member states, be it in terms of the location of claims (coverage in the German press of events taking place in other member states), or the claimants (e.g., a statements by Tony Blair reported in the German press), addressees (e.g., a call by a German actor on the French government), issue framing (e.g., a comparison of one's own country to other member states), or object actors (e.g., a German decision to stop imports of beef from Britain).

Europeanisation of political communication is necessarily a relative concept. Its extent can only be judged in comparison to non-Europeanised forms of political communication. Political communication can be non-Europeanised in two ways. First, it can remain confined to the national level, i.e. in its pure form a claim in Germany by a German claimant, directed at German addressees, with a purely German framing of the issue, and in the name of German interests. Secondly, political communication can also refer to non-German contexts outside of, or broader than the EU, e.g., when a claim is addressed at the United Nations or NATO, or when claimants from non-European countries are cited in the German press.

If we look from this perspective first at the *location* of claims covered in the German press, we see (in *Table 2.2b*) that exactly half of all claims in the German print media were made in Germany itself. Of the remaining claims, 11% were made in or in front of EU seats, 18% in the other fourteen member states of the Union, 4% in the ten enlargement countries, and another 4% in other European countries who might in the future aspire to become members (excluding Russia but including Turkey). All in all, then, 38% of claims qualify as Europeanised in terms of their location. Whether this is much or little, depends on the standard of comparison. Comparison to the 50% of claims which took place in Germany suggest a still strong national anchoring of claim-making. However, comparison to the only

12% of all claims that were made in all non-European countries of the world taken together, suggests that if the German media report on events outside their own country, the European context appears as much more relevant than the world beyond Europe.

The table also shows, however, that Europeanisation on this dimension depends strongly on the issue field. Only 30% of claims on European integration were made in Germany, and as much as 25% in EU seats, and 40% in other European countries. The two fields where European supranational competencies are strong, monetary politics and agriculture, also display relatively high levels of both vertical and horizontal Europeanisation. In monetary politics, 16% of claims were made in EU seats (mainly the Frankfurt seat of the European Central Bank) and another 22% in other European countries. For agriculture, the figures are very similar: 19% in EU seats and 24% in other European countries. A difference between the two fields is the degree to which claim-making in the non-European rest of the world plays a significant role. This is hardly the case in agriculture (4%), but in monetary politics non-European events (18%), especially in the USA, do play an important role.

We find an opposite pattern in the two fields where the EU has thus far gained few competencies: pensions and retirement, and primary and secondary education. Here 92% (pensions), respectively 86% of all reported claims were made in Germany and only 1% in each case in EU seats. Horizontal Europeanisation is a bit more prominent, especially in the education field (10%, as against 5% in pensions and retirement). Events in the rest of the world play an irrelevant role in both issue fields, especially in pensions (1%, as against 4% in education).

The immigration field is situated between these extremes. On the one hand, events in EU seats (2%) are as irrelevant as in pension and education politics. On the other hand, we find a rather high level of horizontal Europeanisation (21% of claims take place in other European countries). However, this is perhaps better seen as part of a larger process of transnationalization in this field that by definition deals with connections between nations, as there is also a significant level of coverage of claims made outside Europe (14%). Still, overall, immigration remains on this dimension a strongly nationalized policy field, with almost two thirds (64%) of all claims made in Germany.

Troop deployment is a better example of a truly transnational policy field, albeit of a global rather than specifically European nature. This is the field with the lowest share of claims made in Germany (26%). Exactly the same number of claims (26%) were made in other European countries, and a mere 2% in EU seats. This is also the field with by far the largest role for events in the rest of the world (46%), both because that is where the major actor in this field, the USA (15%) is situated, and because the countries where troops are deployed are mostly found outside Europe (e.g. the Middle East, where 10% of claims in this field took place).

Given the fact that actors are located in geopolitical space and make most of their claims at their own location (e.g., German actors in Germany, EU-level actors in one of the EU seats, etc.), it is not surprising that we find very similar results if we look at the geopolitical scope of the claimants that are covered in the German press (in *Tables 5.5 a-g*). The most nationalized policy field in terms of claimants is pensions and retirement (90% German claimants), closely followed by education (86%), and at a larger distance by immigration (64%). Intermediate levels of German claimants are found in agriculture (52%) and monetary politics (44%). European integration (31%) and troop deployment (28%), finally, are the two fields that are

least dominated by German actors. Actors from the European level (EU and other European supranational such as the Council of Europe) are most prominent in the field of European integration (28%), followed by agriculture (19%) and monetary politics (17%). In all other policy fields, European-level actors do not play a significant role (between 3% in immigration and 1% in pensions and education). Horizontal Europeanisation of claimants is also strongest in the field of European integration (35%). Contrary to the vertical dimension, we do find relatively high levels of claimants from other European countries in immigration (16%) and troop deployment (22%), more or less on a par with the levels in monetary politics (21%) and agriculture (19%). In education (10%) and pensions (7%) levels of horizontal Europeanisation are low. Countries from the non-European rest of the world or from supranational institutions beyond Europe are most important in troop deployment (39%), followed by monetary politics (15%), immigration (11%), agriculture (8%), education (3%), and pensions (1%).

In all issue fields and regardless of the differences in levels, claimants from other European countries are clearly more often covered than those from the world beyond Europe, indicating that we are justified to interpret these findings in terms of horizontal Europeanisation and not merely as a reflection of a broader globalisation of political communication. The only partial exception is monetary politics, where claimants from other European countries are about as numerous as those from the world beyond Europe. Another interesting finding is that levels of horizontal Europeanisation of claimants are in all fields (often substantially) higher than those of vertical Europeanisation. This indicates that much of the previous research on Europeanisation of public spheres, which has almost exclusively focused on explicit mentioning of European-level actors and institutions, has missed the perhaps most important part of the picture, namely the degree to which the mass media of a member state offer a forum to actors from other European countries. Again, there is one partial exception to this pattern, namely agriculture, where actors from the EU-level are equally numerous as actors from other European countries.

Moving now to the addressees of claims (in *Table 6.4a*), we find in some issue fields a very similar pattern to the structure of claimants, but in other fields we find a significantly different picture. To begin with the similarities between the patterns of claimants and addressees, we find in education (86%) and pension politics (91%) that claims are almost exclusively directed at German addressees, and the few that are not, are more often addressed at actors in other European countries (7% and 4% respectively) than to the non-European world (3% respectively 4%) or to European-level actors and institutions (1% in both fields). The pattern for the addressees in immigration politics is also relatively similar to that of claimants in this field: a relatively strong focus on German addressees (59%), a minor role for EU-level addressees (5%), but a somewhat larger one for addressees in other European countries (16%), as well as in the rest of the world (14%).

Troop deployment is a first field where the pattern of addressees differs significantly from that of claimants. German actors (28% among the claimants, 13% among the addressees), as well as national actors from other European countries (22% among the claimants, 12% among the addressees) are only about half as prominent among the addressees as among the claimants. By contrast, countries from the rest of the world (39% among claimants, 52% among addressees), first and foremost the USA (16% among claimants, 30% among addressees), play a much more prominent role as addressees. In other words, troop deployment is a field where we frequently find actors from European countries addressing actors from non-European countries, especially the USA.

A second important shift occurs in the fields of monetary politics, agriculture, and European integration. Whereas among claimants, horizontal Europeanisation in the form of actors from the national level predominated, we find a strong shift on the dimension of addressees towards the vertical variant of Europeanisation. In all three fields, European-level actors and institutions are much more prominent as addressees (39% in European integration and agriculture, 24% in monetary politics) than actors from other European countries. In monetary politics and agriculture, the share of European-level addressees is even (more than) the double of that of national-level addressees from other European member countries. In the same three issue fields, we also find a strong decline in the share of German actors (16% in European integration, 27% in monetary politics and 37% in agriculture) as addressees as compared to their share as claimants. This trend is strongest in the field of European integration where the share of German addressees is halved in comparison to the share of German claimants. The conclusion to draw is that in these three issue fields a significant part of the claims by national actors from Germany as well as from other European countries are addressed at European-level institutions and actors.

Broadening the picture further by including (in *Table 7.3a*) the way in which issues are geopolitically framed, we can again add some interesting nuances. To interpret the findings in the table, it is important to know how we dealt with (quite common) cases in which several geopolitical framings were present simultaneously in a claim (e.g., when a claim states that in order to effectively control the influx of asylum seekers to Germany, common solutions on the European level are necessary, reference is made to both the German and the European political context). In such cases, we always coded the “highest” of these levels (i.e., in the example given, the reference to the European context is decisive for the coding of issue scope). As a result, European integration is not a very interesting field as regards this dimension of claim-making, because this is by definition an issue that refers to the European-level context. In the other fields, however, this is not the case.

Again, we find only slight changes in the picture for the two highly nationalised policy fields of education and pensions. Also in the framing of the issue, they remain overwhelmingly focused on Germany (78% and 88%, respectively). In the field of immigration the changes are slight as well, although there seems to be somewhat of a relativisation of the national component: 64% of claimants were German in this field, 59% of claims had German addressees, and only slightly more than half of the claims (52%) are framed purely in national German terms. However, this does not mean that when we consider issue framing this field becomes more Europeanised. Against a slight increase in the vertical dimension of Europeanisation (3% of claimants, 5% of addressees, 9% of issue framings) stands a decline in the relevance of horizontal references to other European countries (from 16% among claimants and addressees to 13% among issue framings). An even larger decline occurs in the relevance of non-European countries among issue framings (11% among claimants, 16% among addressees, 6% among issue framings). The shifts in this field are especially caused by the emergence of the categories multilateral and especially bilateral as significant forms of issue framing (20% together, of which 17% bilateral). This is a result of the fact that immigration claims often refer to relations between the receiving and the sending country, e.g., between Germany and Turkey or Iran.

In troop deployment, we find a similar emergence of the categories bilateral and multilateral, this time of more or less equal weight (65% of all framings). Again, this is to an important extent in the nature of the issue, which by definition involves a deploying actor outside the country where troops are deployed (internal troop deployments are disregarded). Also, we

find an increase of the relevance of supranational contexts beyond Europe (UN and otherwise). The UN, NATO and other supranational institutions are responsible for only 8% of all claims on troop deployment, they are addressed in 18% of claims, and referred to in the issue framing in 25% of the cases. Still, the results show that the large majority of contention over troop deployment refers to traditional international relations between nation-states. While supranational contexts beyond Europe are at least referred to in a quarter of the cases, the EU cannot claim much relevance in this field (4% of claims refer to the EU and another 3% to other European supranational contexts, e.g. the WEU or the Council of Europe).

In the two remaining fields, however, issue framings give further body to the strongly Europeanised character of these fields. In monetary politics, as much as 62% of claimants were German, but only 27% of addressees were. We now see that only 6% of all claims have a spatial framing that does not extend beyond Germany. We see a similar shift, although somewhat less pronounced, in the field of agriculture, where 52% of claimants, 37% of addressees, and 29% of issue framings were German. In both fields, it is the supranational EU context that is the main beneficiary of this relativisation of the national context. In monetary politics, 17% of actors, 34% of addressees, but as much as 62% of issue framings referred to the European-level contexts, first and foremost as a result of the discussion around the introduction of the Euro. In agriculture, the EU-level was responsible for 19% of claimants, 39% of addressees and 46% of issue framings.

Finally, we look at the object actors of claims (in *Table 9.4a*), i.e. those whose interests are at stake. At the risk of becoming repetitive, for the fields of education and pensions there is nothing new under the sun. These are fields where overwhelmingly German actors address German institutions, and do so referring to German political contexts and interests of Germany as a whole or of groups and social categories within Germany (e.g., the German elderly, the German taxpayer, German schools). For monetary politics and agriculture, object actors do not add much to the picture, either. The results for object actors are in line with those obtained above, falling somewhere between the extremes of the more nationalised nature of claimants, and the strongly Europeanised nature of issue framings.

In the field of European integration, a striking result is the extent to which claims refer to common European interests (44%, of which 42% EU-related). This is especially striking in relation to the low level of German object actors (10%). Although German actors were responsible for 31% of claims in this field, this result implies that in the large majority of cases, German actors did not intervene in debates on European integration in order to defend German interests, but rather to emphasise common European stakes. To what extent this is rhetoric is of course another matter, but even the rhetorical reference to the European common good is an important finding. Apparently this is less the case for claims on European integration made by actors from other European countries, as the percentages of this category among claimants (25%) is almost the same as among object actors (34%).

In the field of troop deployment, we find again an important shift in the results, but again this is to an important extent a result of how the issue is defined, namely as deployment of troops in another country. As a result, other countries of the world beyond Europe dominate here even more (67%, of which 43% alone for the Middle East, predominantly Iraq) than in the previous tables. In immigration, too, the only thing worth mentioning is a shift related to the intrinsic nature of the field, namely the rise of non-European countries as object actors, simply because these are the main countries of origin of immigrants to Europe, and therefore often the implied object actors in immigration claims.



## 2. Trends in the Europeanisation of public claim-making

Europeanisation of political communication is not just a matter of relative degree, but it should also be judged as a developing process. Since 1990, there have been several important landmarks in the deepening of European integration, e.g., the abolition of border controls, the introduction of an – albeit embryonic – European citizenship, the introduction of the Euro, the 1995 enlargement with three countries and the upcoming extension with ten more countries, or the Convention on a European constitution. Normatively, it is important that political communication in the mass media follows suit and reflects these developments so as to enable citizens to remain informed about developments in European politics, and European policy-makers to remain informed about the demands and wishes of the citizenry and their organised representatives in interest groups, NGO's and social movements.

From the theoretical perspective of political opportunity structures that we take in this project, it is also to be expected that political communication and mobilisation react to shifts in competencies from the national to the European level. Such an effect is most likely in those fields where the expansion of the EU's prerogatives has been strongest. The introduction of the common currency Euro in twelve member states and the related transfer of decision-making power from national governments and central banks to the European Central Bank is certainly the most important transfer of power that has occurred in the period of study. In the other five substantive fields, institutional developments at the EU level have been less spectacular and one may even have doubts whether any significant transfer of power to the EU level has occurred in some fields. For instance, little of a common security and defence policy could be seen in the recent Iraq conflict, the EU's common agricultural policy is under increasing pressure and criticism, and attempts to formulate a common immigration and asylum policy have thus far failed. Nonetheless, even if they have not always been translated in the transfer of issue-specific competencies, the important developments in European institution-building cannot be denied. We should therefore expect an increasing relevance in contestation over these institutional issues, i.e. an increase in the absolute and relative (to the other issue fields) relevance of the meta-issue of European integration. The deepening of integration and the related growing interdependencies among member states may also imply an increase in levels of Europeanised political communication in all issue fields, even in the absence of concrete issue-specific transfers of powers. However, such Europeanisation tendencies would then most likely be of the horizontal, inter-member state, type, rather than of the vertical, EU-level directed, type.

To investigate the empirical validity of these expectations, we begin by looking (in *Table 2.2a*) at the development of the location of claims between 1990 and 2002. These results do not show strong Europeanisation tendencies. On the one hand, in line with a tendency of vertical Europeanisation, there is a significant, though not spectacular, increase in the frequency of EU seats as locations where claims are made, from 8% in 1990 to 13% in 2002. On the other hand, this gain is offset by a similar decrease in the frequency with which other European countries are mentioned as locations of claims from 29% in 1990 and 1995 to 22% in 2000 and 2002. Concomitantly, there are no large changes in the percentage of claims that occur in Germany, but if there is a trend it is towards more rather than less emphasis on events in Germany (from 44% in 1990, peaking at 55% in 2000 and then back to 48% in 2002). However, these results are only a first, rough approximation because they do not allow us to

differentiate by issue field. It may well be that shifts in the relative importance of issue fields hide real trends in these aggregate data that can be discerned at the level of individual issues.

We now turn to such a more detailed analysis (see *Tables 4.5a-g*) for the geopolitical scope of claimants. In monetary politics we find as expected clear evidence of Europeanisation tendencies. Claimants from the EU-level increase spectacularly, from 4% in 1990 to 21% in 2002. This trend goes along with an equally dramatic decline in the frequency of German claimants, from 62% in 1990 to 38% in 2002. Interestingly, whereas German claim-makers become less important as a result of the transfer of power to the European level, this is not true for national actors from other European countries, whose importance has remained more or less the same (20% in 1990, 21% in 2002). Thus, while the transfer of power to the EU level has negatively affected German claimants, actors from other European countries remain relevant as a result of the growing interdependencies among the Eurozone economies as a result of the introduction of the common currency. A final interesting trend is that there is also a strong and steady increase in the relevance of claimants from the non-European rest of the world, from 7% in 1990 to 19% in 2002, about half of these stemming from the USA. This indicates that public debates on monetary politics are reflecting globalisation tendencies at the same time as they experience Europeanisation tendencies. In sum, the results for this field show a striking correspondence between institutional developments and trends in public communication and mobilisation, precisely as the opportunity structure perspective would lead us to expect.

The agriculture field shows us quite a different picture. Although EU-level actors are able to maintain, or in 2002 even to increase their presence in the German public sphere (16% in 1990 via 15% in 1995 and 2000 to 27% in 2002), there is a strong decrease in the frequency with which actors from other European countries get (or seek) access to the German media (30% in 1990 via a peak of 46% in 1995 to 17% in 2000 and 16% in 2002). Actors from the rest of the world also decline in relevance, from 17% in 1990 to 8% in 2002. Taken together, these trends result in a certain re-nationalisation of this policy field, as indicated by the strong increase in the presence of German claimants, from 38% in 1990 via a peak of 63% in 2000 to 49% in 2002. At first sight these trends do not seem to be explained by shifts in the importance of specific subtopics in agricultural politics (compare *Table 7.2b*). For instance, the most important sub-issue BSE (responsible for 41% of all agriculture claims) was important mainly in 1995 and 2000, the two years with respectively the lowest and the highest frequency of German actors. We may carefully conclude that developments of claim-making in the agriculture field reflect discussions among European policy-makers, which tend to move towards greater responsibility for national governments and certainly not towards an expansion in the resources available for the common agricultural policy.

The immigration field again provides a different picture. Here it is difficult to discern any consistent trend at all. If there is a trend, it is one of re-nationalisation – albeit weaker than in agriculture – rather than of Europeanisation or wider transnationalisation. The year 1990 actually was the most Europeanised and transnational of all, with 7% EU-level claim makers (not a high figure, but more than the 0% in 1995, 2% in 2000 and 5% in 2002), and 28% claimants from other European countries (against 22% in 2002). Actors from supranational institutions were stably irrelevant (between 0% in 1995 and 4% in 1990), and actors from the countries beyond Europe declined from 15% in 1990 to 11% in 2002. On balance, however, these trends are weak and irregular rather than linear. This is also reflected in the percentage of German claim makers, which is lowest in 1990 (46%), then increases to 73% in 1995, but again declines to 59% in 2002.

The developments among claimants in the field of troop deployment do not show any signs of Europeanisation, either. EU-level actors are marginal, reaching a maximum of 4% in 2000, but declining again to 2% in 2002, the year of the build-up to the latest Iraq war. Horizontal Europeanisation in the form of statements by claimants from other European countries declines over the course of the period, from 28% in 1990 to 20% in 2002. German claimants show no clear trend, and the same is true for actors from non-European countries. Within that latter category, the data nicely reflect Russia's loss of superpower status. In 1990 and 1995 Russian claimants on troop deployment were still about equally prominent as those from the USA (14 and 16%, respectively) but by 2002, Russia's share of 2% pales in comparison to the 20% of the USA. Another trend in international relations that is clearly visible in the data is the crisis of the United Nations and other supranational institutions such as NATO as players in issues concerning the deployment of troops. Until 2000, there is a steady and strong increase in the relevance of these institutions, from only 2% in 1990 to 23% in 2000. But in the year 2002, dominated in this field by the Iraq issue, the share of supranational institutions plummets to 5%.

As we saw above, the EU and other European countries do not play important roles in pensions and retirement and in education politics. This does not imply that these fields cannot experience Europeanisation in the sense of an increase over time in the relevance of EU-level institutions and claimants from other European countries. However, we find no such thing. In the two fields there is some minor fluctuation, but there are no real trends. Claimants from the national German level almost completely dominate these fields in each of the years under study. In the education field, there is even an increase in the share of German claimants, from 80% in 1990 to as much as 95% in 2002.

In the issue field of European integration, however, we do again find clear signs of Europeanisation. To begin with, there is a moderate increase in the absolute number of claims in this field. Considering the fact that the sample for the years 1990 and 1995 was twice as thin as that for 2002, and that the data for the year 2000 contain an extra circa 12% of claims from regional and tabloid newspapers, one arrives at weighed numbers of cases (taking 2002 as the baseline sample) of 210 claims on European integration in 1990, 138 in 1995, 270 in 2000 and 226 in 2002. This does not imply, however, that European integration also becomes more important in a relative sense. As our data show (in *Table 7.1*) there is an overall increase in the number of claims for our seven issue fields, and as a result there is only some minor fluctuation in the share of European integration around its overall share of 25% of all claims.

However, there is more convincing evidence of Europeanisation in the structure of claim-making on European integration. There is a strong and steady increase in the presence of EU-level actors among the claimants, from 18% in 1990 to 34% in 2002. There is also a more limited and irregular increase in the share of actors from other European countries, from 24% in 1990 to 34% in 2002. At the same time, German claimants steadily lose prominence. In 1990, they still outnumbered EU-level actors and claimants from other European states taken together (46% against 42%), suggesting that to an important extent, the debate on European integration was a discussion among German actors. By 2002, this has radically changed and the share of German actors has declined to 28%, and they are only the third most important group of actors, after both EU-level and other European country actors.

The results thus far are ambiguous. On the one hand, we find strong Europeanisation tendencies, most strongly of the vertical type, in the fields of monetary politics and European

integration. However, we find no indication of Europeanisation tendencies, either vertical or horizontal, in any of the other issue fields. In these fields we either find no clear trends at all (troop deployment and pensions), or we find – mostly weak – tendencies toward a re-nationalisation of public debates (agriculture, immigration, and education).

For addressees we have (in *Table 6.4b*) at present no analyses available at the issue-specific level. We therefore look only at aggregate trends across all seven issue fields regarding the actors at whom demands, criticism, or support are directed. Probably because of the countervailing trends in different issue fields, the overall picture is one of stability. The only more or less consistent trend seems to be an increase in the relevance of addressees on the EU level. However, this may well be due to the fact that the two numerically largest issue fields in our data, namely European integration and monetary politics, are also the ones that display the strongest Europeanisation tendencies.

Similarly, an increase in the share of issue framings referring to the EU level (from 30% in 1990 to 42% in 2002, see *Table 7.3b*) is the only significant and consistent trend on the aggregate level when we consider the way in which claims are geopolitically framed. However, here we can (in *7.4a-g*) descend to the level of specific issues to get a clearer picture. For monetary politics, the results add to the picture we obtained looking at the claimants. Claims that refer to the EU-level context increase dramatically from 15% in 1990 to 73% in 2002. Purely German framings decline over that same period to insignificance, from 12% to 1%, and the same is true even more pronouncedly for bilateral framings (from 45% to 3%), which were often found in discussions over exchange rates of national currencies. As on the level of claimants, we find that the strong Europeanisation tendencies are accompanied by a weaker trend of wider transnationalisation of claim-making, as indicated by the increase (from 10% in 1990 to 17% in 2002) of issue framings referring to non-European countries.

For agricultural politics, the conclusions we drew from the analysis of claimants have to be nuanced when we include issue framings in the picture. Although on the level of claimants we found tendencies toward re-nationalisation, these are only weakly present in the issue framings (an increase in purely German framings from 11% in 1990 to 25% in 2002). The increase in framings referring to the EU level is, however, much more spectacular and more regular, from 32% in 1990 to 65% in 2002. The picture that emerges from the combination of the claimant and issue framing data is therefore not that of a re-nationalisation per se, but of an increasing involvement of German actors in debates on issues that are defined at the European level. This seems consistent with the trend – in this field and in others – for actors to become more concerned about “what we get back” from the EU, i.e. not a de-Europeanisation, but a stronger emphasis on national stakes in European matters.

Also in the immigration field, we find somewhat more support for Europeanisation tendencies, at least of the vertical type. Whereas at the level of claimants we found a decrease rather than an increase in the share of European actors, we now find a significant increase in issue framings that refer to the EU level, from 4% in 1990 to 11% in 2002 (compared to only 2% EU-level claimants in 2002). Apart from this, the results for this field are not much different on the claimant and issue framing dimensions. For troop deployment there is not much new information to be gained either. The main finding is here also the dramatic drop in the relevance of UN and other supranational contexts in 2002. Between 1990 and 2000, claims referring to these contexts increased from 16% to 44%, but in 2002 the share of such framings halved to 22%. For pensions and education the trends in issue framings are also very

similar to those in claimants, namely hardly any trend at all in pensions and retirement, and a – now somewhat more pronounced than on the claimant dimension – trend toward re-nationalisation in education politics (62% purely German framings in 1990 against 80% in 2002). EU-level framings had a brief appearance in education politics in 1990 (at 12%), but then disappeared almost completely from the debate. In European integration, European-level framings dominate the scene by definition, but there is an interesting trend to discern, namely a strong decrease in non-EU European-level framings, from 10% in 1990 to 2% in 2002 (and a concomitant increase from 86% to 98% for EU-related framings). This indicates that non-EU forms of European integration, such as EFTA or the Council of Europe have strongly lost in significance relative to the expanding and invigorated EU.

For object actors, finally, we have no analyses on the issue-specific level available. As a result, we find much the same picture as for addressees, namely stability because of countervailing trends in different issue fields. The only discernable aggregate trend is again an increase in references to the interests and stakes of EU-level object actors, from 9% in 1990 to 17% in 2002.

In sum, European integration and especially monetary politics are the two issue fields that display strong and consistent Europeanisation over the period 1990-2002. Such tendencies can also be found in agriculture and to a lesser extent in immigration. The trends in these two fields are however ambiguous: regarding issue framings there is increasing reference, most strongly so in agriculture, to European contexts, but among claimants the share of German actors rises. This indicates in both fields tendencies to use European framings to further national interests, or the use of European references as a rhetorical device in contestation among German actors. A third pattern, namely of no discernable trend whatsoever, is offered by troop deployment and pensions. Finally, education is the only field with a consistent tendency toward re-nationalisation, albeit the trend is weak and at a level where the national level was already overwhelmingly predominant anyway.

### **3. Support for, and opposition to European integration and European institutions**

An increase in Europeanised political communication does not necessarily need to imply increasing support for European institutions or a growing consensus about the integration process. European integration is – perhaps increasingly – a contested issue, and it is therefore to be expected that different actors will take different positions regarding integration and European institutions.

We begin addressing these questions by looking (in *Table 6.3b*) at the evaluation of addressees. When actors are the target of claims, this may entail criticism or support, or a more neutral appeal. Our results show that generally, criticism predominates in public political communication, as is suggested by the negative average evaluation (-0.26 on a scale ranging from -1 to +1). EU-level actors are somewhat less often criticised (-0.20), especially when we compare them to German addressees (-0.33). Supranational institutions beyond Europe are the only main addressee category that is on balance targeted in neutral or slightly positive ways (0.00 for the UN, +0.06 for other supranational institutions).

Next, we look (in *Table 8.1*) at the overall evaluation of European integration (again measured on a scale from -1 to +1, indicating respectively opposition to, or support for an

extension of EU competencies and resources) across issue fields and across time. Interestingly, while as we saw that the evaluation of European-level institutions as addressees of claims is on average negative, the integration process as such can count with consistent support (see the overall average evaluation of +0.29). This support extends across all seven issue fields, although it is very weak in agriculture (+0.05), and to a lesser extent also in monetary politics (+0.14). Of course, this is partly a result of the fact that these are fields where EU competencies are already strong. Our evaluation score measures the attitude towards *further* extensions of competencies and resources. The lukewarm evaluations in these two fields therefore imply that many claimants do not favour further extensions of European competencies, but that does not necessarily mean that they are against the present strong influence of the EU in these fields. Across time, there are no consistent trends in support for integration discernable in the six substantive issue fields, but there is a very clear, negative trend in the meta-field of European integration, where the average support for further integration halves from +0.65 in 1990 to +0.33 in 2002. Again, this may partly be due to the important advances that have been made in European institution-building in the meantime, which may bring growing numbers of actors to the conclusion that a further deepening of integration is not necessary or even harmful. However, our data do not suggest that, at least as far as the claimants cited in the German press are concerned, the integration process threatens to come to a standstill because of a lack of support. Even in 2002, there is on average still quite strong support for the integration process.

Support for European integration, moreover, extends across almost all actor types (see *Table 8.2*). The only numerically significant actor category who express predominantly negative attitudes towards European integration are farmers and agricultural organisations, which is ironic given the fact that this is the group that benefits most from the EU's redistributive policies. The reason is probably that the way in which EU policies in this field are structured has not stimulated a focus on European interests or solidarity with farmers in other countries. To the contrary, it has strengthened a focus on national farmers' interests and a concomitant struggle among farmers in various European countries, and between them, their national governments, and the EU about who can get the most benefits from the European fleshpots – a constellation that has hardly contributed to a positive image of the EU. A further interesting finding concerns the relative amount of support among the main categories of actors. State and party actors are most in favour of the integration process (+0.33). Civil society actors, both economic (+0.10) and other (+0.19), are more lukewarm in their support. The mass media finally, often depicted as the culprit for the EU's presumed negative image, turn out to take a clearly positive stand (+0.24) in relation to the integration process, close to the overall average.

Turning now (in *Table 8.3*) to the evaluation of the integration process in relation to the geopolitical scope of claimants, we see that both German (+0.30) and EU-level actors (+0.34) take positions close to the average. The only negative score is that of Swiss actors (-0.08). Actors from the UK are also clearly sceptical towards further integration (+0.01), as are actors from the three 1995 accession countries, predominated by Austrian actors during the 2000 "Haider debate" (+0.04). Strong support for European integration can be found among those who aspire to become part of the Union, the ten upcoming enlargement countries (+0.38), Turkey (+0.41), and other (mainly East) European countries (+0.71).

Among German political parties, there is generally strong support for European integration, and there does not seem to be much party-political polarisation over this issue. On average, the small liberal FDP is the most pro-European (+0.68), followed by the Christian Democrat

CDU (+0.49), the Social Democrat SPD (+0.42), and the Greens and the post-communist PDS (+0.40). The only party that deviates from this pro-European consensus is the Bavarian Christian Democrat Party, the CSU, which takes a more euro-sceptical position (+0.07). Over time, there are no clear trends in most parties' positions. However, there is a rather strong decline in support for European integration among the CDU in the most recent years (from +0.61 in 1990 to +0.23 in 2002), which coincides with the parties' shift to the opposition and the fall of the strongly pro-European Helmut Kohl from the party leadership. Another trend is the rising support for European integration among the Greens (from 0.00 in the first half of the 1990s to +0.37 in 2002), which is similarly linked to the first-time ascent of this party to national government, and the rise of its pro-European figurehead foreign minister Joschka Fischer.

Finally, we look (in *Table 9.3b*) at the evaluation of object actors of different geopolitical scope. The evaluation again runs from -1 to +1 and indicates the degree to which a claimant's demand amounts to a worsening or an improvement in the object actor's interests or resources. On average, object actor evaluations are positive (+0.25), indicating that claimants often intervene in public debates to further their own or other beneficiaries' interests. As in the case of addressees, EU-level object actors receive a more favourable treatment (+0.37), both compared to the average and to German object actors (+0.31).

Summing up, the results presented in this section indicate quite strong levels of support for the European integration process and for European institutions, both in an absolute sense, and compared to national, German actors. However, we also found strong evidence suggesting that this support comes under increasing pressure the more the EU gains in power. Support for further European integration has steadily eroded over the period of study, although even in 2002 it is still safely on the positive side. Comparing the six substantive issue fields, we find that support for increased European influence tends to be weakest where the EU has most to say already, namely in monetary and agricultural politics. Thus, the data nicely illustrate the erosion of the former permissive consensus, which to an important extent could prevail because the stakes were low. The higher the stakes in European integration become, the more conflicts will emerge and the more euro-sceptics will mobilise in opposition. Although the signs of this development are visible in the German public sphere, euro-polarisation does not (yet) have German party politics in its grips, as there is broad support for, and consensus about the integration process among the main political parties.

#### **4. Who profits? The winners and losers of Europeanisation of public claim-making**

The erosion of the permissive consensus and growing contestation over European integration are linked to the fact that European integration is not – or at least not always – a “win-win game”, in which every actor stands to win, and nobody suffers any losses. The transfer of competencies from the national to the intergovernmental and supranational European arenas opens up opportunities and makes resources available for some categories of actors, but not – or not to the same extent – for others. Similarly, the erosion of undivided national sovereignty may improve the opportunities of some actors, but may also negatively affect those of actors who had obtained institutionalised access to national resources and opportunity structures. Thus, European integration unavoidably also implies a redistribution of power. About the question what form this redistribution takes, opinions in the literature are divided. Some see Europe as an ally of weaker players in the political game, i.e. civil society interests such as

human rights organisations, migrants, consumer organisations and other NGO's. Others see the EU as further strengthening the position of those who are already strong on the national level, i.e. executive actors and business interests.

We begin investigating these issues by looking (in *Table 4.1*) at the actors involved in debates on European integration compared to the six other issue fields. Is participation in public debates on European integration more or less egalitarian than in the other policy fields? The results suggest that debates on European integration are decisively *less* egalitarian than other political debates. As much as 82% of claims on European integration stem from state and party actors, more than in any other issue field. The only civil society category which is not underrepresented among the participants in debates on European integration are media and journalists, who participate in this field as often as in the other fields (10%). Economic interests are marginal in debates on European integration (2%, against an average of 10% across all fields). However, they are strongly represented in the very Europeanised field of monetary politics, where economic interest groups are responsible for as much as 27% of all claims. The balance between employers' organisations and unions is telling in this case: 11% versus a mere 1%. Non-economic civil society interests are also underrepresented among the claimants in European integration debates (5%, against an average of 8%). Significantly, although non-economic civil society groups are nowhere strongly represented, in a relative sense their presence is strongest in the fields where national sovereignty still prevails most: in education (25%), immigration (12%), and pensions and retirement (7%).

That the EU arena is not a haven for weak social actors is further substantiated when we look (in *Table 4.4*) at the geopolitical level at which different types of claimants are organised. Actors on the EU level that appear in public debates are almost exclusively state and party actors (98%) and there was not a single case in our data of a non-economic civil society group, and just a handful of economic interests organised at the European level. Conversely, all types of civil society actors were overrepresented among the national German actors, of which 14% were economic interests (10% on average, 2% among European claimants – EU and other European taken together), 12% were media and journalists (10% on average, 0% among European claimants), and 9% were non-economic civil society groups (8% on average, 0% among European claimants). Conversely, state and party actors were much less predominant among the German claimants (64% against 72% on average and 98% among European-level claimants).

To get an idea of the presence in public debates of social movement actors, we may take a look at the presence of protest (demonstrations, strikes, etc.) as a form of contention. Again, we can start (in *Table 5.1a*) by comparing the European integration field to the other fields. Protest is not a very frequent form of action in any of the issue fields (2% of claims on average), but in European integration it is even less prominent (1%). Again, the two fields where protest reaches at least some degree of visibility are ones where national politics still predominates, namely education (5%) and immigration (4%). However, in this case the national policy field of pensions and retirement does not seem very open to weakly organised actors (1%).

The next step is to look (in *Table 5.1c*) at the frequency with which claimants organised on different geopolitical levels use protest as a form of action. Actors organised on the EU level use protest in only 1% of their claims. This time, we do not contrast German actors to actors from other countries, but subdivide all national-level actors into national, regional, and local organisations and groups. This provides an interesting perspective on the opportunities for



protest organising. Among the actors organised at the national level, 2% use protest, among the regional ones 3%, and among the local ones 7%. In other words, protest organising becomes more difficult the further away one gets from the local level (the fact that among the supranational actors beyond Europe not a single protest took place further confirms this trend). In that sense, Europeanisation (and wider globalisation) poses a strategic difficulty for weakly institutionalised social movement actors because political decisions are taken ever further away from the local level where protest is most easily organised.

If we combine these results with those in the previous section, it becomes understandable why state and party actors tended to be more in favour of European integration and why civil society actors were only lukewarm in their support. The results in this section strongly suggest that these differences in evaluation of the EU integration process correspond to the varying degrees to which these actor types stand to win or lose from further European integration. Thus far, the Europeanisation of public contention has above all strengthened the hand of state and party actors – above all the executive – who have almost exclusive hegemony in debates over European issues. Civil society actors, on the contrary, have hardly gained any foothold in debates on European integration and are much better represented in the national political arena. Europeanisation tends to make public debates less inclusive and less egalitarian. Therefore, in spite of – or perhaps one should even say: because of – Europeanisation tendencies in certain issue fields, there is a clear democratic deficit in Europeanised public communication. The nature of this deficit is not – as is often supposed – that the media give us little information about Europe or that such information is nationally focused. This view is contradicted by the strong correlation between EU competencies in a field and the amount of Europeanised coverage of claims, as well as by the strong presence of both EU institutions and actors from other European countries in debates on European integration. The true nature of the democratic deficit of Europeanised political communication lies in who gets access to this emerging Europeanised public arena.

**PART II:**  
**Commented Tables**

## 1. Article-level

**Table 1.1: Number of articles coded per year**

Year	Articles coded (in % within sample) from		Total	
	full sample issue	reduced European sample issue	In %	(N)
1990	14	7	11	373
1995	14	9	12	412
2000	38	26	33	1119
2001	.	39	17	586
2002	33	19	27	921
Total (N)	100 1899	100 1512	100	3411

A total number of 3411 articles were coded in Germany for a reference period of five single years, stretching from 1990 to 2002. A bit less than half (44%) of the articles were selected according to a reduced sample, which takes into account only articles with at least one European dimension (i.e. either about a European topic or involving a European actor). The number of articles in 1990 and 1995 is lower because the sample is reduced by half: instead of coding two quality papers in each week, only one is coded per week, in an alternating fashion.

**Table 1.2: Articles by paper**

Paper	(Abbreviation)	Number of articles (N)	In % of database
Süddeutsche Zeitung	(SZ)	1588	47
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	(FAZ)	1708	50
Leipziger Volkszeitung	(LVZ)	81	2
Bild Zeitung	(Bild)	34	1
Total		3411	100

The most important part of the database is constituted by articles from the two quality broadsheets with nation-wide distribution, the centre-right *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (50%) and the centre-left *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (47%). An additional 3% stem from two other newspapers, the regional quality daily *Leipziger Volkszeitung* published in Saxony in Eastern Germany and the tabloid *Bild Zeitung* which is the largest circulation daily in Germany with over 4 million copies sold per day. The latter two papers were only coded for the year 2000, in order to allow comparative analysis with the two quality papers. In that year they together make up 10% of all articles (7% LVZ and 3% Bild), which – given their diverging sample<sup>1</sup> – corresponds to a ratio of about 1 : 3 compared to FAZ and SZ for the regional paper, and of about 1 : 7 for the tabloid (i.e. the two national quality dailies have about three to seven times as many relevant articles per issue as the regional or tabloid papers).

<sup>1</sup> The sample is one issue per week on alternating days for each SZ and FAZ (52 issues per year, each) in 2000 to 2002 and one issue per week for either SZ or FAZ (26 issues per year, each) in 1990 and 1995. In addition, one issue in two weeks for LVZ and Bild (26 issues per year, each) is coded for the year 2000.

**Table 1.3: Section from which articles were coded by paper**

Section	By paper, in %				Total	
	SZ	FAZ	LVZ	Bild	In %	(N)
Mixed internat'l/national news section	60	65	51	97	62	2131
Regional/local news section	.	.	26	3	1	26
Commentary pages	7	2	6	–	4	153
Business / economy section	30	32	17	–	30	1036
International news section	2	0	–	–	1	38
National news section	1	–	–	–	1	21
No differentiation between sections	–	0	–	–	0	4
Section unknown	–	0	–	–	0	2
Total (N)	100 1588	100 1708	100 81	100 34	100	3411

Like in the other national case studies, the selected papers were scanned for relevant articles in the news section (including miscellaneous news pages such as “Panorama” in SZ, “Deutschland und die Welt” in FAZ, and “Aus aller Welt” in LVZ), in the economic and business section, but not in the cultural section (“Feuilleton” in German papers), nor in the sports section. Only regular sections appearing on a daily basis were included (for instance sections on environment or science that appear once a week were disregarded). The final database is constituted by about one third of articles from the business or economic section and more than two thirds of all articles stemming from news sections. The latter are mainly the mixed international and national news (62% of all articles), and few from regional or purely national or international news sections; and 4% are articles from opinion pages that are not written by the paper itself but by other authors (i.e. opinions stemming from other media in the form of press reviews, or from guest commentaries by politicians or public intellectuals). The own commentaries and editorials of the four papers are analysed in a separate study (work package 3 of the Europub project).

Except for the tabloid Bild, which does not distinguish between different news and only has a regional section, the other papers follow a similar distinction between sections, and for both SZ and FAZ the share of the economic section is almost a third of all relevant articles, although one might have expected the FAZ to emphasise economic issues more than SZ. In the regional paper from Leipzig, a much higher share (half) of relevant articles comes from the political news section, and also the regional section contributes to the total number of articles (a quarter). For the two national broadsheets, the Bavaria and Munich (SZ) and the Hessen and Frankfurt (FAZ) sections were disregarded.

**Table 1.4a: Source of article by paper**

Source	By paper, in %				Total	
	SZ	FAZ	LVZ	Bild	In %	(N)
Own cov.: foreign correspondent	19	38	6	–	28	960
Own cov.: nat. office editor /journalist	42	40	46	100	42	1417
National press agency	14	6	33	–	11	365
Other EU press agency	11	4	4	–	7	249
Non-EU press agency	5	1	7	–	3	102
Other national media source	2	6	2	–	4	133
Other EU media source	4	4	1	–	4	139
Non-EU media source	2	1	–	–	1	42
Other source	0	0	–	–	0	4
Total (N)	100 1588	100 1708	100 81	100 34	100	3411

For each relevant article, the source of the information as indicated at the beginning or at the end of the article is coded. When several news agencies are quoted for the same article, the first mentioned is retained. Only Bild Zeitung does not provide any information on the source of its news, although our interview partners from this newspaper mentioned subscriptions to several news agencies.

If one relies on this information, 78% of all relevant FAZ articles originate from the papers own coverage, against 62% for SZ and only 52% for LVZ. These figures clearly reflect the differences in resources of the respective newspapers. The variation is less in the share of the national office editor or journalists (40-46%) than in the contribution of foreign correspondents, where FAZ (38%) clearly outnumbers SZ (19%) and LVZ (6%). Actually the latter mainly shares four correspondents with other regional papers in Germany, and uses the services of some others on a case by case basis. (See interview Hochstein.)

Information that is not attributed to own coverage comes either from press agencies or from other media sources (mainly opinion quotes from other newspapers). The overall reliance on press agencies is lowest in FAZ (11%), high in SZ (31%) and highest in the regional paper (44%). The national press agency DPA (together with some less important agencies) is still the dominant news provider for all three papers (6-33%), but closely followed by other EU press agencies (Reuters and AFP) in the two national distribution papers. The American AP plays less of a role as the main information provider: only the regional paper relies more on it than on EU press agencies. However, AP is the main “non-EU” provider while the category “other EU” is shared by several agencies.

**Table 1.4b: Source of article by year**

Source	By year, in %					Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	In %	(N)
Own coverage: foreign correspondent	27	25	24	35	31	27	960
Own cov.: nat. office editor /journalist	35	27	47	44	43	35	1417
National press agency	14	17	13	8	6	14	365
Other EU press agency	12	14	5	5	7	12	249
Non-EU press agency	5	4	3	3	2	5	102
Other national media source	3	4	4	2	5	3	133
Other EU media source	3	5	4	4	5	3	139
Non-EU media source	2	5	0	0	1	2	42
Other source	0	–	–	0	0	0	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	373	412	1119	586	921		3411

[Based on both samples. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

No clear trend is visible, in particular because Bild and LVZ with their different patterns are distorting the data for 2000, and because the year 2001 is only based on the European sample, which may favour foreign sources or foreign correspondents.

If one considers only 1990, 1995 and 2002, the role of foreign correspondents and own contributions by the national office as information providers seem to have increased and the use of news agencies decreased.

**Table 1.5: Articles with and without claims**

Articles	Number of articles (N)	In % of database
Articles without claims	341	10
Articles with claims (new claims)	2985	88
Articles with claims (already coded claims)	85	2
Total	3411	100

[Based on both samples. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The large majority (90%) of all articles that were found relevant for our study contain claims; only a tenth of all articles are merely factual texts on the selected topics. In only 2% of the cases, articles contain claims that have already been coded in other articles. These ratios are fairly similar over the years, but differ from one newspaper to the other: for both the regional LVZ and the tabloid Bild, a fifth of all selected articles are factual texts without any claims.

## 2. Claim-level

### General

**Table 2.1: Number of claims coded per year: total, full sample, European sample**

Year	Claims coded (in % within sample) from		Total	
	full sample issue	reduced European sample issue	In %	(N)
1990	14	5	10	500
1995	13	8	11	545
2000	37	26	32	1577
2001	.	42	17	850
2002	36	19	29	1398
Total (N)	100 2822	100 2048	100	4870

A newspaper article can contain one or more different claims; the total number of 4870 claims in 2985 articles containing new claims means that the statistical average number of claims per article is slightly higher than one and a half (1.62 claims).

Over time, if one takes into account that the early years are coded with a halved sample, there is a slight increase of claims making on the seven topics we analyse.

## Location

**Table 2.2a: Country where claim was made by year**

	In % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Germany (incl. GDR)	44	46	55	48	50	1402
France	7	12	3	3	5	137
UK	3	4	3	3	3	92
Italy	2	2	1	2	2	43
Spain	1	2	0	1	1	27
Netherlands	1	1	1	0	1	19
Other pre-1995 EU members	5	1	3	3	3	79
Austria, Finland, Sweden	3	1	5	2	3	83
EU seats	8	6	13	13	11	321
Switzerland	1	1	1	1	1	26
10 upcoming enlargement countries	4	2	4	4	4	103
Other Eur. countries (excl. CIS countries)	2	2	1	0	1	36
Turkey	0	1	0	3	2	43
Russia (incl. USSR)	4	2	2	1	2	54
USA	7	6	3	7	5	145
Japan	1	2	1	0	1	23
Middle East	5	1	1	2	2	56
UN seats	0	1	1	0	0	14
NATO seats	0	1	0	0	0	9
Rest of the world	2	4	3	6	4	110
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	389	377	1051	1005		2822

[Based on full sample issues only. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

Overall, half of all claims reported in the German (quality) press were actually made on the national territory. This leaves as high a share as 50% to claims made elsewhere in the world. This shows clearly that the national quality press takes a very international perspective in its news reporting. When looking at the news geography in detail, the next important power centre attracting media attention appear to be the seats of the European Union, i.e. Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg and Frankfurt (only coded as such when the respective claims are not national matters of the respective countries). The individual foreign countries that are most covered are the last remaining superpower USA and Germany's neighbour France (5% of all claims each), and the United Kingdom (3%). Together, claims from foreign EU countries or from EU seats make up 41% of all claims.



**Table 2.2b: Country where claim was made by issue field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Germany (incl. GDR)	44	51	64	26	92	86	30	50	1402
France	6	5	3	6	0	4	6	5	137
UK	3	5	1	6	3	2	3	3	92
Italy	1	–	3	2	1	1	2	2	43
Spain	2	1	1	0	0	–	1	1	27
Netherlands	1	2	1	1	–	0	1	1	19
Other pre-1995 EU members	3	3	2	2	–	1	6	3	79
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1	1	2	0	1	2	8	3	83
EU seats	16	19	2	1	1	1	25	11	321
Switzerland	1	2	2	0	–	–	1	1	26
10 upcoming enlargement c.	3	5	2	2	0	–	9	4	103
Other European c. (excl. CIS)	1	–	3	2	–	0	1	1	36
Turkey	–	–	1	5	–	–	2	2	43
Russia (incl. USSR)	1	–	1	5	0	1	3	2	54
USA	8	2	4	15	1	2	1	5	145
Japan	2	1	1	2	–	–	–	1	23
Middle East	–	–	3	10	–	0	0	2	56
UN seats	–	–	–	3	–	–	0	0	14
NATO seats	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	0	9
Rest of the world	7	1	5	9	–	1	1	4	110
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	535	208	351	446	273	300	709		2822

[Based on full sample issues only, ISFIELD1. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

*Issue fields* are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., livest. quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troop deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

The geographical distribution of places where news is produced depends largely on the policy field which is concerned. In three fields, the share of claims made within Germany is far higher than on average: in pensions, education and immigration (92%, 86% and 64%, respectively), while only one quarter of all claims on troop deployment are made in Germany. This field is structured in a very different way than the others and reflects that neither the conflicts themselves nor their potential generation or solution is predominantly located within the European Union. Only 45% of all claims on the deployment of troops are made in Germany, other EU Member States or the EU seats – in the other policy fields this share ranges between three quarters (monetary politics) and 98% (pension politics). Instead the action is located in the US, the Middle East and the rest of the World (15%, 10% and 9%, respectively). The two EU countries that hold a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, France and the United Kingdom (6% each) as well Russia and Turkey (5% each), are also important locations.

If one looks at the German press' news geography in broader terms of continents, non-European countries are the place where less than a fifth (18%) of all monetary claims are made, 12% of all immigration claims and five percent or less of all cases in the fields of agriculture, education pensions and European integration policy are made. Considering the large number of non-European countries sharing these small portions of public attention, and within it the high share of a single country, namely the USA, one might speak of a tendency towards a bipolar setting, where the pole 'Europe' is rather decentralised internally. Again, this does not apply to the field troop deployment and the internal decentralisation within the European continent is very low for the two policy fields still in national competence.

**Table 3.1: Region in own country where claim was made by issue field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Berlin (capital)	15	43	36	43	57	26	35	35	497
Bonn (other government seat)	6	12	11	19	6	10	12	10	139
Other 4 largest cities	49	16	16	23	16	16	29	24	335
Other locations in Germany	30	28	38	15	21	49	24	31	431
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	235	106	226	115	251	257	212		1402

[Based on full sample issues only, ISFIELD1, only the first claim per article, only claims made in Germany. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.] "Other 4 largest cities" are Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, and Frankfurt/Main.

Looking at the place where claims are made can give information about the degree of centralisation or decentralisation of a political system. In the German case, the distinction between the two capitals Bonn and Berlin is not relevant, because the distribution depends strongly on the time variable, i.e. when in the process of moving all capital functions (mainly the seat of parliament and government) a claim was made. This process stretched over several years, and parts of some ministries are still located in Bonn, so that some claims may still be made there; one would expect to find the "break in the series" between the sample years 1995 and 2000.

The two capitals together account for less than half (45%) of all claims made in Germany, which can be seen as a reflection of the federal system of this country. A second indicator is that the bigger part of the rest of political action in the public sphere (31%) occurred in other places than in the four biggest cities. The comparison with more centralised countries such as France will be interesting in this respect.

Public political action is most concentrated in Berlin/Bonn for those policy fields where competences are either at the national or international level: social policy (pensions), foreign policy (troop deployment) and agriculture. In line with the distribution of competences in education policy, which is mainly under regional authority, almost half of all claims are made in cities or regions other than the capital or the next four biggest cities. In turn, only in monetary politics the capitals do not represent an important stage: here, Frankfurt am Main is clearly the leading stage, as it accounts for nearly half of all claims together with the three other big cities. It should be noted that – as we also measure media claims - the two main sources of our data, FAZ and SZ increase the relative importance of the two big cities Frankfurt and Munich. The dominance of Frankfurt as a stage for claims on monetary politics also shows how much this policy is dominated by non-political action, i.e. action of central banks and commenting by financial experts who are located at the German capital market Frankfurt am Main. Here again, a comparison with France, where monetary decisions used to be less withdrawn from political rule and contestation, will be interesting.

## Actors (claim makers)

**Table 4.1: Actors of claims by issue field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
<b>STATE AND PARTY ACTORS</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>2025</b>
Politicians	1	-	1	1	3	0	2	1	32
Former states(wo)men	1	-	1	1	1	1	2	1	30
Government/executive	27	68	37	60	26	34	58	45	1266
Legislative	3	3	9	8	10	8	13	8	236
Judiciary	0	-	5	-	4	4	1	2	47
Police and internal security agencies	-	0	5	-	-	-	0	1	18
Military	-	-	1	6	-	-	0	1	31
Central banks	24	-	0	-	1	-	0	5	134
Social security executive org.s	-	-	0	-	5	-	-	1	15
Other state executive agencies	0	2	3	-	1	2	1	1	30
Political parties	2	3	10	4	19	9	5	7	186
<b>ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>553</b>
Unions and employees	1	-	1	-	6	5	0	1	41
Employers organisations and firms	11	3	4	0	7	3	1	4	116
Farmers and agricultural org.s	0	9	-	-	-	-	-	1	20
Economists and financial experts	15	-	1	0	4	0	1	4	105
<b>MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>271</b>
<b>OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>214</b>
Churches / religious org.s / groups	0	-	2	1	0	1	1	1	22
Educational professionals/ org.s	0	-	0	-	-	12	0	1	39
Other scientific / research inst.	2	3	1	1	3	4	2	2	61
Students, pupils, and their parents	-	-	-	0	-	7	0	1	24
Other professional org.s / groups	-	0	0	0	2	-	0	0	12
Consumer organisations/ groups	0	1	-	-	1	0	-	0	6
Migrant organisations/ groups	-	-	5	0	-	-	0	1	19
Pro-/anti-European campaign org.s	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	1
Solidarity and human rights org.s	-	-	1	1	-	-	0	0	7
Welfare organisations	-	-	1	-	0	-	-	0	5
Peace movement org.s / groups	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	1
Environmental org.s / groups	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	1
Terrorist groups	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	1
Rebel forces/guerrilla	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	0	3
Other civil society org.s / groups	0	-	1	1	-	-	1	0	12
<b>GENERAL/ UNKNOWN/ UNSPECIFIED</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>30</b>
Whole polities	0	1	0	0	-	0	0	0	9
The general public	1	0	1	1	-	-	0	1	15
Unknown/unspecified actors	0	-	1	-	-	-	-	0	6
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2822</b>
	<b>537</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>448</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>299</b>	<b>706</b>		

[Based on full sample issues only, ACT1S and ISFIELD1. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The claim makers that are most present in the German press are of course state and party actors, thus the institutions that are attributed the executive, legislative and judicial powers by the constitution, or the parties that are competing for obtaining these mandates. Together, these actors account for 72% of all claims, and their share even exceeds three quarters of the claims in European integration, troop deployment, and agriculture policies. Their dominance

is lowest in monetary and education policies. The distribution of visibility within this aggregate category differs considerably between policy fields: in the monetary field, the government actors share the portion with the central banks (about a quarter of all claims each) for obvious reasons of distributions of competences. Pension politics is the field where the legislative, parties and politicians together contribute a whole third of all claims, and also in European integration and immigration policies, they play a very prominent role (21-22% each).

The part of the public arena that is left to other groups of society is again structured in different ways in each policy field. Economic interest groups shape the discourse on monetary decisions (38%), and in particular employers organisations and firms and financial experts. It is interesting to note that trade unions do not often appear in the German press with positions on interest rates, exchanges rates or central bank independence in general. The only other field where economic interest groups are more important than on the overall average of one fifth of all claims is pension politics (23%). In Germany, both employers and employees pay contributions to the state pension cash, so that both have stakes in the decisions on contribution levels, pension levels and the reform of the system. With almost every tenth claim, farmers as a single interest group are actively involved in the public debate on agriculture, however given the relatively little importance of agriculture for the German economy one might expect to find higher shares of farmer claims in France.

Other civil society actors do not contribute more than 3% to 5% of all claims in most policy fields, except education (25%), where education professionals, their organisations, students, pupils and their parents have a considerable share in the public debate, and except immigration (12%), where migrant organisations, solidarity and human rights organisations as well as churches voice their interests and concerns. In pension politics, civil society actors are also slightly more visible (7%), but mainly due to the category of scientific institutions and researchers. The opinion of such research professionals is reflected in the press coverage on all policy fields, which is only the case for one other group (apart state and party actors and the media), the employers. It will be interesting to know if the role of expert opinion is equally important in other countries' press.

On average, media and journalists contribute about one out of ten claims. Their role as active claim makers is particularly high in the field of troop deployment (14%) and monetary affairs (12%), and relatively low in agricultural (4%) and pension (6%) policies. Given that these are relative numbers and that the media's share depends on how active other actor groups are in the respective field, a possible explanation for the role of media in troop deployment might be the relative abstinence of economic interest groups and civil society actors, but this would need to be looked at in detail.

**Table 4.2: Actor type by issue field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Unorganised collective	7	2	6	4	1	8	1	4	115
Named repr. of unorg. collective	0	1	1	-	-	2	1	1	18
Organisation or institution	34	30	29	34	31	31	24	30	842
Anonymous spokesperson(s)	7	7	9	8	5	3	5	6	175
Named spokesperson(s)	52	60	55	54	63	57	69	59	1672
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	537	209	350	448	273	299	706		2822

[Based on full sample issues only, ACTTYP1 by ISFIELD1. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The dominant pattern of claims making in the German press (about half or two thirds of the cases, depending on the policy field) is that named spokespersons make statements and take other public actions. Only in one fourth or one third of the cases it is whole organisations or institutions acting and speaking. In rare cases, claims are also made by anonymous spokespersons (6% on average), by unorganised collectives (4%) or by named representatives of unorganised collectives (1%). Even if only a part of the spokespersons are known by the general public – 857 different named individuals were responsible for the in the 2822 total claims –, this journalistic practice of quoting a spokesperson can fulfil other aims apart from the claimant’s objective to gain public support for their cause and on the long-term for themselves: From a qualitative perspective, news that can be traced back to an individual is easier to verify by others and easier to reject by the quoted spokesperson, therefore news attributed to anonymous spokespersons or to whole organisations appears to have a lower degree of credibility. Another aspect is that personalisation is considered to be an important news value that will attract media consumers’ attention; journalists are advised to link stories to individual people, whether they are mere examples of social phenomena or decision makers.

In the debate about why European politics are under-represented in the media, one factor is seen in the EU decision making process, which is held to be less suitable for personalised reporting than national or local processes. In this view, the degree of personalisation should be lower in policy fields with Europeanised decision making than in fields under national competence. When looking only at the summary table above, this cannot be confirmed: the share of named spokespersons in total claim makers in the nationally organised pensions and education policies is not consistently higher (63% and 57%) than that in the more Europeanised monetary and agricultural policies (52% and 60%). On the contrary, the field which is most dominated by personalised action is European integration politics (69%). However it can be confirmed that the actor type of anonymous spokespersons is slightly more represented in the two Europeanised fields (7% each) than in the two national ones (5% and 3%). This minimal difference is again relativised by the fact that anonymous spokespersons are even more important in the policy fields with a medium degree of Europeanisation (8% and 9%) and rather less important (5%) in the public debate on European integration. Beyond these aggregate results, it will be necessary to compare the degree of personalisation for different actor scopes, in order to see whether European claim makers are more often anonymous spokespersons or institutions than this is the case for national claim makers, as is suggested in the literature.

**Table 4.3: Twenty-five most often mentioned spokespersons**

Named spokesperson	Number of claims (N)	In % of all claims
1 Schröder, Gerhard	51	1.8
2 Stoiber, Edmund	26	0.9
3 Prodi, Romano	25	0.9
4 Fischer, Joschka	21	0.7
5 Riestler, Walter	17	0.6
6 Duisenberg, Wim	16	0.6
Eichel, Hans	16	0.6
Kohl, Helmut	16	0.6
7 Verheugen, Günter	15	0.5
8 Merkel, Angela	14	0.5
9 Solbes, Pedro	13	0.5
10 Blair, Tony	12	0.4
Bulmahn, Edelgard	12	0.4
Schily, Otto	12	0.4
Seehofer, Horst	12	0.4
11 Chirac, Jacques	11	0.4
Fischler, Franz	11	0.4
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich	11	0.4
Merz, Friedrich	11	0.4
Welteke, Ernst	11	0.4
12 Bush, George jr.	10	0.4
Künast, Renate	10	0.4
13 Kinkel, Klaus	9	0.3
14 Clinton, Bill	8	0.3
Greenspan, Alan	8	0.3
Scharping, Rudolf	8	0.3
Schüssel, Wolfgang	8	0.3
<i>830 other named spokespersons</i>	<i>1281</i>	<i>45.4</i>
<i>Anonymous spokespersons or organisations</i>	<i>1147</i>	<i>40.6</i>
<b>Total</b>	<b>2822</b>	<b>100.0</b>

[Based on full sample issues only, actname1. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The table lists the 27 most often mentioned spokespersons because several persons appeared equally often.

When measuring which individual spokespersons succeed in placing a claim in the media (claim-makers), it is not surprising to find the head of the German government at the top rank. Indeed, *Gerhard Schröder* was the most prominent claim-maker in the German press, with as much as double the number of appearances compared to the next prominent person, his challenger and opposition leader *Edmund Stoiber*. This is a reflection of a democratic media system, where not only the actual government, but also its political competitors receive a high media attention. Another indication of an open public sphere is the very number of different individual spokespersons that were personally given the chance to become known to the public: More than 850 individuals were mentioned in total. It should be noted that the prominence of opposition leaders tends to be above average in election years, and one of the most important years of our sample, 2002, was such a period. The chancellor's prominence is due to the fact that he is an active claim-maker in all issue fields, while other spokespersons appear only in one or a few issue fields. Only in European integration politics, Schröder was the most prominent claim-maker.

The top most prominent claim-makers in each policy field were: monetary politics: the Dutch ECB president *Wim Duisenberg*; agriculture: the Austrian EU Commissioner for Agriculture *Franz Fischler*; immigration: the German federal minister for the interior *Otto Schily*; troop deployment: US president *George W. Bush*; pensions: the then German federal minister for

work and social order *Walter Riester*; education: the German federal minister for education *Edelgard Bulmahn*; and European integration: chancellor *Schröder*. Overall, this measure thus appears to be a relatively reliable indication of the power centre in a given policy field.

When looking at the whole group of the top 27 most prominent persons in the German press, own national spokespersons play the biggest role (15 national politicians plus the central banker *Ernst Welteke* who holds leading posts both in the Bundesbank and in the ECB and who therefore seems to be preferred speaker for the German press). They are followed by a group of five prominent EU representatives: the Italian Commission president *Romano Prodi* (who is almost on equal terms with the German opposition leader), ECB president *Duisenberg*, the German Commissioner for enlargement *Günter Verheugen*, the Spanish EU Commissioner for economic and monetary affairs *Pedro Solbes*, and EU Commissioner *Fischler*. The remaining most prominent persons are the heads of state or government of (Germany's) most important (partner) countries United Kingdom, France and USA, as well as Austria (the Austrian chancellor's prominence being mainly due to the *Haider* conflict in 2000). Comparison with other national cases with show whether the two German speaking Commissioners *Verheugen* and *Fischler* eventually get higher media attention here than in other countries, or whether their prominence is merely due to their respective portfolios and our selection of issues. It should also be noted, however, that the other German speaking Commissioner *Michaele Schreyer*, responsible for the budget, is not overrepresented because of linguistic or cultural proximity.

The analysed German newspapers thus give a considerable stage to individual representatives of the EU as well as to foreign politicians. However this overall result does not apply to immigration, education and pension policies, where almost no foreign or EU spokespersons are mentioned. In turn the field troop deployment

**Table 4.4: Actor scope by broad actor categories**

	In % within recoded first actor scope					Total	
	state and party actors	economic interest groups	media and journalists	other civil society actors	general/unknown/unspecified	In %	(N)
<b>SUPRANATIONAL/BI-OR MULTILATERAL LEVEL ACTORS</b>							
Supranational: UN	100	–	–	–	–	100	28
Other supranational	80	–	3	18	–	100	40
EU	98	1	–	–	0	100	339
Other Eur. supranational	77	23	–	–	–	100	13
Multilateral	25	45	–	25	5	100	20
Bilateral	–	50	50	–	–	100	2
<b>NATIONAL LEVEL ACTORS</b>							
Germany	64	14	12	9	0	100	1406
France	69	5	21	4	–	100	114
UK	63	10	23	4	–	100	92
Italy	61	6	28	–	6	100	36
Spain	83	4	4	9	–	100	23
Netherlands	74	–	26	–	–	100	19
Other pre-1995 EU-MS	80	2	8	8	2	100	50
Austria, Finland, Sweden	77	1	10	8	4	100	84
Switzerland	60	5	15	15	5	100	20
10 upcoming enlarg. c.	81	9	4	5	1	100	94
Other Eur. countr (EIS)	76	–	4	16	4	100	25
Turkey	77	2	12	5	5	100	43
Russia	83	3	6	6	2	100	64
USA	81	12	3	3	1	100	137
Japan	72	17	–	6	6	100	18
Middle East	79	2	4	15	–	100	53
Rest of the world	73	6	4	11	6	100	83
Unclassifiable	–	53	5	37	5	100	19
Total	72	10	10	8	1	100	
(N)	2025	282	271	214	30		2822

[Based on full sample issues only, ACTSCNW1 by ACT1SS. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

As we have seen in table 4.1, claims making in the German press is very clearly dominated by state and party actors, and as can be observed in table 4.4 above, this is the case for actors from virtually all geographical origins. Whether the claimants are German nationals, foreign nationals, or European or supranational actors, the category state and party always outweighs all other categories of actors, such as economic interest groups, media and journalists or other civil society actors. This is partly due to the way the category is defined: it includes government representatives, public administration, the judiciary, parties and political groups in the parliaments, as well as individual politicians or former statesmen. Still, the table shows in how far the German press presents a stage for interest groups, media, and civil society actors from other countries or from different supranational levels.

The most striking result in terms of an emerging European public sphere is that not a single claim coded in any of the seven issue fields was made by a *European level civil society group or organisation*. While civil society groups organised multilaterally or at global supranational level did manage to place their claims in the German press (25 and 18% of all claims made by actors of these geographical levels, respectively), no European group did. The interviews held in the frame of this project should help understand whether European civil society actors did not actively try to use this stage or whether they actually made attempts and failed to get



access to it. Also *European economic interest groups* such as the social partners, farmers associations or economic experts from firms, although at least present in a few cases, are marginal compared to European level state and party actors. As for civil society actors, this does not necessarily mean that European economic interest groups are inactive, but only that they did either not try or not succeed in getting media attention for their positions. According to academic research on interest groups' strategies, actors adapt their strategies to the political opportunity structures in which they operate, and it has been stated that actors (for instance environmental groups) that pursue very active media strategies at national level may focus on lobbying strategies when trying to influence European level decision makers. This would be one probable explanation for the invisibility of these groups in German media. While they may be successful with this choice of strategy in terms of reaching their goals, the impact on public perception of how European politics work should be negative. If one assumes that claims in media also help to shape public opinion and have a mobilising effect, than such an abstention of NGOs from media arenas would have a negative consequence.

The absence of truly *European media* among the European actor range is not surprising since the few truly European newspapers or TV channels are either non-political (sports, music channels) or used only by a small elite, as has often been noted.

In the above table, only the full sample is taken into account. When doing the same analysis for the European sample, which should provide all European scope actors with a higher probability of being represented, there are a few cases of claims made by civil society and economic interest groups, for instance "the newly elected COPA president, *Sonnleitner*, starts a post-card campaign claiming vaccinations of cattle against foot and mouth disease (instead of slaughtering)" or "seven church organisations (Comece, Caritas Europe, European Justitia-et-Pax, etc.) declare in reaction to EU Interior Council proposals on common immigration policy, that illegal immigrants should not be criminalized". However their overall weight compared to that of state and party actors is only about one percent of total claims made by European level actors.

Civil society groups organised *multilaterally* or at *global supranational level* managed better than the European ones to place their claims in the German press (see above), their share compared to state and party actors is even higher than that of German civil society representatives (9%). Although a considerable part of these multilateral economic interest groups stems from multinational firms and banks, this result invites to analyse more in-depth the possible emergence of a global public sphere. The supranational category also includes human rights organisations such as Amnesty International, which succeeded in placing its criticism of EU Interior Council proposals for a European immigration law in the German media.

The structure of societal representation is clearly changed when we look at the horizontal dimension of press coverage: ***national actors from foreign countries*** or groups of countries are predominantly representatives of states and parties, but to a lesser degree (ranging from 60-61% of the Swiss and Italian actors to 83% of the Spanish and Russian actors). This means that for German press coverage, it is not only important to know what foreign governments or politicians do, but also what interest groups or the media from these foreign public spheres think or want. *Media and journalists* from foreign countries are paid relatively most attention to (in respect of all voices from these countries) in the case of the other European Union countries: Italy (28% of all Italian actors making claims in the German press), Netherlands, UK and France (26%, 23% and 21% respectively), as well as most other Member States and Switzerland. In many cases this outweighs even the relative attention that is paid by our selected newspapers to German media and journalists (12%). Media voices from non-EU members except Turkey are not given much attention compared to the governments or

politicians of these countries, be they Eastern European countries or the USA. The relative representation of foreign *civil society actors* in turn is not clearly linked to a geographical area, representatives from NGOs or social groups from EU Member States are rather relatively less prominent than those from Switzerland, other European countries or the Middle East. Economic interest groups from foreign countries are paid relatively less attention (than their governments) than those from Germany (14%); only in the cases of the big global players Japan, USA and UK, economic interest groups play a bigger role compared to other actors from these countries.

**Table 4.5a-g: Actor scope by year, separate for each policy field**

A	Monetary politics				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	–	–	–	1	0	1
Other supranational	4	3	2	2	2	12
EU	4	11	20	21	17	88
Other European supranational	–	–	1	–	0	1
Multilateral	–	–	3	2	2	9
Bilateral	–	1	–	–	0	1
Germany	62	43	45	38	44	233
France	4	12	1	4	4	23
UK	6	–	3	3	3	15
Italy	3	1	1	–	1	4
Spain	1	7	1	1	2	10
Netherlands	3	–	1	1	1	4
Other pre-1995 EU-members	–	2	5	2	3	14
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1	2	1	4	2	11
Switzerland	–	1	1	2	1	5
10 upcoming enlargement countries	1	3	3	3	3	14
Other Eur. countries (excl. CIS)	1	–	1	1	1	3
Russia	1	–	1	2	1	6
USA	3	10	6	7	7	35
Japan	–	–	3	2	2	9
Middle East	–	–	–	1	0	1
Rest of the world	3	2	5	7	5	26
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	68	90	177	190		525

Media attention in Germany for monetary politics is high throughout the reference period: 1990 is a period in which the design of the monetary union is developed (a European central bank system being defined as a precondition for EMU, as well as first proposals for convergence criteria being tabled), 1995 is marked by speculations on who will be the first members of the common European currency, and by currency fluctuations. Afterwards the freezing of exchange rates between the participating currencies maintains the issue on the agenda; and once the Euro coins and banknotes become an every day reality for the citizens of the Eurozone, public claims-making intensifies. A real trend of Europeanisation can be observed over time: while the (theoretical) debate on monetary union in 1990 is dominated

with 62% by German actors<sup>2</sup>, this own national share drops to 43% in 1995 and even lower to 38% in 2002. This withdrawal of German speakers gives way mainly to European speakers and actors, above all of course to the European Central Bank and its predecessor, the European Monetary Institute, this share raising from 4% in 1990 to 21% in 2002. Media claims in this field include also monetary policies in other countries, i.e. classical foreign news. In the year 1999, the debate is mainly about the perspectives of single countries for joining the common currency, or their potential failure to meet the convergence criteria.

An important part of the claims in this policy field consists of decisions made by central banks, for instance modifying interest rates, setting the official exchange rate of a currency or buying or selling a currency on the financial markets in order to influence its market value. It is therefore not surprising to see that the USA are the most important single country from where claim makers stem – in many cases this is the FED or more specifically its director Alan Greenspan. For obvious reasons, not only actual decisions but also judgements on how the economy evolves, normally not a newsworthy claim, have very high chances of being reported in the business sections of any German quality paper if the author of the claim is the US American central bank.

B	Agriculture				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Other supranational	–	–	1	–	0	1
EU	16	15	15	27	19	39
Germany	38	31	63	49	52	108
France	5	–	4	3	4	8
UK	11	38	2	–	5	11
Spain	–	–	1	–	0	1
Netherlands	–	–	3	3	2	5
Other pre-1995 EU-members	–	–	3	–	1	3
Austria, Finland, Sweden	–	–	2	–	1	2
Switzerland	3	8	1	–	1	3
10 upcoming enlargement countries	11	–	1	10	5	11
USA	11	–	2	3	4	8
Japan	3	–	–	2	1	2
Rest of the world	3	8	1	3	2	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	37	13	94	63		207

Agricultural policy as defined in our study (i.e. including the sub-issues agricultural subsidies, livestock quotas and disease control), was not very intensely debated in the four years of reference, except in 2000. The BSE crisis was the main reason for the issue to be on the media agenda in that year (two thirds of all claims on agriculture), and it is probably this sub-issue which most contributes to the changes in the structure of claim makers in our agriculture data. The comparatively low share of German actors in the debate in 1990 and 1995 (38% and 31%) sharply rises to almost two thirds of all claims in 2000, and remains at about half of the claims in 2002. This can be a reflection of a re-nationalisation of the public debate in this period; however this does not happen to the disadvantage of EU speakers, who also increase their share of the debate from 15% to 27% in 2002.

The category loosing voice in this process is that of national speakers from foreign countries, the supranational level (including for instance the WTO or the UN organisations dealing with

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that about a fourth of the claims on monetary politics in 1990 concern the monetary union between the Deutsche Mark and the East German Mark.

development) not playing any role throughout the period. Except for France and the United Kingdom, representatives of partner countries are hardly quoted at all. The outbreak of BSE in the UK in 1995 leads to a sudden focus on British actors. In 2000, the fact that cases of the mad cow disease are reported from virtually everywhere in the completely integrated European food market, is reflected in a sudden diversification of claim makers from many foreign countries. It is interesting to note that in this very year, EU representatives cannot manage to extend their role in the German public sphere, instead it is the federal minister as well as regional politicians monopolising the debate. The interviews will hopefully explain whether this lack of active engagement of EU representatives was due to a lack of action or to a lack of reporting. In any case, in the moment of a deep uncertainty in the population about the risk to get a fatal disease from their everyday nutrition habits, media turn their attention to the national decision makers although the legal authority for decision making in this field is on the European level. In an interview for the Europub project, an EU affairs speaker of the CDU/CSU group emphatically expresses his distress over the German media in this question, reproaching them to report without any criticism claims of German ministers to adopt a national solution to the BSE problem. Such cases were, for instance, the regional health minister *Bärbel Höhn* (NRW) claiming on 6 November 2000 that beef imports from BSE-hit Member States must be banned and that the German government must take national measures in case that the EU does not find a common solution, and federal agriculture minister *Karl-Heinz Funke* stating on 17 November he would take measures at national level if there is no Europe-wide agreement on how to protect consumers from BSE.

c	Immigration				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	–	–	2	2	1	5
Other supranational	4	–	2	–	1	5
EU	7	–	2	5	3	11
Other European supranational	–	–	–	1	0	1
Multilateral	–	2	–	2	1	3
Germany	46	73	70	59	64	222
France	2	7	–	2	2	6
UK	–	–	1	4	1	5
Italy	–	–	3	4	2	8
Spain	–	–	1	3	1	5
Netherlands	–	–	1	1	1	2
Other pre-1995 EU-members	–	–	1	2	1	4
Austria, Finland, Sweden	11	–	1	1	2	7
Switzerland	–	–	3	1	1	5
10 upcoming enlargement countries	4	–	3	1	2	7
Other Eur. Countries (excl. CIS)	9	–	2	–	2	7
Turkey	2	2	–	3	1	5
Russia	4	–	1	1	1	4
USA	7	2	4	1	3	11
Japan	–	–	1	–	0	1
Middle East	2	7	1	3	2	8
Rest of the world	2	7	4	6	5	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	46	44	153	105		348

The entry and exit aspects of immigration (excluding social integration of migrants) play a bigger role than agriculture on the German media agenda in our sample, with a slight increase

in the recent years. Here, the active speakers in the public sphere are from a more diversified geographical background: from different supranational levels such as amnesty international or the UNHCR as well as from most world regions. Yet, the debate is clearly dominated by German actors, fluctuating between 46% and 73% of all claims. European play a modest role throughout the decade. However, the role of national actors from EU partner countries increases from two percent in 1990 to 16% in 2002. This trend corresponds to the way competences in this only partially Europeanised policy field are distributed: Apart from the Schengen Agreement, European cooperation in immigration matters only becomes relevant with the treaty of Maastricht (mainly in a non-binding way) and with the treaty of Amsterdam in force since 1999. Decisions are taken by the Council of ministers without voting rights for the EP or a prerogative of initiative for the Commission, on top the voting in the Council is with unanimity; all these elements give the individual governments a crucial role in the decision making. On top, the Member States executives assume that specific measures on limiting the access to the national territory for asylum seekers or other immigrants may directly impact on the attempts of these people to access neighbouring countries. Thus observation and also media coverage of other EU countries' immigration and asylum policies has increased in the past years. Except some spectacular cases such as the refugee detainee centres offshore Australia or the Cuban refugee child Elias and his family's fight over his immigration to the USA, the total share of claim makers from countries outside the European continent does not exceed 10 per cent.

d	Troop deployment				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	–	7	17	2	4	18
Other supranational	2	6	6	3	4	16
EU	–	2	4	2	2	8
Multilateral	–	–	2	1	1	3
Germany	16	26	15	35	28	122
France	7	7	–	4	5	21
UK	8	6	6	6	6	28
Italy	2	–	–	1	1	5
Spain	1	–	–	–	0	1
Netherlands	1	2	–	0	1	4
Other pre-1995 EU-members	2	1	–	0	1	4
Austria, Finland, Sweden	–	–	–	1	0	2
Switzerland	–	–	–	0	0	1
10 upcoming enlargement countries	7	–	–	0	2	7
Other Eur. countries (excl. CIS)	–	8	–	1	2	10
Turkey	–	1	2	7	4	17
Russia	14	16	2	2	7	32
USA	16	7	15	20	16	70
Japan	1	6	–	–	1	6
Middle East	19	–	21	6	9	41
Rest of the world	3	5	10	7	6	27
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	88	87	48	220		443

In opposition to market regulation or distribution policies such as monetary and agricultural policies, public coverage of troop deployment is highly dependent on concrete crises. After the end of the constant crisis of the Cold War, such coverage is mainly initiated by crises with

military intervention and much less often by structural aspects. The issue was on the agenda in all our reference years, and very intensively in 2002 due to the announcement and preparation for a military invasion of Iraq by the US led alliance and, less prominently also to the aftermath of the Afghanistan war. In 1990, it is the preparation for a military attack on Iraqi troops in Kuwait that prompts most media coverage, in 1995 the war in Bosnia and in 2000 the Kosovo war. The fact that the Afghanistan and Iraq wars happened in the Middle East but with the active involvement of some EU countries under the military leadership of the US, while the Balkan conflicts were located in Europe but with different multilateral actors involved (UNPROFOR, KFOR, NATO), should have an impact on media coverage and particularly on the claim-makers. It is therefore difficult to speak of trends over time in this field. The conflict between Israel and its neighbours is a minor, but reoccurring issue throughout the reference period. In addition several shorter conflicts such as in Congo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, are covered, and troops withdrawals from Europe by the two superpowers in the early years of the study. Given Germany's only very recent re-involvement in military action outside its borders, it is clear why this policy field is the one with the lowest dominance of German claim makers. It might be worth contrasting these results to the study on the German and US American media coverage of these conflicts carried out by Antje Knorr (presentation at the European Public Sphere Conference in Berlin, November 2003).

E	Pensions				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	–	–	1	–	0	1
Other supranational	–	–	–	2	1	2
EU	–	4	–	1	1	2
Other European supranational	–	–	–	1	0	1
Multilateral	–	–	–	1	0	1
Germany	90	75	95	84	90	245
France	–	–	1	–	1	2
UK	–	–	1	6	3	7
Italy	–	13	–	–	1	3
Spain	–	–	1	–	0	1
Austria, Finland, Sweden	–	–	1	1	1	2
10 upcoming enlargement countries	10	–	–	1	1	2
Russia	–	4	–	–	0	1
USA	–	4	–	1	1	2
Middle East	–	–	1	–	0	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	10	24	158	81		273

Pension politics are only a major issue in the two recent years, before this, pension questions concern almost exclusively the system change in East Germany and specific aspects such as certain groups of population or certain periods or events in life that should or should not be taken into account for the calculation of state pensions. These questions just as the major reform debate in 2000, are almost exclusively discussed by German actors, foreign actors only appear in exceptional cases, such as in the bilateral Polish-German social cooperation (1990), the Italian pension reform, and an EU green light to some state aid in the form of pensions to a privatised German company (both 1995), or an ECJ decision on German pension payments for Turkish migrant workers benefiting from the EC association agreement (2000). It is interesting to see that the higher intensity of the pension reform debate in Germany is accompanied by somewhat more attention for foreign actors speaking about pensions in their

countries, and that at the same time the supranational level becomes a bit more visible. Global institutions such as the Worldbank try to push for reforms of pension systems in European countries, and different European level actors, including the EP, the Commissioner for social affairs and the employers' federation UNICE, also intervene on common European rules. This empirical finding corresponds to the expectations we formulated in the work package on political opportunity structure in this field, where we described the role of international expert reports and of certain parts of the European executive in convincing Member States governments of the need for substantial reform of their pension systems, in particular in view of avoiding excessive public deficits. Despite this increased visibility of non-German actors, the public debate on pensions in the national press is still dominated at 84% by German actors. It would be interesting to analyse whether there are differences in reporting by newspaper, but unfortunately the low number of cases does not allow for it. (One hypothesis might be that the FAZ, being the most inclined to liberalisation and deregulation among the four papers, has a positive bias towards this kind of supranational claims.)

F	Education				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
EU	6	–	1	–	1	3
Multilateral	–	–	–	1	0	1
Germany	80	76	84	95	86	258
France	–	14	4	–	4	11
UK	–	–	5	–	2	5
Italy	–	–	2	–	1	2
Netherlands	–	–	–	1	0	1
Other pre-1995 EU-members	9	–	–	–	1	3
Austria, Finland, Sweden	–	2	1	4	2	6
Russia	–	–	3	–	1	3
USA	6	4	–	–	1	4
Middle East	–	–	1	–	0	1
Rest of the world	–	4	–	–	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	35	50	104	111		300

As is the case for pension policies, political competences in the education field still largely reside with the nation state (in the German case, even at the sub-national level). This is well-reflected in the way the debate is run. German actors dominate the debate at three quarters to 95%. EU level actors only intervene at a very low percentage, and only on the few issues for which there is a European competence, namely on financial contributions and not on any regulatory aspects. For instance public announcements of payments under the European Social Fund for education projects in Berlin, or a member of the European Parliament claiming more funds for exchange programmes, or again the EU Commission rejecting claims of welfare, culture and education organisations receiving public aids to be exempted from subsidy controls.

In very few cases, foreign actors appear in the debate on German education politics, for instance when the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* quotes French *Le Monde* and Austrian *Der Standard*, both supporting the German constitutional court in its so-called crucifix decision (about the legality of religious symbols in class rooms) and opposing the Bavarian CSU's criticism of the Court ruling.

Most of the times when foreign actors make claims on education in the German press, their own national school systems are concerned. The most frequently covered education politics

are those of France, the United Kingdom and Sweden, but also non European countries such as the USA. In these cases, the whole political process can be covered: government proposals for reform, opposition parties' criticism of such proposals, teacher and pupil demonstrations for better resource allocation, expert reports on specific problems, etc. While most of this coverage is prompted by current events such as mass protests, it is in some cases initiated by new developments within Germany, where newspapers will look at countries that are more advanced in some education aspects (for instance Swedish schools' strategies against mobbing among pupils), and interview foreign experts, teachers, or politicians.

As an exception, the interest may also be rather a "human interest" or curiosity, for instance when the Egyptian state secretary for education and the police are reported to arrest parents who helped their children during school exams by shouting the right answers in front of the school.

g	European integration				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	–	–	–	1	0	3
Other supranational	3	–	–	0	1	4
EU	18	23	25	34	27	188
Other European supranational	3	–	2	1	1	10
Multilateral	–	–	1	–	0	3
Bilateral	–	–	–	0	0	1
Germany	46	32	27	28	31	218
France	10	14	5	3	6	43
UK	–	4	4	3	3	21
Italy	2	1	2	3	2	14
Spain	1	1	0	1	1	5
Netherlands	–	3	0	–	0	3
Other pre-1995 EU-members	3	1	3	4	3	22
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1	1	14	4	8	54
Switzerland	–	3	1	–	1	6
10 upcoming enlargement countries	5	9	8	8	7	53
Other Eur. countries (excl. CIS)	2	–	0	1	1	5
Turkey	–	4	1	7	3	21
Russia	4	–	4	1	3	18
USA	2	–	1	0	1	7
Middle East	–	1	–	–	0	1
Rest of the world	1	–	1	1	1	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>(N)</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>226</b>		<b>707</b>

Tables 4.a-g: Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild. Minor differences in total (N) for some issue fields in comparison to the other tables are due to data revision.

Table g shows that in the German press, the debate on European integration is led in a truly Europeanised way, and this increasingly since 1990: the share of German national speakers in this debate has fallen from a bit less than half to a bit more than one quarter, while in parallel the voice of European level actors such as the EP, Commission or Council has increased from 18% to a third of all claims on this issue. The remaining part of the claims is shared between nationals from other EU countries and, increasingly, also from enlargement candidates. Given the large number of potential contributors (a total of 28 countries including the three with a long-term membership perspective), it is clear that a single country's share in total claims cannot exceed a few percent, and in addition there are noticeable fluctuations from one year to



the other. The only country whose nationals continuously have a particularly high stance in the German media debate on European integration is Germany's special partner France, even if its relatively high share has dropped quite strongly in the more recent years. In the interviews for this project, German actors, when asked about the contribution of their country to European integration, almost unanimously quote France as equally important in the integration process.

The relevance of Austrian speakers in the year 2000 is not representative as it is mainly linked to the Haider affair. In fact about a fifth of the German newspaper coverage of the debate on European integration in the year 2000 is about the participation of *Jörg Haider* in the Austrian government and about the reactions of the EU partners to this event.

Next to the role of specific countries (Germany because of reunification in 1990, Austria in 2000 and Italy because of the Berlusconi government in 2002), the most debated sub-issue is enlargement. Representatives of governments, but also of interest groups and civil society from the candidate countries are also actively expressing their positions or claims in the German public discourse on enlargement.

## Action forms

**Table 5.1a: Forms of action by issue field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
political decision	11	17	13	12	13	13	8	12	297
executive action	4	3	7	9	1	4	2	4	104
judicial action	0	–	4	1	3	3	1	2	39
non-specified statement	54	50	46	43	49	45	42	46	1180
other verbal statement	21	15	18	16	24	19	24	20	512
meeting	9	13	7	17	9	12	23	14	357
direct-democratic action	0	1	0	–	–	–	0	0	4
protest action	1	2	4	2	1	5	1	2	52
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>(N)</b>	<b>472</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>385</b>	<b>257</b>	<b>274</b>	<b>635</b>		<b>2545</b>

[Based on full sample issues only, excluding claims made by media (ACT1S=160), FORMS by ISFIELD1.  
Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

If one disregards the claims made by the press, which are by definition newspaper articles, two thirds of overall public claims making in German papers consist of verbal statements: a bit less than half of all claims are non-specified statements, which read “as xy said, stated, criticised, supported, claimed, etc” without any further details, and a fifth of all claims are other verbal statements such as public speeches, interviews, and press releases. The remaining third of the claims consists of meetings (14%, for instance summit meetings, parliamentary sessions, party conventions etc.), political decisions (12%, for instance legislative proposals, parliamentary votes or resolutions, administrative decisions or court rulings, etc.), executive actions (4%, financial support, arrest, troop deployment, etc.), protest actions (2%, including demonstrations, confrontational protest or violent actions), and judicial actions (2%, i.e. appealing to the judiciary, namely by filing lawsuits).

This overall composition of public claims making in quality papers applies to all seven policy fields of this study, however there are a few notable differences. The share of non-specified statements is higher than average in the two most Europeanised fields, monetary and agricultural politics. In monetary politics this is certainly due to the dominant pattern of central bank representatives and anonymous financial experts commenting on economic trends and consequent necessity of adapting interest rates. Even claims by trade unions of a modification of monetary policy are likely to be expressed as verbal claims. If one looks at the aggregate category of all verbal statements, this difference is less clear. The field European integration politics is characterized by a particularly high ratio of meetings, thus by negotiation and deliberation, often in the frame of European summits, Council meetings, and parliamentary sessions. Troop deployment is by definition the field where executive action, namely announcements of troop movements is the most important. The only policy fields where protest action is slightly more often chosen than usually are immigration and education; here many claims are made by refugees demonstrating or hunger striking against deportation or bad detention conditions, and by pupils, students and teachers protesting against the tuition conditions or fees. Another specific political instrument for immigration politics is judicial action, for instance the filing of suits against deportation decisions of the executive. In agricultural politics, political decisions are the second most used form of claims-making, however it should be checked if this is due to the sub-issue disease control or a general phenomena. The overall picture of German public sphere is that protest action is very limited and political contestation and conflict seems to be limited to verbal confrontation and

negotiation. The results from other national case studies will show whether this is a general pattern of the public spheres in Europe, or whether different opportunity structures lead to other means of conflict settlement.

**Table 5.1b: Forms of action by broad actor categories**

	In % within actor category				Total	
	state and party actors	economic interest groups	other civil society actors	general/unknown/unspecified	In %	(N)
political decision	14	1	2	10	12	297
executive action	5	1	1	7	4	14
judicial action	1	1	4	3	2	39
non-specified statement	44	67	42	21	46	118
other verbal statement	19	22	29	14	20	512
meeting	16	6	8	7	14	357
direct-democratic action	–	–	0	10	0	4
protest action	0	3	14	28	2	52
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>100</b> 2023	<b>100</b> 282	<b>100</b> 211	<b>100</b> 29	<b>100</b>	<b>2545</b>

[Based on full sample issues only, excluding claims made by media (ACT1S=160), FORMS by ACT1SS. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The choice of action repertoire obviously depends on the power and resources of individual actors. Institutional actors such as the executive and judiciary have the prerogative of binding action; but they also need to gain public support for their decisions by a large amount of verbal action. The joint category “state and party actors” also includes opposition parties, which are confined to verbal action anyway. Economic interest groups do not hold any discretionary power (except for their tariff agreements) and therefore mainly recur to verbal action. In addition, trade unions and farmer organisations also use protest action such as striking or boycotting, however to a very low degree (3%). In the industrial relations literature, it has often been pointed out that strikes are fairly infrequent in Germany compared to other countries, and that tariff agreements are instead negotiated by the social partners. Here, the results from other countries will be telling. For civil society actors in the German public sphere, verbal action is also the most often chosen instrument, but in addition protest action is also emphasised (14%). The aggregate category “general/unknown/unspecified” needs to be explored more in detail, but given the low number of claims, it is disregarded here.

**Table 5.1c: Forms of action by actor scope**

	In % within actor scope								Total	
	political decision	executive action	judicial action	non-specified statement	other verbal statement	meeting	direct-democratic action	protest action	In %	(N)
Supranat.: United Nations	14	4	–	46	29	7	–	–	100	28
Other supranational	5	5	3	36	36	15	–	–	100	39
European Union	16	3	1	41	17	21	–	1	100	338
Other Eur. supranational	–	8	–	31	38	23	–	–	100	13
Multilateral	5	–	5	60	15	10	–	5	100	20

Bilateral	–	–	–	100	–	–	–	–	100	1
National	11	4	1	48	20	13	0	2	100	1780
Regional	12	3	4	47	17	15	–	3	100	268
Local	12	7	2	34	32	5	–	7	100	41
Unclassifiable	–	–	–	71	18	–	–	12	100	17
Total	12	4	2	46	20	14	0	2	100	
(N)	297	104	39	1180	512	357	4	52		2545

[Based on full sample issues only, excluding claims made by media (ACT1S=160), ACTSCOP1 by FORMS. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

One of the hypotheses brought forward for explaining the lack of media interest in European affairs is that the usual action repertoire of European actors is too much declaratory and administrative, which is seen as less “sellable” to media users. The above table shows that indeed protest action is more used by multilateral, national, regional and local actors than by European actors. Interestingly, there is an almost linear increase in the frequency of protest actions going from the European, via the national to the regional and finally to the local level. This strongly suggests that opportunities for protest organizing decline the further away the centers of power are from the average citizen.

Claims by European actors occur much more often in the scope of meetings than for any other actor scope. This is certainly due to the fact that one of the most powerful organs of the EU, the Council of ministers, can only act as a body that meets, when one of its members speaks outside the meeting, he or she would be coded as a national minister, not as an EU actor anymore. Another factor may be that European party politicians usually address the press during the parliamentary sessions (again a meeting) and do not – as is the case at national level – intervene in public debates at any moment. For instance, in Germany, opposition politicians are heard virtually everyday criticising proposals, action or inaction by the federal government, irrespective of whether there is a Bundestag session or not. They are prominent enough to be heard as party representatives, while European party officials seem to be perceived only as relevant when there is a vote on a motion or on a legislative proposal (whether they try to address the press outside the sessions is to be seen in the interviews). Further analysis of the European actors’ claims should help understand this better. EU actors indeed appear more often in public by political decisions than other actors, but somewhat less often by way of executive action.

## Addressees

**Table 6.1: Presence of addressee by issue field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
No indirect object Addressee	45	26	28	27	25	28	30	31	881
Supported actor	41	58	53	60	61	59	51	53	1498
Opponent	7	7	9	8	6	6	11	8	229
	7	10	10	5	8	7	8	8	214
Total (N)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
	535	208	351	446	273	300	709		2822

[Based on full sample issues only, IOPRES by ISFIELD1. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

In about 70% of all cases, claim makers address other organisations or individuals, either by asking them to take action or to stop a specific action, by holding them responsible for a certain situation, or by supporting or criticising them. All these forms are summarised here as indirect object actors or addressee in general.

Monetary politics is the only field in our study in which a significantly larger portion of claims (45%) are without any kind of addressee. This field is often characterised by impersonal statements evaluating the current economic situation or expressing expectations about future developments, without any political responsibility being attributed to anybody. In addition administrative decisions in this field, namely the modification or maintenance of interests rates by central banks, are not addressed at any political actors.

Logically the usual addressee of a public claim are the institutions that are attributed the executive, legislative and judicial powers by the constitution, in more general terms state and party actors, which altogether are addressed in 84% of the cases (see **table 6.2a**). It may be surprising that the share of the legislative and parties, politicians and former states(wo)men accounts only for 13% of all cases. It will be interesting to compare with other countries' results in order to know whether their claims-making is more focused on legislative actors and parties, which would indicate rather parliamentary systems, or whether there is the same focus on the government.

In five percent of the cases, claim makers address economic interest groups, mainly the employers and their organisations as well as private companies. Also other civil society groups can be the target of political claims, in particular groups involved in the education process, i.e. pupils, parents, students and teachers, or migrants and their organisations, or consumers. Criticism of, or demands on the media as a political actor in its own right are very rarely published in our selected papers, although criticism of the media ("Medienschelte") is often said to be common in Germany.

Education policy is the field where least is expected from the state and parties, and most from society in general; and also in immigration politics, civil society groups are supported, criticised or held responsible more often than on average, namely migrant groups and churches. Consumers as political actors are only addressed in agricultural politics.

**Table 6.2a: Addressees by issue field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
<b>STATE AND PARTY ACTORS</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>1628</b>
Politicians	–	–	1	1	0	0	3	1	21
Former states(wo)men	1	–	1	–	–	–	2	1	14
Government/executive	48	71	54	70	61	52	64	60	1171
Legislative	2	4	7	5	6	5	9	6	115
Judiciary	0	–	5	–	2	6	0	2	32
Police /internal security agencies	–	–	1	0	–	–	–	0	3
Military	–	–	2	11	0	–	2	3	52
Central banks	32	1	–	–	–	–	1	5	99
Social security executive org.s	–	–	–	–	2	–	–	0	5
Other state executive agencies	0	2	1	–	1	3	1	1	19
Political parties	2	1	9	4	12	3	5	5	97
<b>ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>89</b>
Unions and employees	0	–	–	–	6	0	0	1	15
Employers org.s and firms	5	3	4	0	3	5	0	2	47
Farmers and agricultural org.s	–	5	–	–	–	–	–	0	8
Economists and financial experts	4	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	19
<b>MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>122</b>
Churches &religious org.s/groups	–	–	2	0	–	1	–	0	7
Educational professionals / org.s	–	–	–	–	–	15	–	2	32
Other scientific/ research inst.	0	4	–	–	1	2	–	1	13
Students, pupils, parents	–	–	0	–	0	5	–	1	12
Other professional org.s /groups	–	–	–	0	0	–	–	0	2
Consumer organizations /groups	0	3	–	–	0	–	–	0	6
Migrant org.s and groups	–	–	8	1	–	0	–	1	24
Pro-/anti-Europ. campaign org.s	–	–	–	–	–	–	0	0	2
Solidarity and human rights org.s	–	–	–	0	–	–	–	0	1
Welfare organizations	–	–	0	–	0	–	–	0	2
Org.s and groups of the elderly	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	0	3
Womens org.s /groups	–	–	–	–	0	–	–	0	1
Terrorist groups	–	–	–	0	–	–	–	0	1
Rebel forces/guerrilla	–	–	–	0	–	–	–	0	1
Other civil society org.s/groups	0	–	2	2	–	0	0	1	15
<b>GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPEC.</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>93</b>
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	293	154	251	325	204	216	498		1941

[Based on full sample issues only, IOS and IOSS by ISFIELD1. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

**Table 6.2b: Addressees by year**

	In % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
<b>STATE AND PARTY ACTORS</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>1628</b>
Politicians	0	1	1	1	1	21
Former states(wo)men	1	–	1	0	1	14
Government/executive	70	58	55	64	60	1171
Legislative	4	8	5	7	6	115
Judiciary	–	4	2	1	2	32
Police /internal security agencies	–	–	0	0	0	3
Military	3	5	1	3	3	52
Central banks	5	5	7	3	5	99
Social security executive org.s	–	1	0	0	0	5
Other state executive agencies	0	2	1	1	1	19
Political parties	2	5	5	6	5	97
<b>ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>89</b>
Unions and employees	–	0	2	0	1	15
Employers org.s and firms	1	2	4	2	2	47
Farmers and agricultural org.s	1	–	1	–	0	8
Economists and financial experts	–	0	1	1	1	19
<b>MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>122</b>
Churches &religious org.s/groups	0	0	0	0	0	7
Educational professionals / org.s	3	–	2	1	2	32
Other scientific/ research inst.	1	1	0	1	1	13
Students, pupils, parents	0	0	1	1	1	12
Other professional org.s /groups	–	0	–	0	0	2
Consumer organizations /groups	–	–	1	0	0	6
Migrant org.s and groups	2	3	1	1	1	24
Pro-/anti-Europ. campaign org.s	–	–	0	0	0	2
Solidarity and human rights org.s	–	0	–	–	0	1
Welfare organizations	0	–	0	–	0	2
Org.s and groups of the elderly	1	–	0	–	0	3
Womens org.s /groups	–	–	0	–	0	1
Terrorist groups	0	–	–	–	0	1
Rebel forces/guerrilla	–	–	–	0	0	1
Other civil society org.s/groups	0	1	1	0	1	15
<b>GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPEC.</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>93</b>
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	226	255	759	701		1941

[Based on full sample issues only, IOS and IOSS by CYEAR. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The ratio of state and party actors as the main addressees is fairly constant over time, except that in 2000 there is a noticeable shift of claim-makers' attention away from this category towards economic interest groups as well as general or unspecified actors. The distribution within this aggregate category changes over time: compared to 1990, the role of legislative and party actors increases slightly, while the role of government as main addressee drops somewhat from 70% in 1990 to 64% in 2002 – trends which merit further exploration. This also holds for the tendency for civil society actors to be less addressed over time (from 8% in 1990 down to 5% in 2002).

**Table 6.3a: Mean evaluation by category of addressees**

	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
<b>STATE AND PARTY ACTORS</b>	<b>-0.27</b>	<b>1622</b>	<b>0.8</b>
Politicians	-0.05	20	0.9
former states(wo)men	0.43	14	0.9
government/executive	-0.33	1166	0.8
Legislative	-0.04	115	0.8
judiciary	-0.16	32	0.8
police and internal security agencies	0.33	3	1.2
military	-0.25	52	0.7
central banks	0.12	99	0.8
social security executive organizations	-0.80	5	0.4
other state executive agencies	-0.58	19	0.8
political parties	-0.43	97	0.8
<b>ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS</b>	<b>-0.33</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>0.8</b>
unions and employees	-0.33	15	0.7
employers organizations and firms	-0.46	46	0.8
farmers and agricultural organizations	-0.43	7	1.0
economists and financial experts	0.00	19	1.0
<b>MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS</b>	<b>-0.11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0.8</b>
<b>OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS</b>	<b>-0.16</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>0.8</b>
churches and religious organizations and groups	0.57	7	0.8
educational professionals and organizations'	-0.13	32	0.8
other scientific and research professionals and institutions	-0.23	13	0.8
students, pupils, and their parents	-0.17	12	0.8
other professional organizations and groups	0.00	2	1.4
consumer organizations and groups	0.17	6	0.4
migrant organizations and groups	-0.46	24	0.8
pro- and anti-European campaign organizations and groups	1.00	2	0.0
solidarity and human rights organizations	1.00	1	.
welfare organizations	0.00	2	1.4
organizations and groups of the elderly	-0.33	3	1.2
womens organizations and groups	0.00	1	.
terrorist groups	0.00	1	.
rebel forces/guerrilla	1.00	1	.
other civil society organizations and groups	-0.53	15	0.8
<b>GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPECIFIED</b>	<b>-0.23</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>0.7</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>-0.27</b>	<b>1933</b>	<b>0.8</b>

[Based on full sample issues only, means of IOEVAL for each category of IOS and IOSS. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

Claim makers can address other actors in a neutral way (“consumer organisations claim that the government should ban British beef imports”), or in combination with a positive or negative evaluation of the addressee (“the SPD reproaches the CDU for leading a blockade strategy in the second chamber of parliament” or “finance minister *Clement* (SPD) praises regional agricultural minister *Höhn* (Grüne) for insisting on a beef import stop”). For each actor or actor category it is possible to calculate the mean evaluation based on all cases in which this actor is addressed by others. The value can range between very negative (-1) to very positive (+1); the mean is 0.0 when either the actor is always addressed in a neutral way (if the standard deviation is zero) or when positive and negative evaluations of this addressee are equally present (if the standard deviation is high).

The overall pattern of claims-making in the German press is that criticism of other actors is more frequent than support (the mean for all addressees being -0.27).



Very few actor groups receive more support than criticism, this is only the case for churches and religious groups (0.57), former states(women) (0.43), consumer organisations (0.17) and central banks (0.12). However, given the low number of cases, these figures only have indicative value. In general it can be said that economic interest group have a more negative image (-0.33) than state and party actors (-0.27), and that civil society actors receive relatively more support (-0.16), while media and journalists are the least criticised aggregate category (-0.11).

The most interesting single results to be compared with other countries' data are the following actor groups: Central banks – do they receive similarly much support in countries with a tradition of independent central banks as in the UK or the Netherlands, and are they more criticised in countries with a tradition of a more political grip on monetary politics such as France?; migrants and their organisations (-0.46) – are they referred to in similarly negative ways in other EU countries as in Germany?; farmers (-0.43) and employers (-0.46) – are these individual interest groups opposed in the same way in other public spheres?

**Table 6.3b: Mean evaluation by broad addressee scope**

	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
Supranational: UN	0.00	43	0.7
Other supranational	0.06	35	0.6
EU	-0.20	379	0.8
Other European supranational	-0.32	19	0.8
Multilateral	-0.07	27	0.8
Bilateral	0.33	6	1.0
Germany	-0.33	777	0.8
France	-0.35	62	0.8
UK	-0.35	48	0.8
Italy	-0.38	26	0.9
Spain	0.17	12	1.0
Netherlands	0.43	7	1.0
Other pre-1995 EU-members	-0.13	23	0.8
Austria, Finland, Sweden	-0.63	48	0.6
Switzerland	-0.33	12	1.0
10 upcoming enlargement countries	-0.12	58	0.9
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	-0.30	20	0.9
Turkey	-0.17	36	0.8
Russia	-0.40	25	0.8
USA	-0.16	136	0.8
Japan	-0.50	12	0.8
Middle East	-0.20	35	0.8
Rest of the world	-0.35	78	0.8
Total	-0.26	1924	0.8

[Based on full sample issues only, means of IOEVAL by IOSCNW. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

For our research question, the mean evaluation<sup>3</sup> of actors according to their geographical scope is the most important feature: are European Union actors more or less contested than those of the national level?

<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that the mean evaluation is based on all claims, i.e. on those made by foreign actors as much as by German actors.

On average, EU actors are addressed clearly less negatively (-0.20) than German actors (-0.33). Further analysis of the detailed data should clarify whether this is the case for specific institutions only or for all EU actors, and whether this relative advantage is due to less frequent positive and negative evaluations in general (which may also indicate indifference) than for national actors.

When taking a horizontal perspective on the mean evaluation of national actors from other countries (at least those with a significant number of cases), it is striking to see that actors from EU members France, Italy and the United Kingdom are addressed in a similarly negative way as those from Germany, and that actors from the USA are relatively little criticised. The very negative mean evaluation of the category of new EU member states since 1995 is due almost exclusively to the contestation of Haider's participation in the Austrian government in 2000. These values should, however, not be directly interpreted as a measure of sympathy towards a given country. For instance that fact that internal political conflict in France is covered more than such conflict in other countries, means that more claims of French actors criticising other French actors (e.g. students demonstrating against the government's education policy) are published in the German press. More in depth analysis is needed for analysing these patterns, for instance coalition building across borders.

**Table 6.4a: Addressee scope by issue field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	–	1	1	12	–	–	0	2	43
Other supranational	2	1	0	6	–	–	2	2	35
EU	34	39	5	3	1	1	39	20	379
Other European supranational	–	–	–	0	–	–	4	1	19
Multilateral	2	3	1	2	0	0	1	1	27
Bilateral	1	–	0	–	–	–	1	0	6
Germany	27	37	59	13	91	86	16	40	780
France	5	3	2	2	0	3	5	3	62
UK	3	7	1	1	2	1	3	2	48
Italy	1	–	2	–	1	0	3	1	26
Spain	1	1	0	0	–	–	1	1	12
Netherlands	0	1	0	–	–	0	0	0	7
Other pre-1995 EU-members	3	–	0	1	–	1	2	1	23
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1	–	2	–	1	2	6	2	48
Switzerland	–	–	2	–	–	–	1	1	12
10 upcoming enlargement c.	3	3	2	2	–	–	7	3	60
Other European countries (GIS)	–	–	4	2	–	–	1	1	20
Turkey	–	–	1	4	–	–	4	2	36
Russia	1	–	0	4	0	1	1	1	25
USA	7	3	3	30	0	1	2	7	138
Japan	2	–	1	1	–	–	–	1	12
Middle East	–	–	2	8	0	0	0	2	35
Rest of the world	7	1	8	9	1	1	1	4	79
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>(N)</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>249</b>	<b>324</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>216</b>	<b>498</b>		<b>1932</b>

[Based on full sample issues only, IOSCNW by ISFIELD1. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The analysis of addressee scope by issue field offers a good indication of who is seen as responsible for a specific political situation or for taking action. As the table shows, the general distribution is that in two fifths of all claims with an addressee, it is the national German level being addressed, and in one fifth it is the European level. The field of troop deployment is the only field where national German actors are less frequently addressed than those of another country, namely the USA as the factual power centre, and where the supranational level is almost equal to the German one, because of the UN as the potential centre of legitimate power. Other supranational level actors (the term supranational is not used in the strict political science way but in a wider definition) such as NATO are also referred to more frequently in troop deployment than in other fields, while the EU as a potential level of action is widely ignored.

The relative importance of EU and national German actors in the different policy fields largely confirms the theoretical assumptions underlying this project: political opportunity structures influence the behaviour of political actors; they orient their claims to the competent level of authority; where decision making is Europeanised, the public claims will be addressed to the European level, and where it is not, the claim-makers continue to turn towards the national authorities. This is the case for monetary and agricultural politics (claims are more addressed to the EU than to the own national level) and also for pension and education politics (hardly any claims are addressed at European actors; the focus is on the national level). The only field where claim-makers perhaps do not address the European level proportional to the state of Europeanisation of decision making, might be immigration. However, given the fact that in all other fields a strong correspondence between the level of Europeanisation of decision-making and claim-making can be found, this result may also read differently. Our data may indicate that the emphasis in the immigration literature on postnationalism and transnationalism and the importance that is ascribed in that context to the EU, may be an academic misperception, rather than a fact on the ground.

**Table 6.4b: Addressee scope by year**

	In % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	2	5	1	3	2	43
Other supranational	3	4	1	1	2	35
EU	14	11	24	19	20	379
Other European supranational	0	2	2	–	1	19
Multilateral	2	1	1	1	1	27
Bilateral	1	–	0	–	0	6
Germany	34	36	46	38	40	780
France	5	6	2	2	3	62
UK	2	3	3	1	2	48
Italy	0	1	0	3	1	26
Spain	0	1	0	1	1	12
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	7
Other pre-1995 EU-members	2	0	1	1	1	23
Austria, Finland, Sweden	2	1	4	2	2	48
Switzerland	–	0	1	0	1	12
10 upcoming enlargement countries	4	3	2	4	3	60
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	2	4	1	0	1	20
Turkey	–	2	1	4	2	36
Russia	3	3	1	1	1	25
USA	15	7	2	10	7	138
Japan	0	2	1	0	1	12
Middle East	4	0	1	2	2	35
Rest of the world	2	7	3	5	4	79
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>(N)</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>754</b>	<b>698</b>		<b>1932</b>

[Based on full sample issues only, IOSCNW by CYEAR. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

As table 6.4b shows, there is no clear trend over time, the year 2000 is, as for many other variables, somewhat special. In any case, the degree to which claim-makers in the German media address German actors has rather increased since the nineteen nineties than decreased. EU actors are slightly more turned to in the more recent years than previously, while the supranational level, the USA, Russia and the Middle East lose relative importance as addressees over time. For actors from the individual EU member states, there is no clear pattern of more or less relevance as targets of political claims.

**Table 6.4c: Addressee scope by broad addressee category**

	In % within addressee category					Total	
	state and party actors	economic interest groups	media and journalists	other civil society actors	general/unknown/unspecified	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	3	–	–	–	–	2	43
Other supranational	2	1	–	2	–	2	35
EU	20	6	–	–	48	20	379
Other Eur. supranational	1	–	–	–	2	1	19
Multilateral	1	6	–	3	1	1	27
Bilateral	0	2	–	1	–	0	6
Germany	40	64	50	55	13	40	780
France	4	1	–	–	1	3	62
UK	2	8	13	6	–	2	48
Italy	2	1	–	–	–	1	26
Spain	1	2	–	1	–	1	12
Netherlands	0	–	–	–	1	0	7
Other pre-1995 EU-MS	1	2	–	1	5	1	23
Austria, Finland, Sweden	3	–	–	2	3	2	48
Switzerland	0	–	–	3	1	1	12
10 upcoming enlarg. c.	3	2	25	1	4	3	60
Other European c. (GIS)	1	–	–	3	2	1	20
Turkey	2	–	–	2	2	2	36
Russia	1	–	–	1	1	1	25
USA	8	–	–	1	2	7	138
Japan	1	–	–	–	–	1	12
Middle East	1	–	13	6	3	2	35
Rest of the world	3	4	–	14	9	4	79
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	1626	85	8	120	93		1932

[Based on full sample issues only, IOSCNW by IOSS. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The overall share of two fifths of all claims being addressed to German actors and one fifth to EU actors corresponds to the structure of claims addressed to state and party actors. Among single foreign countries, the most important most often quoted, opposed or supported state and party actors are from the USA and France.

Supranational state and party actors are the target of another 5% of all claims, the rest is distributed among the state and party actors of a large range of other (mainly EU) countries. When political requests or an evaluation are directed at economic interest groups, these are German groups in two thirds of the cases, followed by British groups. In only 6% of the cases, these groups are organised at EU level, such as the trade union federation ETUC or the employers' federation UNICE, or farmers organisations. As we have seen in table 6.2b, civil society actors are rarely the target of claims, only in 6% of the cases. Yet it is striking that among the 120 claims addressing civil society groups, not a single one is directed at European level groups. Neither journalists nor national NGOs or other groups who might call on European civil society groups to act have done so in the sample of four years. This is an indication of the lack of a European civil society, or at least about the public conscience of its existence or relevance as a political actor.

The category "general/unknown/unspecific" is in fact solely composed by claims addressing 'whole politics', which in half of the cases correspond to the European Union or Europe, in 13% to Germany and in 11% to other EU Member States. Very often, this category can be understood as a synonym for government, in particular when the addressee is appealed for

action, for instance when US Deputy Secretary of Defense *Paul Wolfowitz* calls upon the EU to name a date for the beginning of EU accession negotiations with Turkey (4.12.2002). Another example is the Greek prime-minister *Costas Simitis* declaring in the Greek radio that Greece acknowledges that Turkey is an EU-candidate and will support Turkey's policy of rapprochement to the EU, after having met with Turkish prime minister *Bülent Ecevit* during a Balkan conference (14.2.2000). In other cases, the category 'whole polity' may refer to the whole state system rather than to a specific government, for instance when the Austrian minister of Kärnten *Jörg Haider* states that the EU is as immoral and decadent as the old Rome, and that this thinking of rulers and slaves won't exist much longer thanks to democratic movements (28.4.2000).

The particularly high share of the EU as an addressee is however due to the over-representation of the policy field European integration (60% of addressed whole polities correspond to the EU). If one disregards this policy field, there are only 43 cases left, of which the EU holds just over a third.

## Issues and aims

**Table 7.1: Policy field by year**

	In % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	17	24	18	19	19	537
Agriculture: Subs., livest. quotas, disease ctrl	10	3	9	6	7	209
Immigration: entry and exit	12	12	15	11	12	350
Troop deployment	23	23	5	22	16	448
Retirement and pension schemes	3	6	15	8	10	273
Education	9	13	10	11	11	299
European Integration	27	18	29	22	25	706
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2822</b>
<b>(N)</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>1051</b>	<b>1005</b>		

[Based on full sample issues only, ISFIELD1 by CYEAR. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

For each claim, the policy field and a more detailed sub-issue within this field are recorded, as well as the geographical scope of the issue (e.g. does it concern the French university system, a comparison between the French and the German systems, or a harmonisation of the national systems at European level?) as well as the general position the claim maker takes regarding European integration.

With a normal distribution, each policy field would make up 14% of the total database of 2822 claims. In Germany, we found less clearly less claims on agriculture and pensions (7% and 10%, respectively) and more claims on European integration and monetary politics (25% and 19%). As media agendas are subject to constant change, the numbers of claims found in each policy field vary from one year to the other, so that the distribution of cases across fields fluctuates considerably from one year to the next. In the following overview on each policy field, the thematic peaks of certain issues are explained.

**Tables 7.2a-g: Issues within policy fields by year, in % within year**

<b>a</b>	<b>Monetary politics</b>				<b>Total</b>	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
General unspecific	–	2	2	2	2	9
Interest rate adjustments	10	27	31	17	23	122
EMU Convergence criteria and stability pact	4	20	3	32	16	88
EMS/ERM	4	6	1	–	2	9
Exchange rate intervention	12	12	14	13	13	71
Independence Central Banks	7	–	5	6	5	26
Eurozone-outsiders: rel. with pre-ins (ERM2) & CC	–	–	3	1	1	7
Common currency (ECU, EURO)	21	19	30	20	23	125
Dynamics of Euro campaigns	–	–	1	1	1	3
Other specific	41	14	11	8	14	77
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>537</b>
<b>(N)</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>193</b>		

The issues attracting most public attention in the field of monetary politics are the general question of introducing a common currency and, as a more every-day issue, interest rate

adjustments (23% each). Further the reference period is marked by the definition of European Monetary Union convergence criteria and the growth stability pact, including the monitoring of which countries fulfil the criteria and can therefore join the Euro from the beginning (16%). Exchange rate interventions and related discussion about the impact of certain exchange rate developments are another important every-day issue (13%). The relatively many claims on the common currency sub-issue in 1990 are mainly linked to the intra-German monetary union, the European monetary union only just begins to be debated more concretely. After the introduction of the Euro coins and banknotes, characterized by significant contention in the German public sphere, the debate does not stop immediately, in particular because of the public perception of increased consumer prices for which even a new term is created (the “TEuro”). It is likely to continue as Eurozone outsiders such as the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark and later on the new member states are considering to join the Euro.

b	Agriculture				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Reform of the system of subsidies	35	23	9	32	22	45
Subsidies and enlargement of the EU	–	–	2	28	10	20
Subsidies and international trade	43	8	3	5	11	23
BSE	11	46	69	17	41	86
Foot and Mouth Disease	–	–	–	5	1	3
Other diseases	–	–	9	–	4	8
Quotas for livestock and dairy production	5	–	–	2	1	3
Other Specific	5	23	9	12	10	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>(N)</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>65</b>		<b>209</b>

In the case of agriculture, it is one single issue that has generated two fifths of all claims (41%) in this field, namely the BSE crisis. More structural issues are the reform of the system of subsidies in general (22%) and subsidies in the frame of international trade policy (11%) as well as subsidies in the light of EU enlargement (10%). The issue cycles are such that the GATT negotiations are the dominant agricultural issue in 1990, that the whole field is hardly covered by the media in 1995, that public attention for the BSE disease peaks in 2000 and that after the settlement of the crisis two years later, the public debate turns around the reform of the European system of subsidies and the dilemma of traditional beneficiaries wanting to maintain the status quo, while accession countries claim to obtain the same support for their farmers during the negotiations, and while net contributors who benefit less from agricultural policy reject any expansion of the budget.

In immigration policy, several different sub-issues attract public attention: migration programmes and quotas in general, and more concretely expulsions and deportations of foreigners (22-23% each); the general evaluation or policy directions, and questions related to the institutional frameworks, responsibilities, procedures and costs of immigration politics (12-13% each). Taken together, the two interlinked categories entry and border control and actions relating to smuggling and illegal entries contribute another 15% to the debate. As only aspects dealing in some way or another with entry and exit in other countries, the whole area of social, economic and cultural integration of migrants in the society is excluded from the study. After the very intense public debate on asylum seekers in Germany in the nineteen nineties, the two more recent years are more characterised by developing an active



immigration law and by the controversial debate on whether or not to consider oneself as an immigration country.

c	Immigration				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
General evaluation or policy direction	4	5	18	13	13	45
Instit. framework, responsibilities, proced., costs	20	16	12	6	12	41
Entry and border controls	11	11	5	8	8	27
Expulsions/deportations	22	59	17	13	22	76
Migration programs and quotas	2	5	29	31	23	80
Role of third parties in preventing migration	2	–	–	1	1	2
Visa and consular policy	9	2	3	5	4	15
Actions relating to smuggling and illegal entries	–	–	12	7	7	25
Other specific issues	30	2	5	16	11	39
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>(N)</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>106</b>		<b>350</b>

The foreign policy field of troop deployment can either be analysed by looking at specific conflicts that involve military action and public debate on it, or by looking at the different purposes of the troop movements. In our sample, only half of all claims in this field (51%) are related to military invasion of, or aggression against foreign sovereign territory, or other aggressive operations against hostile regimes or groups. One quarter of the claims concerns the deployment of troops for peace-keeping, for protecting civilians against aggression or natural catastrophes or for other humanitarian purposes. The rest of the claims concerns either troop movements in the context of military alliances, such as the reorganisation of NATO and Warsaw Pact troops after the end of the Cold War, or other references to the deployment of troops, for instance on their implications for military budgets or for compulsory military service. For a detailed analysis of the evolution over time, it may be more useful to look at individual conflicts. In 2002, the announcement by US president George W. Bush to 'implement' UN resolutions on weapons inspections in Iraq by a military attack, or later, to force a regime change in this country by military invasion generates a strong increase of claims making in this field compared to the previous years.

d	Troop deployment				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
General unspecific reference to deployment of troops	7	1	4	6	5	22
d.o.t for mil. aggression on foreign sovereign territory	25	14	2	33	24	109
d.o.t for mil. invasion of foreign sovereign territory	16	11	24	32	24	107
d.o.t in covert aggr. operations vs hostile regimes/groups	3	10	2	1	3	15
d.o.t for peace-keeping	2	39	42	17	21	95
d.o.t to rescue/protect civilians facing aggression	2	3	–	1	2	7
d.o.t in crisis, civil emergency, catastrophic events	–	–	8	0	1	5
d.o.t for non-military humanitarian purposes	–	3	–	–	1	3
d.o.t in the context of military alliances	24	8	6	1	8	34
other specific reference to deployment of troops	20	9	12	9	11	51
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>(N)</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>223</b>		<b>448</b>

e	Pensions				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
General	–	–	31	11	21	58
Demographic changes: ageing population	–	–	6	9	6	16
Retirement ages	–	17	4	6	5	15
Income levels in retirement, Poverty in retirement	60	21	14	15	16	45
State versus private pension schemes	–	–	5	7	5	14
State pension scheme	10	17	14	26	18	48
Private pension scheme	–	4	15	10	12	32
Other / Specific	30	42	12	16	16	45
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>(N)</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>81</b>		<b>273</b>

Pension politics only become a major issue on the German media agenda in 2000, and as we have seen in earlier tables, it is an essentially national debate. The high share of unspecific claims (21%) in this sensitive field might indicate the big effort of pro-reform actors to convince the public that there is a collective problem needing a political solution, and of beneficiaries of the status quo and their lobbies to convince the public of the social risks of a reform. The majority of the specific claims concerns the state pension scheme and its financing (18%), income levels in retirement and in particular the risk of poverty in retirement (16%). The concrete reform proposals of minister *Riester* also fall under the category private pension schemes, as this new feature is introduced in the German pension system for balancing reductions in the state pension scheme due to ageing population.

f	Education				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
General unspecific	9	2	4	10	6	19
Structural issues	11	10	23	41	26	79
Resource allocation and salaries	26	20	23	15	20	60
Private education	–	4	2	4	3	8
Administrative power allocation	6	–	–	–	1	2
Curriculum	3	2	2	7	4	12
Information and communication technologies	–	–	9	–	3	9
Scholarships and fees	–	20	15	4	10	29
Problems at school	–	2	9	6	6	17
other specific issues	46	40	14	13	21	64
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>(N)</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>111</b>		<b>299</b>

Education politics is defined in a broad sense in this study and includes schools and universities, and even some tuition related aspects of kinder gardens as well as professional education in the German dual system. The issue attracts public attention also in the earlier years. The main focus is on structural issues (26%), on resource allocation and salaries of teaching professionals (20%) as well as on scholarships and fees for public tuition (10%). Other specific aspects also play an important role, among others the questions related to the German reunification in 1990 and 1995. As a German specificity, private education is not a major issue. Aspects that characterise the education debate soon after the reference period, like problems at school (the Erfurt massacre) and poor results in an international pupil comparison (PISA) are still less important.

g	European integration				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
General European integration, not specific	22	14	5	5	8	60
National vs. European Identity, shared values	–	4	3	0	2	13
Role of a specific country and balance of power in the EU	41	10	29	23	27	193
Relationship EU - nat.&reg. levels / future constitution	2	3	11	12	9	67
Institutional structure &relationship between EU instit.	1	13	10	8	8	58
Defining EU`s core tasks/balance of different policy areas	2	3	1	1	1	9
Relationship between EU institutions and public	–	3	0	1	1	6
Enlargement	4	16	24	32	23	160
Budget: Financing the EU and spending EU funds	1	6	3	4	3	24
other specific EU integration	8	10	9	5	8	56
Associational agreements/ treaties EU - non-EU countries	9	13	1	2	4	26
Personnel issues within EU/discussions about candidacies	–	1	1	4	2	15
Non-EU forms of European integration	11	3	1	0	3	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	105	69	306	226		706

[Tables 7.2a-g: Based on full sample issues only, ISSUE1S by CYEAR. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The field with the highest number of claims, European integration policy, is on the agenda throughout the whole reference period. It is dominated by debates on the role of specific countries in the community and the balance of power (more than a quarter of all claims), focussing on the integration of the new East German Bundesländer in the EC and Germany's role in Europe after reunification, and later the Haider affair in Austria. The Eastern enlargement of the European Union is the second most important issue on the agenda (almost a quarter). With these two main public debates, other questions are in the background. If one adds the two categories 'relationship between the EU and national or regional level and future constitution' on the one hand, and 'institutional structure and relationship between EU institutions' together because they are closely interlinked and usually treated together in treaty revising processes (e.g. Nice summit in 2000), this EU institutional issue accounts for 17% of all claims. The fact that the issue 'national versus European identity or shared values' is relatively little represented might be misleading, as such aspects are often recorded as *frames* of a claim falling under another category (for instance, many claims for sanctions against Austria refer to the frame of common values, stating that a national government should not include politicians or parties that are clearly opposed to these values). It should be checked whether the same observation can be made or not for the hardly mentioned issue 'relationship between the institutions and the public'.

**Table 7.3a: Issue scope by policy field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	–	1	1	17	–	0	0	3	80
Other supranational	2	7	–	8	–	–	1	2	65
EU	62	46	9	4	1	2	94	41	1146
Other European supranational	–	1	–	3	1	0	5	2	58
Multilateral	2	3	3	30	1	5	0	6	182
Bilateral	8	4	17	35	1	2	–	10	276
Germany	6	29	52	1	88	78	–	27	751
France	2	1	1	–	0	3	–	1	28
UK	1	3	1	–	2	1	–	1	25
Italy	1	–	2	–	1	1	–	1	17
Spain	–	–	1	0	0	–	–	0	5
Netherlands	0	–	1	–	–	0	–	0	4
Other pre-1995 EU-members	–	0	1	–	–	1	–	0	7
Austria, Finland, Sweden	0	–	2	–	1	2	–	1	15
Switzerland	1	1	1	–	–	–	–	0	10
10 upcoming enlargement c.	2	2	1	–	0	–	–	1	19
Other European countries (CIS)	0	–	1	–	–	–	–	0	6
Turkey	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	0	3
Russia	1	–	–	–	0	1	0	0	12
USA	6	0	1	0	0	2	–	2	47
Japan	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	0	10
Middle East	0	–	2	1	–	0	–	0	13
Rest of the world	4	1	2	–	1	1	–	1	39
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>(N)</b>	<b>536</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>448</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>706</b>		<b>2818</b>

[Based on full sample issues only, ISSCNW by ISFIELD1. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

Apart from the field of European integration, which is by default recorded with a European or other international scope, claims may have a multitude of different geographical scopes: they can be about German local, regional or national issues, or about those of foreign countries, or have a European or other international dimension. Even claims concerning mainly the own national level, such as the German school system, are recorded as “supranational: UN” as soon as they explicitly refer to a UNESCO study. This voluntary bias should be kept in mind when analysing the data. On average, two fifths of the claims are about EU issues, one quarter about (purely) German issues, 16% about issues concerning two or more countries (bi- and multilateral), 7% about international issues (UN, other global or European integration forms other than the EU), and the remaining claims concern the national issues of foreign countries. As already noted for the claim makers and for the addressees of claims, EU issues are represented largely in line with the actual degree of Europeanisation of the decision making competences.

**Table 7.3b: Issue scope by year**

	In % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	2	6	2	4	3	80
Other supranational	5	2	2	2	2	65
EU	30	33	45	42	41	1146
Other European supranational	3	6	2	1	2	58
Multilateral	12	3	1	11	6	182
Bilateral	23	13	5	9	10	276
Germany	14	24	36	23	27	751
France	1	4	1	0	1	28
UK	1	2	1	1	1	25
Italy	0	2	1	0	1	17
Spain	0	–	0	0	0	5
Netherlands	0	–	0	0	0	4
Other pre-1995 EU-members	1	–	0	0	0	7
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1	–	0	1	1	15
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	10
10 upcoming enlargement countries	2	1	0	1	1	19
Other European countries excl. CIS	1	–	0	–	0	6
Turkey	–	–	–	0	0	3
Russia	1	0	1	0	0	12
USA	2	3	1	2	2	47
Japan	–	1	1	0	0	10
Middle East	1	1	0	1	0	13
Rest of the world	1	2	1	2	1	39
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>(N)</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>1049</b>	<b>1005</b>		<b>2818</b>

[Based on full sample issues only, ISSCNW by CYEAR. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

Compared to the overall distribution of issue scopes seen in the previous table, there is a clear increase of EU issues in the two recent years compared to 1990 and 1995. This Europeanisation is not linked to a decrease in the share of German national issues, but rather goes along with a decline in the relative share of foreign national issues and partly also of supranational issues. The monetary policy field might be co-responsible for this trend: with monetary union, there will be almost no more claims from the twelve participating countries that refer exclusively to their national level. In this case vertical Europeanisation automatically replaces horizontal Europeanisation.

**Table 7.4a-g: Issue scope by year, separate for each policy field**

a	Monetary politics				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Other supranational	–	1	3	1	2	9
EU	15	48	74	73	62	330
Multilateral	4	1	3	1	2	12
Bilateral	45	7	1	3	8	44
Germany	12	13	4	1	6	30
France	3	10	–	–	2	11
UK	3	1	–	1	1	5
Italy	1	3	–	–	1	4
Netherlands	1	–	–	–	0	1
Austria, Finland, Sweden	–	–	1	–	0	1
Switzerland	–	–	1	1	1	3
10 upcoming enlargement countries	3	3	2	2	2	12
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	1	–	–	–	0	1
Russia	3	–	2	1	1	7
USA	4	8	5	7	6	33
Japan	–	2	2	1	1	8
Middle East	–	–	–	1	0	1
Rest of the world	3	2	3	7	4	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	67	90	186	193		536

[7.4a-g: Based on full sample issues only, ISSCNW1 by CYEAR. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

Indeed, after European monetary union, claims in this policy field do not concern anymore the individual countries in the Eurozone (and maybe incidently neither the UK). Bilateral issues seem to be also absorbed by the EU level, but this trend might also be related to German-German monetary union in 1990.

b	Agriculture				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	–	–	2	–	1	2
Other supranational	30	–	1	3	7	14
EU	32	38	40	65	46	96
Other European supranational	–	8	1	–	1	2
Multilateral	14	–	1	–	3	6
Bilateral	–	8	4	5	4	8
Germany	11	–	42	25	29	59
France	–	–	3	–	1	3
UK	–	38	2	–	3	7
Other pre-1995 EU-members	–	–	1	–	0	1
Switzerland	3	8	–	–	1	2
10 upcoming enlargement countries	11	–	–	–	2	4
USA	–	–	–	2	0	1
Rest of the world	–	–	1	2	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	37	13	92	65		207

Agricultural claims seem to be rather more about European issues in the recent years than in the nineteen nineties (as far as the data basis in the early years allows such conclusions).

c	Immigration				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	–	–	–	2	1	2
EU	4	9	8	11	9	30
Multilateral	2	5	2	4	3	10
Bilateral	37	20	15	10	17	60
Germany	30	52	59	51	52	182
France	2	2	–	1	1	3
UK	2	–	1	1	1	3
Italy	–	–	3	3	2	7
Spain	–	–	1	2	1	3
Netherlands	–	–	1	1	1	2
Other pre-1995 EU-members	–	–	1	1	1	3
Austria, Finland, Sweden	11	–	1	1	2	7
Switzerland	–	–	2	2	1	5
10 upcoming enlargement countries	–	–	–	2	1	2
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	2	–	3	–	1	5
Turkey	–	–	–	3	1	3
USA	–	–	3	1	1	5
Japan	–	–	1	–	1	2
Middle East	7	7	–	2	2	8
Rest of the world	2	5	1	3	2	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	46	44	154	106		350

In immigration politics, fluctuations between years are very high, so that no clear trend can be singled out. In any case the share of claims about own national issues remains fairly stable. The low share in 1990 is due to the fact that border crossing between East and West-Germany is still treated as a bilateral issue and that there are massive population movements happening or about to happen after the fall of the Iron Curtain on the whole European continent, notably in Romania and neighbouring countries.

From 1990 to 2002, a slight increase both in numbers and in relative share of immigration claims with a European scope can be witnessed. This trend corresponds to an extended competence of the EU level on this issue. One of the two European claims of 1990 is actually the complaint of *Dieter Samland*, the asylum coordinator of the PES Group in the European Parliament, that the European Community is not active enough in respect of a European asylum regulation. Over time, the claims are about more and more various immigration issues: Eastern European governments ask the EU to abolish mandatory visa or obstacles to free movement in the Schengen area for their citizens; the German catholic church calls on Europe not to combat illegal migrants but the reasons for their decision to migrate; the Bavarian CSU blames the European Commission to fail in pursuing the aim of a fair distribution of asylum-seekers to the member states; the then French minister for the interior and EU Council president *Jean-Pierre Chevènement* says that France will propose EU-wide controlled immigration enabling 75 Mio immigrants to enter the EU during the next 50 years.

D	Troop deployment				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	8	24	24	15	17	74
Other supranational	8	7	20	7	8	38
EU	–	9	8	4	4	20
Other European supranational	–	17	–	–	3	15
Multilateral	41	7	10	39	30	133
Bilateral	42	36	38	31	35	156
Germany	–	–	–	3	1	6
Spain	1	–	–	–	0	1
USA	–	–	–	1	0	2
Middle East	–	–	–	1	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	88	87	50	223		448

An analysis over time of troop deployment is better done on the basis of variables indicating the individual conflict, because the geographical location of wars as well as the involvement of foreign armies and their geographical level (US American led alliance, or NATO, or KFOR or UN) obviously has a great impact on the issue scope.

e	Pensions				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
EU	–	4	–	2	1	3
Other European supranational	–	–	–	4	1	3
Multilateral	–	4	–	4	1	4
Bilateral	20	4	–	–	1	3
Germany	80	67	96	80	88	241
France	–	–	1	–	0	1
UK	–	–	1	6	2	6
Italy	–	13	–	1	1	4
Spain	–	–	1	–	0	1
Austria, Finland, Sweden	–	–	1	1	1	2
10 upcoming enlargement countries	–	–	–	1	0	1
Russia	–	4	–	–	0	1
USA	–	4	–	–	0	1
Rest of the world	–	–	1	–	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	10	24	158	81		273

Even if one takes into account that the sample in the two earlier years is halved, it is still clear that the issue of pension politics has gained salience only in 2000 and 2002. Although the numbers of claims are too low for a meaningful analysis of changes over time, it seems that there are no systematic looks beyond the national borders. Foreign debates on pension politics are only covered at times of conflict or increased public debate in the concerned country, for instance the pension reform agreed in May 1995 by the Italian government and the trade unions, as well as the Italian employers' and communists' protest against this agreement (three claims reported in the same article), or the increase of state guaranteed pensions in Russia or concerns about the ageing population in the USA and the impact on the state pension scheme. With pension reform becoming salient in more and more countries, the



German press coverage extends over more and more countries, in 2002, government action and also political parties' or interest groups' positions on their national pension schemes are reported from United Kingdom, Austria, Hungary, and Italy. In addition, the share of claims going beyond the purely national scope extend, in particular such claims as UN reports or multinational firms' expert opinions, for instance when Worldbank director for social protection *Holzmann* and rating agency S+P criticise at a congress on Europe's pension systems that many governments react to slowly to the changing demography, and that this puts at risk the economic stability in Europe (13.02.2002).

f	Education				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	–	–	1	–	0	1
EU	12	–	1	–	2	5
Other European supranational	–	–	–	1	0	1
Multilateral	–	2	–	14	5	16
Bilateral	9	–	2	–	2	5
Germany	62	76	83	80	78	233
France	–	12	4	–	3	10
UK	–	–	4	–	1	4
Italy	–	–	2	–	1	2
Netherlands	–	–	–	1	0	1
Other pre-1995 EU-members	9	–	–	–	1	3
Austria, Finland, Sweden	–	–	–	5	2	5
Russia	–	–	3	–	1	3
USA	9	4	–	–	2	5
Middle East	–	–	1	–	0	1
Rest of the world	–	6	–	–	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	34	50	103	111		298

Again, there are no clear trends over time, except that German education issues seem to become even more dominant in the recent years and that in the foreign news on education, the focus seems to extend to more countries in 1995 and 2000. While in 1990, only one article reports several claims of protesting Belgian teachers, students and their parents as well as the (Wallon) Belgian education minister's response, and another article presents structural problems of the US American education system, there are reports in 1995 on education matters from France, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, USA, and South Africa, as well as on the multilateral Danube region cooperation between university deans. In 2000, the focus on how other European countries deal with education problems even increases, and two years later a considerable part of the debate has a multilateral scope in as far as it refers to the comparative pupils' performance study PISA, organised by the OECD. At the same time, the education systems or policies in Northern European countries are covered, but not in a systematic way. One might speculate that there is a linkage between the interest for a foreign country's educational matters and its performance in the PISA study, since Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands are covered, but there are not enough cases to analyse in this respect.

g	European integration				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	–	–	0	–	0	1
Other supranational	3	–	0	–	1	4
EU	86	93	93	98	94	662
Other European supranational	10	7	6	2	5	38
Multilateral	1	–	–	–	0	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	105	69	306	226		706

As said earlier, European integration issues are coded by definition as EU scope or other international. The growing numbers of Eastern European countries submitting a request for membership in the EU is making other forms of European integration less relevant, which is clearly reflected in the table. It should be checked in the database whether issues involving both the EU and third countries or other supranational levels such as NATO or UN are coded systematically in a way that makes them visible in this table or if they are maybe coded as “EU”.

**Table 8.1: Position regarding European integration by policy field and year**

	Year	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	1990	0.06	18	0.73
	1995	0.29	91	0.75
	2000	0.10	230	0.46
	2001	0.10	214	0.48
	2002	0.17	251	0.52
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.14</b>	<b>804</b>	<b>0.53</b>
Agriculture: Subsidies, livestock quotas, disease control	1990	0.00	17	0.35
	1995	-0.21	14	0.80
	2000	0.13	68	0.60
	2001	0.06	125	0.48
	2002	0.02	86	0.34
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>0.49</b>
Immigration: entry and exit	1990	1.00	4	0.00
	1995	-0.17	12	0.72
	2000	0.50	28	0.51
	2001	0.29	34	0.63
	2002	0.69	16	0.48
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.39</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>0.63</b>
Troop deployment	1995	0.44	25	0.65
	2000	0.67	9	0.71
	2001	0.35	23	0.57
	2002	0.43	14	0.65
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.44</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>0.63</b>
Retirement and pension schemes	1995	0.00	1	.
	2001	0.00	2	0.00
	2002	0.25	12	0.45
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>0.41</b>
Education	1990	0.71	7	0.49
	1995	0.00	1	.
	2000	0.75	4	0.50
	2001	0.50	2	0.71
	2002	0.00	1	.
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>0.51</b>
European Integration	1990	0.65	156	0.64
	1995	0.47	131	0.78
	2000	0.34	624	0.68
	2001	0.39	396	0.69
	2002	0.33	415	0.61
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.39</b>	<b>1722</b>	<b>0.68</b>
<b>Total</b>	1990	0.55	202	0.66
	1995	0.34	275	0.77
	2000	0.28	963	0.63
	2001	0.25	796	0.62
	2002	0.26	795	0.57
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.29</b>	<b>3031</b>	<b>0.63</b>

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4). Means ISPOS1 by ISFIELD1 by CYEAR. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The overall position towards European integration of claims reported by the German press is positive (0.29), but over time there is a dramatic decline of approval: from 0.55 in 1990 to 0.26 in 2002. These figures include actors from all countries, i.e. from the United Kingdom, Austria, Germany etc. The lowest mean approval of European integration is found in claims on agricultural matters (0.05), and the highest on education and troop deployment (0.60 and 0.44, respectively, but based on relatively few cases). The decline over time is mainly due to

the policy field European integration where mean approval drops steadily from 0.65 in 1990 to 0.33 in 2002. For these data it will be worth exploring whether the decline is due to less frequent positive evaluations of European integration or to an increase of rejection of integration, or to both at the same time. It should be noted that the criteria for judging whether a claim takes a positive or negative stance towards integration are operationalised as “would they lead to *more* competences or prestige for the EU or not?”. This means that claims opposing an *additional* shift of competences towards the European level are coded as negative, even if these claims do not imply any re-nationalisation of competences. In the Haider affair, all claims criticising the sanctions against Austria are coded by default as “negative” – this should be borne in mind when analysing for instance positions of the CSU or Austrian actors.

**Table 8.2: Position regarding European integration by actor type**

	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
<b>STATE AND PARTY ACTORS</b>	<b>0.33</b>	<b>2266</b>	<b>0.63</b>
politicians	0.25	32	0.88
former states(wo)men	0.47	45	0.73
government/executive	0.37	1556	0.62
legislative	0.32	237	0.66
judiciary	0.06	16	0.57
police and internal security agencies	0.00	6	0.89
military	0.43	14	0.65
central banks	0.17	200	0.47
other state executive agencies	0.19	31	0.54
political parties	0.10	129	0.81
<b>ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>311</b>	<b>0.52</b>
unions and employees	0.00	16	0.73
employers organisations and firms	0.15	137	0.43
farmers and agricultural organisations	-0.22	32	0.61
economists and financial experts	0.14	126	0.53
<b>MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>0.68</b>
<b>OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS</b>	<b>0.19</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>0.63</b>
churches and religious organisations and groups	0.00	12	0.60
educational professionals and organisations	0.50	6	0.84
other scientific and research professionals and institutions	0.28	43	0.59
other professional organisations and groups	0.13	8	0.35
consumer organisations and groups	0.17	6	0.41
migrant organisations and groups	0.33	6	0.82
pro- and anti-European campaign organisations&groups	0.00	4	1.15
solidarity and human rights organisations	-0.40	5	0.55
racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-1.00	1	.
environmental organisations and groups	0.00	3	0.00
other civil society organisations and groups	0.60	5	0.55
<b>GENERAL/ UNKNOWN/ UNSPECIFIED</b>	<b>0.36</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>0.76</b>
whole polities	0.50	12	0.67
the general public	0.30	10	0.82
unknown/unspecified actors	0.00	3	1.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.29</b>	<b>3031</b>	<b>0.63</b>

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4). Means ISPOS1 by ACT1S by ACT1SS. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.] [Not yet corrected: 1999 data.]

Almost the whole range of political actors addressing the German public on European integration matters takes an overall pro-European or at least neutral position, except farmers

and agricultural organisations (-0.2). However, the actors defending European integration most clearly are state and party representatives (0.3), while media and journalists (0.2), civil society groups (0.2) and economic interest groups (0.1) are somewhat more careful in their approval of European integration.

Given the common claim that the EU is mainly an economic project serving the interests of powerful economic actors, it is surprising how lukewarm the pro-European stance of employers' organisations or firms is. Judging from the public positioning of actors towards Europe, integration seems to be rather a project of the political than of the economic elites.

As the more detailed study of Koopmans/Pfetsch has already shown, media and journalists tend to publicly back European integration rather than to oppose it.

**Table 8.3: Position regarding European integration by actor scope**

	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
Supranational: UN	0.33	9	0.50
Other supranational	0.30	33	0.59
EU	0.34	833	0.56
Other European supranational	0.15	20	0.59
Multilateral	0.00	15	0.65
Bilateral	0.57	7	0.53
Germany	0.30	1125	0.61
France	0.33	162	0.69
UK	0.01	103	0.77
Italy	0.24	58	0.73
Spain	0.11	36	0.71
Netherlands	0.06	18	0.64
Other pre-1995 EU-members	0.31	87	0.72
Austria, Finland, Sweden	0.04	143	0.73
Switzerland	-0.08	12	0.90
10 upcoming enlargement countries	0.38	175	0.68
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	0.71	21	0.56
Turkey	0.41	51	0.70
Russia	0.23	31	0.56
USA	0.12	26	0.59
Japan	0.20	5	0.45
Middle East	0.00	1	.
Rest of the world	0.42	33	0.56
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.29</b>	<b>3004</b>	<b>0.63</b>

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4). Means ISPOS1 by ACT1S by ACTSCNW1. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

Public claims reported in the German press take an overall positive position towards European integration. Just as the overall average, claims made by national actors from Germany and France as well as by European or other supranational actors are generally pro-European (around 0.3). When German news readers are confronted with EU-critical or sceptical voices, these tend to belong to national actors from the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Austria (although the EU criticism here was mainly the contestation of the other 14 EU members' sanctions against Austria following Haider's participation in the national government).

An interesting fact is that European integration receives much higher approval from those regions that did not yet have the chance to participate in the European Union than from within the EU: actors from the ten upcoming enlargement countries and Turkey and even more so from other European countries (namely the Balkans) are clearly more pro-European than

speakers from some long-time members such as Italy, Spain or the Netherlands. [NB: in many cases such as the Netherlands or Switzerland, the low number of cases does not allow for a strong conclusion.]

**Table 8.4: Position regarding European integration by party affiliation and by year**

	Year	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
CDU	1990	0.61	18	0.78
	1995	0.71	28	0.66
	2000	0.46	28	0.69
	2001	0.39	23	0.66
	2002	0.23	22	0.75
	<b>Total</b>	<b>0.49</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>0.71</b>
CSU	1990	0.40	5	0.55
	1995	0.00	10	0.82
	2000	-0.04	28	0.58
	2001	0.27	11	0.65
	2002	0.06	16	0.57
	<b>Total</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>0.62</b>
FDP	1990	1.00	13	0.00
	1995	0.71	7	0.49
	2000	0.25	8	0.46
	2001	0.75	4	0.50
	2002	0.00	2	0.00
	<b>Total</b>	<b>0.68</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>0.47</b>
SPD	1990	0.71	7	0.49
	1995	0.31	13	0.75
	2000	0.49	77	0.58
	2001	0.49	59	0.63
	2002	0.30	83	0.56
	<b>Total</b>	<b>0.42</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>0.60</b>
Die Grünen/Bündnis 90	1990	0.00	1	.
	1995	0.00	3	1.00
	2000	0.47	30	0.63
	2001	0.42	53	0.53
	2002	0.37	27	0.49
	<b>Total</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>0.56</b>
PDS	2000	1.00	1	.
	2001	0.00	2	0.00
	2002	0.50	2	0.71
	<b>Total</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0.55</b>

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4). Means ISPOS1 by ACTPAR1 by CYEAR. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

None of the parties represented in the German federal parliament *Bundestag* takes an anti-European position on average. The support for European integration ranges from the liberal FDP, which takes a clearly pro-European stance (0.7), to the Bavarian CSU (as an exception to the usually federally organised parties, the CDU does not exist in Bavaria; instead the conservative party in this Bundesland is called CSU, and its delegates to the Bundestag build a common political group with those from CDU, called *die Union* or *CDU/CSU Fraktion*). On average, the CSU's rhetoric about European integration is almost neutral (0.07), because its politicians are among the most EU-critical ones in Germany, but at the same time the party generally supports EU integration. The other parties are moderately pro-European, with mean

positions ranging from 0.4 to 0.5: i.e. the conservative christian-democrats, CDU (0.5), the social-democrats, SPD (0.4), the green Die Grünen/B90 (0.4) and the left PDS (since 2002, the follow-up of the GDR's ruling party SED has lost its group status in *Bundestag* and is only present with two MPs) (0.4). The only change over time that can be shown on the basis of sufficient cases is the decline of the pro-European position of CDU, whose representatives took on average a clearly positive position in 1990 and 1995 (0.6 and 0.7), and a less and less clear, but still positive, position in the more recent years (down to 0.23 in 2002). For the Greens, there is some evidence (based on low numbers of cases in the early years) of the opposite trend, in the direction of an increasing approval of European integration among Green party representatives over time. These shifts in party positions may be due to the change in government in 1998, which made the Greens for the first time a partner in government, where they hold among other things the position of foreign minister, which is occupied by the strongly pro-European Joschka Fischer. At the same time, the CDU lost power in 1998. Soon after that its long-time figurehead, the also strongly pro-European former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, became involved in a corruption scandal and was sidelined within the party.

## Object actors

**Table 9.1: Presence of object actor by policy field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
No	62	37	31	21	43	31	49	42	1172
Yes	38	63	69	79	57	69	51	58	1650
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	537	209	350	448	273	299	706		2822

[Based on full sample issues only, OBJPRES by ISFIELD1. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

Besides the roles of claim makers and their addressees, the claim structure can include a third role: the so-called object actors. These are the people or organisations on whom the claim has an impact or whose interests are affected by it, either neutrally, positively or negatively, and who are explicitly mentioned in the claim. Often it is the collective in whose name a political request or statement is made. On average, more than half of all claims (58%) in our database have one or more object actors<sup>4</sup>. In the policy fields troop deployment (79%), immigration and education (69% each) this is more often the case, while claims on monetary politics less often have explicit object actors (38%).

<sup>4</sup> The decision on whether or not to code an object actor varies considerably with the different coders even if one takes into account that there may be different reporting practices in the analysed newspapers: for FAZ, one individual coder chose an object actor in 27% of the cases and another coder in 95% of the cases, for SZ the coder averages range from 45% to 69% (with at least 200 cases per coder). If one weighs by paper and coder, the overall average is that in 55% of cases an object actor is coded. This variance is even higher than for the decision on whether to code an addressee or not: here the coder averages range from 32% to 72% for SZ and from 52% to 80% for FAZ, and also higher than for coding frames (3% - 17% for SZ and 19%-47% for FAZ). Further analysis should show whether this variance also impacts on the distribution of addressees and objects actors over actor categories and scopes.



**Table 9.2a: Object actor type by policy field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
<b>STATE AND PARTY ACTORS</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>318</b>
politicians	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	0	3
former states(wo)men	–	–	1	–	–	–	1	0	6
government/executive	15	6	2	11	7	4	19	10	172
legislative	–	–	–	1	3	1	4	2	25
judiciary	–	–	0	–	–	0	1	0	6
police/ internal security agencies	–	–	0	–	–	–	–	0	1
military	–	–	2	14	2	–	1	4	61
central banks	12	2	–	–	–	–	–	2	27
other state executive agencies	–	–	0	–	–	–	0	0	2
political parties	–	–	2	1	1	0	2	1	15
<b>ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>161</b>
unions and employees	0	–	2	–	15	1	1	2	36
employers org.s and firms	6	4	4	1	4	1	3	3	47
farmers and agricultural org.s	0	54	–	–	–	0	1	5	75
economists and financial experts	0	–	–	–	–	–	1	0	3
<b>MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>481</b>
churches and religious org.s	–	–	0	–	–	–	1	0	3
educational professionals / org.s	–	2	–	–	1	27	–	4	58
other scientific/ research inst.	–	2	–	–	–	0	–	0	4
students, pupils, and their parents	–	1	–	–	4	59	–	8	129
other professional org.s/ groups	–	1	0	–	–	0	–	0	3
consumer org.s/ groups	1	14	–	–	–	–	0	1	23
migrant org.s/ groups	–	–	67	1	–	0	1	10	169
racist and extreme right groups	–	–	–	–	–	–	0	0	1
org.s/ groups of the elderly	–	–	–	–	44	–	–	4	68
women's org.s/ groups	–	–	–	–	2	–	–	0	3
terrorist groups	–	–	–	0	–	–	–	0	1
other civil society org.s/ groups	–	–	4	1	4	–	0	1	19
<b>GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPECIFIED</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>689</b>
whole polities	26	9	5	70	2	1	49	31	508
whole economies	30	4	1	–	2	1	6	6	95
the general public	7	2	7	2	9	1	8	5	86
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	203	132	242	353	156	205	359		1650

[Based on full sample issues only, OBJ1S and OBJ1SS by ISFIELD1, only claims with an object actor.  
Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The most common object actor (42%) of claims in the German press are whole polities in a broad sense - that is either countries or the European Union, or in rare cases even the World -, whole economies or the general public, for instance “the whole society”. Another very common category of affected actors are civil society actors (29%), in particular migrants and refugees, students, pupils and their parents, educational professionals or the elderly. State and party actors (19%, above all the government) and economic interest groups (10%) are also object actors of many claims. This distribution changes from one policy field to the other: Actions in the field of troop deployment affect in almost three quarters of the cases whole polities or societies, since armies are moved to foreign countries. Also in monetary and European integration policies, claims affect whole polities or whole economies in almost two thirds of the cases. Decisions to change interest rates or appeals to do so usually invoke the

well-being of a national economy, or since EMU of the Eurozone economy, and also positions in favour of or against joining a common currency are mostly argued as beneficial for the own country or economy. In the debate on European integration, a widespread pattern is to argue that certain changes in the institutional structure or in the geographic extension of the EU are good or bad for the EU as a whole, or for a specific country. Education, immigration and pensions are the policy fields where claims most often affect civil society actors, either specific categories of people, or groups of them, or organisations defending their interests. Pension claims also affect, besides the current beneficiaries of pensions, the current contributors to the pension cashes, above all employed people and their trade unions. Economic interest groups are relatively most affected in the field of agriculture, where more than half of all claims have an impact on farmers or on their organisations, and also on a number of civil society actors such as consumers. As the next table shows, there are no obvious trends over time – the recent period is not clearly different from the early years.

**Table 9.2b: Object actor type by year**

	In % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
<b>STATE AND PARTY ACTORS</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>318</b>
politicians	–	0	0	–	0	3
former states(wo)men	1	–	0	–	0	6
government/executive	6	8	8	16	10	172
legislative	0	3	1	2	2	25
judiciary	–	1	–	1	0	6
police/ internal security agencies	–	0	–	–	0	1
military	4	8	3	2	4	61
central banks	2	1	2	1	2	27
other state executive agencies	–	–	–	0	0	2
political parties	0	–	1	1	1	15
<b>ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>161</b>
unions and employees	0	3	4	0	2	36
employers org.s and firms	2	2	3	3	3	47
farmers and agricultural org.s	7	3	5	4	5	75
economists and financial experts	–	–	0	0	0	3
<b>MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>481</b>
churches and religious org.s	–	0	–	0	0	3
educational professionals / org.s	1	3	4	4	4	58
other scientific/ research inst.	–	–	–	1	0	4
students, pupils, and their parents	2	8	10	8	8	129
other professional org.s/ groups	–	0	0	0	0	3
consumer org.s/ groups	0	1	3	0	1	23
migrant org.s/ groups	13	12	10	9	10	169
racist and extreme right groups	–	–	–	0	0	1
org.s/ groups of the elderly	3	2	6	4	4	68
women's org.s/ groups	–	0	0	–	0	3
terrorist groups	–	–	–	0	0	1
other civil society org.s/ groups	–	0	0	–	1	19
<b>GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPECIFIED</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>689</b>
whole polities	42	29	24	35	31	508
whole economies	6	7	6	5	6	95
the general public	6	6	6	4	5	86
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	216	224	611	599		1650

[Based on full sample issues only, OBJ1S and OBJ1SS by CYEAR, only claims with an object actor. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

**Table 9.3a: Evaluation by object actor type**

	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
<b>STATE AND PARTY ACTORS</b>	<b>0.09</b>	<b>317</b>	<b>0.88</b>
politicians	0.33	3	1.15
former states(wo)men	0.50	6	0.84
government/executive	0.05	171	0.91
legislative	0.40	25	0.82
judiciary	0.33	6	0.82
police and internal security agencies	1.00	1	.
military	0.05	61	0.76
central banks	0.19	27	0.88
other state executive agencies	0.50	2	0.71
political parties	-0.27	15	0.96
<b>ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS</b>	<b>0.32</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>0.86</b>
unions and employees	0.31	36	0.82
employers organizations and firms	0.28	47	0.88
farmers and agricultural organizations	0.32	71	0.89
economists and financial experts	1.00	3	0.00
<b>MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.</b>
<b>OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS</b>	<b>0.28</b>	<b>481</b>	<b>0.80</b>
churches and religious organizations and groups	-0.67	3	0.58
educational professionals and organizations'	0.17	58	0.70
other scientific and research professionals and institutions	-0.25	4	0.96
students, pupils, and their parents	0.57	129	0.63
other professional organizations and groups	0.33	3	0.58
consumer organizations and groups	0.65	23	0.57
migrant organizations and groups	0.08	169	0.87
racist and extreme right organizations and groups	-1.00	1	.
organizations and groups of the elderly	0.28	68	0.81
womens organizations and groups	1.00	3	0.00
terrorist groups	0.00	1	.
other civil society organizations and groups	0.16	19	0.96
<b>GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPECIFIED</b>	<b>0.29</b>	<b>687</b>	<b>0.69</b>
whole polities	0.21	508	0.66
whole economies	0.56	95	0.73
the general public	0.46	84	0.72
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>1643</b>	<b>0.78</b>

[Based on full sample issues only, means of OBJEVAL1 by OBJ1S and OBJ1SS; only claims with an addressee. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

On average, the affects that claims have (or would have if implemented) on object actors are more often positive (46%) than negative (21%), and in a third of cases they are neutral (33%), which corresponds to a mean evaluation (or impact) of 0.25. Only for the category state and party actors, the mean evaluation is almost balanced between positive and negative impacts (0.09), and among the specific actor groups that are often affected by claims, migrants are affected by almost equally many negative as positive claims (0.08), while pupils, students and their parents are generally affected in a positive way (0.57), for instance when increases of education budgets are claimed in order to offer them better learning conditions. The positive values for whole economies (0.56) and for the general public (0.46) are typical for a common good rhetoric; for instance employer federations rejecting tax increase plans will rather argue in the name of the national economy or in terms of loss of employment than in the name of their members who would suffer losses in income, because the public debate mainly aims at convincing the general public of what is best for “the” country or “the economy”.

**Table 9.3b: Evaluation by object actor scope**

	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
Supranational: UN	0.28	18	0.75
Other supranational	0.09	22	0.92
EU	0.37	252	0.73
Other European supranational	0.10	10	0.74
Multilateral	0.22	59	0.93
Bilateral	0.64	11	0.67
Germany	0.31	517	0.79
France	0.50	20	0.83
UK	-0.03	39	0.78
Italy	0.00	11	1.00
Spain	0.50	4	0.58
Netherlands	0.00	3	1.00
Other pre-1995 EU-members	0.44	16	0.81
Austria, Finland, Sweden	0.33	49	0.85
Switzerland	0.63	8	0.52
10 upcoming enlargement countries	0.42	57	0.78
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	0.38	78	0.65
Turkey	0.06	31	0.85
Russia	0.37	30	0.76
USA	0.14	36	0.80
Japan	0.10	10	0.88
Middle East	-0.06	171	0.67
Rest of the world	0.16	185	0.77
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>1637</b>	<b>0.78</b>

[Based on full sample issues only, means of OBJEVAL1 by OBJSCNW1; only claims with an addressee. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The general mean evaluation for object actors changes with their geographical scope. On average, the European Union is affected in a more positive way by claims in the German press than actors from the supranational levels or from Germany. As these figures concern very aggregate categories, it is useful to run the same calculation only for those claims that affect whole polities, whole economies or the general public, thus where the object actor is a broad collective that can be summarised as “the country”. Out of the 689 claims that have such an object actor, three quarters (N=508) affect whole polities, one fifth (N=95) whole economies and another fifth (N=86) the general public. The overall average of this category is only slightly more positive (0.29) than the total average (in detail: polities: 0.21, economies: 0.56, general public: 0.45). If one compares countries that are affected by more than 10 claims, almost all of them are evaluated more positively than the average, except countries against whom military attacks were launched (Iraq: -0.12 /N=105; Afghanistan: 0.09 /N=11; Bosnia and Herzegovina: 0.17 /N=23), the contested candidate country Turkey (0.28 /N=18), and EU Member State United Kingdom (0.20 /N=15), for reasons which still need to be explored. Countries whose state-political integration is prepared (GDR: 0.59 /N=17; Poland: 0.47 /N=19) or who are subject to a military liberation action (Kuwait: 0.73 /N=12) are affected by relatively more positive claims than the average, perhaps this is indication on how intensely public support for these political decisions was sought via the mass media.

The way in which claim makers speak in the name of Germany and the European Union, or in which they make claims affecting the interests of these two polities, is surprisingly similar: The mean evaluation is 0.37 for the EU (N=101) and 0.36 for Germany (N=66), and for both there are only ten percent negative claims, 47 % positive and 42% neutral claims. It would be interesting to develop this case study further, and to compare with other countries.

**Table 9.4a: Object actor scope by policy field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	–	–	–	5	–	–	0	1	18
Other supranational	2	2	1	3	–	–	1	1	22
EU	28	24	3	1	–	1	42	15	252
Other European supranational	–	–	0	1	–	–	2	1	10
Multilateral	3	3	10	1	2	2	4	4	59
Bilateral	0	–	3	1	–	–	0	1	11
Germany	25	39	19	7	88	85	10	32	518
France	2	3	0	–	1	2	1	1	20
UK	4	13	–	–	3	2	2	2	40
Italy	2	–	0	–	3	0	0	1	11
Spain	1	–	–	0	–	–	–	0	4
Netherlands	–	1	0	–	–	–	0	0	3
Other pre-1995 EU-members	4	1	0	–	–	1	1	1	16
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1	–	–	0	1	2	11	3	49
Switzerland	0	1	1	–	–	–	1	0	8
10 upcoming enlargement c.	4	8	1	2	1	–	9	4	62
Other European c. (excl. CIS)	1	–	9	12	–	0	3	5	78
Turkey	–	–	3	0	–	–	6	2	31
Russia	2	–	3	3	1	1	1	2	30
USA	7	1	1	5	1	–	1	2	36
Japan	2	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	10
Middle East	0	–	7	43	–	0	–	10	171
Rest of the world	8	5	38	15	1	1	4	11	185
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	202	130	240	353	156	204	359		1644

[Based on full sample issues only, OBJSCNW1 by ISFIELD1; only claims with an object actor. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

About one third of the actors concerned by claims is from the German national level, one sixth from the European Union level, eight percent affect supranational or bi- and multilateral actors, and the remaining 37% of claims have an impact on actors from other countries. Some countries are clearly more often affected than others, but in most cases this is due to a specific policy field. For instance, the degree to which European countries that are not current or near future members of the EU are represented, is mainly due to the wars and upheavals in the Balkans recorded in the field of troop deployment and to the subsequent refugee movements recorded in the immigration field. Also the prominence of the three countries who joined the EU in 1995 is exclusively due to the claims to sanction or not to sanction Austria in the Haider affair. French and British actors are the object of claims in several policy fields, although not more in total than actors from the USA or Russia, or Turkey.

Immigration and troop deployment are two policy fields that by definition concern actors from other countries, namely foreign nationals and foreign countries that are either adversaries or allies in an armed conflict. The fact that immigration claims hardly affect EU and future EU country nationals, while those from other European countries, the Middle East and the rest of the World are touched most by the consequences corresponds to the political setting of an internal EU market with free movement of people and high efforts being made to control the crossing of this area's external border. Here, German object actors are more likely to be those in whose name the claims are made (e.g. "reduce immigration for protecting German workers from competition", or the opposite "the ageing German society needs

controlled immigration for maintaining the generational balance in the future”). Along similar lines, one can interpret the fact that in troop deployment, there are almost no object actor from European Union countries and also very few from Germany, and instead object actors are mainly found in the Middle East and the rest of the World. One of the main motives for European integration was pacification, and today, these countries and their nationals are not subject to military action on their own territory anymore. The only possibility for a higher representation would be when EU citizens or the EU as a whole were invoked as something that needs to be protected by troop deployment, as was one of the main arguments in the US justification of the war against Iraq. However this is not (yet) a frequent line of argument.

**Table 9.4b: Object actor scope by year**

	In % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	1	2	1	1	1	18
Other supranational	2	2	1	1	1	22
EU	9	15	17	17	15	252
Other European supranational	4	–	0	0	1	10
Multilateral	3	2	5	3	4	59
Bilateral	2	0	1	–	1	11
Germany	27	26	38	29	32	518
France	2	2	1	1	1	20
UK	1	3	4	1	2	40
Italy	–	3	0	0	1	11
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	4
Netherlands	–	0	0	–	0	3
Other pre-1995 EU-members	1	–	2	1	1	16
Austria, Finland, Sweden	–	–	7	2	3	49
Switzerland	–	1	1	0	0	8
10 upcoming enlargement countries	6	3	4	4	4	62
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	7	16	3	2	5	78
Turkey	–	2	1	4	2	31
Russia	4	2	1	1	2	30
USA	2	3	1	3	2	36
Japan	0	3	0	0	1	10
Middle East	13	1	3	21	10	171
Rest of the world	15	13	11	10	11	185
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>(N)</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>598</b>		<b>1644</b>

[Based on full sample issues only, OBJSCNW1 by CYEAR. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

Over time, there is a slight increase of the role of EU actors as the beneficiaries of claims, even if this increased relevance is not to the detriment of own national actors from Germany. EU actors rather seem to replace other supranational actors, but this needs to be checked in absolute numbers, not only in percentages. The “jump” from 9% EU actors in 1990 to 15% in 1995 may be explained with the fall of the Iron Curtain, which made certain other forms of Europeanisation redundant (down to nil from 4% in 1990) and which gave way to the power of attraction of the EU to the rest of the continent. The peak of the 1995-accession countries in 2000 is, again, solely due to the Haider case. In general there are no clear trends, as individual countries’ representation seems to be very dependent on agenda changes.

## Frames

**Table 10.1a: Presence of frame by policy field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
No	72	83	70	78	93	60	59	66	2035
Yes	28	17	30	22	7	40	41	34	1056
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	834	311	94	76	15	15	1746		3091

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4). FRAPRES by ISFIELD1. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

About a third of all claims dealing with a European issue contain a frame related to European integration. In the claims structure, *frames* are defined as the justification of a claim by its author, i.e. the answer to the question why the claim is made or why it should be implemented. The codebook lists four types of frames: identity frames (what the EU is or stands for), instrumental frames (what EU integration is good for), historical frames (justification of EU because of an historical experience), and frames internal to the integration process (causal linkages between different aspects of EU integration, for instance ‘enlargement requires institutional reform’). Claims in the policy field “European integration” use a bit more often (41%) frames for supporting their aims. Comparing the other policy fields (as far as this is possible, given the low N), it seems striking that the two fields with highest Europeanisation at institutional level do not trigger the highest rate of framing efforts in public debate. Different potential explanations would be worth further exploration: First, if the political power in a field is already distributed between national and supranational actors, and no major institutional change is on the agenda, actors might less feel the need for framing their claims. If in turn the shift of competences is not yet completely decided, and major legislative efforts are still pending (as in immigration or troop deployment matters), or European competence in a field is not yet accepted (as in education policy), actors might use relatively more often frames for supporting their claims. Second, an alternative explanation might be linked to the contents of each policy decision; one would expect less framing efforts in fields that are rather de-politicised or run by independent state agencies (like the ECB in monetary politics) rather than by ministers. In any case the type of frames and the public discourses in which they are used, need to be looked at in detail.

**Table 10.1b: Presence of frame by broad actor type**

	In % within actor type					Total	
	state and party actors	economic interest groups	media and journalists	other civil society actors	general/unknown/unspecified	In %	(N)
No	67	71	53	57	81	66	2035
Yes	33	29	47	43	19	34	1056
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	2307	319	338	100	27		3091

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4). FRAPRES by ACT1SS. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

Compared to the average of one third of claims on European integration, media and journalists are the actors that make most often use of frames (almost half of all cases), followed by civil society actors (43%). Both actor types do not hold own decision making

power and therefore are depend more on convincing those in power by arguments, or at least by influencing public opinion. It should also be noted that media are the only claim makers who decide themselves on the final output of their claim in the mass media. Other political actors may have used frames in their press declarations, but these may have been reported only partially in the media. By contrast, the journalists of our selected newspapers can use more space for justifying their positions.

Economic interest groups less often refer to justification frames than the other actor groups. Perhaps trade unions or employers find it more difficult to appeal to the common good to strengthen their usually particularistic concerns. Perhaps it would be useful to select only the verbal action forms and run the frame analysis, as actors that use other action forms (such as administrative decisions) will certainly use less framing (for instance lowering the interest rate).

**Table 10.2a: Frame type by policy field**

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Identity, normative and value frames	11	38	25	41	0	67	32	27	290
Constitutional / governance frames	8	9	25	12	0	0	29	23	242
Economic frames	69	34	0	0	100	17	9	24	249
Other instrumental frames	9	11	39	47	0	17	14	14	150
Historical frames	0	2	4	0	0	0	10	7	74
Frames internal to integration proc.	3	6	7	0	0	0	5	5	51
Total (N)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	1056
	236	53	28	17	1	6	715		

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4), and only cases with a frame. FRAME1SS by ISFIELD1. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

In the German public sphere, statements and actions on European integration use a broad range of frames. In our study over 100 different frames were identified, distributed fairly equally (a fourth each) over three categories or types of frames: Identity, normative and value frames (27%), economic frames (24%), and constitutional and governance frames (23%). The rest falls under such categories as non-economic instrumental frames (for instance “together with other European nations we have a bigger say in the World”), historical frames (“we have learnt the lesson from two World Wars”), or arguments that are internal to the integration process (such as “enlargement needs prior institutional change”).

The type of frame varies with the subject of the claims; not surprisingly, more than two thirds of all cases in monetary politics are economic frames. Public positions on the European integration process (such as widening and deepening the EU or reforming its decision making procedures) are predominantly framed with identity or normative considerations and also with governance principles, for instances with accountability, transparency or good governance. Economic arguments clearly play the least important role among all types of motivations for public debate on integration in Germany.

**Table 10.2b: Frame type by year**

	In % within year					Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	In %	(N)
Identity, normative and value frames	26	25	29	23	33	27	290
Constitutional and governance frames	24	19	23	25	23	23	242
Economic frames	13	27	23	28	20	24	249



Other instrumental frames	21	21	13	14	10	14	150
Historical frames	13	6	6	8	6	7	74
Frames internal to integration process	4	2	6	3	7	5	51
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	72	121	367	280	216		1056

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4), and only cases with a frame. FRAME1SS by CYEAR. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The general equilibrium between frame types seems to be relatively constant over time. There are only some variations in single years, but no clear trend: In the year 1990, when the then recent fall of the iron curtain promised an end to the historic divide of the European continent, but also required to debate the future relationship of the Eastern European countries with the EU, historical and political instrumental frames appeared to be more relevant than economic ones. In 2002, actors recur more frequently to identity, normative and value considerations for framing their claims on European integration. Further analysis should look at frames by sub-issues in order to understand this result.

**Table 10.2c: Frame type by broad actor type**

	In % within actor type					Total	
	state and party actors	economic interest groups	media and journalists	other civil society actors	general/unknown/unspecified	In %	(N)
Identity, normative, value	28	10	33	33	40	27	290
Constitutional/governance	25	10	20	26	0	23	242
Economic	19	70	20	14	20	24	249
Other instrumental	15	8	13	16	40	14	150
Historical	7	1	9	7	0	7	74
Internal: integration proc.	5	2	4	5	0	5	51
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	757	92	159	43	5		1056

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4), and only cases with a frame. FRAME1SS by ACT1SS. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

How positions on European integration are defended in public also varies with the author of the position: The social partners, farmers and economic experts are the only actor type that mainly frames European matters in an economic, instrumental way. For all other actor types, identity, normative and value considerations are the dominant frame. A tentative conclusion might be that, since frames also help the public seizing the importance of new information and ordering it in their cognitive system without necessarily understanding it in detail, the very small role of frames that are internal to the integration process (2-5%) might be an indication of future problems of public support for reforms of the EU decision making system.

**Table 10.3: Twenty-five most often mentioned frames**

Frame	Number of claims (N)	In % of all frames
1 Economic stability	52	4.9
2 Inflation	44	4.2
3 Community of values	43	4.1
4 Equality among countries/member states/regions	40	3.8
Democracy	40	3.8
Economic growth	40	3.8
5 Efficiency, competence	32	3.0
6 Acceptance of the EU by citizens	30	2.8
7 Security	29	2.7
Institutional reforms > enlargement	29	2.7
8 Transparency	27	2.6
Strength in global competition	27	2.6
9 Peace	26	2.5
10 French-German co-operation in the post-war period	25	2.4
11 Unity	23	2.2
12 Human rights	18	1.7
National interest	18	1.7
13 Solidarity	16	1.5
Federalism	16	1.5
European - a country's relation with USA	16	1.5
14 Competition in Europe	15	1.4
15 Credibility (in citizens perspective)	14	1.3
Own (national) economy	14	1.3
Prices	14	1.3
16 Opportunity space for citizens (work,study,live abroad)	13	1.2
Political stability	13	1.2
<i>85 other mentioned frames</i>	<b>382</b>	<b>36.2</b>
<b>Total (111 frames)</b>	<b>1056</b>	<b>100.0</b>

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4), and only cases with a frame., FRAME1S. Data from SZ+FAZ, in 2000 also LVZ+Bild.]

The table lists the 26 most often mentioned frames because several frames appeared equally often.

When looking at the total number of cases in which frames are used, two economic considerations, “economic stability” and “inflation”, appear to be the top most often used frames (5 and 4% of all cases respectively). They are followed by normative and constitutional frames such as “community of values”, “equality among countries” and “democracy”, as well as “economic growth” (4% each). However this overall picture is distorted because the total percentages are not weighed by policy fields. The economic frames only play a dominant role in the public discourse on monetary politics. If one looks only at the policy field “European integration”, whose claims contribute more than two thirds of all frames to the total, the picture changes: Here, the top most often used frames are “community of values” (6%), “democracy” (5%), “efficiency, competence” and “equality among countries” (4% each).

**Table 10.4a: What the EU should not be/lead to: ten most frequent frames**

Frame	Number of claims (N)	In % of all such frames
Inflation	17	18.3
National interest	6	6.5
Equality among countries/member states/regions	6	6.5
Fragmentation	5	5.4
Federalism	5	5.4
Unemployment	5	5.4
Communist/stalinist rule in Eastern Europe	4	4.3
Racism/xenophobia	3	3.2
Bureaucracy	3	3.2
French-German co-operation in the post-war period	3	3.2
<i>30 other mentioned frames</i>	36	38.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100.0</b>

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4), and only cases with a frame, FRAME1S for FRAPOS1=-2.]

Frames can be used in different ways, for instance they can reflect what the EU stands for in the view of the speaker, or what it does not stand for but ought to, what it has helped to prevent or on which general principles it is based. In the coding process, the direction that a specific frame takes is recorded as a positive (is) or negative value (is not), and as a description of a status (is/is not now) or of a wish (should be/should not be). If one considers those frames that express what the EU should not be, the most frequent frame was that EU should prevent inflation or should not lead to price increases (again, mainly linked to the introduction of the common currency). The way in which the frame “national interest” is used in Germany is probably very different from the way one would expect it in the UK: In the German public discourse, the claim that national interests should not be the dominant rationale in Europe, but that the EU should help overcome national egoisms is a common claim. The interpretation is difficult, because there seem to be inconsistencies in the frames coding due to the high level of complexity, for instance it is surprising to see many public claims saying that the EU should not lead to equality among its members. A possible explanation could be that the claims were in favour of a European integration with different speeds for different countries, but this needs to be checked.

**Table 10.4b: What the EU is not/does not lead to: ten most frequent frames**

Frame	Number of claims (N)	In % of all such frames
Inflation	18	19.8
Acceptance of the EU by citizens	8	8.8
National identity	4	4.4
Economic growth	4	4.4
Racism / xenophobia	3	3.3
Efficiency, competence	3	3.3
Transparency	3	3.3
National interest	3	3.3
Strength in global competition	3	3.3
Unemployment	3	3.3
<i>34 other mentioned frames</i>	39	42.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>100.0</b>

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4), and only cases with a frame, FRAME1S for FRAPOS1=-1.]

The frames used to depict what the EU is currently reflect different positions: among the top ten of such frames, there are pro-European views (the EU prevents inflation, racism and xenophobia, and unemployment) as well as EU-critical views (the EU is not accepted by citizens, it is harmful to national identity and prevents economic growth). For more detailed results, one could calculate means of positive and of negative values of each frame, and then rank again.

**Table 10.4c: What the EU is/leads to: ten most frequent frames**

Frame	Number of claims (N)	In % of all such frames
Community of values	31	8.5
Economic stability	22	6.0
Democracy	20	5.5
Economic growth	17	4.6
French-German co-operation in the post-war period	17	4.6
Security	13	3.6
Peace	12	3.3
Unity	12	3.3
Strength in global competition	12	3.3
Equality among countries/member states/regions	9	2.5
Rule of law	9	2.5
Own (national) economy	9	2.5
<i>63 other mentioned frames</i>	201	54.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>366</b>	<b>100.0</b>

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4), and only cases with a frame, FRAME1S for FRAPOS1=1]

The most popular frames used in German media discourse for describing the current state of the EU or of what it is linked to, are mainly positive: the EU is a community of values, it leads to economic stability and growth, is based on democracy, and exists thanks to French-German cooperation, guarantees for security and peace, etc.

**Table 10.4d: What the EU should be/should lead to: ten most frequent frames**

Frame	Number of claims (N)	In % of all such frames
Economic stability	27	7.0
Equality among countries/member states/regions	24	6.2
Efficiency, competence	19	4.9
Transparency	18	4.7
Democracy	17	4.4
Economic growth	17	4.4
Acceptance of the EU by citizens	15	3.9
Security	14	3.6
Peace	13	3.4
Community of values	11	2.9
<i>55 other mentioned frames</i>	210	54.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>385</b>	<b>100.0</b>

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4), and only cases with a frame, FRAME1S for FRAPOS1=2.]

As far as the future or an ideal state of the EU is concerned, the most common frames are more critical, claiming that there should be more equality among its members and that it

should become more transparent, democratic and acceptable to the citizens. Again, there might be inconsistencies in the +/- values attributed to frames, therefore a verification of this variable is recommended.

## Abbreviations and definitions

### *Data*

.	Not applicable
–	Nil
0	Less than half the final digit shown

### *Newspapers*

Bild	Bild Zeitung
FAZ	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
LVZ	Leipziger Volkszeitung
SZ	Süddeutsche Zeitung

### *Issue fields*

MON	Monetary politics: currency and interest rate
AGR	Agriculture: Subsidies, livestock quotas, disease control
IMM	Immigration: entry and exit
TRP	Troop deployment
PEN	Retirement and pension schemes
EDU	Education
EUI	European Integration

### *Miscellaneous*

10 upcoming enlarg. c.:	New EU Member States as from 1.5.2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia)
AFP	Agence France Presse
AP	Associated Press
BSE	Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia and the former Soviet republics, excluding the three Baltic countries)
DPA	Deutsche Presseagentur
ECB	European Central Bank
EMU	European Monetary Union
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
EU-MS	Member States of the European Union
EU seat	European Union seat (Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg, Frankfurt, etc.)
FED	Federal Reserve (the US central bank)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East-Germany)
KFOR	Kosovo Force (this NATO-led international force entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 under a United Nations mandate to establish and maintain security in Kosovo)
Middle East	defined here as: Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Yemen
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NRW	Nordrhein-Westfalen
PES	Party of European Socialists
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations

UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICE	Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (initially established in Croatia, later extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organisation