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Report **Final case report of political claims analysis**

Case report **Italy**

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Part I: Analytic Summary

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WP2: Country report

The Italian Case

Part I: Analytic Summary

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The data collected within the WPII package indicate that Italy is not behind other countries as far as the debate on our seven issues is concerned. In Italy, a significant number (3392) of claims were found in the 1669 articles selected, for an average of 2 claims per article. The general debate in the Italian public sphere, on our seven topics of interests, has clearly increased over the years, as shown by the total amount of claims found in the more recent years as compared to the historical years (967 in 2002 against 350 in 1990 and 380 in 1995, all years for which we used a similar, although not identical, sample.

As for the other countries, it is however a more in-depth analysis of the claimants, the forms of the claim, its addressees, the substantive issue addressed, the object actor, and the justification for the claim that can tell us something about the degree and forms of Europeanization that are at play.

In the following, we shall in particular refer to the following types (presented in the introduction of the WPI Report; see della Porta 2003a, pp. 5-6):

- According to the actors' territorial level, between the *supranational* versus the *intergovernmental* paths toward Europeanisation. With specific regard to this, we shall verify to what extent European institutions intervene as supranational actors in the public sphere, and, by contrast, the extent of the relevance of national governments; also to what extent European institutions are recognized targets of action, and, by contrast, to what degree national or sub national institutions function as power-wielders, or at least gatekeepers. Our data on the actors addressed in or who address the public sphere shall be of help in discussing the role of national and supranational actors in multilevel governance.
- Over and above the territorial level of the actors involved in the public sphere, it is important to comprehend their nature distinguishing between patterns of Europeanisation initiated *from above* and *from below*. Much research on the formation

of nation-states reveals that over and above constitutional input “from above”, their construction involved the development of a common identity, through participation “from below”. Nowadays, the development of European citizenship is of increasing interest to both scholars and policy-makers. In our research, therefore, we shall also attempt to measure the impact in the public sphere of actors of so-called civil society, in a “bottom up” process.

- The development of territorial politics follows both *consensual* and *conflictual* paths. The construction of the nation-state developed through conflicts of a greater or lesser degree of politicisation between the centre and the periphery, and between Church and State, both cleavages contributing to the shaping the characteristics of national politics (Rokkan 1982). Mobilization of other cleavages, in particular that dividing social classes, also contributed to the building of the nation-state (Bendix 1964), the struggle to build polity at national level interacting with the process of production of national policies. Furthermore, not only can the debate on Europe and the construction of a public sphere be carried out in an atmosphere of greater or lesser consensus, but also moreover conflicts can (and do) develop either around the very existence of a European *polity* or the specific *policies* implemented by European institutions.
- With specific regard to the framing of policy issues, other characteristics of the Europeanisation of the public sphere can also be identified. Studies on diffusion showed clearly that (good) ideas tend to spread from unit to unit, by either *hierarchical* (from the most powerful to the less powerful) or *horizontal* (based on geographical or functional proximity) diffusion. In our research, we shall verify not only the extent of similarities among countries on a variety of issues, but also try to assess the provenance of the various ideas and discourses from EU institutions or European states.

In short, the Europeanisation of the public sphere may take the following forms, which are not mutually exclusive:

According to the territorial actors involved	<i>Intergovernmental</i>	<i>Supranational</i>
According to the social/institutional nature of the actors involved	<i>From above</i>	<i>From below</i>
According to how the polity/politics/ policy characteristics of the EU are judged	<i>Consensual</i>	<i>Conflictual</i>
According to the direction of diffusion of ideas	<i>Vertical</i>	<i>Horizontal</i>

In what follows, we shall evaluate the spread of these different forms of Europeanization in the public sphere, by focusing on set of variables referring to the claimants (part 1), the form of the claim (part 2), its addressee (part 3), substantive issue (part 4), object actor (part 5), and the justification of the claim (part 6). For each part, we shall develop a cross-issue and cross-time analysis.

1. The claimants—an elitarian public sphere

An important criterion to analyse the public debates and mobilisation is the extent to which different types of collective actors participate to them. At first sight, the data on the claimant indicate a strong predominance of institutional actors that account for 72% of all claims, while about one fourth of actors consist of institutionalised interest and professional groups (12%) and other civil society organisations (12%). The direct presence of the media as actors in the public sphere is low (4%). Among state actors the government and executive actors are the most prominent ones (with a share of 43% of claims), followed by an additional 6-8% of claims made by the legislative, the political parties and the central banks. Notwithstanding their relative strength in terms of members, Italian parties confirm therefore a limited role in policy debate (della Porta 2003a, pp. 25-27). This data confirm, first of all, a low degree of pluralism in the Italian press, that indeed developed strong political affiliations (see Adam, Berkel and Pfetsch 2003, p. 97), and also, related to this, a low degree of professionalization of the journalist profession (confirmed, among others, by a negative image of the press among claimants (see below). It however also indicates that the pluralist assets in interest representation (della Porta 2003, 27; 29; 31) *reduce the visibility of non-institutional actors*.

Important differences emerge, however, in the relative role of actors across policy domains with in general a *stronger presence of institutional actors in the domains that are more Europeanised* (della Porta, Caiani, Mosca e Valenza 2003). In particular, in the domains of troop deployment, immigration and EU integration, state actors nearly monopolised the debate (with a share of claims from 84-90%), and there is instead a very low presence of civil society actors as well as economic interest groups. On monetary policy state actors play a still prominent role (75% of the claims) but together with institutionalised interest and professional economic groups (above all economists and financial specialists, who cover 10% of the total of claims of the category). The range of actors involved in agriculture, education, and pension is wider, with a significant presence of civil society organisations in agriculture and education (respectively 33% and 16% of claims) and of interest groups in all three areas

(respectively 29%, 17% and 35% of claims). More in detail, the interest groups are mainly constituted by farmers and agricultural organisations (24%) on agriculture and by unions and employees (25% and 15%) on pension and education. In term of Europeanisation, the data indicate that, within the Italian political system, the topics of Europe, as well as, those concerning monetary policy, are strongly debated within the institutional arena, while the discussion on pension, education (but also on the already well “Europeanised” domain of agriculture) is more pluralistic, with a wider range of actors involved in it. This seems to reflect the dominant cleavage structure, with a focus of social conflicts on the issues that are still at the heart of social citizenship—subsidies and education are among them.

Still about the actors, we have to stress also a certain *degree of personalization*, that reflects general as well as specifically Italian trends: first of all, what Manin (1995) defined as the shift from party democracy to the democracy of the public; second, and more typically Italian, the shift towards a populist-majoritarian model, with institutional reform that converge with the patrimonialistic leadership of Mr. Berlusconi in increasing the role and visibility of single leaders. Our data indicated, indeed, the prominent role played by named spokespersons and organisations or institutions, who account for almost two third of all claims, while the “unorganised collectivity” covers the remaining one third and “anonymous spokespersons” are rarely present. These data seem to confirm a high degree of selectivity in the (printed) public sphere.

A *high degree of selectivity* (and therefore a tendentially “top-down” process) is also indicated by the data referring to the location of claim-making. In general, nearly two third of all claims reported in the Italian press were made on the national territory. And the large majority of them come from the capital city (76%)—a data that confirm the still centralized nature of Italian politics, recent process of decentralization notwithstanding (della Porta 2002; see also della Porta 2003a, p. 19)--with an additional 9% by claims made in the four largest cities, and only 15% elsewhere.

In terms of *Europeanization as supranationalization* is however interesting to note that, of the remaining one third of the claim that are not made on the Italian territory, a significant share of claims (11%) was made in the *various locations of the European Union* (namely, Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg and Frankfurt), while—indicating some degree of horizontal Europeanization--the other foreign countries that are most covered are the three EU members--Germany (5%), France (4%) and the United Kingdom (3%), besides the USA (6%). In a cross time perspective, we can notice that claims made in cities that are the seats of the European Union strongly increased their presence in the Italian press in the more recent

years. Confirming that *multilevel governance is reflected in the public sphere, with also some space for supranational EU leaders*, the two most present institutional leaders are the head of the European Commission *Romano Prodi*, who accounts for 2.3% of all claims, at the top rank. The next four prominent claim-makers are: *Ciampi*, the present head of the State, *De Mauro*, who was Italian minister for education under the centre-left government of Amato from April 2000 to May 2001, the Dutch ECB president *Wim Duisenberg*, and finally the present head of the Italian government, *Berlusconi*. On overall, when looking at the whole group of the top 27 most prominent persons in the Italian press, national spokespersons play the most important role: 15 national politicians plus the former secretary general of the most important Italian labour Union (CGIL), *Sergio Cofferati*. The remaining most prominent persons are the heads of the state or the government of important EU member's countries (France, Germany and Spain) as well as USA and Iraq (the Iraq sovereign's prominence being mainly due to the past and present conflict against Iraq). Three important EU representatives constitute an additional group of prominent spokespersons: the Italian Commission president *Romano Prodi*, the ECB president *Duisenberg*, and the Spanish EU Commissioner for economic and monetary affairs *Pedro Solbes*.

The relevance of the *specific issue governance* is however confirmed also on this dimension. The coverage of the papers is in fact strongly focussed on national based claims on topics concerning immigration (88%), pension (87%) and education (93%), while on issues referring to monetary policy, agriculture and European integration there are significantly more claims made in the seats of the EU. The Italian press takes a significant international perspective with claims on the topic of troop deployment, with a significant coverage of claims coming from individual foreign countries (i.e. 27% of the total claims in this fields are made in the USA, 9% in Middle East, 8% in Britain and so on). Moreover, the political debate is most concentrated in Rome for those policy fields where the nation state still plays a central role (troop deployment with 91% of the claims made in the capital and pension with 88%, but this is not true for education), while it is more dispersed for issues characterized by multilevel governance: monetary policy, agriculture, the topic of European integration, but also partly immigration, between 24% and 33% of the claims are made out of Rome). The significant presence of a local debate on education that nevertheless is a policy field still well anchored at national level (Spanish team 2003, p. 130), can be attribute to the large presence of non-political actors (i.e. protests and contestation). Some recent Europeanization follows the implementation in this policy area of the Open Method of

Coordination (Spanish team 2003, 132). Similar cross-issue differences emerge also if we look at the individual spokespersons that are more prominent in the media.

Although the general debate on our seven topics is dominated mainly by Italian actors (a bit less than two third of all claims), *Europeanisation* (also in its supranational form) is clearly visible in the significant share of claims made by genuine European actors (14%), as well as by national actors from other EU member countries¹ (13%). In a cross time perspective, it is worth noticing that *European actors are increasingly present in media reporting* (from the share of 6% of claims in 1990 to 17% in 2002), as, but to a lesser extent, own national actors (from 45% of claims in the year 1990 to 56% in 2002). *Europeanization by cross-country diffusion process seems instead stable*: claims made by actors from other EU member countries remain nearly constant (around a share of 13-14%) from 1990 to 2002 (with a peak of 17% in 1995).

Anyway, there is *strong variation in the role of different types of claim-makers across the seven policy fields*. In term of “supranational” Europeanization, European actors are clearly more important in the two fields where the EU has formal competencies, agriculture and monetary politics, where they account for 20-30% of all claim-makers. Nevertheless, when looking in a cross time perspective, European actors are increasingly present in media reporting on monetary policy, while declining on agriculture (where however we have a small number of cases). On agricultural issues, Italian actors are the dominant speakers; responsible for almost two thirds of claims, while in topics concerning monetary policy their weight is very similar to that of European actors (32% of claims). Furthermore, the presence of Italian actors decreases on monetary policy, while on agriculture their share remains nearly constant, with the exception of the peak in 2000, when they gained in importance, making more then two third of all claims in this area. Indicating some horizontal Europeanization, also the involvement of national actors from other EU member states is significant (22% in monetary politics and 13% in agriculture) and reaches a peak in 2000 for agriculture (particularly present claims made by French and British actors) and in the year 1995 on monetary policy (particularly present claims made by German, French and British actors. In monetary politics, we also find a significant share (10%) of claims that were made by actors from non-European countries, especially the USA. More surprisingly, European actors do not play a significant role as claim-makers on immigration and troops deployment that are policy domains

¹ For the following tables, when we talk about the “scope” of the actor (either as claimant, addressee and as object) and scope of the issue, the terms *European* and *EU countries* include both the 15 current members and the 12 countries future members states, for which the negotiations have been concluded or opened.

characterised by some degree of multilevel governance. Indeed, the distribution of actors is similar in the immigration field as in education and retirement policies. As many as 83% of claim-makers on immigration are national Italian actors, and the remaining part is mainly constituted by claims made by national actors from other countries: actors from EU countries (4%) and non-EU countries (3%). Besides, multilateral and bilateral statements play a significant role in the debate on this topic (4%).

In terms of Europeanisation it is worth noticing that European-level actors, as well as other supranational actors, play a very modest role in public claim-making on immigration. On troops deployment, Italian actors play a quite marginal role in this field comparing to other fields, and account only for 17% of all claims, even if they gained in importance in 2002 (27% of claims). Furthermore, European actors have no visibility at all in this field (with only 1% of all claims), while in terms of Europeanisation, we can only notice the role played by actors from other member countries that are present with a share of 16% of all claims. In contrast, actors from non-EU countries (most importantly the USA) account for more than half of all claim-makers (52%). Supranational actors, beyond the EU, have a lower than expected presence (only 9% of all claims), with the exception of 2000 (28%).

Not surprisingly, the two policy fields where national institutions retained most of their competencies, education and pension (both policy areas recently characterized by the Open Method of Coordination; see, respectively, Spanish team 2003, p. 132; Erbe 2003, p. 173), are correspondingly strongly dominated by Italian actors, who account for 94% of all claims on education, and 86% on pensions and retirement. In terms of Europeanisation, on pension issues, it is interesting to notice that the other actors that – at a great distance – receive some level of visibility in the Italian media are more national actors from EU member states (10%) than genuine European actors (3%). In the area of education, claims by EU-level actors play no role, a bit more those claims made by national actors from other countries, but non-EU countries predominate over those by EU member states. Additionally, in a cross time perspective, the presence of national claim makers tends to increase in both areas. As expected, European actors are instead most prominent in media reporting on the topics concerning European integration (37% of all claims). Even actors from the other EU member countries, who account for 24% of all claims, play a significant role in this field. Further, their presence is increasing across the year, while other EU countries have a nearly constant, if not decreasing, presence, except for the peak of claims made by German (29%) and French (18%) actors in 1995. Italian claim-makers are on the topic of European integration present with an almost constant level of about 28% of all claims.

The *selectivity of the media* is confirmed when looking at which types of actors are making claim in the public sphere, it is worth noticing that among the European actors, institutional actors account for the vast proportion of instances (96% of claims European, 75% other European supranational). We find very little evidence for the visibility of a transnational European civil society (2%), and when present, actors of civil society represent more often the institutionalised interest and professional groups than public interest associations and NGOs (see the share of 25% of “other European supranational” economic interest groups). Surprisingly non-EU supranational civil society actors with a proportion of 14% of claims (4% made by economic interest groups and 10 % by other civil society organisations), as well as forms of transnational linkages among civil society actors’ through multilateral contacts (24%) are a bit more present than EU level non-institutional actors. In term of horizontal Europeanisation, even when we look at the presence on the Italian political debate of national actors from EU member countries, the role of state and party actors is still prominent with a share of about 80%- 90% of all claims, except for the case of British actors who are more differentiated and with a significant role of the media actors (22%), and for Dutch actors, who are characterised with a high presence of claim made by civil society organisations (25%).

2. Action forms—Europeanization by consensus?

There is a low presence of more disruptive forms of claims-making. The large majority of claims (more than two third) are verbal actions (above all non-specified statements, 44% of all claims); the remaining part is constituted mainly by executive and political decisions (21% of all claims), and by meetings (8%). In general, protest has been not used frequently.

Looking at cross-issue difference, however, offer some signs of a “*discursive*”, *if not consensual, type of Europeanization*. In fact, the specific topic of European integration show the most articulated range of form of actions: only 12% of all claims in it are executive and political decisions, 70% are verbal actions, 18% meetings, congress and assemblies and 5% protests (considering direct-democratic actions as forms of protest). Protest is mainly used in education (11% of all claims of the topic). As far as issues are concerned, executive and political decisions are present mainly in troop deployment (32% of all claims in the topic), but also in agriculture (28%) and immigration (26%). Monetary policy and pensions are characterized by the large presence of verbal actions (in both fields 73% of all claims).

Strategies of action in the public sphere also vary significantly according to the actors of the claim-making—with a *higher conflictuality in forms of Europeanization from below*

(della Porta, Caiani, Mosca and Valenza 2003). Not surprisingly, for instance, protest is mainly used by civil society actors, and among them more by associations and NGOs (22%) or the general unorganised public (14%) than by economic interest groups (5%). The latter recur mainly to discursive claims as non-specified statements and other verbal statements (88% of their claims). In general, in the period examined here, it is evident that this type of verbal claim emerges as the form of action most used by any type of actor, even by those, like for instance social movements, that traditionally rely upon protest. Sub-national actors (both regional and local) are those with the most articulated repertoire of action. They recur to executive and political decisions (respectively for 22% and 30% of their total claims), but also frequently to verbal actions (respectively 52% and 60%), as well as engaging in meetings and assemblies (7% and 4%) and organizing protest (20% and 8%). Local and regional actors seem able to combine different action forms according to the different levels of decision-making they address (and consequently according to the changes in the political opportunity structure that characterize such different levels of government). On the contrary, national actors, but also supranational and European actors recur mainly to discursive claims (respectively in 70%, 56-66% and 65% of their total claims). Bilateral and multilateral actors appear in the Italian public sphere mainly with executive and political decisions (respectively for 37% and 43% of their total claims). When supranational and European actors make claims, also meetings are frequently used (they engage in this type of action respectively in 8-16% and 16% of their total claims).

3. *The addressees of the claim: A two-level game?*

The analysis of the addressees confirms the strongly *hierarchical and centralized* nature of the Italian politics. In the Italian public sphere, *almost all demands are addressed to institutional actors*. This is true in particular on troop deployment (98% of all claims), immigration (97%), European integration (93%) and monetary politics (92%). Slightly more articulated is the range of addressed actors in agriculture, pension and education: indeed, together with institutional actors, still predominant, in agriculture and pension issues economic interest groups play an important role as well (8% in agriculture, 11% in pension), in education, organisations from civil society (21%) are very present. Looking at the subcategories of institutional actors addressed by claim-making, it is worth noticing that the executive actors are prominent in topics concerning troop deployment and agriculture (respectively 80% and 78% of the claims). Not surprisingly, in monetary policy we found a significant role of central banks (18% of claims), while parliaments have a more important

role mainly on pension (18%), but also, at a lesser extent, on immigration, education, as well as on the topic concerning Europe (about 11-12%). Political parties are not often addressees of claim-making (a share about of 2-5%), except on immigration, where they are mentioned in 12% of the cases.

If institutional actors dominate the public sphere (as claimants as well as targets of action), the data about the direction of the claims, however, confirms the *low degree of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy* (see della Porta 2003a, pp. 20-21). In the Italian public debate, claim-makers are likely to evaluate state and party actors and interest groups in a similar *negative* way, while media are evaluated more negatively than all the other actors. Vice versa, civil society actors are evaluated less negatively compared to all the other categories of actors targeted by the claim-making. Among institutional actor, politicians and party actors are evaluated more negatively than the other actors, and that legislative, judiciary and police and internal security agencies are evaluated less negatively than all mentioned others. Among economic interest groups, employer's organisations and firms receive more criticism than unions. Among civil society organisations, churches and religious organisations and groups, consumers, organisations of elderly and in particular migrants are positively evaluated. Only other scientific and research professionals and institutions, extreme rights and racists groups are evaluated as negatively as institutional actors.

A cross-policy comparison of the territorial level of the addressees point, however, at two-level games (Putnam 1988): the different types of game in the different policy area tend to adapt to the different distribution of competences. As expected, there is in fact a strong presence of actors with an European scope as addressees of the claim-making on topics concerning the European integration (56% of all claims), monetary policy (48%), and also, even if to a lesser extent, agriculture (32%). As signal of the weakness (visibility) of Europe in the immigration policy field we can notice a modest presence of European level actors as addressees of the claim-making (6%). Finally, in the policy domains that remain the preserve of nation-states, namely education and pension, virtually no claims are directed at the supranational EU level (1-4%), and a similar picture emerges in the policy field of troop deployment (3%). However, in term of Europeanisation, we can notice that on topics concerning pension and troop deployment national actors play a certain role as target of the claims from EU countries (a range of 7-9%). Italian actors play a still predominant role as direct target on immigration (80%), pension (87%) and education (93%) issues. Not surprisingly, supranational actors are present as addressees in the Italian public sphere, particularly on troop deployment (20% of all claims).

As an additional sign of *supranationalization* (vis-à-vis intergovernmentalism or cross-national diffusion) in a cross time perspective, we can observe that the *number of claims with a European target is increasing*, while those directed to national Italian addressees oscillate across the years (with a peak in 1995), remaining at an almost constant level of about 50% of all claims from 1990 to 2002. National actors from other EU member states are slightly decreasing across the years: from 11% of claims in 1990 to 6% in 2002.

Double-level game are facilitated by a high degree of acceptance for EU institutions. Given mistrust in national institutions and a non-universalistic model of welfare state (della Porta 2003a, p. 32), with among others low investment in high-education (Spanish team 2003, p. 135), a weak currency (Boerefijn and Mak 2003, p 168; 171), and a weak visibility in defense politics (Gray 2003, pp. 188, 193), the European institutions are often considered as potential allies. Europeanization has been in fact understood as “normalization”—“in the sense of losing its eccentric, extraordinary, astonishing and unique features that have certainly fascinated many Italianists but probably not many Italians” (Giuliani 2000, 51). In the Italian public sphere claims-makers are in fact less likely to evaluate negatively European institutions and actors, when compared to national ones. Even supranational actors (especially actors related with the United Nations) are evaluated less negatively than Italian ones. Among the other EU member states to which demands are addressed, only France and Germany are more criticized than Italian actors.

4. The issues of the claim: up-and-down with Europe (and the rest)?

Our data suggest that the *degree of Europeanization of the public sphere is subject to contingent shifts related with issue cycles*. The total number of claims found is not equally spread over the seven issues and clear trends cannot be observed except, to a certain extent, for immigration. In general, monetary policy and education have a significant level of importance (around 20% of the total numbers of claims we gathered); in the year 2002, they are overtaken by the topic of immigration (that, notwithstanding the low percent of immigrants, is quite conflictual, see Guiraudon 2003, 153-54) that account for 22% of all claims in this year. In 2000, monetary policy is overcome by European integration (23%), in 1995 is the field of retirement and pension scheme that mainly attracts the attention to the Italian media (28%), while in 1990 a prominent role is played by issues concerning troop deployment. As a sign of this conjunctural nature of the coverage of Europe, we can quote the up-and-down in the total number of claims dealing with *European integration*: they decrease from 1990 (when they nevertheless already account for a significant 13% of all claims), to a

share of 6% in 1995; they reach a peak in 2000 with a share of 23% of claims, decreasing again in 2002 (to 16%). When talking about European integration, the most prominent sub-issue in the various years concerns the role of specific countries, or group of countries in the process of European integration, and the balance of power and coalitions among member states (29% of claims). The next prominent sub-issue across the years is represented by the topic of the relationship between EU and national /regional levels, and the future constitution, but in 2002, this sub-issue is overcome by the topic of enlargement, that strongly attracts the interest of the media (31% of all claims). Minor attention is paid to European institutions and their functioning.

Also on other policy areas, the degree of Europeanization of the public sphere seems related with the specific issue cycles of sub issues. Although *agriculture*, as well as, monetary politics, is a policy field where the European political institutions have growing competences, and where consequently changes have occurred in term of policy governance in the recent years, this topic (or at least the sub issues we have selected) is strongly and constantly underrepresented in the Italian media, comparing to the other issues. Only in 2000 the debate on agriculture is present at a significant level (in this year we gather 53 of the total 76 claims on agriculture we have found), and it is almost totally concentrated on BSE (72% of all claims in the field). Important elements of the policy governance (and above all the European dimension of that), like for instance the discussion on quotas for life stock, is strongly underrepresented in the Italian public sphere, while the attention is attracted only by the “emergency” of the animal diseases. The *two-level policy making* (with implementation still at the national level) as well as the *fragmentation of Italian agricultural sectors* in small farms (Jochum 2003, p. 123-124) can explain this low and episodic presence of agricultural issues in the public sphere (notwithstanding the relatively high percent of labour force and share of GDP in this sector) and a less-than-expected level of Europeanization.

As far as *monetary* policy is concerned, there is a peak of claims in 1995 (25% of all claims), linked to the discussions about the EMU convergence criteria, a sub issue which attract much attention also .in 1995 (33%) and 2002 (about 50%) of all the claims of the year. In 1995, the topic of interest rate adjustments was important too (33% of claims), while in 2000 the topic of common currency appears prominent, only second to EMU convergence criteria in 2002 with a share of 26% of all claims.

Immigration and troop deployment are situated in the middle fields, occupying respectively a share of 14% and 13% of all claims. In a cross time perspective, *immigration* is constantly increasing, from 7% of all claims in 1990 to 11% in 1995 and 2000 to 22% in

2002. In term of sub-issues, it is worth noticing that on the topic of immigration the debate was strongly concentrated on one single sub-issue in 1990: entry and border control, that nearly monopolise it with 78% of all claims. Then, across the years, the discussion becomes more and more articulated, referring also to general evaluation or policy direction (28% of claims) and to smuggling and illegal entries (22% in 1995 and 17% 2000). In addition to these two sub-issues in 2002 also the sub-issue of migration programs and quotas appears (34%).

Claims on *troop deployment* reach a high peak in 1990, when they account for 32% of all claims of the year; they remained then at a quite constant level of 15% until the recent 2002, except the decrease in 2000 (4%). Troop deployment for military aggression on foreign sovereign territory is the main sub-issue in 1990 (33%) and 2002 (65%), while military actions relating to peace keeping are the main issue in 1995 (51%) and 2000 (60%).

Slightly minor attention have attracted the issues we selected concerning *retirement and pension*, within which the main sub-issue under discussion in the various years, is state-pension scheme. The next prominent sub-issue in the debate is the topic concerning income levels in retirement/poverty scheme that, starting from 1995 increases its presence, stabilising at a quite constant level of 20%.

When considering together all the four years of study, *education* accounts for the largest share of claims (a bit less than a quarter). In particular it is really prominent in the debate of the year 2000 with a share of 28% of all claims. As for as the sub-issues, the topic referring to curriculum is quite important, even if slightly decreasing, across the years (from 21% of claims in 1990 to 18% in 1995 to about 10% in 2000 and 2002). Administrative power allocation is dominating the debate only in 1990 and then it disappears in the following years, while on the contrary resource allocation and salaries, of a reduced importance in 1990 (8% of claims), becomes more and more important starting from 1995, reaching a share of 36% in 2002.

On all these sub fields, there are differences in as far the *issue scope*, which refers to the geographical scope of the substantive content of the claim, is concerned². This variable is especially useful to investigate the “salience” of the integration process in the everyday life of citizens: the question is whether the nation-state still remains the primary focus for debates,

² Issue-scope is in principle independent from the scope of the subject actor, target, and/or object actor. E.g., if Amnesty International appeals to the European Court of Justice in protest against the Berlin police’s treatment of immigrant suspects, the actor is supranational, the addressee European, but the scope of the issue (‘The Berlin police’s treatment of immigrant suspects’) remains local. However, if a local Berlin committee for asylum seekers criticizes the Berlin Senate for its treatment of refugee children on the grounds that it constitutes a breach of the Un Children’s Convention, then the issue scope is supranational, in spite of the local scope of the actor and addressee.

discourses and collective identities, or, on the contrary, whether actors increasingly frame their claims within an European dimension. While *monetary and agriculture issues are often framed with a specific reference to Europe – indicating supranational forms of Europeanization* (68% of claims with an European issue scope for the former, and 38% for the latter), in the other policy fields under study, i.e. immigration, troop deployment, pension and education³, claims rarely refer to the European Union (from 2% to 7% of all claims).

More in details, on *monetary* issues, the European level, that already played an overwhelming role in 1990 (37% of all claims), becomes more and more prominent, reaching a share of 90% of all claims in this field in 2002. Vice versa—and again indicating the prevalence of vertical path of Europeanization--relatively little attention is paid to other EU countries, with the only exception of 1995.⁴

Due to the already mentioned low numbers of claims found in *agriculture*, little can be said on cross-time evolution. We can observe, however, that one third of all claims found in this field in 2000 and two third in 2002 refer to the European level, while a significant share (11%) of claims in 2000 refers to the national level of the EU partner France. This data seems to confirm the observations made about claims-domestication on issue referring to agricultural, characterized by strong competition between member states (and a more intergovernmental dynamic) (see Imig and Tarrow 1999; Bush and Imi 2001).

In *immigration*, the portion of claims with a European level of reference is modest (between 6-9% of all claims) and quite constant over time (except for the negative peak in 1995). Also references to national level of other EU member states are rarely present, with the exception of the high share of claims concerning Germany in 1990 (17%). On the contrary, claims that raise issues at bi-laterally and multi-laterally levels are often present (18%), even if it is not possible to see clear trends across the years. Claims with a national, Italian issue scope appear on the rise, even if not linearly (from 56% of claims in 1990 to 74% in 2002).

On topics concerning *troop deployment*, claims with a European issue scope are absent, with the exception of the modest share of 6% of all claims in 1990. The lack of reference to the European Union is balanced by the overwhelming and, even if not linearly, increasing over time presence of claim with a supranational issue scope (41% of all claims).

³ The topics referring to European integration were coded, by definition, as having a European “frame” of reference

⁴ In term of “globalisation” beyond the EU/EE, it is worth noticing that multilateral and bilateral scopes are only relevant in 1990, while the year 2000 is characterises by a significant presence of claims that have a genuine supranational reference (14% of all claims in the year).

The remaining part of all claims (a bit less than two third) is framed within a multilateral and bilateral reference that is also increasing from 1995 to 2002.

Not surprisingly, in *pension and education*, which are fields still under full control of national political institutions, the debate is almost entirely concentrated on the Italian national space. In general, as many as 87% of all claims on pension and 92% of those on education have a national Italian issue scope. Nevertheless, in term of Europeanisation (both in its supranational and horizontal forms), there are some differences between the two topics, having the former a share of 5% of all claims with a pure European scope and an additional 9% of claims with reference to the other EU members, and the latter only a minimal share of claims either with an European scope (2%), or with an EU member states scope of reference (1%).

An analysis of claims making can reveal the consensual versus conflictual path of Europeanisation. An important criterion to evaluate the political debate and mobilisation in the Italian public sphere is the position of the claim-makers on the issue of European integration. Are the claims against or in favour of a deepening of the integration process? Do they ask for increasing or restricting the competences of European institutions? Valence positions scores on Europe/European integration range from -1 to +1. The overall debate in Italy about Europe appears as characterised by a positive attitude toward Europeanisation (0.19), that confirms other data about strongly pro-European sentiments (della Porta 2003a, pp. 20-22). More in details, when talking about European issues⁵, claims explicitly expressing a positive attitude toward increased Europeanisation are at a high level on European integration, immigration and retirement and pension schemes.

Confirming other research (della Porta 2003a, appendix A), the overall position of *Italian political parties is pro-European*, with the exception of the “regionalist” *Lega* party, has been strongly anti-European over the years (-0.39). Notwithstanding a traditionally high degree of polarization in party politics (della Porta 2003a, p. 24), the parties are consensual in supporting Europe. On average, left-wing parties express more consensus on the benefits of European integration when compared to right-wing parties (see the score of 0.39 for non specified parties belonging to the centre-left coalition against the more neutral score of 0.06 for non specified parties of the right-right coalition). Nevertheless, looking more in details, there are interesting differences among parties belonging to the same “area”. Among the left wing parties, support for Europe ranges from DS (*Democratici di Sinistra*), one of the

⁵ The attitudes towards increased European integration is only registered for issues which had an European dimension (in either the actors of the issue).

followers of the old Communist party, which takes a clearly pro-European stance (0.32), to the parties-parties in a middle position (0.25), to the green party that shows a more moderate position (0.17). Among the right-right parties, AN (*Alleanza Nazionale*) takes a more resolute pro-European position (0.31) compared to the others. FI (*Forza Italia*) is moderately pro-European (0.17), while the conservative parties CCD-CDU, born from the old Christian democrat party DC (*Democrazia Cristiana*) are almost neutral. The year 1995 is characterized by the “technical” government of Premier Dini that shows a supporting position toward the European Integration.

There are however also *signs of conflicts*. On topics concerning European integration, it is worth noticing that positive attitudes towards the process decrease over the years. When the claim making is on immigration with a European angle, neutral positions alternate with positive positions across the years, without a clear trend about the degree of consensus on Europe within this policy field. Pension and retirement schemes is characterised by alternative peaks of favour and criticism of Europe across the years, showing in 1995 a significantly negative judgment about European integration, strongly positive attitudes in 2000, with, nevertheless, a slight decrease in support later on (reaching a neutral position in 2002). Within educational issues, the debate about European is in general quite favourable to European integration (strongly in favour in 1990, but with support decreasing since then until reaching a neutral position in the more recent years). In the debate about monetary policy, we find a predominantly neutral value over the years of our study (except for the significantly positive position toward Europe expressed in 1995). Similar is the picture for agriculture, where positive positions, but at a very modest level, are present in 2000.

Non-institutional actors also appear more critical of European decisions. When looking at the evaluation of the process of European integration by different type of actors, it is worth noticing that almost the whole range of institutional and social actors present in the Italian public debate takes an overall pro-European or at least neutral position, except for educational professionals and organisations (-0.20), unions and employees (-0.13), and the general public (-0.30). Nevertheless, the actors with more clearly positive attitudes towards European integration are state and party representatives (0.21) and, among them, in particular former statesmen, the judiciary and other states executive agencies. Civil society actors have an intermediate position, defending, even if not strongly, the European Union (0.14); while media and journalists and economic interest groups (0.09) are much more careful in their

approval of European integration process. From the public positioning towards Europe, integration seems thus a project more of the political elites than of the economic ones.⁶

5. Object actor: a European identity?

Object actor refers to who would be affected by the claim if realized. In terms of Europeanization, this set of variables is interesting in order to single out to which extent European object are referred to, and therefore to which extent the conception of a European citizenship (an indicator of supranationalization) develops. From a cross time perspective, in term of *Europeanisation as supranationalisation*, it is worth noticing that the *discussion is more and more carried on behalf of the EU* (the European level object actors increase their presence from 10% of claims in 1990 to 23 % in 2002), or – with horizontal Europeanization – on behalf of other EU member countries (objects from other EU member states increase up to a share of 11% of claims in 2000, and decrease from 2000 to 2002). Italian actors as objects of the debate are increasing their presence from 1990 to 1995 (56% of all claims), but they decrease to 45% of claims in 2000 and to 38% in 2002.

Here as well, we find however significant cross-issue differences. In monetary politics, the object of claim-making is mainly whole polities (25%) or whole economies (56%). The majority of claims in agriculture refer to the interests of farmers and agricultural organisations (30%) as well as, for a significant share, the more post-materialistic interests of consumers groups (22%) or the generic public (19%). This means that agriculture cannot be considered simply a sectorial issue of policy. Not surprisingly in immigration actors on whose behalf claims are made are mainly migrants (62%), but there is also an additional 18% of claims that concerns the interests of institutional (mainly executive 9%) actors. On troop deployment are those where there is the largest share of claims that have as object institutional actors (42%) as well as whole polities (56%), while pension and education are characterise by the largest share of claims made for benefits or disadvantage of actors from civil society: 41% of the former (within which 36% of all claims have for object elderly groups), 88% of the latter (constituted by a large portion of claims whose object are educational professional and

⁶ Claims made by national actors from Italy (0.17) as well as from the large majority of the other EU member states (Germany 0.19, France 0.21, Spain 0.23, but also Austria, Finland and Sweden 0.12) are generally as pro-European as claims made by European actors generally are (0.24). Negative position towards the process of European integration present in the Italian public sphere are expressed by national actors from the United Kingdom (-0.06), and above all Switzerland (-0.38). It is interesting to notice that claims from non-yet EU member states, such as the upcoming enlargement countries or national countries that look with interest to Europe, but are not part of it (like the Balkan countries) are more pro-European (around 0.50) than claims from the EU member states.

institutions, namely teacher, professors and school 54%, and a little part for students and their parents, 31%). When claims refer to the European integration, they have as objects either whole polities, namely the whole countries or whole polities (55%), or the governments (31%).

The object of claim-making by policy fields shows the different degrees of emergence of a reference to European identity. The majority of “object actors” on monetary politics and European integration are European actors, although the second prominent actors are nevertheless different in the two highly institutionally europeanised topics: being represented by Italian actors in the agriculture and national actors from other EU members in monetary issues. In agriculture a bit more than half of the claims contain a reference to Italian actors as object (57% of claims), but still in this field the role played by the European ones is significant (21%), as it is the place reserved to other EU member countries (17%). On immigration, due to the large presence of migrants as object of the claim-making, the multilateral scope, that by definition characterises the migrant question, is most prominent (two third of all claims), while Italian actors constitute the rest. The claim-making on troop deployment has mainly object actors from non-EU national countries, in particular from USA (11%) and from Middle East (41%). By contrast, the object scope remains firmly national on pension (87%) and education (94%).

6. Framing Europe: consensus for what?

Looking at the way in which Europe is “framed” means to analyse the motivations used by the actors to support their claim-making related to the European integration. This set of variables indicates therefore not only the *degree of consensus/dissent* vis-à-vis Europe, but also the dominant image of Europe: as an *intergovernmental or supranational institution*. The arguments used to frame Europe can be of four types: identity frame (that refer to the question, what is the EU and what does it stand for?), instrumental frames (that answer the question: what is the EU good or bad for?), historical frames (that are about positive--e.g. to Enlightenment or classical antiquity--or negative--e.g. to past national isolation or to the Cold War--linkages of the EU to historical periods or experiences), and frames internal to the European integration process (that are frames about causal linkages between one aspect of European integration and another, e.g. between enlargement and institutional reforms).

In about one third of all claims referring to European issues, frames related to European integration are present. *Not surprisingly for a polity-on-the-make, claim-making on*

the topic of European integration is characterised by a larger presence of frames when compared to the other policy fields (43% of claims), but also on immigration issues the role of the framing on Europe appear significant (33%). The same is true, even if at a lower extent, in monetary policy, education and pension (but in the latter two fields, giving the low number of cases, no firm statement can be made). However, the two institutionally most “Europeanised” fields, namely monetary policy and agriculture, are not those where frames of European integration are mainly used. Instead, it is above all in those policy fields, like immigration, *where the process of Europeanisation of the policy is still uncertain, that Europe is more often referred to within general frames*. When comparing different types of actors looking at their framing activities, it is worth noticing that civil society actors use more frequently (49% of claims) frames than institutional actors and the media (both a share of 32%) in order to express their concerns in the Italian public sphere. Economic interest groups are the actors that make less often use of frames (23% of all claims).

*The type of frame used about European integration varies a lot according to the subject of the claims, namely the topics about which they are used.*⁷ Overall, the 91 frames found in Italy for the reference period under study are similarly distributed: around one third each for identity, normative and value frames (30%), constitutional and governance frames (27%) and economic frames (25%). The remaining part is mainly constituted by frames internal to the integration process (10%). As for as the topics over which the debate is carried on, it is not surprisingly that a bit less than two thirds of all cases in *monetary politics are economic frames* (“economic stability” and “inflation” respectively are the most frequently mentioned ones, both in about 4% of cases in this field), while almost the same relevant role (half of the claims) is played by the *economic arguments in agriculture* (even if here most of them refers to “consumer protection”: 4.7% of cases in the field). The other two types of frame that often are used in public debate concerning monetary policy and agriculture are firstly constitutional /governance frames (they account respectively for a share of 21% of frames in the former and 23% in the latter policy field) and secondly frames internal to integration process for monetary topics (12%), and other instrumental frame for agriculture (14%). Public positions on the topic of *European integration are predominantly framed within identity or normative considerations* (41%). Europe is seen above all as “community of values” (4.8% of cases in this topic), protection against “racism/xenophobia” (2.7% of cases), but also with reference to constitutional/ institutional frames as “democracy” (2.8% of

⁷ Due to the low number of cases with frames in troop deployment, pension and education, we will not analyse the distributions of the different frames inside these three fields

cases). Even governance principles are frequently used (31% of cases in the topic, above all with reference to “efficiency and competence” 1.3% of cases). Economic frames play, instead, a very reduced role (8%). On the whole, therefore, in the formally most “Europeanised” domains—monetary issues and agriculture—the frame stresses the main motivation for integration in the very beginning: instrumental advantages. *On the issue of European integration, the search for a common demos seems to become more and more important.*

The role of different types of frames varies *over the years*. Economic frames about Europe appear to be more relevant in 1995 and 2002, constitutional and governance arguments are more often used in 1990, while identity frames are prominent in 2000. Besides these variations in single years, it is difficult to find clear trends that characterise the use of frames, except, partially, for other instrumental frames that appear increasingly used by actors in the debate from 1995 to 2002, and the frames internal to integration process that, to the contrary, are less and less present from 1990 to 2002.

When looking at the types of frames mainly used by different categories of actors, it is worth noticing that *economic interest groups* (unions, farmers, and employers organisations and firms) mainly emphasise the *instrumental* side of European integration in their claims, underlining in particular the socio-economic dimensions of the process (“economic growth” and “inflation”, both 3.1% of cases, and “strength in global economic competition” 2.5%, are the most often mentioned arguments). Economic interest groups focus their strategies firstly on economic frames and secondly on constitutional /governance arguments (among the latter the most frequent concept is “rule of law”, 1.8% of cases). All the other actors use economic frames as well, but less frequently.

State and party actors make a balanced use of three types of frames: identity and normative frames (the most frequent concepts are Europe as “community of value”, 2.4% of their cases and “racism/xenophobia”, 2.1%), constitutional/governance (above all “democracy” and “rule of law”, both 1.2%) and economic frames (“economic stability” 2% and “inflation” 1.5%). Media and journalists are the actors that use a more articulated strategy of framing, that include the largest range of frames from the identity ones (among which we find once again the concept of Europe as “community of values”, 2.7% of cases, but also new concepts such as, “tolerance”, and “unity” both 1.8%) to those referring to other instrumental arguments about Europe (either economical, such as “consumer protection” and “national economy” both 1.8%, and political such as “influence in international relations” and “European relation with USA” both 1.8%).

Civil society actors, as well as the general public from civil society, are the only actors that mainly frame European matters emphasising immaterial aspects of the process, as testified for by their large use of general identity frames (after the prominent concept of “community of values” 7.5%, we find new arguments as “Christianity values”, 5%, as well as “solidarity” and “peace”, both 2.5%).

When looking at the total number of cases in which frames are used, the idea of *Europe as a “community of values” is the most prominent frame used in claim-making (7.2% of all cases). The next prominent ones are the instrumental considerations of “economic stability” and “inflation” (5.7% and 4.8% of all cases respectively). These frames, often used in claim-making, are followed by normative and constitutional frames inside the category of identity frames, such as “democracy” (4.1%), “racism/xenophobia” (3.8%), “rule of law” (3.8%). However, this overall picture is incomplete if the total percentages are not weighted by policy fields, even if we have to remember that the economic frames play a dominant role in the public discourse on all topics (where they characterise about half of all claims), except for European integration. For this reason if one looks only at the policy field “European integration”, the picture changes and the top most often used frames are mainly identity frames such as principles, norms and values, constitutional, institutional frames and frames concerning governance.*

Together with the type of framing strategy used in the public debate, it is also interesting to see the ways in which frames are linked to the process of European integration. Indeed, frames can be used both negatively and positively referring to Europe and can be referred to the present or to a possible future. In fact, not only the direction of a specific frame has been coded, but also if the frame refers to a description of what is perceived as a present status or as a wish for the future (“what does Europe should/should not stand for?”). The two most prominent frames used to underline what the EU actually is not, are racism/xenophobia and inflation (about 20% of such claims respectively). The former insists on the immaterial side of the EU, the latter on an instrumental economic argument. Frames that are used to support European integration conceive Europe as a barrier against racism, inflation, nationalism, fascism /nazism, bureaucracy; frames used vice versa against European integration consider the EU as a danger for (national) economy, national identity, tolerance and democracy. The most frequent frames used in the Italian public sphere to express what the EU is refer to identity. Indeed, European integration is perceived as a community of values (12.4% of such claims), linked to constitutional, institutional frames such as democracy (6.4%), rule of law (6.1%), human rights (3.6%) or to principles, norms and

values, such unity (4.5%), freedom /liberty (2.7%). Beside, from an instrumental but always positive point of view Europe is conceived as conducive to economic stability (7.9%), growth (4.8%) and strength in global competition (2.7%). As far as the future or an ideal state of the EU is concerned, the most common frames are more critical. The most frequent argument is that Europe should be more efficient and competent, and should guarantee more economic stability, unity and strength in global competition. Among these types of ideal claims it is worth noticing the appearance of a new frame: Europe as “civil society, active citizenship”.

Concluding, if there is a high degree of support for Europe, Europe however represents different values for different groups (della Porta 2003b); the pro- versus anti-Europe cleavages do not overlap with other existing cleavages (della Porta 2003a, p. 37), but *very different images of Europe are supported by different actors.*

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Part II: Commented Tables⁸

1. Article-level

Table 1.1: Number of articles coded per year

Year	Articles coded from		Total	
	Full sample issue In %	Reduced European sample issue In %	In %	(N)
1990	15	5	11	175
1995	12	5	9	149
2000	43	28	36	606
2001	.	46	20	338
2002	30	16	24	401
Total (N)	100 932	100 737	100	1669

In Italy, for a period of five single years (from 1990 to 2002), a total number of 1669 articles were coded. About half of the articles (44%) were selected according to a reduced sample, that included only articles with an European dimension in either the claimant, the addressee, the issue, or object. For the year 2001, only articles from a reduced sample were coded. In the more recent years, the total number of articles is more than double compared to the historical years, with an increase of the presence of articles with a European dimension in the Italian press.

Table 1.2: Articles by paper

Paper	(Abbreviation)	Number of articles (N)	In % of database
Repubblica	(REP)	800	48
Corriere della Sera	(COR)	688	41
Mattino	(MATT)	107	6
Nazione	(NAZ)	74	4
Total		1669	100

Articles concerning our seven topic were found mainly in the two quality newspapers with nation-wide distribution: the centre-left *Repubblica* (48%) and the centre-right *Corriere della Sera* (41%). The rest of the total database (10%) is constituted by articles from the two

⁸ For the presentation of the data in the tables we mainly used rounded figures (i.e. with no decimals), the “0” only where figures are greater than zero and lower than 0.5, while when cells are really zero, we put “. ” in the cell.

selected regional newspapers⁹: the *Nazione* (4%), and the *Mattino* (6%), published respectively in the centre and in the south of Italy (in the regions of Tuscany and Campania). For each of the two quality newspapers we sample one issue per week, and for the tabloid and regional papers one issue every two weeks.

The regional papers were coded only for the year 2000. In this year, they account for 10% of all articles (6% MATT and 4% NAZ).

Table 1.3: Section from which articles were coded by paper

Section	By paper, in %				Total	
	REP	COR	MATT	NAZ	In %	(N)
Mixed internat. /national news section	48	40	45	38	44	735
Regional/local news section	.	.	18	16	2	31
Commentary pages	4	0	.	.	2	38
Business / economy section	21	21	19	24	21	345
International news section	13	21	3	7	15	259
National news section	6	18	16	15	12	194
No differentiation between sections	8	.	.	.	4	67
Total (N)	100	100	100	100	100	1669
	800	688	107	74		

All articles in the home news section and also in the economic and business section of the newspapers were checked for relevant acts. Culture and sports sections, letters to the editor, as well as supplements were excluded from the coding; articles in the regional and local sections (if present at all) were only included if a reference to them was made in the international/national news section of the paper¹⁰. Finally, commentaries by others than the newspaper's journalists and editors (i.e. guest like politicians or opinion leaders) were included, while the own commentaries and editorials of the four papers were analysed in a separate workpackage of the Europub project.

About 20% of the total articles of the database are from the business or economic section. The remaining part, coming from “news section”, is constituted mainly by articles from mixed international and national news (44%), but also by articles from purely national (12%) or international news (15%). Few articles (2%) are from regional and commentary sections. The distributions of articles in the different sections is similar inside the same “family” of newspapers (the quality and the regional ones), while the relative contribution of the sections to the total numbers of articles is different for the two “types” of newspapers, with a share of articles from international news section larger in the two quality newspapers than in the regional ones, and the absence in the latter of articles from commentary pages and in the former from regional/local pages. Surprisingly, the share of the economic section is very similar for the four newspapers.

⁹ For each Europub national team the composition of the sample of the newspapers had to be: two quality newspapers, one regional newspaper and one tabloid. For the Italian case two regional newspapers were chosen, because there isn't in Italy any broadsheet that could really be considered as “tabloid”.

¹⁰ This rule applied to all newspapers except the regional newspaper, for which regional and local sections were fully included.

Table 1.4a: Source of article by paper

Source	By paper, in %				Total	
	REP	COR	MATT	NAZ	In %	(N)
Own cov.: foreign correspondent	40	32	35	18	36	592
Own cov.: nat. office editor /journalist	56	63	64	78	60	1004
National press agency	1	2	1	4	1	20
Other EU press agency	2	2	.	.	2	33
Non-EU press agency	.	0	.	.	0	1
Other national media source	0	0	.	.	0	2
Other EU media source	0	1	.	.	1	8
Non-EU media source	1	0	.	.	0	7
Other source	.	0	.	.	0	2
Total (N)	100 800	100 688	100 107	100 74	100	1669

For each article, the source of the information (if present at all) is coded. When no source was indicated, we considered “by default” the article as originated from the papers own coverage (national office editor or journalist). The large majority (96%) of all articles found originates from the papers own coverage: 60% by the national office editor or journalists, 36% by foreign correspondents. The strong similarity among our four newspapers in the share of articles originated from the own coverage shows that probably the differences in the organisational resources don’t account for this aspect. Not surprisingly, the amount of articles coming from foreign correspondents is higher for REP and CORR than for NAZ, while the regional MATT is similar to the two quality newspapers on this respect. A small share of the total articles relies on press agencies, either national (1%) or European (2%), or on other media sources. The two regional newspapers rely only on national press agencies; REP and COR rely both on national and European press agencies.

Table 1.4b: Source of article by year

Source	By year, in %					Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	In %	(N)
Own coverage: foreign correspondent	38	29	39	36	32	36	592
Own cov.: nat. office editor /journalist	58	64	57	62	63	60	1004
National press agency		2	2		2	1	20
Other EU press agency	3	5	2	0	2	2	33
Non-EU press agency					0	0	1
Other national media source			0		0	0	2
Other EU media source	1		0	1	0	1	8
Non-EU media source			0	1	1	0	7
Other source					0	0	2
Total (N)	100 175	100 149	100 606	100 338	100 401	100	1669

[Based on both samples. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ]

Due to the low share on the total database of articles originated from other sources than the own coverage of newspapers, it is difficult to reach conclusions about trends across the years. Further, as we said, other distortions are introduced by the different sample of papers used for the year 2000 and by the exclusive European samples used for the year 2001. Taking these

considerations into account and thus comparing only the years 1990, 1995 and 2002, suffice to notice that the proportion of the information provided by foreign correspondents, the own national offices and all the other sources, remains nearly constant during the years.

Table 1.5: Articles with and without claims

Articles	Number of articles (N)	In % of database
Articles without claims	104	6
Articles with claims (new claims)	1548	93
Articles with claims (already coded claims)	17	1
Total	1669	100

[Based on both samples. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ]

Almost all the articles found concerning our topics of interest contains claims (93%), while a minority (6%) is characterise by narration of pure “facts” without any expression of a political opinion or some form of physical or verbal action made by some actors in the public sphere.

2. Claim-level

General

Table 2.1: Number of claims coded per year: total, full sample, Eu sample

Year	Claims coded from		Total	
	Full sample issue In %	Reduced European sample issue In %	In %	(N)
1990	13	6	10	350
1995	15	6	11	380
2000	36	28	33	1115
2001	.	42	17	580
2002	36	18	29	967
Total	100	100	100	3392

[Based on both samples. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ]

A total number of 3392 claims were found in the 1669 articles selected, for an average of 2 claims per article. The general debate in the Italian public sphere, on our seven topics of interests, has clearly increased over the years, as shown by the total amount of claims found in the more recent years as compared to the historical years (967 in 2002 against 350 in 1990 and 380 in 1995)¹¹.

¹¹ As mentioned, we shall compare only the years 1990, 1995 and 2002 for which we have used the same sample.

Location

Table 2.2a: Country where claim was made by year

	By year, in % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Germany (incl. GDR)	5	10	4	4	5	100
France	6	7	4	3	4	82
UK	4	2	2	3	3	51
Italy	48	62	60	59	58	1177
Spain	.	.	1	2	1	16
Netherlands	0	.	1	0	0	6
Other pre-1995 EU members	4	1	3	4	3	59
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1	0	2	0	1	22
EU seats	3	4	14	14	11	224
Switzerland	.	1	0	0	0	5
Upcoming enlargement countries	0	0	1	0	0	9
Other Eur. countries (excl. CIS countries)	0	2	1	0	1	15
Turkey	1	.	0	1	1	10
Russia (incl. USSR)	4	1	1	1	1	25
USA	11	5	4	7	6	119
Japan	1	.	1	.	0	7
Middle East	5	0	1	1	1	26
UN seats	.	2	1	1	1	23
NATO seats	1	1	.	0	0	7
Rest of the world	5	1	1	1	2	34
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	273	294	723	727		2017

[Based on both samples. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ]

For each claim selected, the country where it was made was coded. In the case of locations of headquarter of supranational institutions, a distinction was made between 'Brussels as the capitol of Belgium' and 'Brussels as a seat of the European Union', 'New York as a city in the USA' and 'New York as a seat of the UN', and so on.

In general, nearly two third of all claims reported in the Italian press were made on the national territory. This means that the remaining one third is constituted by claims reported in other part of the world and covered by the Italian papers in their daily work of news reporting. A significant share of claims (11%) was made in the various locations of the European Union (namely, Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg and Frankfurt), while the other foreign countries that are most covered are the three EU members--Germany (5%), France (4%) and the United Kingdom (3%)--and the USA (6%). In a cross time perspective, we can notice that the attention of the Italian media for the coverage of national news slightly increases (from 48% of nationally based claims found in the year 1990 to 59% in the year 2002). At the same time also claims made in cities that are the seats of the European Union strongly increase their presence on the Italian press in the more recent years, while, in general, claims coming from individual foreign countries (even if they are EU members) appear to be slightly less covered in recent years.

Table 2.2b: Country where claim was made by issue field

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Germany (incl. GDR)	11	.	2	4	4	0	9	5	100
France	7	11	0	6	3	1	6	4	82
UK	3	3	1	8	1	.	4	3	51
Italy	34	63	88	17	87	93	29	58	1177
Spain	1	.	0	3	.	0	1	1	16
Netherlands	0	.	0	0	.	0	1	0	6
Other pre-1995 EU members	3	1	0	1	2	.	12	3	59
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1	.	0	.	.	.	5	1	22
EU seats	24	20	4	0	3	1	28	11	224
Switzerland	1	1	0	5
Upcoming enlargement c.	1	.	.	0	.	.	1	0	9
Other European c. (excl. CIS)	.	.	2	3	.	.	0	1	15
Turkey	.	.	0	2	.	.	2	1	10
Russia (incl. USSR)	0	1	0	4	1	1	2	1	25
USA	7	.	.	27	.	3	.	6	119
Japan	1	.	.	1	.	.	.	0	7
Middle East	.	.	0	9	.	0	.	1	26
UN seats	2	.	0	5	1	.	.	1	23
NATO seats	.	.	.	3	.	.	.	0	7
Rest of the world	3	1	1	7	1	.	0	2	34
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	395	76	289	266	195	461	335		2017

[Based on full sample issues only, isfield1. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.] Empty cells reflect values <0.05.

Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

A cross issues comparison of the geographical coverage of the Italian press points at relevant differences. The coverage of the papers is strongly focussed on national based claims in topics concerning immigration (88%), pension (87%) and education (93%), while on issues referring to monetary policy, agriculture and European integration there are significantly more claims made in the seats of the EU. The Italian press takes a significant international perspective with claims on the topic of troop deployment, with a significant coverage of claims coming from individual foreign countries (i.e. 27% of the total claims in this fields are made in the USA, 9% in Middle East, 8% in Britain and so on).

Table 3.1: Region in own country where claim was made by issue field

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Rome (capital)	73	75	76	91	88	73	68	76	897
Other 4 largest cities	17	4	5	7	5	11	16	9	111
Other locations in Italy	10	21	19	2	7	16	17	15	169
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	135	48	254	44	170	430	96		1177

[Based on full sample issues only, isfield1, only the first claim per article, only claims made in Germany. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.] "Other 4 largest cities" are Milan, Naples, Turin and Palermo.

Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

If we consider the places where claims are made in Italy, it is worth noticing that the large majority of them come from the capital city (76%); with an additional 9% by claims made in

the four largest cities, and only 15% elsewhere). This clear concentration of the claim-making seems to largely reflect the institutional division of power between the centre and the sub-national level of governments in the Italian unitary state. However, some differences emerge in the degree of centralisation of the debate in the Italian public sphere depending on the policy domains. The political debate is most concentrated in Rome for those policy fields where the nation state still plays a central role (troop deployment with 91% of the claims made in the capital and pension with 88%, but this is not true for education), while it is more dispersed for issues characterized by multilevel governance: monetary policy, agriculture, the topic of European integration, but also partly immigration, between 24% and 33% of the claims are made out of Rome).

Actors (claim makers)

Table 4.1: Actors of claims by issue field

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
STATE AND PARTY ACTORS	75	55	84	90	59	47	87	72	1444
Politicians	1	.	3	2	2	1	5	2	43
Former states (wo) men	1	.	.	1	1	1	1	1	14
Government/executive	39	53	37	63	32	28	63	43	873
Legislative	3	1	12	7	5	8	10	7	144
Judiciary	0	.	5	.	2	1	0	1	24
Police and internal security agencies	.	.	4	.	.	0	.	1	11
Military	.	.	3	11	.	.	0	2	37
Central banks	28	.	0	.	1	.	1	6	118
Other state executive agencies	0	1	2	0	6	2	.	1	26
Political parties	3	.	19	6	11	7	6	8	154
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS	15	29	5	1	35	17	1	12	251
Unions and employees	1	1	1	1	25	15	.	6	127
Employers org.s and firms	5	4	3	0	8	2	0	3	53
Farmers and agricultural org.s	.	24	0	.	.	0	.	1	21
Economists and financial experts	10	.	1	.	3	0	1	3	50
MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS	4	.	1	8	2	2	6	4	76
OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS	5	16	9	1	4	33	5	12	239
Educational professionals /org.s	1	3	0	.	1	17	1	4	88
Other scientific/ research institutions	1	5	1	0	2	2	2	1	28
Churches and religious org.s/groups	.	.	2	0	1	2	2	1	23
Students, pupils, and their parents	.	.	0	.	.	11	0	3	52
Other professional org.s/groups	1	.	0	0	1	1	.	0	8
Consumer org.s/groups	2	4	1	12
Migrant org.s and groups	.	.	1	0	4
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	.	.	0	0	1
Solidarity and human rights org.s	.	.	1	.	.	.	0	0	4
Women's organisations and groups	0	.	0	2
Environmental org.s/groups	.	4	0	3
Other civil society org.s and groups	1	.	2	.	.	1	0	1	14
GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPECIFIED	.	.	1	.	.	0	1	0	7
Whole politics	.	.	0	.	.	.	0	0	2
The general public	.	.	0	.	.	0	0	0	4
Unknown/unspecified actors	0	.	1
Total (N)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	2017
	395	76	289	266	195	461	335		

[Based on full sample issues only, act1s and isfield1. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ]. Empty cells reflect values <0.05. *Issue fields* are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

An important criterion for the analysis of the public debates and mobilisation is the extent to which different types of collective actors participate to them. At first sight, the data on the claimant indicate a strong predominance of state and party actors that account for 72% of all claims, while about one forth of actors consist of institutionalised interest and professional groups (12%) and other civil society organisations (12%). The direct presence of the media as actors in the public sphere is low (4%). Among state actors the government and executive actors are the most prominent ones (with a share of 43% of claims), followed by an additional 6-8% of claims made by the legislative, the political parties and the central banks.

However, important differences emerge in the relative role of actors across policy domains. In the domains of troop deployment, immigration and EU integration state actors nearly monopolise the debate (with a share of claims from 84-90%), with a very low presence of civil society actors as well as economic interest groups. On monetary policy state actors play a still prominent role (75% of the claims) but together with institutionalised interest and professional economic groups (above all economists and financial specialists, who cover 10% of the total of claims of the category). The range of actors involved in agriculture, education, and pension is more differentiated, with a significant presence of civil society organisations in agriculture and education (respectively 33% and 16% of claims) and of interest groups in all three areas (respectively 29%, 17% and 35% of claims). More in detail, the interest groups are mainly constituted by farmers and agricultural organisations (24%) on agriculture and by unions and employees (25% and 15%) on pension and education. In term of Europeanisation, the data indicate that, within the Italian political system, the topics of Europe, as well as those concerning monetary policy, are strongly debated within the institutional arena, while the discussion on pension, education and also on the already well “Europeanised” domain of agriculture is more pluralistic, with a wider range of actors involved in it.

Table 4.2: Actor type by issue field

	In % within issue field								Total In % (N)
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I		
Unorganised collectivity	3	4	2	0	1	5	2	3	51
Named repr. of unorg. collective	1	1	0	.	1	0	1	1	16
Organisation or institution	35	49	29	38	38	40	21	34	690
Anonymous spokesperson(s)	3	3	4	6	1	3	3	3	64
Named spokesperson(s)	58	43	65	56	59	52	73	59	1196
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Total (N)	395	76	289	266	195	461	335		2017

[Based on full sample issues only, isfield1 Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]
Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

Measuring which type of actors are most present in the media, it is worth noticing the prominent role played by named spokespersons and organisations or institutions, who account for almost two third of all claims., while the “unorganised collectivity” covers the remaining one third and “anonymous spokespersons” are rarely present. This findings lead to some interesting reflections concerning the high level of “personalisation” of the debate on the political issues and the way in which the debate and the mobilisation on these topics emerge

and, in particular, how they are covered by the media. Concerning the latter point, two possible interpretations are at stake: firstly, that in the Italian political system the political debate and contestation is mainly carry out by organised actors (either institutions and social actors), secondly, that even when unorganised actors actually participate to the public political debate by some form of physical or verbal action, these actors are not able to reach the public sphere. It is very likely that many attempts at making public claims never reach the columns of the news media because the fail to pass the media's selection filters.

Table 4.3: Twenty-five most often mentioned spokespersons

Named spokesperson	Number of claims (N)	In % of all claims
Prodi, Romano	46	2.3
Ciampi, Carlo Azeglio	24	1.2
De Mauro, Tullio	22	1.1
Duisenberg, Wim	21	1
Berlusconi, Silvio	20	1
Chirac, Jacques	18	0.9
Amato, Giuliano	17	0.8
Moratti, Letizia	16	0.8
Bossi, Umberto	16	0.8
Schroder, Gerhard	13	0.6
Dini, Lamberto	12	0.6
Solbes, Pedro	11	0.5
Tremonti, Giulio	11	0.5
Fini, Gianfranco	11	0.5
Cofferati, Sergio	11	0.5
Treu, Tiziano	10	0.5
Buttiglione, Rocco	9	0.4
Bush, George sr.	9	0.4
Berlinguer, Luigi	9	0.4
Maroni, Roberto	9	0.4
Bush, George Jr	8	0.4
Kohl, Helmut	8	0.4
Panini, Enrico	8	0.4
D'Alema, Massimo	7	0.3
Aznar, José Maria	7	0.3
Bianco, Enzo	7	0.3
Hussein, Saddam	7	0.3
<i>608 other named spokespersons</i>	<i>1218</i>	<i>42.8</i>
<i>Anonymous spokespersons or organisations</i>	<i>799</i>	<i>39.6</i>
Total	2017	100.0

[Based on full sample issues only, actname1. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

The table lists the 27 most often mentioned spokespersons because several persons appeared equally often.

If we look at which individual spokespersons is more prominent in the media, it is not surprising to find the head of the European Commission *Romano Prodi*, who accounts for 2.3% of all claims, at the top rank. The next four prominent claim-makers are: *Ciampi*, the present head of the State, *De Mauro*, who was Italian minister for education under the centre-left government of Amato from April 2000 to May 2001, and who, according to the data, played a central role in the debate concerning education in that period, the Dutch ECB president *Wim Duisenberg*, and finally the present head of the Italian government, *Berlusconi*. On overall, when looking at the whole group of the top 27 most prominent persons in the Italian press, national spokespersons play the most important role: 15 national politicians plus

the former national secretary of the most important Italian labour Union (CGIL), *Sergio Cofferati*.

The remaining most prominent persons are the heads of the state or the government of important EU member's countries (France, Germany and Spain) as well as USA and Iraq (the Iraq sovereign's prominence being mainly due to the past and present conflict against Iraq). Three important EU representatives constitute an additional group of prominent spokespersons: the Italian Commission president *Romano Prodi*, the ECB president *Duisenberg*, and the Spanish EU Commissioner for economic and monetary affairs *Pedro Solbes*. All mentioned persons are politicians.

The analysed Italian newspapers seem to pay a considerable attention to individual representatives of the EU as well as to foreign politicians: there is however a large issue variation. The four top most prominent claim-makers in monetary policy are: the ECB president *Duisenberg* (5.3% of all claims in the field), the President of EU Commission *Prodi* (2.8%), the EU Commissioner for economic and monetary affairs *Solbes* (2.5%) and the Italian minister for finances *Tremonti* (2%). In agriculture the four most prominent actors are: the two Italian ministers of agriculture and health (*Pecoraro Scanio* and *Veronesi* both with 6.6% of all claims in the field), the EU Commissioner for health and consumer protection *Byrne* and the French head of the state *Chirac* (both with 3.9% of claims). In immigration, pension and education the four most mentioned spokespersons are all Italian politicians and ministers: in the first, the two leaders of parties *Lega* and *Forza Italia*, *Bossi* (2.8%) and *Berlusconi* (2.4%), and the two Italian ministers for the interior *Bianco* (2.4%), and *Mantovano* (2.1%); in the second, the Union leader *Cofferati* (5.1%), the two Italian labour ministers *Treu* (4.1%), and *Maroni* (2.1%) and the minister for finances *Visco* (2.1%); in the third, the three ministers for education *De Mauro* (4.3%), *Moratti* (3.5%), and *Berlinguer* (1.7%), and the leader of Union CGIL-school *Panini* (1.7%). In troop deployment, on the contrary, we find four politicians from foreign countries: *Bush Sr.* (3%) and *Jr.* (2.6%), *Saddam Hussein* (2.6%) and again *Chirac* (1.9%). Finally on the topic of European integration, we find *Prodi* (7.8%), *Chirac*, *Ciampi* (both 3%), and the German head of government *Schroder* (2.1%).

Table 4.4: Recoded actor scope by broad actor categories

	In % within recoded first actor scope					Total	
	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society actors	General/unknown/unspecified	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	100	100	12
Other supranational	86	4	.	10	.	100	50
EU	96	2	2	1	0	100	273
Other Eur. supranational	75	25	.	.	.	100	4
Multilateral	67	5	.	24	5	100	21
Bilateral	93	7	.	.	.	100	27
Germany	85	11	1	3	.	100	91
France	83	6	3	8	.	100	63
UK	66	7	22	5	.	100	41
Italy	60	18	4	18	0	100	1146
Spain	85	8	8	.	.	100	13
Netherlands	75	.	.	25	.	100	4
Other pre-1995 EU-MS	84	5	.	5	5	100	19
Austria, Finland, Sweden	94	.	.	6	.	100	18
Switzerland	100	100	1
Upcoming enlargement c.	90	10	.	.	.	100	10
Other Eur. Countries (excl CIS)	100	100	13
Turkey	79	.	7	7	7	100	14
Russia	82	.	4	15	.	100	27
USA	78	11	6	5	1	100	111
Japan	83	17	.	.	.	100	6
Middle East	89	.	7	4	.	100	27
Rest of the world	81	.	8	12	.	100	26
Total	72	12	4	12	0	100	
(N)	1444	251	76	239	7		2017

[Based on full sample issues only, ACTSCNW1 by ACT1SS. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.] Empty cells reflect values <0.05.

When looking at which types of actors are making a claim in the public sphere, it is worth noticing that among the European actors, state and party actors account for the vast proportion of instances (96% of European claims, 75% other European supranational). We find very little evidence for the visibility of a transnational European civil society (2%), and when present, actors of civil society represent more often institutionalised interest and professional groups than public interest associations and NGOs (see the share of 25% of “other European supranational” economic interest groups). Surprisingly non-EU supranational civil society actors with a proportion of 14% of claims (4% made by economic interest groups and 10 % by other civil society organisations), as well as forms of transnational linkages among civil society actors’ through multilateral contacts (24%) are a bit more present than EU level non-institutional actors. In term of horizontal Europeanisation, even when we look at the presence on the Italian political debate of national actors from EU member countries, the role of state and party actors is still prominent with a share of about 80%-90% of all claims, except for the case of British actors who are more differentiated and with a significant role of the media actors (22%), and for Dutch actors, who are characterised with a high presence of claim made by civil society organisations (25%).

When looking at the scope of the claimant per policy field and year, we can notice that, although the general debate on our seven topics is dominated mainly by national actors¹² (a bit

¹² Subnational actors as regional and local actors are included in the “national” category.

less than two third of all claims), Europeanisation is clearly visible in the significant share of claims made by genuine European actors (14%), as well as by national actors from other EU member countries¹³ (13%). In a cross time perspective, it is worth noticing that European actors are increasingly present in media reporting (from the share of 6% of claims in 1990 to 17% in 2002), as, but to a lesser extent, own national actors (from 45% of claims in the year 1990 to 56% in 2002). Claims made by actors from other EU member countries remain nearly constant (around a share of 13-14%) from 1990 to 2002 (with a peak of 17% in 1995). Anyway, there is strong variation in the role of different types of claim-makers across the seven policy fields.

Table 4.5a-g: Actor scope by year, separate for each policy field

A	Monetary politics				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Other supranational	5	8	8	4	6	25
EU	12	8	33	42	30	118
Multilateral	2	3	1	.	1	4
Bilateral	5	1	1	.	1	4
Germany	5	19	8	11	11	43
France	5	10	.	6	5	18
UK	.	6	2	1	2	8
Italy	51	32	34	25	32	125
Spain	.	.	.	2	1	3
Netherlands	.	.	.	1	0	1
Other pre-1995 EU-members	.	1	.	1	1	3
Austria, Finland, Sweden	.	1	.	1	1	2
Upcoming enlargement countries	.	.	2	.	1	2
Russia	.	.	1	.	.	1
USA	12	8	8	3	7	27
Japan	2	.	2	.	1	4
Rest of the world	.	1	2	3	2	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	41	72	131	151		395

European actors are clearly more important in the two fields where the EU has formal competencies, agriculture and monetary politics, where they account for 20-30% of all claim-makers. Nevertheless, when looking in a cross time perspective, European actors are increasingly present in media reporting on monetary policy, while declining on agriculture (where however we have a small number of cases).

On agricultural issues, Italian actors are the dominant speakers, responsible for almost two thirds of claims, while in topics concerning monetary policy their weight is very similar to that of European actors (32% of claims). Furthermore, the presence of Italian actors decreases on monetary policy, while on agriculture their share remains nearly constant, with the exception of the peak in 2000, when they gained in importance, making more than two third of all claims in this area. Also the involvement of national actors from other EU member states is significant (22% in monetary politics and 13% in agriculture) and reaches a peak in 2000 for agriculture (particularly present claims made by French and British actors) and in the

¹³ For the following tables, when we talk about the “scope” of the actor (either as claimant, addressee and as object) and scope of the issue, the terms *European* and *EU countries* include both the 15 current members and the 12 countries future members states, for which the negotiations have been concluded or opened.

year 1995 on monetary policy (particularly present claims made by German, French and British actors). In monetary politics, we also find a significant share (10%) of claims that were made by actors from non-European countries, especially the USA.

b	Agriculture				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
EU	.	100	15	30	20	15
Multilateral	.	.	4	5	4	3
France	.	.	13	.	9	7
UK	.	.	4	.	3	2
Italy	50	.	64	55	60	46
Upcoming enlargement countries	.	.	.	5	1	1
Rest of the world	50	.	.	5	3	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	2	1	53	20		76

c	Immigration				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	.	.	3	1	1	3
Other supranational	.	.	1	1	1	2
EU	.	3	6	2	3	9
Multilateral	6	.	1	3	2	7
Bilateral	.	.	4	2	2	6
Germany	17	.	1	1	2	6
UK	.	.	.	2	1	3
Italy	50	94	79	86	83	239
Spain	.	.	1	.	0	1
Netherlands	.	.	.	1	0	1
Other pre-1995 EU-members	11	.	.	.	1	2
Austria, Finland, Sweden	.	.	1	.	0	1
Other Eur. Countries (excl CIS)	6	3	3	.	1	4
Turkey	.	.	.	1	0	1
Middle East	6	.	.	.	0	1
Rest of the world	6	.	.	1	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	18	32	81	158		289

d	Troops deployment				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	.	4	28	.	3	9
Other supranational	8	9	.	5	6	16
EU	1	.	.	2	1	3
Multilateral	.	2	.	3	2	4
Bilateral	1	.	4	1	1	3
Germany	3	13	.	1	4	10
France	2	9	.	6	5	12
UK	8	.	8	9	7	19
Italy	9	16	8	27	17	46
Spain	.	.	.	4	2	4
Netherlands	1	.	.	.	0	1
Other pre-1995 EU-members	1	.	.	.	0	1
Upcoming enlargement countries	1	.	.	.	0	1
Other Eur. countries (excl CIS)	.	16	4	.	3	8
Turkey	2	2	.	2	2	5
Russia	7	11	.	5	6	16
USA	28	16	16	31	26	69
Japan	2	.	.	.	1	2
Middle East	16	.	24	4	9	24
Rest of the world	8	2	8	3	5	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	87	45	25	109		266

More surprisingly, European actors neither play a significant role as claim-makers on immigration and troops deployment that are policy domains characterised by some degree of multilevel governance. Indeed, the distribution of actors is very similar in the immigration field as in education and retirement policies. As many as 83% of claim-makers on immigration are national Italian actors, and the remaining part is mainly constituted by claims made by national actors from other countries: actors from EU countries (4%) and non-EU countries (3%). Beside, multilateral and bilateral statements play a significant role in the debate on this topic (4%).

In term of Europeanisation it is worth noticing that European-level actors, as well as other supranational actors, play a very modest role in public claim-making on immigration.

The distribution of claim-makers in the field of troop deployment shows a very different picture. Italian actors play a quite marginal role in this field comparing to other fields, and account only for 17% of all claims, even if they gained in importance in 2002 (27% of claims). Furthermore, European actors have no visibility at all in this field (with only 1% of all claims), while in term of Europeanisation, we can only notice the role played by actors from other members countries that are present with a share of 16% of all claims. In contrast, actors from non-EU countries (most importantly the USA) account for more than half of all claim-makers (52%). Supranational actors, beyond the EU, have a lower than expect presence (only 9% of all claims), with the exception of 2000 (28%).

e	Pensions				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Other supranational	.	2	.	7	2	4
EU	.	.	6	3	3	5
Bilateral	.	.	2	.	1	1
Germany	.	.	8	7	4	7
France	.	4	2	3	3	5
UK	.	.	2	.	1	1
Italy	77	94	82	80	86	168
Other pre-1995 EU-members	18	.	.	.	2	3
Russia	6	.	.	.	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	17	83	65	30		195

Not surprisingly, the two policy fields where the competencies of national institutions are strongest, education and pension, are correspondingly strongly dominated by Italian actors, who account for 94% of all claims on education, and 86% on pensions and retirement. In term of Europeanisation, on pension issues, it is interesting to notice that the other actors that – at a great distance – receive some level of visibility in the Italian media are more national actors from EU member states (10%) than genuine European actors (3%). In the area of education, claims by EU-level actors play no role, a bit more those claims made by are national actors from other countries, but non-EU countries predominate over those by EU member states. Additionally, in a cross time perspective, the presence of national claim makers tend to increased in both areas.

f	Education				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
EU	.	.	1	.	0	2
Germany	.	2	.	1	0	2
France	4	.	1	1	1	5
Italy	85	98	94	97	94	432
Spain	.	.	1	.	0	2
Russia	6	.	.	.	1	4
USA	6	.	3	2	3	13
Middle East	.	.	1	.	0	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	73	44	201	143		461

g	European integration				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Other supranational	.	.	1	1	1	3
EU	20	24	38	40	36	121
Other European supranational	6	.	1	.	1	4
Multilateral	3	.	1	.	1	3
Bilateral	14	18	2	2	4	13
Germany	6	29	6	5	7	23
France	6	18	4	3	5	16
UK	6	.	2	3	2	8
Italy	26	.	29	28	27	90
Spain	.	.	1	1	1	3
Netherlands	.	.	1	.	0	1
Other pre-1995 EU-members	3	.	3	3	3	10
Austria, Finland, Sweden	.	.	8	1	5	15
Switzerland	.	6	.	.	0	1
Upcoming enlargement countries	6	6	.	3	2	6
Other Eur. countries (excl CIS)	3	.	.	.	0	1
Turkey	.	.	.	7	2	8
Russia	.	.	1	3	2	5
USA	3	.	1	.	1	2
Middle East	.	.	1	.	0	1
Rest of the world	.	.	1	.	0	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	35	17	167	116		335

Tables 4.a-g: Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.

Not surprisingly, European actors are most prominent in media reporting on the topics concerning European integration (37% of all claims). Even actors from the other EU member countries, who account for 24% of all claims, play a significant role in this field. Further, their presence is increasing across the year, while other EU countries have a nearly constant, if not decreasing, presence, except for the peak of claims made by German (29%) and French (18%) actors in 1995. Italian claims-makers are on the topic of European integration present with an almost constant level of about 28% of all claims.

Action forms

Table 5.1a: Forms of action by issue field

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Political decision	18	22	19	15	18	17	10	16	318
Executive action	1	5	5	17	2	2	2	4	82
Judicial action	.	1	2	.	1	2	.	1	19
Non-specified statement	46	51	43	39	53	44	39	44	852
Other verbal statement	27	12	20	20	20	17	31	22	429
Meeting	7	4	8	9	5	5	18	8	163
Direct-democratic action	.	.	0	.	.	1	0	0	7
Protest action	2	4	3	.	2	10	1	4	71
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	378	76	286	246	191	450	314		1941

[Based on full sample issues only, excluding claims made by media (ACT1S=160), FORMS by ISFIELD1. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]
Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

As already said claim-making consists of any form of physical or verbal action, regardless of the form this expression takes (statement, violent action, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc.). Even “political decisions” and “policy implementation” are defined as special forms of claim-making, namely ones that have direct effects on the objects of the claim. In our research “verbal statement” has been operationalised as involving press conference/release, interview, public speech, (public) letter, newspaper article, other publication (book, research report, leaflet, etc.), presentation of survey/poll result and publicity campaign (inclusive advertising) and non-specified statement. “Meetings” refer to conferences, congresses etc. that take place inside (state-political meeting, party convention/congress, parliamentary session/debate, election campaign meeting); “direct democratic action” to launching a referendum, collecting signatures for a referendum, vote on a referendum; “protest” as involving petitioning (signature collection, letter campaign), demonstrative protests (public assembly, legal and non-violent march/demonstration, vigil), confrontational protests (illegal and non-violent demonstration, boycott, strike, self-mutilation-hunger strike, suicide, blockade, occupation, disturbance of meetings, symbolic confrontation) and violent protests (threats, symbolic violence, limited destruction of property, sabotage, violent demonstrations, arson or bomb attacks and severe destruction of property, arson or bomb attacks against people, physical violence against people).

The large majority of claims (more than two third) are forms of verbal actions (above all non-specified statements, 44% of all claims). The remaining part is constituted mainly by executive and political decisions (21% of all claims), and secondly by meetings (8%). In general, protest has been not used frequently (but with a relatively high 10% in the area of education). As far as issues are concerned, executive and political decisions are present mainly in troop deployment (32% of all claims in the topic), but also in agriculture (28%) and immigration (26%). Monetary policy and pensions are characterized by the large presence of verbal actions (in both fields 73% of all claims). The topic concerning the European integration is the most various, showing an articulated range of form of actions: only 12% of all claims in it are executive and political decisions, 70% are verbal actions, 18% meetings, congress and assemblies and 5% protests (considering direct-democratic actions as forms of protest). Protest is mainly used in education (11% of all claims of the topic).

Table 5.1b: Forms of action by broad actor categories

	In % within actor category				Total	
	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Other civil society actors	General/unknown/unspecified	In %	(N)
Political decision	21	3	3	.	16	318
Executive action	5	0	2	.	4	82
Judicial action	1	1	3	.	1	19
Non-specified statement	42	63	34	29	44	852
Other verbal statement	20	25	31	.	22	429
Meeting	10	3	5	14	8	163
Direct-democratic action	0	1	.	43	0	7
Protest action	0	5	22	14	4	71
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	1444	251	239	7		1941

[Based on full sample issues only, excluding claims made by media (ACT1S=160), FORMS by ACT1SS. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

Strategies of action in the public sphere vary a lot according to the actors of the claim-making. Not surprisingly for instance protest is mainly used by civil society actors, and among them more by associations and NGOs (22%) or the general unorganised public (14%) than by economic interest groups (5%). The latter recur mainly to discursive claims as non-specified statements and other verbal statements (88% of their claims). In general, in the period examined here, it is evident that this type of verbal claim emerges as the form of action most used by any type of actor, even by those, like for instance social movements, that traditionally rely upon protest.

Table 5.1c: Forms of action by actor scope

	In % within actor scope								Total	
	Political decision	Executive action	Judicial action	Non-specified statement	Other verbal statement	Meeting	Direct-democratic action	Protest action	In %	(N)
Supranat.: United Nations	.	25	.	58	8	8	.	.	100	12
Other supranational	14	8	.	28	28	16	.	6	100	50
European Union	15	2	0	42	23	16	.	1	100	269
Other Eur. supranational	.	.	.	25	.	75	.	.	100	4
Multilateral	33	5	5	19	.	24	.	14	100	21
Bilateral	37	.	.	15	7	41	.	.	100	27
National	16	4	1	47	23	6	0	3	100	1383
Regional	24	4	2	38	22	4	2	6	100	55
Local	12	5	5	30	22	7	.	20	100	120
Total	16	4	1	44	22	8	0	4	100	
(N)	318	82	19	852	429	163	7	71		1941

[Based on full sample issues only, excluding claims made by media (ACT1S=160), ACTSCOP1 by FORMS. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

Sub-national actors (both regional and local) are those with the most articulated repertoire of action. They recur to executive and political decisions (respectively for 22% and 30% of their total claims), but also frequently to verbal actions (respectively 52% and 60%), as well as engaging in meetings and assemblies (7% and 4%) and organizing protest (20% and 8%).

Local and regional actors seem able to combine different action forms according to the different levels of decision-making they address (and consequently according to the changes in the political opportunity structure that characterize such different levels of government). On the contrary, national actors, but also supranational and European actors¹⁴ recur mainly to discursive claims (respectively in 70%, 56-66% and 65% of their total claims). Bilateral and multilateral actors appear in the Italian public sphere mainly with executive and political decisions (respectively for 37% and 43% of their total claims). When supranational and European actors make claims, also meeting is frequently used (they engage in this type of action respectively in 8-16% and 16% of their total claims).

Addressees

Table 6.1: Presence of addressee by issue field

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
No indirect object	50	34	37	45	28	26	33	36	732
Addressee	38	58	54	49	63	60	56	53	1066
Supported actor	6	7	4	5	3	7	6	5	107
Opponent	6	1	6	2	6	8	5	6	112
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	395	76	289	266	195	461	335		2017

[Based on full sample issues only, IOPRES by ISFIELD1. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]
Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

Looking at the territorial scope of the actors who intervene in the debate is not the only way to analyse the interplay between national and European actors in the construction of the public sphere. Another indicator of Europeanisation, although of a different type, is the scope of the organisational and institutional addresses at which demands were addressed in our six policy fields.

Overall, in the large majority (more than two third) of claims, actors that are held responsible by the claimants for implementing their demands or at whom the claims are directly addressed in the form of a call or appeal to do or leave something, are present. More than half of the claims have such a (narrowly defined) addressee (53%), while a much smaller portion (5-6%) directed to actors that we can more correctly define as “opponents/criticised”, namely actors who are not directly held responsible for implementing the claim, but who are seen as advocating a position contrary to that of the claimant, or “support actors”, whom are seen as contributing to the claim's realisation or advocating a position congruent with that of the claimant.

¹⁴ In supranational actors, we include United Nations and other supranational institutions is commented, while for European actors, due to the low numbers of cases for other European supranational actors, only the percentage referring to pure European actors is analysed.

Table 6.2a: Addressees by issue field (IOS and IOSS by ISFIELD1)

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
STATE AND PARTY ACTORS	92	86	97	98	86	75	93	88	1131
Politicians	2	2	2	1	1	1	4	2	20
Former states (wo) men	1	.	1	0	2
Government/executive	64	78	63	80	57	57	73	65	836
Legislative	4	2	12	7	18	11	11	10	126
Judiciary	.	4	5	1	1	3	.	2	23
Police /internal security agencies	.	.	3	.	.	1	.	1	7
Military	.	.	.	7	.	1	.	1	12
Central banks	18	.	.	.	1	.	.	3	36
Social security executive org.s	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Other state executive agencies	2	.	1	.	4	1	.	1	14
Political parties	2	.	12	3	5	2	5	4	55
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS	6	8	.	.	11	5	1	4	49
Unions and employees	2	.	.	.	9	3	.	2	27
Employers org.s and firms	1	4	.	.	2	1	.	1	11
Farmers and agricultural org.s	.	4	0	2
Economists and financial experts	3	0	1	1	9
MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS	1	.	1	1	.	.	3	1	10
OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS	2	6	2	1	2	21	2	7	90
Churches &religious org.s/groups	.	.	1	.	.	1	0	0	5
Educational professionals / org.s	15	.	4	50
Other scientific/ research inst.	.	2	.	.	.	1	0	1	5
Students, pupils, parents	.	2	.	.	.	4	0	1	17
Other professional org.s /groups	1	0	.	0	2
Consumer organisations /groups	2	2	0	4
Migrant org.s and groups	.	.	1	1	2
Pro-/anti-Europ. Campaign org.s
Solidarity and human rights org.s
Welfare organisations
Org.s and groups of the elderly	1	.	.	0	2
Women's org.s /groups
Terrorist groups
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0	0	.	.
Other civil society org.s/groups	1	.	.	1	0	.	.	0	2
GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPEC.	1	.	2	4	.
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	189	50	183	146	140	343	225		1285

[Based on full sample issues only, IOS and IOSS by ISFIELD1. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]
Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

What is the type of addressee at whom demands are addressed in different policy fields? In the Italian public sphere, a large majority of demands are addressed to institutional actors. This is true in particular on troop deployment (98% of all claims), immigration (97%), European integration (93%) and monetary politics (92%). More articulated is the range of addressed actors in agriculture, pension and education: indeed, together with institutional actors, still predominant, in agriculture and pension issues economic interest groups play an important role as well (8% in agriculture, 11% in pension), in education, organisations from civil society (21%) are very present. Looking at the subcategories of institutional actors addressed by claim-making, it is worth noticing that the executive actors are prominent in

topics concerning troop deployment and agriculture (respectively 80% and 78% of the claims). Not surprisingly in monetary policy we found a significant role of central banks (18% of claims), while parliaments have a more important role mainly on pension (18%), but also, at a lesser extent, on immigration, education, as well as on the topic concerning Europe (about 11-12%). Political parties are not often addressees of claim-making (a share about of 2-5%), except on immigration, where they are mentioned in 12% of the cases.

Table 6.2b: Addressees by year

	In % within year				In %	Total (N)
	1990	1995	2000	2002		
STATE AND PARTY ACTORS	85	90	86	91	88	1131
Politicians	1	1	2	2	2	20
Former states (wo) men	.	.	.	0	0	2
Government/executive	69	63	64	65	65	836
Legislative	5	12	7	14	10	126
Judiciary	3	2	3	1	2	23
Police /internal security agencies	1	1	0	1	1	7
Military	3	2	0	1	1	12
Central banks	1	3	6	1	3	36
Other state executive agencies	.	2	0	2	1	14
Political parties	3	5	4	5	4	55
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS	4	4	6	2	4	49
Unions and employees	2	3	3	0	2	27
Employers org.s and firms	1	.	2	0	1	11
Farmers and agricultural org.s	.	.	0	.	0	2
Economists and financial experts	1	1	0	1	1	9
MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS	1	1	1	1	1	10
OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS	11	6	7	6	7	90
Churches &religious org.s/groups	1	.	0	0	0	5
Educational professionals / org.s	5	4	4	3	4	50
Other scientific/ research inst.	.	.	1	0	0	5
Students, pupils, parents	5	1	1	0	1	17
Other professional org.s /groups	.	1	.	0	0	2
Consumer organisations /groups	.	.	.	1	0	4
Migrant org.s and groups	.	.	.	0	0	2
Pro-/anti-Europ. Campaign org.s
Solidarity and human rights org.s
Welfare organisations
Org.s and groups of the elderly	.	1	0	.	0	2
Women's org.s /groups
Terrorist groups
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	.	.	0	.	0	.
Other civil society org.s/groups	.	.	0	0	0	2
GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPEC.	.	.	.	0	1	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	161	190	466	468		1285

[Based on full sample issues only, IOS and IOSS by CYEAR. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

In a cross time perspective, executive actors are constantly addressed as targets of claim-making. The legislative appear to increase its importance as addressee of demands, even if not linearly from 1990 (5% of all claims) to 2002 (14%). The central banks are targeted above all in 2000 (6%). Among economic interest groups, unions and employees are targeted increasingly from 1990 to 2000, while in 2002 they are virtually not called at all to implement

demands. Employers' organisations and firms are slightly increasing their (although modest) presence as addressees from 1990 to 2000 (but they are absent in 1995), and then they disappear in 2002. Organisations from civil society are less considered as addressee in the recent years comparing to the past.

Table 6.3a: Mean evaluation by category of addressees

	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
STATE AND PARTY ACTORS	-0.31	1131	0.7
Politicians	-0.60	20	0.7
Former states (wo) men	0.00	2	1.4
Government/executive	-0.33	836	0.7
Legislative	-0.14	126	0.6
Judiciary	-0.13	23	0.5
Police and internal security agencies	-0.14	7	0.7
Military	-0.33	12	0.7
Central banks	-0.31	36	0.9
Other state executive agencies	-0.36	14	0.7
Political parties	-0.42	55	0.8
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS	-0.33	49	0.8
Unions and employees	-0.33	27	0.6
Employers organisations and firms	-0.64	11	0.8
Farmers and agricultural organisations	0.00	2	1.4
Economists and financial experts	0.00	9	1.0
MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS	-0.60	10	0.8
OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS	-0.03	90	0.8
Churches and religious organisations and groups	0.20	5	1.1
Educational professionals and organisations'	-0.06	50	0.8
Other scientific and research professionals and institutions	-0.40	50	0.9
Students, pupils, and their parents	-0.06	9	0.9
Other professional organisations and groups	0.00	5	0.0
Consumer organisations and groups	0.25	17	1.0
Migrant organisations and groups	1.00	2	0.0
Pro- and anti-European campaign organisations and groups	.	.	.
Solidarity and human rights organisations	.	.	.
Welfare organisations	.	.	.
Organisations and groups of the elderly	0.50	2	0.7
Women's organisations and groups	.	.	.
Terrorist groups	.	.	.
Extreme rights and racist groups.	-1.00	1	.
Other civil society organisations and groups	-0.50	2	0.7
GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPECIFIED	-0.40	5	0.5
TOTAL	-0.30	1285	0.7
[Based on full sample issues only, means of IOEVAL for each category of IOS and IOSS. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]			

After looking at the addressees, it is interesting to see how the claims makers evaluate them. Indeed, calls and appeals toward specific targets inside the public sphere may be made in a neutral sense, when the actors refer to targets without a precise evaluation. Viceversa, claims can be made or be combined with expressions of criticism or support for the actors they target. These evaluations of addressees range from -1 for negative judgments, to +1 for positive judgements, and are calculated as an average for an aggregated addressed actor who include also opponent and supported actors.

In the Italian public debate, claim-makers are likely to evaluate state and party actors and interest groups in a similar quite negative way, while media are evaluated more negatively than all the other actors. Finally, civil society actors are evaluated less negatively compared to all the other categories of actors targeted by the claim-making. Among institutional actor, it is worth noticing nevertheless that politicians and party actors are evaluated more negatively than the other actors, and that legislative, judiciary and police, internal security agencies are evaluated less negatively than all mentioned others. Among economic interest groups, employer's organisations and firms receive more criticism than unions. Among civil society organisations, churches and religious organisations and groups, consumers, organisations of elderly and in particular migrants are positively evaluated. Only other scientific and research professionals and institutions, extreme rights and racists groups are evaluated as negatively as institutional actors. Even the category of "other civil society organisations", that in our data refers mainly to the recent "new global movement", is negatively evaluated in the Italian public claim-making.

Table 6.3b: Mean evaluation by broad addressee scope

	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
Supranational: UN	-0.06	16	0.4
Other supranational	-0.25	28	0.6
EU	-0.12	259	0.7
Other European supranational	0.33	3	0.6
Multilateral	-0.06	18	0.8
Bilateral	-0.17	6	1.0
Germany	-0.29	28	0.8
France	-0.19	36	0.9
UK	-0.54	13	0.8
Italy	-0.37	740	0.7
Spain	-0.50	6	0.8
Netherlands	-1.00	1	.
Other pre-1995 EU-members	-0.57	7	0.8
Austria, Finland, Sweden	-0.46	13	0.9
Upcoming enlargement countries	0.00	2	1.4
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	-0.13	15	0.9
Turkey	0.00	7	1.0
Russia	-0.63	8	0.5
USA	-0.27	52	0.8
Japan	-0.57	7	0.5
Middle East	-0.53	17	0.7
Rest of the world	0.00	3	1.0
Total	-0.30	1285	0.7

[Based on full sample issues only, means of IOEVAL by IOSCNW. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

Looking at the way in which addressees at different geographical level are evaluated by the claim-makers in the Italian public sphere can give us further information on the trajectories of Europeanisation in the country. In the Italian public sphere claims-makers are less likely to evaluate negatively European institutions and actors, when compared to national ones. Even supranational actors (especially actors related with the United Nations) are evaluated less negatively than Italian ones. Among the other EU member states to which demands are addressed, only France and Germany are more criticized than the Italian actors. Even when the claim-makers refer to non-EU countries, the evaluation is particularly negative (except for USA).

Table 6.4a: Addressee scope by issue field

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	1	.	1	10	.	.	.	1	16
Other supranational	5	.	2	10	.	.	0	2	28
EU	48	32	6	3	4	1	56	20	259
Other European supranational	1	0	3
Multilateral	2	2	3	3	.	1	1	1	18
Bilateral	.	.	2	1	.	.	0	1	6
Germany	6	.	1	3	4	.	2	2	28
France	5	8	.	1	2	2	6	3	36
UK	3	2	.	2	1	.	1	1	13
Italy	27	54	80	19	87	93	19	58	740
Spain	.	2	.	1	.	0	1	1	6
Netherlands	1	0	1
Other pre-1995 EU-members	1	.	1	.	2	.	0	1	7
Austria, Finland, Sweden	.	.	1	.	.	.	5	1	13
Upcoming enlargement countries	1	0	0	2
Other European countries ex CIS	.	.	2	6	.	.	1	1	15
Turkey	.	.	.	1	.	.	2	1	7
Russia	.	.	.	2	.	1	1	1	8
USA	1	.	1	25	.	3	1	4	52
Japan	2	.	.	2	.	.	.	1	7
Middle East	.	.	2	9	1	.	.	1	17
Rest of the world	1	.	.	1	.	.	.	0	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	189	50	183	146	140	343	225		1285

[Based on full sample issues only, IOSCNW by ISFIELD1. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]
Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

Here, a cross policy comparison points at relevant differences, with a strong presence of actors with an European scope as addressees of the claim-making on topics concerning the European integration (56% of all claims), monetary policy (48%), and also, even if to a lesser extent, agriculture (32%). As signal of the weakness of Europe in the immigration policy field we can notice a modest presence of European level actors as addressees of the claim-making (6%). Finally, in the policy domains that remain the preserve of nation-states, namely education and pension, virtually no claims are directed at the supranational EU level (1-4%), and a similar picture emerges in the policy field of troop deployment (3%). However, in term of Europeanisation, we can notice that on topics concerning pension and troop deployment

national actors play a certain role as target of the claims from EU countries (a range of 7-9%). A still predominant role as direct target of the claim-making is played by Italian actors in immigration (80%), pension (87%) and education (93%). Not surprisingly, supranational actors are present as addressees in the Italian public sphere, particularly on troop deployment (20% of all claims).

Table 6.4b: Addressee scope by year

	In % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	1	1	2	1	1	16
Other supranational	4	3	2	1	2	28
EU	6	10	26	24	20	259
Other European supranational	2	.	.	.	0	3
Multilateral	1	1	1	2	1	18
Bilateral	1	1	1	0	1	6
Germany	4	4	1	2	2	28
France	3	4	3	2	3	36
UK	1	1	1	1	1	13
Italy	50	70	55	58	58	740
Spain	.	.	0	1	1	6
Netherlands	.	.	.	0	0	1
Other pre-1995 EU-members	3	.	1	.	1	7
Austria, Finland, Sweden	.	.	3	.	1	13
Upcoming enlargement countries	.	.	0	0	0	2
Other European countries ex CIS	1	3	1	0	1	15
Turkey	1	1	.	1	1	7
Russia	3	1	0	0	1	8
USA	11	2	2	5	4	52
Japan	3	.	1	.	1	7
Middle East	8	.	0	1	1	17
Rest of the world	.	.	.	1	0	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	161	190	466	468		1285

[Based on full sample issues only, IOSCNW by CYEAR. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

In a cross time perspective, we can observe that the number of claims with a European target is increasing, while those directed to national Italian addressees oscillate across the years (with a peak in 1995), remaining at an almost constant level of about 50% of all claims from 1990 to 2002. National actors from other EU member states are slightly decreasing across the years: from 11% of claims in 1990 to 6% in 2002.

Table 6.4c: Addressee scope by broad addressee category

	In % within recoded first actor scope					Total	
	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society actors	General/unknown/unspecified	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	1	1	16
Other supranational	2	2	.	2	.	2	28
EU	22	6	30	1	60	20	259
Other Eur. supranational	0	0	3
Multilateral	1	2	.	4	.	1	18
Bilateral	1	1	6
Germany	2	2	.	1	.	2	28
France	3	6	.	1	.	3	36
UK	1	2	40	.	.	1	13
Italy	56	65	.	83	20	58	740
Spain	0	.	10	.	.	1	6
Netherlands	.	2	.	.	.	0	1
Other pre-1995 EU-MS	1	2	.	.	.	1	7
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1	.	.	.	20	1	13
Upcoming enlargement c.	0	0	2
Other European c. (excl. CIS)	1	1	15
Turkey	1	1	7
Russia	1	1	8
USA	4	8	10	6	.	4	52
Japan	1	2	.	.	.	1	7
Middle East	1	.	10	1	.	1	17
Rest of the world	0	0	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	1131	49	10	90	5		1285

[Based on full sample issues only, IOSCNW by IOSS. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

Among state and party actors, those to whom the demands are addressed are mainly national Italian actors (56% of all claims), but also pure European actors appear to be often point of reference for the claim-making (22%). Among the group of national actors from other countries, a balanced presence as target of the claim-making there is between the EU and non-EU countries (about 7-8%).

If few were the European civic-society actors as claim-makers, among addresses we found some more frequent mentions interest and professional groups, either European (6%), or, more often, coming from the other EU member states. The presence of European associations and NGOs remains very modest, also as reference of the claim-making, while, it is worth to notice the prominent role played by the European media (addressed in 30% of the EU claims).

Issues and aims

Table 7.1: Policy field by year

	In % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	15	25	18	21	20	395
Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control	1	0	7	3	4	76
Immigration: entry and exit	7	11	11	22	14	289
Troops deployment	32	15	4	15	13	266
Retirement and pension schemes	6	28	9	4	10	195
Education	27	15	28	20	23	461
European Integration	13	6	23	16	17	335
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	273	294	723	727		2017

[Based on full sample issues only, ISFIELD1 by CYEAR. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

The total number of claims found are not equally spread over the seven issues and clear trends cannot be observed except, to a certain extent, for immigration. There is no topic that can be considered as constantly prominent in the Italian debate across the years. In general, monetary policy and education have a significant level of importance (around 20% of the total numbers of claims we gathered); in the year 2002, they are overtaken by the topic of immigration that account for 22% of all claims in this year. In 2000, monetary policy is overcome by European integration (23%), in 1995 is the field of retirement and pension scheme that mainly attracts the attention to the Italian media (28%), while in 1990 a prominent role is played by issues concerning troop deployment.

Although agriculture (see table 7.2b below), as well as, monetary politics, is a policy field where the European political institutions have growing competences, and where consequently changes have occurred in term of policy governance in the recent years, this topic is strongly and constantly underrepresented in the Italian media, comparing to the other issues. Only in 2000 the debate on agriculture is present at a significant level (in this year, we gather 53 of the total 76 claims on agriculture we have found), and the debate is almost totally concentrated on the topic of BSE (72% of all claims in the field). This give the impression that the debate on some important elements of the policy governance (and above all the European dimension of that), like for instance the discussion on quotas for life stock, is strongly underrepresented in the Italian public sphere, while the attention is attracted only by the “emergency” of the animal diseases.

Tables 7.2a-g: Issues within policy fields by year, in % within year

A	Monetary politics				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
General Unspecific	2	8	3	2	4	14
Interest Rate Adjustments	12	33	23	7	18	69
EMU Convergence criteria and stability pact	2	33	3	50	26	104
EMS/ERM	17	4	.	.	3	10
Exchange rate intervention	24	6	20	5	12	47
Independence Central Banks	2	.	2	2	2	6
Eurozone-outsiders: rel. with pre-ins (ERM2) & CC	.	.	3	1	1	5
Common currency (ECU, EURO)	5	.	29	26	20	79
Dynamics of Euro campaigns	.	.	2	4	2	8
Other Specific	34	15	16	5	13	53
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	41	72	131	151		395

As far as monetary policy is concerned, there is a peak of claims in 1995 (25% of all claims), which can be explained by the discussions about the EMU convergence criteria. This latter sub-issue is predominant as compared with to the other sub-issues in 1995 (33%) and 2002, when it accounts for the half of all the claims of the year. In 1995 also the topic of interest rate adjustments was important (33% of claims), while in 2000 the topic of common currency (29%) appears prominent, only second to EMU convergence criteria in 2002 with a share of 26% of all claims. In the category including “other specific” topics about monetary policy (13% of all claims in the field), we find mainly topics relating to FMI (relation between FMI and national states, influence of FMI, reform of FMI etc.).

b	Agriculture				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Reform of the system of subsidies	.	.	.	35	9	7
Subsidies and enlargement of the European Union	.	.	2	15	5	4
Subsidies and international trade	.	.	4	.	3	2
BSE	.	.	85	50	72	55
Other diseases	50	.	8	.	7	5
Quotas for livestock and dairy production	.	.	2	.	1	1
Other Specific	50	100	.	.	3	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	2	1	53	20		76

c	Immigration				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
General evaluation or policy direction	.	28	25	10	16	45
Instit. framework, responsibilities, proced., costs	6	.	6	4	5	13
Entry and border controls	78	22	26	21	26	75
Expulsions/deportations	6	19	16	11	13	37
Migration programs and quotas	6	.	9	34	21	61
Role of third parties in preventing migration	6	.	.	5	3	9
Visa and consular policy	.	9	1	4	4	11
Actions relating to smuggling and illegal entries	.	22	17	11	13	38
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	18	32	81	158		289

d	Troops deployment				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
General unspecific reference to deployment of troops	5	31	.	1	7	19
d.o.t for mil. aggression on foreign sovereign territory	33	2	12	65	39	104
d.o.t for mil. invasion of foreign sovereign territory	18	7	16	6	11	30
d.o.t in covert aggr. operations Vs hostile regimes/groups	20	4	.	11	12	31
d.o.t for peace-keeping	3	51	60	15	21	57
d.o.t to rescue/protect civilians facing aggression	.	4	4	.	1	3
d.o.t for non-military humanitarian purposes	.	.	8	.	1	2
d.o.t in the context of military alliances	6	.	.	1	2	6
other specific reference to deployment of troops	15	.	.	1	5	14
Total (N)	100	100	100	100	100	266
	87	45	25	109		

Immigration and troop deployment are situated in the middle fields, occupying respectively a share of 14% and 13% of all claims. In a cross time perspective, immigration is constantly increasing, from 7% of all claims in 1990 to 11% in 1995 and 2000 to 22% in 2002. Claims on troop deployment reach a high peak in 1990, when they account for 32% of all claims of the year; they remain since then at a quite constant level of 15% until the recent 2002, except the decrease in 2000 (4%). In term of sub-issues, it is worth noticing that on the topic of immigration the debate was strongly concentrated on one single sub-issue in 1990: entry and border control, that nearly monopolise it with 78% of all claims. Then, across the years, the discussion becomes more and more articulated, referring also to general evaluation or policy direction (28% of claims) and to smuggling and illegal entries (22% in 1995 and 17% 2000). In addition to these two sub-issues, in 2002 also the sub-issue of migration programs and quotas appears relevant (34%).

As for troop deployment, troop deployment for military aggression on foreign sovereign territory is the main sub-issue in 1990 (33%) and 2002 (65%), while military actions relating to peace keeping are the main issues in 1995 (51%) and 2000 (60%). The significant 15% of claims in the year 1995 included in “other specific reference to deployment of troops” refers mainly to agreements between USA and URSS for the reduction of armaments in Europe.

E	Pensions				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
General	6	8	14	10	10	20
Demographic changes: ageing population	.	1	6	.	3	5
Retirement ages	18	6	3	3	6	11
Income levels in retirement, Poverty in retirement	18	15	26	20	20	38
State versus private pension schemes	6	.	9	3	4	8
State pension scheme	47	69	34	60	54	105
Private pension scheme	.	.	3	.	1	2
Other / Specific	.	.	1	.	1	1
Total (N)	100	100	100	100	100	195
	17	83	65	30		

Slightly minor attention attracted the issues we selected concerning retirement and pension, within which the main sub-issue under discussion in the various years, is state-pension scheme. The next prominent sub-issue in the debate is the topic concerning income levels in retirement/poverty scheme that, starting from 1995 increases its presence, stabilising at a quite constant level of 20%.

f	Education				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
General unspecified	16	.	4	24	24	54
Structural issues	3	2	8	11	11	35
Resource allocation and salaries	14	27	29	36	36	132
Private education	.	2	9	7	7	29
Administrative power allocation	31	7	8	3	3	46
Curriculum	21	21	13	11	11	65
Information and communication technologies	1	2	5	.	.	12
Scholarships and fees	1	11	2	.	.	10
Problems at school	4	2	6	4	4	21
Other specific issues	8	43	16	6	5	56
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	73	44	201	143		461

When considering together all the four years of study, education accounts for the largest share of claims (a bit less than a quarter). In particular it is really prominent in the debate of the year 2000 with a share of 28% of all claims. As for as the sub-issues, the topic referring to curriculum is quite important, even if slightly decreasing, across the years (from 21% of claims in 1990 to 18% in 1995 to about 10% in 2000 and 2002). Administrative power allocation is dominating the debate only in 1990 and then it disappears in the following years, while on the contrary resource allocation and salaries, of a reduced importance in 1990 (8% of claims), becomes more and more important starting from 1995, reaching a share of 36% in 2002.

g	European integration				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
General European integration, not specific	14	6	5	3	5	18
National vs. European Identity, shared values	.	.	16	3	9	30
Role of a specific country and balance of power in the EU	37	47	28	26	29	97
Relationship EU - nat.®. levels / future constitution	9	.	22	20	19	62
Institutional structure & relationship between EU instit.	6	12	9	3	7	23
Defining EU's core tasks/balance of different policy areas	.	.	1	3	2	5
Relationship between EU institutions and public	.	.	1	3	2	5
Enlargement	9	6	5	31	15	49
Budget: Financing the EU and spending EU funds	.	.	1	3	1	4
Other specific EU integration	.	.	2	.	1	4
Associational agreements/ treaties EU - non-EU countries	11	18	5	4	6	20
Personnel issues within EU/discussions about candidacies	.	.	5	3	4	13
Non-EU forms of European integration	3	6	1	.	1	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	35	17	167	116		335

[Tables 7.2a-g: Based on full sample issues only, ISSUE1S by CYEAR. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

The numbers of claims that refer to European integration decrease from 1990 (when they nevertheless already account for a significant 13% off all claims), to a share of 6% in 1995; they reach a peak in 2000 with a share of 23% of claims, decreasing again in 2002 (to 16%). As for the content of issues about European integration, it is worth noticing that, in Italy, when talking about Europe, the most prominent sub-issue in the various years, concerns the role of a specific country (Italy), or group of countries in the process of European integration, and the balance of power and coalitions among members states (29% of claims). The next prominent sub- issue across the years is represented by the topic of the relationship between EU and national /regional levels, and the future constitution, but in 2002, this sub-issue is overcome by the topic of enlargement, that strongly attracts the interest of the media (31% of all claims). Minor attention is paid to European institutions and their functioning. Claims included in the category “other specific EU integration” refer mainly to the relations between European Union and USA (i.e. on struggle to terrorism) and to the role of the EU in international affairs (i.e. in the conflict Israel-Palestinian).

Table 7.3a: Issue scope by policy field

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	1	.	1	14	.	.	.	2	41
Other supranational	7	.	1	27	.	.	0	5	104
EU	67	37	7	2	4	2	80	30	604
Other European supranational	1	1	.	.	1	.	20	4	72
Multilateral	2	9	9	26	.	0	.	5	108
Bilateral	2	13	9	29	.	0	.	6	122
Germany	1	.	2	0	4	0	.	1	20
France	2	8	.	.	3	1	.	1	21
UK	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	0	4
Italy	10	30	69	.	87	92	.	42	851
Spain	.	.	0	.	.	0	.	0	3
Other pre-1995 EU-members	0	.	0	.	2	.	.	0	5
Other European countries ex CIS	.	.	.	0	1
Russia	1	.	.	.	1	1	.	0	7
USA	6	.	.	1	.	3	.	2	38
Japan	1	0	3
Middle East	.	.	0	.	.	0	.	0	2
Rest of the world	2	1	1	1	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	395	76	289	266	195	461	335		2017

[Based on full sample issues only, ISSCNW by ISFIELD1. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]
Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

Another important indicator of the Europeanisation of the public sphere is issue scope, which refers to the geographical scope of the substantive content of the claim¹⁵. It is especially useful to investigate the “salience” of the integration process in the everyday life of citizens: the question is whether the nation-state still remains the primary focus for debates, discourses and collective identities, or, on the contrary, whether actors increasingly frame their claims within an European dimension.

There are however significant differences between the issue fields. While monetary and agriculture issues, are often framed with a specific reference to Europe (68% of claims with an European issue scope for the former, and 38% for the latter), in the other policy fields under study, immigration, troop deployment, pension and education, claims referring to European Union are present at a very low degree (from 2% to 7% of all claims). The topics referring to European integration were coded, by definition, as having a European “frame” of reference. More in detail, on monetary issues, claims referring to Italy itself account for a share of about 20% in 1990 and 1995, but decrease strongly to a minimal share after 1995 (8% in 2000 and 2% in 2002). The European level, that already played an overwhelming role in 1990 (37% of all claims), becomes more and more prominent across the years, reaching a share of 90% of all claims in this field in 2002. Relatively little attention is paid to other EU countries, with the only exception of 1995. In term of political “globalisation” beyond the

¹⁵ Issue-scope is in principle independent from the scope of the subject actor, target, and/or object actor. E.g., if Amnesty International appeals to the European Court of Justice in protest against the Berlin police’s treatment of immigrant suspects, the actor is supranational, the addressee European, but the scope of the issue (‘The Berlin police’s treatment of immigrant suspects’) remains local. However, if a local Berlin committee for asylum seekers criticizes the Berlin Senate for its treatment of refugee children on the grounds that it constitutes a breach of the UN Children’s Convention, then the issue scope is supranational, in spite of the local scope of the actor and addressee.

EU/EE, it is worth noticing that multilateral and bilateral scopes are only relevant in 1990, while the year 2000 is characterised by a significant presence of claims that have a genuine supranational reference (14% of all claims in the year).

Table 7.3b: Issue scope by year

	In % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	4	1	2	1	2	41
Other supranational	13	10	3	3	5	104
EU	15	16	36	35	30	604
Other European supranational	6	2	3	4	4	72
Multilateral	9	2	3	8	5	108
Bilateral	7	6	5	7	6	122
Germany	2	1	1	1	1	20
France	1	3	1	0	1	21
UK	.	1	0	.	0	4
Italy	34	56	43	39	42	851
Spain	.	.	0	.	0	3
Other pre-1995 EU-members	2	0	.	.	0	5
Other European countries ex CIS	.	0	.	.	.	1
Russia	2	.	0	.	0	7
USA	3	1	2	1	2	38
Japan	.	.	0	.	0	3
Middle East	0	.	0	.	0	2
Rest of the world	0	2	0	0	1	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	273	294	723	727		2017

[Based on full sample issues only, ISSCNW by CYEAR. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

Table 7.4a-g: Issue scope by year, separate for each policy field

a	Monetary politics				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	.	.	2	.	1	2
Other supranational	7	6	11	3	7	26
EU	37	42	63	90	67	264
Other European supranational	.	.	2	.	1	3
Multilateral	10	1	1	.	2	6
Bilateral	7	4	.	.	2	6
Germany	5	1	1	.	1	4
France	.	8	.	.	2	6
UK	.	4	.	.	1	3
Italy	24	21	8	2	10	39
Other pre-1995 EU-members	.	1	.	.	0	1
Russia	2	.	1	.	1	2
USA	7	4	8	4	6	22
Japan	.	.	2	.	1	3
Rest of the world	.	7	2	1	2	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	41	72	131	151		395

[7.4a-g: Based on full sample issues only, ISSCNW1 by CYEAR. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

b	Agriculture				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
EU	.	100	28	60	37	28
Other European supranational	.	.	2	.	1	1
Multilateral	.	.	13	.	9	7
Bilateral	.	.	19	.	13	10
France	.	.	11	.	8	6
Italy	50	.	26	40	30	23
Rest of the world	50	.	.	.	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	2	1	53	20		76

Due to the already mentioned low numbers of claims found in agriculture, little can be said on cross-time evolution. We can observe, however, that one third of all claims found in this field in 2000 and two third in 2002 refer to the European level, while a significant share (11%) of claims in 2000 refers to the national level of the EU partner France.

c	Immigration				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	.	.	1	1	1	2
Other supranational	.	.	4	1	1	4
EU	6	3	6	9	7	21
Multilateral	.	3	12	10	9	26
Bilateral	11	6	21	4	9	27
Germany	17	.	1	1	2	6
Italy	56	88	53	74	69	198
Spain	.	.	1	.	0	1
Other pre-1995 EU-members	6	.	.	.	0	1
Middle East	6	.	.	.	0	1
Rest of the world	.	.	.	1	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	18	32	81	158		289

In immigration, the portion of claims with a European level of reference is modest (between 6-9% of all claims) and quite constant over time (except for the negative peak in 1995). Also references to national level of other EU member states are rarely present, with the exception of the high share of claims concerning Germany in 1990 (17%). On the contrary, claims that raise issues at bi-laterally and multi-laterally levels are often present (18%), even if it is not possible to see clear trends across the years. Claims with a national, Italian issue scope appear increasing, even if not linearly (from 56% of claims in 1990 to 74% in 2002).

d	Troops deployment				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	14	4	56	8	14	37
Other supranational	38	56	.	14	27	73
EU	6	.	.	.	2	5
Multilateral	24	7	8	39	26	68
Bilateral	16	29	36	39	29	78
Germany	.	2	.	.	0	1
Other European countries ex CIS	.	2	.	.	0	1
USA	2	.	.	1	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	87	45	25	109		266

On topics concerning troop deployment, claims with a European issue scope are absent, with the exception of the modest share of 6% of all claims in 1990. The lack of reference to the European Union is balanced by the overwhelming and, even if not linearly, increasing over time, presence of claim with a supranational issue scope (41% of all claims). The remaining part of all claims (a bit less than two third) is framed within a multilateral and bilateral reference, that is also increasing from 1995 to 2002.

e	Pensions				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
EU	.	1	8	7	4	8
Other European supranational	.	1	.	.	1	1
Germany	.	.	8	7	4	7
France	.	4	2	3	3	5
UK	.	.	2	.	1	1
Italy	77	94	82	83	87	169
Other pre-1995 EU-members	18	.	.	.	2	3
Russia	6	.	.	.	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	17	83	65	30		195

f	Education				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
EU	3	.	2	4	2	11
Multilateral	.	.	1	.	0	1
Bilateral	.	.	1	.	0	1
Germany	.	2	.	1	0	2
France	4	.	.	1	1	4
Italy	82	98	93	92	92	433
Spain	.	.	1	.	0	2
Russia	6	.	.	.	1	4
USA	6	.	3	2	3	13
Middle East	.	.	1	.	0	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	73	44	201	143		461

Not surprisingly, in pension and education, which are fields still under full control of national political institutions, the debate is almost entirely concentrated on the Italian national space. In general, as many as 87% of all claims on pension and 92% on education have a national Italian issue scope. Nevertheless, in term of Europeanisation, there are some differences between the two topics, having the former a share of 5% of all claims with a pure European scope and an additional 9% of claims with reference to the other EU members, and the latter only a minimal share of claims either with an European scope (2%), or with an EU member states scope of reference (1%).

G	European integration				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Other supranational	.	.	1	.	0	1
EU	51	77	89	75	80	267
Other European supranational	49	24	10	25	20	67
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	35	17	167	116		335

As already mentioned, cases coded in the issue field “European Integration”, or in the Euro/EMU sub-issue have automatically a European issue scope (unless they also have a supranational dimension beyond the EU, which would then supersede the European issue scope).

Table 8.1: Position regarding European integration by policy field and year

	Year	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	1990	0.09	53	0.6
	1995	0.24	76	0.6
	2000	0.16	164	0.4
	2001	0.05	255	0.2
	2002	0.05	236	0.4
	Total	0.09	784	0.4
Agriculture: Subsidies, livestock quotas, disease control	1990	0.00	6	0.0
	1995	0.00	3	0.0
	2000	0.15	55	0.5
	2001	0.01	70	0.3
	2002	0.00	16	0.0
	Total	0.06	150	0.4
Immigration: entry and exit	1990	0.33	3	0.6
	1995	0.00	1	
	2000	0.47	15	0.5
	2001	0.00	4	0.0
	2002	0.20	20	0.4
	Total	0.28	43	0.5
Troops deployment	1990	0.00	5	0.0
	2001	0.00	7	0.0
	2002	0.00	3	0.0
	Total	0.00	15	0.0
Retirement and pension schemes	1995	-0.33	3	0.6
	2000	0.67	12	0.5
	2001	0.13	8	0.4
	2002	0.00	10	0.0
	Total	0.24	33	0.5
Education	1990	0.50	2	0.7
	2000	0.25	8	0.7
	2001	0.00	3	0.0
	2002	0.00	7	0.0
	Total	0.15	20	0.5
European Integration	1990	0.52	63	0.6
	1995	0.32	38	0.6
	2000	0.40	359	0.6
	2001	0.17	218	0.5
	2002	0.19	215	0.5
	Total	0.30	893	0.6
Total	1990	0.30	132	0.6
	1995	0.24	121	0.6
	2000	0.31	613	0.5
	2001	0.09	565	0.4
	2002	0.11	507	0.5
	Total	0.19	1938	0.5

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4). Means ISPOS1 by ISFIELD1 by CYEAR. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

An important criterion to evaluate the political debate and mobilisation in the Italian public sphere is the position of the claim-makers on the issue of European integration. Are the claims against a deepening of the integration process, or do they imply restrictions in the competences of European institutions? Or are they in favour? Valence positions scores on

Europe/European integration range from -1 to +1. The overall debate in Italy about Europe appears characterised by a positive attitude toward Europeanisation (0.19), that confirm other data about strongly pro-European sentiments. More in details, when talking about European issues¹⁶, claims explicitly expressing a positive attitude toward increased Europeanisation are at a high level on European integration, immigration and retirement and pension schemes. On topics concerning European integration, it is however worth noticing that positive attitudes towards the process decrease over the years. When the claim making is on immigration with a European angle, neutral positions alternate with positive positions across the years, without a clear trend about the degree of consensus on Europe within this policy field. Pension and retirement schemes is characterised by alternative peaks of favour and criticism of Europe across the years, showing in 1995 a significantly negative judgment about European integration, strongly positive attitudes in 2000, with, nevertheless, a slight decrease in support later on (reaching a neutral position in 2002). Within educational issues, the debate about European issues is in general quite favourable to European integration (strongly in favour in 1990, but with support decreasing from this year until the neutral position in the more recent years). In the debate about monetary policy, we find a predominantly neutral value over the years of our study (except for the significantly positive position toward Europe expressed in 1995). Similar is the picture for agriculture, where positive positions, but at a very modest level, are present in 2000.

¹⁶ The attitudes towards increased European integration is only registered for issues which had an European dimension (in either the actors and the issue).

Table 8.2: Position regarding European integration by actor type

	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
STATE AND PARTY ACTORS	0.21	1574	0.5
Politicians	0.09	54	0.6
Former states (wo) men	0.42	33	0.5
Government/executive	0.24	1089	0.5
Legislative	0.26	95	0.6
Judiciary	0.36	11	0.5
Police and internal security agencies	0.00	1	.
Military	0.20	5	0.5
Central banks	0.09	195	0.4
Other state executive agencies	0.33	9	0.5
Political parties	0.09	82	0.6
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS	0.09	159	0.4
Unions and employees	-0.13	8	0.4
Employers organisations and firms	0.11	46	0.4
Farmers and agricultural organisations	0.04	24	0.5
Economists and financial experts	0.11	81	0.4
MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS	0.09	111	0.4
OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS	0.14	80	0.5
Churches and religious organisations and groups	0.20	15	0.6
Educational professionals and organisations	-0.20	10	0.4
Other scientific and research professionals and institutions	0.41	22	0.5
Students, pupils, and their parents	0.00	4	0.0
Other professional organisations and groups	0.00	3	1.0
Consumer organisations and groups	0.00	15	0.0
Pro- and anti-European campaign organisations & groups	1.00	1	.
Solidarity and human rights organisations	0.50	2	0.7
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-1.00	1	.
Environmental organisations and groups	0.00	1	.
Other civil society organisations and groups	0.00	6	0.0
GENERAL/ UNKNOWN/ UNSPECIFIED	-0.21	14	0.6
Whole polities	0.00	3	0.0
The general public	-0.30	10	0.7
Unknown/unspecified actors	0.00	1	.
TOTAL	0.19	1938	0.5

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4). Means ISPOS1 by ACT1S by ACT1SS. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

When looking at the evaluation of the process of European integration by different type of actors, it is worth noticing that almost the whole range of institutional and social actors present in the Italian public debate takes an overall pro-European or at least neutral position, except for educational professionals and organisations (-0.20), unions and employees (-0.13), and the general public (-0.30). Nevertheless, the actors with more clearly positive attitudes towards European integration are state and party representatives (0.21) and, among them, in particular former statesmen, the judiciary and other states executive agencies. Civil society actors have an intermediate position, defending, even if not strongly, the European Union (0.14); while media and journalists and economic interest groups (0.09) are much more careful in their approval of European integration process. From the public positioning towards Europe, integration seems thus a project more of the political elites than of the economic ones.

Table 8.3: Position regarding European integration by actor scope

	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
Supranational: UN	0.00	1	.
Other supranational	0.13	32	0.4
EU	0.24	731	0.5
Other European supranational	0.40	5	0.6
Multilateral	0.00	15	0.4
Bilateral	0.48	31	0.6
Germany	0.19	161	0.5
France	0.21	80	0.6
UK	-0.06	52	0.6
Italy	0.17	638	0.5
Spain	0.23	13	0.4
Netherlands	0.00	5	0.0
Other pre-1995 EU-members	0.07	42	0.6
Austria, Finland, Sweden	0.12	41	0.6
Switzerland	-0.38	8	0.5
Upcoming enlargement countries	0.53	15	0.5
Other European countries ex CIS	0.50	2	0.7
Turkey	0.09	11	0.3
Russia	0.14	7	0.4
USA	0.09	34	0.3
Japan	0.00	1	.
Middle East	0.17	6	0.4
Rest of the world	0.00	7	0.6
Total	0.19	1938	0.5

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4). Means ISPOS1 by ACT1S by ACTSCNW1. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

Claims made by national actors from Italy (0.17) as well as from the large majority of the other EU member states (Germany 0.19, France 0.21, Spain 0.23, but also Austria, Finland and Sweden 0.12) are generally pro-European as much as claims made by European actors (0.24). Negative position towards the process of European integration present in the Italian public sphere are expressed by national actors from the United Kingdom (-0.06), and above all Switzerland (-0.38). It is interesting to notice that claims from non-yet EU member states, such as the upcoming enlargement countries or national countries that look with interest to Europe, but are not part of it (like the Balkan countries) are more pro-European (around 0.50) than claims from the EU member states.

Table 8.4: Position regarding European integration by party affiliation¹⁷ and by year

	Year	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
DS (+RC)	1995	0.00	2	0.0
	2000	0.50	12	0.5
	2001	1.00	1	.
	2002	0.00	7	0.6
	Total	0.32	22	0.6
VERDI	2000	0.50	4	0.6
	2001	0.00	1	.
	2002	-1.00	1	.
	Total	0.17	6	0.8
Center parties (Rinnovamento, Margherita, PPI)	1995	-1.00	1	.
	2000	0.50	10	0.5
	2001	0.00	2	0.0
	2002	0.00	3	0.0
	Total	0.25	16	0.6
Non specified/ Center - left Coalition	1990	1.00	3	0.0
	1995	1.00	1	.
	2000	0.52	98	0.5
	2001	0.21	76	0.4
	2002	0.36	61	0.5
	Total	0.39	239	0.5
AN	2000	0.40	5	0.6
	2001	0.00	2	0.0
	2002	0.33	6	0.5
	Total	0.31	13	0.5
FI	1995	0.00	2	1.4
	2000	0.50	8	0.5
	2001	-1.00	1	.
	2002	0.09	11	0.5
	Total	0.18	22	0.7
LEGA	1995	0.50	2	0.7
	2000	-0.67	3	0.6
	2001	0.00	2	0.0
	2002	-0.55	11	0.5
	Total	-0.39	18	0.6
CCD-CDU	1995	1.00	1	.
	2000	0.50	2	0.7
	2001	-0.50	2	0.7
	2002	-0.11	9	0.3
	Total	0.00	14	0.6
Non specif/Center –right Coalition	1990	0.44	16	0.5
	1995	1.00	1	.
	2000	0.20	5	0.8
	2001	0.06	67	0.3
	2002	-0.06	62	0.5
	Total	0.06	151	0.5
GOV. DINI	1995	0.37	19	0.5
	Total	0.37	19	0.5

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4). Means ISPOS1 by ACTPAR1 by CYEAR. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

¹⁷ For the abbreviations of the parties, see the appendix. Among the non-specified parties of the center-right coalition in the year 1990 almost all cases are represented by the DC (*Democrazia Cristiana*) party.

The overall position of Italian political parties is pro-European, with the exception of the “regionalist” *Lega* party, that has been strongly anti-European over the years (-0.39). On average, left-wing parties express more consensus on the benefits of European integration when compared to right-wing parties (see the score of 0.39 for non specified parties belonging to the center-left coalition against the more neutral score of 0.06 for non specified parties of the center-right coalition). Nevertheless, looking more in details, there are interesting differences among parties belonging to the same “area”. Among the left wing parties, support for Europe ranges from DS (*Democratici di Sinistra*), one of the followers of the old Communist party, which takes a clearly pro-European stance (0.32), to the center-parties in a middle position (0.25), to the green party that shows a more moderate position (0.17). Among the center-right parties, AN (*Alleanza Nazionale*) takes a more resolute pro-European position (0.31) compared to the others. FI (*Forza Italia*) is moderately pro-European (0.17), while the conservative parties CCD-CDU, born from the old Christian democrat party DC (*Democrazia Cristiana*) are almost neutral. The year 1995 is characterized by the “technical” government of Premier *Dini* that shows a supporting position toward the European Integration.

Object actors

Table 9.1: Presence of object actor by policy field

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
No	15	12	9	3	20	9	9	11	213
Yes	85	88	91	97	81	91	91	89	1804
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	395	76	289	266	195	461	335		2017

[Based on full sample issues only, OBJPRES by ISFIELD1. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]
Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

Object actors are the actors whose interests are materially affected by the implementation of the claim. The majority of claims we found relevant for our analysis contains actors on whose behalf claims are made (89%).

Table 9.2a: Object actor type by policy field

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
STATE AND PARTY ACTORS	11	8	18	42	11	5	39	20	335
Politicians	.	.	2	.	.	0	3	1	15
Former states (wo) men	0	.	0	1
Government/executive	6	3	9	16	5	3	31	11	202
Legislative	0	.	3	.	3	0	1	1	17
Judiciary	.	.	2	.	.	0	0	0	6
Police/ internal security agencies	.	2	2	0	5
Military	.	.	0	25	.	.	0	4	67
Central banks	5	1	16
Other state executive agencies	.	3	.	.	3	0	.	0	7
Political parties	.	.	1	0	1	1	3	1	19
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS	2	37	3	.	29	1	1	5	95
Unions and employees	1	.	0	.	22	1	.	2	43
Employers org.s and firms	1	8	3	.	6	0	0	2	27
Farmers and agricultural org.s	.	30	0	1	21
Economists and financial experts	1	.	.	.	1	.	0	0	4
MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS	.	.	.	0	.	0	1	0	4
OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS	3	25	71	1	41	88	1	36	650
Churches and religious org.s	0	.	0	1
Educational professionals / org.s	.	2	.	.	3	54	.	13	233
Other scientific/ research inst.	.	.	0	.	.	1	.	0	6
Students, pupils, and their parents	.	2	.	.	1	31	0	8	135
Other professional org.s/ groups	1	1	.	0	4
Consumer org.s/ groups	3	22	1	2	29
Migrant org.s/ groups	.	.	62	9	162
Pro-/anti-Europ. Campaign org.s	.	.	0	0	1
Org.s/ groups of the elderly	36	.	0	3	57
Terrorist groups	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	0	1
Other civil society org.s/ groups	.	.	8	0	.	.	.	1	21
GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPECIFIED	84	30	7	57	19	6	59	39	700
Whole polities	25	9	5	56	11	4	55	25	452
Whole economies	56	2	1	0	6	.	2	12	209
The general public	3	19	0	1	2	1	2	2	39
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	337	67	262	257	157	419	305		1804

[Based on full sample issues only, OBJ1S and OBJ1SS by ISFIELD1, only claims with an object actor. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]
Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

In monetary politics, the object of claim-making is mainly whole polities (25%) or whole economies (56%). The majority of claims in agriculture refer to the interests of farmers and agricultural organisations (30%) as well as, for a significant share, to the more post-materialistic interests of consumers groups (22%) or the generic public (19%). This means that agriculture cannot be considered simply a sectorial issue of policy. Not surprisingly in immigration actors on whose behalf claims are made are mainly migrants (62%), but there is also an additional 18% of claims that concerns the interests of institutional (mainly executive 9%) actors. On troop deployment are those where there is the largest share of claims that have as object institutional actors (42%) as well as whole polities (56%), while pension and education are characterise by the largest share of claims made for benefits or disadvantage of actors from civil society: 41% of the former (within which 36% of all claims have for object

elderly groups), 88% of the latter (constituted by a large portion of claims whose object are educational professional and institutions, namely teacher, professors and school 54%, and a littler part for students and their parents, 31%). When claims refer to the European integration, they have as objects either whole polities, namely the whole countries or whole polities (55%), or the governments (31%).

Table 9.2b: Object actor type by year

	In % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
STATE AND PARTY ACTORS	16	21	21	20	20	335
politicians	0	.	1	1	1	15
Former states (wo) men	.	.	.	0	0	1
Government/executive	6	8	14	11	11	202
Legislative	1	1	1	1	1	17
Judiciary	.	.	1	0	0	6
Police/ internal security agencies	.	.	0	0	0	5
Military	6	10	1	3	4	67
Central banks	1	1	1	1	1	16
Other state executive agencies	0	0	0	1	0	7
Political parties	1	.	2	1	1	19
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS	1	9	7	3	5	95
Unions and employees	0	7	3	1	2	43
Employers org.s and firms	0	2	2	1	2	27
Farmers and agricultural org.s	0	.	2	1	1	21
Economists and financial experts	.	0	0	0	0	4
MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS	0	.	0	0	0	4
OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS	32	32	39	36	36	650
Churches and religious org.s	.	.	.	0	0	1
Educational professionals / org.s	11	12	16	11	13	233
Other scientific/ research inst.	.	0	.	1	0	6
Students, pupils, and their parents	13	4	9	6	8	135
Other professional org.s/ groups	.	0	0	0	0	4
Consumer org.s/ groups	.	.	2	3	2	29
Migrant org.s/ groups	5	8	7	13	9	162
Pro-/anti-Europ. Campaign org.s	.	.	.	0	0	1
Org.s/ groups of the elderly	3	7	3	2	3	57
Terrorist groups	.	.	.	0	0	1
Other civil society org.s/ groups	0	0	2	1	1	21
GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPECIFIED	51	38	33	41	39	700
Whole polities	39	20	18	29	25	452
Whole economies	10	18	11	11	12	209
The general public	2	0	4	1	2	39
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	253	254	668	629		1804

[Based on full sample issues only, OBJ1S and OBJ1SS by CYEAR, only claims with an object actor. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

In a cross time perspective, whole polities (prominent as object particularly in monetary policy, troop deployment and European integration) decrease across the years (from 39% in 1990 to 29% in 2002), while whole economies (not surprisingly prominent in monetary policy) remain nearly constant at a share of about 10% (except for the peak in 1995 where it was object for 18% of claims). Among institutional actors (present in particular in troop deployment and European integration, as well as, to a lesser extent, immigration), it is worth noticing that executive actors slightly increase their presence from 6% in 1990 to 14% in 2000

to 11% in 2002, while military actors increase from 1990 to 1995, and then decrease after this year. Central banks are very rarely mentioned as object of the claims and their modest presence (1%) remains constant over the years. Among the economic interest groups, unions (prominent in topics concerning pension and retirement) are significantly present in 1995 (7%), but with a declining presence. Employers organisations and firms are constantly present at a more modest level (2%); farmers and agricultural organisations appear on the debate starting from 2000. The role played by educational professional and institutions as object of the claim-making, already significant in 1990 (with a share of 11%) remains nearly constant over the years, with a peak in 2000 (16%), while the presence of students, the other next prominent actors in education policy, is decreasing, even not linearly, from 1990 to 2002. References to migrants as object of claims are increasing.

Table 9.3a: Evaluation by object actor type

	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
STATE AND PARTY ACTORS	0.15	355	0.9
Politicians	-0.47	15	0.7
Former states (wo) men	1.00	1	.
Government/executive	0.20	202	0.9
Legislative	-0.12	17	0.9
Judiciary	0.50	6	0.8
Police and internal security agencies	0.80	5	0.5
Military	0.07	67	0.8
Central banks	0.19	16	0.9
Other state executive agencies	0.57	7	0.8
Political parties	0.00	19	0.9
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS	0.67	95	0.6
Unions and employees	0.65	43	0.6
Employers organisations and firms	0.78	27	0.6
Farmers and agricultural organisations	0.57	21	0.8
Economists and financial experts	0.75	4	0.5
MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS	0.00	4	1.2
OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS	0.48	650	0.8
Churches and religious organisations and groups	1.00	1	.
Educational professionals and organisations'	0.70	233	0.6
Other scientific and research professionals and institutions	0.83	6	0.4
Students, pupils, and their parents	0.76	135	0.6
Other professional organisations and groups	1.00	4	0.0
Consumer organisations and groups	0.69	29	0.6
Migrant org.s/ groups	0.04	162	0.9
Pro-/anti-Europ. Campaign org.s	-1.00	1	.
Org.s/ groups of the elderly	0.53	57	0.7
Terrorist groups	-1.00	1	.
Other civil society org.s/ groups	-0.81	21	0.6
GENERAL/UNKNOWN/UNSPECIFIED	0.53	700	0.8
Whole polities	0.44	452	0.8
Whole economies	0.67	209	0.6
The general public	0.74	39	0.6
TOTAL	0.44	1804	0.8
[Based on full sample issues only, means of OBJEVAL1 by OBJ1S and OBJ1SS; only claims with an addressee. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]			

When institutional actors are considered in the Italian claim-making as objects of the claim instead than addressees (see above table 6.3a), they are likely to be evaluated less negatively. In particular only politicians and (even if to a lesser extent) their parliamentary branch are

negative objects of claim-making, namely actors which can be disadvantaged by the (implementations of) claims, while the administrative side of the state, like police and internal security agencies, other state executive agencies, and the judiciary, are likely to be actors on whose behalf the claims are made (positive objects). Economic interests groups (but this is less true for farmers) are more likely considered as objects positively affected by the claims when compared to civil society actors. Indeed, among the latter, we found wide differences between the strongly positive judgements on church and religious organisations, scientific institutions and other professional organisations and groups and the other actors, less positively when not negatively considered by the claim-making.

Table 9.3b: Evaluation by object actor scope

	Mean	(N)	Std. Dev.
Supranational: UN	0.43	7	0.8
Other supranational	0.16	25	0.8
EU	0.63	338	0.7
Other European supranational	0.63	8	0.7
Multilateral	0.07	202	0.9
Bilateral	0.54	13	0.8
Germany	0.42	43	0.8
France	0.41	39	0.8
UK	0.78	9	0.7
Italy	0.63	773	0.7
Spain	0.75	4	0.5
Netherlands	1.00	1	.
Other pre-1995 EU-members	0.00	13	1.0
Austria, Finland, Sweden	0.22	41	0.8
Switzerland	1.00	1	.
Upcoming enlargement countries	0.67	6	0.8
Other European countries ex CIS	0.13	40	1.0
Turkey	0.00	20	1.0
Russia	0.53	17	0.7
USA	0.13	56	0.8
Japan	0.83	6	0.4
Middle East	-0.29	107	0.9
Rest of the world	0.34	35	0.8
Total	0.44	1804	0.8

[Based on full sample issues only, means of OBJEVAL1 by OBJSCNW1; only claims with an addressee. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

In term of Europeanisation, it is worth noticing that in the Italian claim-making European institutions and actors are likely to be positive objects of the claims as much as Italian actors. A bit less often one speaks on behalf of the other EU member states in general, but this is not true for some EU partners like Britain, Spain and Netherlands, that are clearly positive objects of the majority claims. Supranational institutions are positive object of claim-making, although less than EU and national actors. Among other national non-EU countries, Japan is often positive object of the claims, while countries in the Middle East are object of negative claims.

Table 9.4a: Object actor scope by policy field

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	.	.	.	3	.	.	.	0	7
Other supranational	3	.	.	5	.	.	.	1	25
EU	47	21	2	2	3	1	50	19	338
Other European supranational	.	.	0	.	.	.	2	0	8
Multilateral	2	5	63	9	.	1	1	11	202
Bilateral	1	.	1	2	.	1	1	1	13
Germany	5	.	2	2	5	0	3	2	43
France	3	15	.	1	3	1	2	2	39
UK	1	2	0	0	1	.	1	1	9
Italy	25	57	23	7	87	94	15	43	773
Spain	.	.	.	0	.	1	0	0	4
Netherlands	0	0	1
Other pre-1995 EU-members	2	.	1	.	2	.	0	1	13
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1	13	2	41
Switzerland	0	0	1
Upcoming enlargement countries	0	2	0	6
Other European countries ex CIS	.	.	5	7	.	.	3	2	40
Turkey	.	.	1	2	.	.	4	1	20
Russia	1	.	0	0	1	1	3	1	17
USA	5	.	.	11	.	2	0	3	56
Japan	2	0	6
Middle East	.	.	0	41	.	0	.	6	107
Rest of the world	3	2	2	7	.	.	1	2	35
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	337	67	262	257	157	419	305		1804

[Based on full sample issues only, OBJSCNW1 by ISFIELD1; only claims with an object actor. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

When looking at the scope of the object of claim-making by policy fields, we find a similar picture. The majority of “object actors” on monetary politics and European integration are European actors, although the second prominent actors are nevertheless different in the two highly institutionally Europeanised topics: being represented by Italian actors in the agriculture and national actors from other EU members in monetary issues. In agriculture a bit more than half of the claims contain a reference to Italian actors as object (57% of claims), but still in this field the role played by the European ones is significant (21%), as it is the place reserved to other EU member countries (17%). In immigration, due to the large presence of migrants as object of the claim-making, the multilateral scope, that by definition characterises the migrant question, is most prominent (two third of all claims), while the rest is constituted by Italian actors. The claim-making on troop deployment has mainly object actors from non-EU national countries, in particular from USA (11%) and from Middle East (41%).

Table 9.4b: Object actor scope by year

	In % within year				Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2002	In %	(N)
Supranational: UN	.	1	0	1	0	7
Other supranational	3	3	1	1	1	25
EU	8	7	24	23	19	338
Other European supranational	2	.	0	0	0	8
Multilateral	11	9	8	16	11	202
Bilateral	1	1	1	1	1	13
Germany	3	4	1	2	2	43
France	2	4	2	1	2	39
UK	0	1	1	0	1	9
Italy	36	56	45	38	43	773
Spain	.	.	0	0	0	4
Netherlands	.	.	.	0	0	1
Other pre-1995 EU-members	2	0	1	0	1	13
Austria, Finland, Sweden	.	0	6	0	2	41
Switzerland	.	0	.	.	0	1
Upcoming enlargement countries	.	0	0	1	0	6
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	1	7	3	0	2	40
Turkey	0	2	0	2	1	20
Russia	2	1	1	1	1	17
USA	5	2	2	4	3	56
Japan	1	.	1	.	0	6
Middle East	20	.	2	7	6	107
Rest of the world	2	2	2	2	2	35
Total	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	253	254	668	629		1804

[Based on full sample issues only, OBJSCNW1 by CYEAR. Information from addressees, opponents and supported actors is combined; only claims with an addressee. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

From a cross time perspective, in term of Europeanisation it is worth noticing that the discussion is more and more carried on behalf of the EU (the European level object actors increase their presence from 10% of claims in 1990 to 23 % in 2002), or on the behalf of other EU member countries (objects from other EU member states increase up to a share of 11% of claims in 2000, and decrease from 2000 to 2002). Italian actors as objects of the debate are increasing their presence from 1990 to 1995 (56% of all claims), but they decrease to 45% of claims in 2000 and to 38% in 2002.

Frames

Table 10.1a: Presence of frame by policy field

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
No	75	85	67	87	79	75	57	68	1320
Yes	25	15	33	13	21	25	43	32	627
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	784	150	43	15	33	20	902		1947

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4). FRAPRES by ISFIELD1. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]
Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

Looking at the way in which Europe is “framed” means to analyse the motivations used by the actors to support their claim-making related to the European integration. The arguments used to frame Europe can be of four types: identity frame (that refer to the question, what is the EU and what does it stand for?), instrumental frames (that answer the question: what is the EU good or bad for?), historical frames (that are about positive--e.g. to Enlightenment or classical antiquity--or negative--e.g. to past national isolation or to the Cold War--linkages of the EU to historical periods or experiences), and frames internal to the European integration process (that are frames about causal linkages between one aspect of European integration and another, e.g. between enlargement and institutional reforms).

In about one third of all claims referring to European issues frames related to European integration are present. Not surprisingly, claim-making on the topic of European integration is characterised by a larger presence of frames when compared to the other policy fields (43% of cases), but also on immigration issues the role of the framing on Europe appear significant (33%). The same is true, even if at a lower extent, in monetary policy, education and pension (but in the latter two fields, giving the low number of cases, no firm statement can be made). The two most “Europeanised” fields at the institutional level, namely, monetary policy and agriculture, are not those where frames of European integration were mainly used. Instead, it is above all in those policy field, like immigration, where the process of Europeanisation of the policy is still uncertain, that reference to Europe is more often expressed with reference to general frames.

Table 10.1b: Presence of frame by broad actor type

	In % within actor type					Total	
	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society actors	General/ unknown/ unspecified	In %	(N)
No	68	77	68	51	71	68	1320
Yes	32	23	32	49	29	32	627
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	1583	159	111	80	14		1947

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4). FRAPRES by ACT1SS. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

When comparing different types of actors looking at their framing activities, it is worth noticing that civil society actors use more frequently (49% of cases) frames than institutional actors and the media (both a share of 32%) in order to express their concerns in the Italian public sphere. Economic interest groups are the actors that make less often use of frames (23% of all cases).

Table 10.2a: Frame type by policy field

	In % within issue field							Total	
	MON	AGR	IMM	TRP	PEN	EDU	EU I	In %	(N)
Identity, normative and value frames	9	9	57	50	14	40	41	30	187
Constitutional / governance frames	21	23	21	.	.	.	31	27	167
Economic frames	57	50	.	.	57	40	8	25	157
Other instrumental frames	1	14	21	50	.	.	9	7	45
Historical frames	1	5	2	2	10
Frames internal to integration proc.	12	.	.	.	29	20	9	10	61
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	193	22	14	2	7	5	384		627

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4), and only cases with a frame. FRAME1SS by ISFIELD1. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]
Issue fields are: Monetary politics: currency and interest rate; Agriculture: Subs., quotas, disease control; Immigration: entry and exit; Troops deployment; Retirement and pension schemes; Education; European Integration.

The type of frame used about European integration varies a lot according to the subject of the claims, namely the topics about which they are used. Due to the low number of cases with frames in troop deployment, pension and education, we will not analyse the distributions of the different frames inside these three fields. Overall, the 91 frames found in Italy for the reference period under study are similarly distributed over three types of claims: around one third each for identity, normative and value frames (30%), constitutional and governance frames (27%) and economic frames (25%). The remaining part is mainly constituted by frames internal to the integration process (10%). As for as the topics over which the debate is carried on, it is not surprisingly that a bit less than two thirds of all cases in monetary politics are economic frames (“economic stability” and “inflation” respectively are the most frequently mentioned ones, both in about 4% of cases in this field), while it is a little more surprising than almost the same relevant role (half of the claims) is played by the economic arguments in agriculture (even if here most of them refers to “consumer protection”: 4.7% of cases in the field). Other dimensions concerning for instance public goods (i.e. protection of the environmental) are not covered (v. other instrumental frames is 1%). The other two types of frame that often are used in public debate concerning monetary policy and agriculture are firstly constitutional /governance frames (they account respectively for a share of 21% of frames in the former and 23% in the latter policy field) and secondly frames internal to integration process for monetary topics (12%), and other instrumental frame for agriculture (14%). This latter field is the one in which historical frames (5%) are more present (even if the share is very modest). Public positions on the topic of European integration are predominantly framed with identity or normative considerations (41%). Europe is seen above all as “community of values” (4.8% of cases in this topic), protection against “racism/xenophobia” (2.7% of cases), but also with reference to constitutional/ institutional frames as “democracy” (2.8% of cases). Even governance principles are frequently used (31% of cases in the topic, above all with reference to “efficiency and competence” 1.3% of cases). Here economic frames play a very reduced role (8%). Among frames internal to the European integration process, which create linkages between one aspect of European integration and another, the most prominent is that between institutional reforms and enlargement (2%of cases).

Table 10.2a: Frame type by year

	In % within year					Total	
	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	In %	(N)
Identity, normative and value frames	28	15	38	22	25	30	187
Constitutional and governance frames	35	32	22	18	34	27	167
Economic frames	19	42	21	42	23	25	157
Other instrumental frames	.	7	6	7	10	7	45
Historical frames	2	.	0	1	4	2	10
Frames internal to integration process	16	5	13	11	4	10	61
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	43	41	283	74	186		627

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4), and only cases with a frame. FRAME1SS by CYEAR. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

The role of different types of frames varies over the years. Economic frames about Europe appear to be more relevant in 1995 and 2002, constitutional and governance arguments are more often used in 1990, while identity frames are prominent in 2000. Besides these variations in single years, it is difficult to find clear trends that characterise the use of frames, except, partially, for other instrumental frames that appear increasingly used by actors in the debate from 1995 to 2002, and the frames internal to integration process that, to the contrary, are less and less present from 1990 to 2002.

Table 10.2c: Frame type by broad actor type

	In % within actor type					Total	
	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society actors	General/unknown/unspecified	In %	(N)
Identity, normative, value	29	3	33	64	50	30	187
Constitutional/governance	28	22	22	13	25	27	167
Economic	24	57	17	15	25	25	157
Other instrumental	7	5	17	3	.	7	45
Historical	1	.	6	3	.	2	10
Internal: integration proc.	10	14	6	3	.	10	61
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(N)	511	37	36	39	4		627

[Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope (ISSCOP1=3 or 4), and only cases with a frame. FRAME1SS by ACT1SS. Data from REP+COR, in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

When looking at the types of frames mainly used by different categories of actors, it is worth noticing that economic interest groups, like unions, farmers, and employers organisations and firms mainly emphasise the instrumental side of European integration in their claims, underlining in particular the socio economic dimensions of the process (“economic growth” and “inflation”, both 3.1% of cases, and “strength in global economic competition” 2.5%, are the most often mentioned arguments). Economic interest groups focus their strategies firstly on economic frames and secondly on constitutional /governance arguments (among the latter the most frequent concept is “rule of law”, 1.8% of cases). All the other actors use economic frames as well, but less frequently. State and party actors make a balanced use of three types of frames: identity and normative frames (the most frequent are Europe as “community of value”, with 2.4% of their cases and “racism/xenophobia”, with 2.1%), constitutional/governance (above all “democracy” and “rule of law”, both 1.2%) and economic frames (“economic stability” 2% and “inflation” 1.5%). Media and journalists are

the actors that use a more articulated strategy of framing, that include the largest range of frames from the identity ones (among which we find once again the concept of Europe as “community of values”, 2.7% of cases, but also new concepts such as, “tolerance”, and “unity” both 1.8%) to those referring to other instrumental arguments about Europe (either economical, such as “consumer protection” and “national economy”, or political such as “influence in international relations” and “European relation with USA”). Civil society actors, as well as the general public from civil society, are the only actors that mainly frame European matters emphasising immaterial aspects of the process, as testified for by their large use of general identity frames (after the prominent concept of “community of values” 7.5%, we find new arguments as “Christianity values”, 5%, as well as “solidarity” and “peace”, both 2.5%).

Table 10.3: Twenty-five most often mentioned frames

Frame	Number of claims (N)	In % of all frames
Community of values	45	7.2
Economic stability	36	5.7
Inflation	30	4.8
Democracy	26	4.1
Racism/xenophobia	24	3.8
Rule of law	24	3.8
Unity	21	3.3
Economic growth	21	3.3
Efficiency. Competence	19	3
Institutional reforms > enlargement	18	2.9
Strength in global competition	16	2.6
Political integration > common currency	16	2.6
Sovereignty	15	2.4
Centralisation	15	2.4
Human rights	12	1.9
Consumer protection	12	1.9
Equality among countries/member states/regions	11	1.8
Freedom. Liberty	10	1.6
Security	10	1.6
Own (national) economy	10	1.6
Peace	9	1.4
Prices	8	1.3
National identity	7	1.1
Solidarity	7	1.1
Bureaucracy	7	1.1
Social standards/social security	7	1.1
<i>65 other mentioned frames</i>	191	30.5
Total (91 frames)	627	100

[Based on full sample issues only. FRAME1S. Data from REP+COR. in 2000 also MATT+NAZ.]

The table lists the 26 most often mentioned frames because several frames appeared equally often.

When looking at the total number of cases in which frames are used, the idea of Europe as a “community of values” is the most prominent frame used in claim-making (7.2% of all cases). The next prominent ones are the instrumental considerations of “economic stability” and “inflation” (5.7% and 4.8% of all cases respectively). These frames, often used in claim-making, are followed by normative and constitutional frames inside the category of identity frames, such as “democracy” (4.1%), “racism/xenophobia” (3.8%), “rule of law” (3.8%). However, this overall picture is incomplete if the total percentages are not weighted by policy fields, even if we have to remember that the economic frames play a dominant role in the

public discourse on all topics (where they characterise about half of all claims), except for European integration. In the policy field “European integration”, the picture changes and the top most often used frames are mainly identity frames such as principles, norms and values, constitutional, institutional frames and frames concerning governance.

Table 10.4a: What the EU should not be/lead to: ten most frequent frames

Frame	Number of claims (N)	In % of all such frames
Inflation	8	32
Equality among countries/member states/regions	3	12
Centralisation	3	12
Over-regulation	2	8
Bureaucracy	2	8
(Neo-) liberalism	1	4
“Fortress”	1	4
Dictatorship/totalitarianism	1	4
Subsidiary	1	4
Efficiency. Competence	1	4
Prices	1	4
Wastefulness (e.g.. gravy train)	1	4
Total	25	100

[Based on full sample issues only. FRAME1S for FRAPOS1=-2.]

The table lists the 12 most often mentioned frames because they represent the total number of frames of such types we found.

Together with the type of framing strategy used in the public debate, it is also interesting to see the ways in which frames are linked to the process of European integration. Indeed, frames can be used both negatively and positively referring to Europe and can be referred to the present or to a possible future. In fact, not only the direction of a specific frame has been coded, but also if the frame refers to a description of what is perceived as a present status or as a wish for the future (“what does Europe should/should not stand for?”). When considering frames that express what the EU should not be, once again we find at the top of the rank instrumental/economic worries: the European integration process should not led to inflation (32% of all such frames). Interesting is the use of the concept of “fortress” of Europe (used especially in the topic of immigration) in order to indicate that Europe should not be a close space for other people or countries.

Table 10.4b: What the EU is not/does not lead to: ten most frequent frames

Frame	Number of claims (N)	In % of all such frames
Racism/xenophobia	24	23.1
Inflation	21	20.2
Nationalism	5	4.8
Fascism/nazism	5	4.8
Sovereignty	5	4.8
Own (national) economy	5	4.8
Bureaucracy	4	3.8
National identity	2	1.9
Tolerance	2	1.9
Democracy	2	1.9
<i>21 other mentioned frames</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>27.9</i>
Total	104	100

[Based on full sample issues only. FRAME1S for FRAPOS1=-1.]

The two most prominent frames used to underline what the EU actually is not, are racism/xenophobia and inflation (about 20% of such claims respectively). The former insists on the immaterial side of the EU, the latter on an instrumental economic argument. Among these frames, that express arguments on what the EU is not/does not have to be, there are some clearly supporting Europe and some clearly criticising it. To the first group of frames belong those that conceive Europe as a barrier against racism, inflation, nationalism, fascism /nazism, bureaucracy; to the second group those that consider the EU as a danger for (national) economy, national identity, tolerance and democracy.

Table 10.4c: What the EU is/leads to: ten most frequent frames

Frame	Number of claims (N)	In % of all such frames
Community of values	41	12.4
Economic stability	26	7.9
Democracy	21	6.4
Rule of law	20	6.1
Economic growth	16	4.8
Unity	15	4.5
Human rights	12	3.6
Freedom. Liberty	9	2.7
Efficiency. Competence	9	2.7
Strength in global competition	9	2.7
Peace	7	2.1
Centralisation	7	2.1
<i>71 other mentioned frames</i>	138	41.8
Total	330	100.0

[Based on full sample issues only. FRAME1S for FRAPOS1=1]

The table lists the 12 most often mentioned frames because they represent the total number of frames of such types we found.

The most frequent frames used in the Italian public sphere to express what the EU is refers to identity. Indeed, European integration is perceived as a community of values (12.4% of such claims), linked to constitutional, institutional frames such as democracy (6.4%), rule of law (6.1%), human rights (3.6%) or to principles, norms and values, such unity (4.5%), freedom /liberty (2.7%). Beside, from an instrumental but always positive point of view Europe is conceived as conducive to economic stability (7.9%), growth (4.8%) and strength in global competition (2.7%).

Table 10.4d: What the EU should be/should lead to: ten most frequent frames

Frame	Number of claims (N)	In % of all such frames
Efficiency. Competence	7	6.8
Economic stability	7	6.8
Unity	6	5.8
Strength in global competition	5	4.9
Civil society, active citizenship	4	3.9
Community of values	4	3.9
Equality among countries/member states/regions	3	2.9
Democracy	3	2.9
Sovereignty	3	2.9
Security	3	2.9
<i>36 other mentioned frames</i>	57	55.3
Total	103	100.0

[Based on full sample issues only. FRAME1S for FRAPOS1=2.]

As far as the future or an ideal state of the EU is concerned, the most common frames are more critical. The most frequent argument is that Europe should be more efficient and competent, and should guarantee more economic stability, unity and strength in global competition. Among these types of ideal claims it is worth noticing the appearance of a new frame: Europe as “civil society, active citizenship”.

Abbreviations and definitions

Regions/countries/scopes

CH	Switzerland
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia and the former Soviet republics. excluding the three Baltic countries)
DE	Germany
ES	Spain
EU seat	European Union seats (Brussels. Luxembourg. Strasbourg. Frankfurt. Etc.)
FR	France
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East-Germany)
IT	Italy
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America

Newspapers

REP	Repubblica
COR	Corriere della Sera
MATT	Mattino
NAZ	Nazione

Issue fields

MON	Monetary politics: currency and interest rate
AGR	Agriculture: Subsidies. livestock quotas. disease control
IMM	Immigration: entry and exit
TRP	Troops deployment
PEN	Retirement and pension schemes
EDU	Education
EUI	European Integration