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Report **Final case report of political claims analysis**

Case report **The Netherlands**

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PART I:
Analytic Summary

This analytic summary of the results of work package 2 for the Dutch case is structured along the following themes:

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1 THE MOST REMARKABLE RESULTS

1a On the Making of Claims

Place of claim making More than half of the claims about European policies made in Dutch newspapers are made in the Netherlands. Yet a growing number of claims in Dutch newspapers is made in countries *with EU seats* (from 6,1% in 1990 to 17,9% in 2002), not to the detriment of claims made in the Netherlands but rather of claims made in other member states and the United States. This suggests Europeanisation of foreign news but not necessarily of domestic news. Moreover, it suggests an increased focus on “Europe” to the detriment of the United States.

The set of pre-1995 member states *other than large ones* (including Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland) as sources of claims is growing (from 2,4% in 1990 to 6,4% in 2002). In 2002 this set is larger than Germany (4,6%), France (2,3%), the United Kingdom (1,4%) and Italy (1,4%), the traditional centres of reference in Dutch politics and news on European integration. Again, this suggests Europeanisation, in particular cross-national diffusion.

In the Dutch field of monetary politics the countries with EU seats and Germany *together* are almost as large as sources of claims as the Netherlands *itself* (32,4% versus 38,6%). In European integration the countries with EU seats are even *more* important than the Netherlands (31,2% versus 26,6%). Europeanisation in the Netherlands seems *sector-bound*. Some fields of public policy (such as monetary politics) are more integrated in the European process of diplomacy, politics, law and administration than others (such as education).

Identity of claimants State and party persons are the most frequent claimants in the Netherlands (66,7%), followed by civil society actors (13,5%), media and journalists (9,6%), and, finally, economic interest groups (8,4%). Within the category of state and party persons the government is the leading actor (42,5%). Together with similar results with respect to the identity of addressees, this suggests that European integration to date has been conducive to the formation of a *public policy sphere* rather than a public sphere in the traditional sense (dominated by civil associations and media beyond the reach of state and market). In other words, the politics of European integration in the Netherlands remains marked by the overweight of the central government and vested producer interests, dating back to the early days of

the ECSC and the EEC. However, the entry of civil society actors, such as professionals in education and scientific research, may indicate the *beginning* of a truly public sphere with respect to European politics and administration.

Personalities The leading spokespersons in Dutch newspapers are the *French* president Chirac and the former president of the *European Central Bank* Mr. Duisenberg (in a sample with EU scope only). Mr. Kok, Dutch prime minister in the period of study, ranks fifth and second in the respective lists. If Mr. Trichet, the Frenchman who succeeded Mr. Duisenberg in 2003, would be able to match Duisenberg's performance, this would signal the advanced nature of Europeanisation in the Netherlands.

Identity of Claimants Continued The majority of claimants in Dutch newspapers is formed by actors with a Dutch organizational extension (720), but actors with a *EU scope* are quite *numerous* (170).

In European integration claimants with a EU scope form a large minority (30,1%), virtually *on a par with* claimants with a domestic scope (30,4%). In monetary politics and agriculture claimants with a EU scope are second on the list. In some cases specific states are prominent, such as actors with a German scope in the news on monetary politics, immigration and European integration (particularly in 1995); actors with a French scope in agriculture; actors with an American scope in troops deployment; actors with a Spanish scope in retirement and pension schemes; and actors with a British scope in education. Again, Europeanisation is *sector-bound*.

Identity of Addressees Most addressees are state and party actors (78,1%), followed at a great distance by civil society actors (10,6%), economic interest groups (6,4%), and media and journalists (1,1%). The government is the most important state actor (55,8%), in particular in European integration and in immigration. State and party actors are dominant in the set of addressees with a Dutch scope (39%) *and* addressees with a EU scope (25,9%). Economic interest groups dominate as addressed actors with a Dutch scope (74,6%). Likewise, civil society actors are mainly addressees as actors with a domestic scope (73,6%). Europeanisation has *not* spread here beyond traditional bastions of power (state and party actors and economic interest groups). However, the share of civil society actors increased since 1990, while the share of economic interest groups decreased. Again, this may indicate the *beginning* of a truly public sphere of communication.

Evaluation (criticism, support) The evaluation by claimants of addressed media and journalists is slightly more unfavourable (-0,36) than evaluation of addressed state and party actors (-0,32), while economic interest groups and other civil society actors are evaluated in the least negative sense. In the category of state and party actors, the evaluation of *politicians* (-0,63), political parties, former states (wo)men and the judiciary turn out to be quite negative. In the category of economic interest groups, evaluation of trade unions is most negative (-0,62). The result about media and journalists deviates from an authoritative study of the Dutch Social Planning Bureau (2000) about popular trust in institutions. According to this study television, radio and press rank first. However, the result about politicians confirms this study. Political parties rank lowest (although the Dutch trust in politicians is higher than the trust of Belgian, German, French, British, Danish and Italian respondents).

The evaluation by claimants of actors with a Dutch scope is moderately unfavourable (-0,34), while the evaluation of actors with a German scope is more negative (-0,49) and the evaluation of actors with a EU scope is less negative (-0,26). The scores of actors with a European scope in a wide sense (non-EU, old and new EU) are all negative (-0,8 for ex-CIS countries), while the scores of supranational actors, Switzerland and Japan are positive. The evaluation of the United States is neutral. Evaluation of French actors is slightly less negative than evaluation of German actors, which is against the anti-French self-image of many Dutch politicians, diplomats and journalists. Evaluation of supranational actors is more positive than of American actors, evaluation of American actors is more positive than of EU actors, while evaluation of EU is more positive than of separate EU member states.

By and large, the results with respect to evaluation suggest that Europe is becoming a *new conflict dimension* in Dutch society and politics, after four decades of permissive consensus.

Identity of Addressees Continued The three most important addressed actors are Dutch ones, EU ones and USA ones. In European integration and monetary politics the EU is the most important addressee (50,6% and 38,3%), which suggests Europeanisation. There is a slight decrease of the share of addressees with a Dutch scope (from 50% in 1990 to 44% in 2002). There is major increase of European actors (from 8,4% to 25,2% with a peak in 2000). Both the share of multilateral and American actors decreased. All this *strongly* indicates the process of Europeanisation.

Claims in policy fields The composition of claims in the Netherlands has been *dynamic* and *event-driven* since 1990 (events such as German unification). Claims with respect to European integration and monetary politics increased strongly, while claims with respect to immigration and retirement and pension schemes increased weakly. Claims with respect to agriculture, troops deployment, and education decreased strongly. European integration engendered a peak of claims in 2000. Its share of claims is highest (25,6%), followed by the share of education (19%) and monetary politics (15,1%). The share of retirement and pension schemes is lowest (2,9%).

Issues The main issues in the field of monetary politics in Dutch newspapers since 1990 are interest rate adjustments (decreasing), introduction of a common currency (increasing, with a peak in 2000), and the rules of EMU (*idem*). Main issues with respect to agriculture are subsidy reform, quotas, BSE, and other diseases. Main issues with respect to immigration are expulsions, migration programs and quotas, and actions relating to smuggling and illegal entries. Main issues with respect to troops deployment are peace-keeping, military aggression on foreign sovereign territory, invasion of such territory, and the rescue of civilians beyond borders facing aggression. Main issues with respect to retirement and pension schemes are ageing, age of retirement, and private pensions. Main issues with respect to education are resource allocation and salaries, revisions of curricula, and scholarships and fees.

Main issues with respect to European integration are the role of specific countries (such as Austria during the Haider ban in 2000) and the balance of power in the European Union, Eastern enlargement, and personal issues with respect to the

success or failure of Dutch candidates for prominent EU positions. *Non-issues* here are the relationship between European institutions and the public, the definition of EU core competences, and associational agreements of the EU. The budget of the EU is becoming more important over the years, partly because of the growing willingness of Dutch governments and ministers to complain about net fiscal losses of the Dutch member state. The general nature of European integration as well as the identity of the EU are minor issues. This striking result may be related to the pragmatic approach of European cooperation by generations of Dutch policy-makers and opinion leaders.

Most issues in Dutch newspapers have a *European* scope (41,35). Other main issue scopes are the Netherlands itself (28,7%), bilateral and multilateral actors (7,6% and 6,7%), and supranational actors (the UN 5,6%, other supranational actors 2,6%). This indicates the *international outlook* of actors in the public sphere of the Netherlands. Issues with a EU scope are most frequent in the fields of European integration (90,5%), monetary politics (76,3%), and agriculture (43,2%). These are least frequent in education and troops deployment, while intermediate in retirement and pension schemes as well as immigration. The degree of EU scope as compared to Dutch scope is striking in monetary politics, agriculture and European integration. All this roughly conforms the hypothesis that the degree of Europeanisation of the public sphere reflects the degree of penetration of European regulation in certain national fields of public policy.

As to the *scope* of issues in Dutch claim making since 1990, three changes must be singled out. Firstly, the share of issues with a EU scope increased steadily from 15,9% in 1990 to 51,7% in 2002. Secondly, the share of issues with a domestic scope decreased steadily from 33,1 % in 1990 to 27,5% in 2002. Finally, issues with a bilateral and multilateral scope decreased from respectively 11% and 18,8% in 1990 to 4,9% and 6,4% in 2002. Again, the results reveal Europeanisation of foreign news next to a *stable* share of national news issues.

As to issues with a *EU scope*, in the field of monetary politics issues with a EU scope *increased very strongly* from 26,3% in 1990 to 88,9% in 2002, while issues with a Dutch scope *decreased strongly* from 15,8% in 1990 to 2,8% in 2002. This top-down Europeanisation is one of our most striking results in the Dutch case. A similar trend can be observed in the field of retirement and pension schemes, although the validity of this result is affected by the low volume of data (N).

Agriculture differs from monetary politics with regard to the *annual oscillation* of issues with a EU scope. Here actors with a EU scope are dominant in the sub-issues of subsidy reform, subsidies in the setting of Eastern enlargement, subsidies in the setting of international trade, and the Foot and Mouth Disease. Actors with a UK scope are dominant in Foot and Mouth Disease, while actors with a French scope are important in BSE. The impact of France and the United Kingdom, though low in terms of absolute numbers of cases (N's), means that news from the country of origin of certain epidemic diseases *spills over* to domestic news and politics in the Netherlands. This suggests horizontal convergence through cross-national diffusion of problems and conflicts.

Immigration differs from other fields because issues with a domestic scope *increased* from 19,2% in 1990 to 47,5% in 2002, a unique result in our study. Furthermore, the increase of immigration issues with a EU scope has been *erratic*.

Troops deployment and education differ because of the *absence* of actors with a EU scope, except for the year 1995 in troops deployment (the Yugoslavian crisis, including the Srebrenica crisis in Dutch politics). Issues with supranational, multilateral and bilateral scopes are dominant in troops deployment. Issues with a domestic scope are dominant in education, despite some slight decrease since the peak year 1990.

In the field of European integration issues with a European scope increased *very strongly* from 26,8% in 1990 to 98,8% in 2002, combined with an increase of issues with some European supranational scope, disappearance of issues with some other supranational scope, and the *total absence* of issues with a domestic or one-country scope after German unification in 1990.

Evaluation of European integration The overall evaluation of European integration by claimants in Dutch newspapers is *moderately favourable*, ranging from +0,40 in 1990 to + 0,24 in 2002. The trend of *steadily decreasing* positive evaluation in the general picture is also visible in monetary politics, immigration, and retirement and pension schemes. There are no trends in the assessment of agriculture (slightly favourable), troops deployment and education. There is a large spread of evaluations in most cases. Yet this result confirms the hypothesis of the end of permissive consensus in the Netherlands.

All types of actors evaluate European integration *moderately favourable*, ranging from +0,33 (state and party actors), +0,22 (civil society actors), and +0,19 (media and journalists) to +0,10 (economic interest groups). Within the category of state and party actors the score of the government (+0,38) is a telling one, just as the high score of employers' associations in the category of economic interest groups (+0,43). Economists and financial experts *disagree* with the government and the employers' associations (-0,10). The score of trade unions is positive, yet based on a very low volume of (+0,60, 5 actors). This result may be related to the gap since the mid-1990s between the enthusiastic Dutch establishment and the critical Dutch community of economists as to the short-run social benefits of EMU membership and the euro.

Actors with a domestic, EU, German, other pre-1995 EU member and British scope evaluate European integration quite favourably in Dutch news, although actors with a British scope are virtually neutral (respectively: +0,20, +0,41, +0,42, +0,22 and +0,1). Negative scores are attributed to actors with a UN, Middle East, Russian, Italian and multilateral scope. German actors are slightly more positive than EU actors.

Evaluation of European integration by Dutch political parties The total scores of evaluation by Dutch parties range from +1 (SP, radical socialists), +0,56 (Groenlinks, greens), +0,33 (CDA, Christian democrats), + 0,29 (VVD, conservative liberals), and +0,27 (PvdA, social democrats) to +0,26 (D66, social liberals). The *overall positive* sign makes a lot of sense, particularly in the case of the greens. Yet on the basis of common knowledge and interviews with party politicians one would expect a negative

sign for the SP (against European neoliberalism and federalism), a more positive sign of D66 close to the score of the greens, and less differences between Christian democrats and social democrats than between these traditional pro-Europe parties and the VVD (recently more Euro-sceptic in a Dutch perspective). The scores of three different *party coalitions* are more in line with common knowledge and our own interviews. The coalition CDA/VVD/LPF, shortly in power in the year 2002 (with the LPF as a new right-wing populist party), is much more negative than the coalition PvdA/VVD/D66, in power in the period 1994-2002 (-0,60 compared to 0,11). Note that the coalition CDA/PvdA is neutral with respect to European integration. After the most recent general elections (January 2003), the leaders of these parties did not succeed in their effort to make a cabinet. The European course of the present government (CDA/VVD/D66) seems to be mildly negative, though less negative than the short-lived government with the populists.

Object actor alias *cui bono?* In the field of monetary policy, central banks and the government are most often referred to as objects of claimants whose interests are involved in the setting of the European Union (respectively 9,7% and 6,9%). In agriculture, the most important object actors are farmers' associations (71,2%) and consumer associations (3,4%). In immigration, the most important object actors are immigrants' associations (87,1%). In troops deployment the military come first (43,5%). In retirement and pension schemes associations of the elderly (33,3%), unions (27,3%) and associations of women (6,1%) are most important. In education students (57,2%) and educational associations (32,9%) are most important. In European integration the government is the most important object actor (29,3%). Most of these results seem *self-evident*.

The impact of the European Union on the quality of whole *polities* is considered to be most strong in European integration (48,1%) and troops deployment (44,6%). The impact of the EU on the quality of whole *economies* is considered to be most strong in monetary politics (51%), education (6,1%) and agriculture (5,1%). The general *public* does not play a crucial role as objects of claimants in Dutch newspapers, except for *monetary politics* (5,5%).

As to state and party actors, the *government* is the single most important object of claimants in the Netherlands (10,5%). As to interest groups, *farmers' associations* are the single most important object. As to other civil society actors, *students* and *immigrants' associations* are most important objects (respectively 12,5% and 12,3%). Generally, *civil society actors* are the most important object (34,8%), followed by state and party actors, and economic interest groups, while media and journalists are virtually absent. There are no general trends here, except the steady rise of civil society actors since 1990. We selected the field of immigration for its sovereignty dimension. Yet the object "whole polity" is lacking here. It is present in European integration and troops deployment.

The alleged effects of claims in the EU setting on whole economies, whole polities, the general public as well as civil society actors are all *positive* (respectively +0,48, +0,32, +0,23 and +0,20). The effects on certain civil society actors are quite positive, such as in the case of educational associations (+0,43) and students (+0,37). The effects of claims on some other separate actors are *surprisingly neutral*, for example in the case of the government (-0,05), the military (+0,16), farmers' associations

(+0,13) and immigrants' associations (-0,17). *Strongly negative evaluations of interest affected by the EU seem missing in the news coverage of Dutch newspapers.* Negative scores entail politicians, former statespersons, the legislative branch, central banks, political parties, churches, professionals and rebel forces. However, these scores are based on low volumes (N's). Generally, the relative absence of civil society actors at the level of claimants and the relative presence of these actors at the level of objects suggests that civil society actors are *used as legitimisation* of policies by politicians and policy-makers.

The general evaluation of the impact of claims in the EU setting on the interests of main actors is *close to neutral* in the Netherlands (+0,19). It is mildly positive with respect to the interest of the government (+0,29) and close to neutral with respect to the interests of the EU (+0,20) and multilateral actors (+0,19). The score of the United States (+0,25) is higher than that of the EU. Negative scores involve Germany, Italy, other pre-1995 EU member states, Turkey, Russia and the Middle East. Yet they are based on low volumes. Generally, these results seem to conform the impression of a *mild* climate of opinion with regard to European affairs in the Netherlands. There is neither broad European idealism nor broad European scepticism.

In the field of monetary politics, the most important object actors of claimants in terms of *scope* are the EU (39,3%), the Netherlands (23,4%) and the United States (9%). In agriculture the important object actors are the Netherlands (52,5%), the EU (31,4%), and the United Kingdom (3,4%). In immigration the important object actors are multilateral actors (41,3%), the Netherlands and pre-1995 EU member states (both 12,7%). In troops deployment the most important actors are the Middle East (22,8%), the Netherlands (14,7%) and the United Nations (13,6%). In retirement and pension schemes the most important actors are the EU (66,7%), Spain (9,1%) and the EU (6,1%). In education the most important actor is the Netherlands (93%). In European integration the most important actors are the EU (46,8%), Austria/Finland/Sweden (15,6%) and the rest of the world (7,4%). Monetary politics and agriculture are *street lengths ahead* in terms of Europeanisation here. Furthermore, domestic articulation of interests (self-interest and the interest of others) remains pervasive, particularly in the fields of education, retirement and pension schemes *and agriculture* (which suggests renationalisation of mobilisation and communication). The fields of European integration, immigration and troops deployment are much more internationalised in this respect.

Generally, the Netherlands (35,4%) *and* the EU (20,1%) are the most important actors with some scope as objects of claims, that is, as focus in articulation of affected interests. The rest is much less important, except for actors with a multilateral scope (8,6%) and the Middle East (4,8%). The standing of the Netherlands is remarkably *constant* since 1990, while the standing of the EU has increased substantively from 8% in 1990 to 26,7% in 2002. Again, a nice indicator of balanced Europeanisation of the public sphere in a small member state.

1b On Framing

Frequency of framing In more than half of the Dutch cases (54,4%) there are *no clear frames* (conceptual frameworks, basic conceptions) of the EU. In the fields of retirement and pension schemes the lack of framing is even overwhelming (100%). Elsewhere the lack of framing is less overwhelming but still striking: nearly 70% in agriculture and immigration; more than 60% in troops deployment, and nearly 56% in monetary politics. A majority of state and party actors and of economic interest groups do *not* conceive the European setting of society and politics in terms of frames. However, *most* actors in the Netherlands do use frames with respect to European integration in general (51,3%). So there must be something in integration itself that promotes framing. Furthermore, a majority of media and journalists as well as civil society actors do use frames. Perhaps the most striking is the popularity of frames among *media and journalists* (66,7%), compared to state and party actors (40,8%) and economic interest groups (37,5%). We cannot tell at this stage of research why journalists are more able and/or willing to frame the EU than politicians and lobbyists in the Dutch case.

Kinds of frames The most important frames of the European setting of society and politics in Dutch newspapers are the frame of *identity and values and norms* (27%), the frame of *constitution-making and governance* (26,7%), and the *economic* frame alias the frame of *economism* (24,8%). The third place of the economic frame is a surprising result in an old “nation of shopkeepers”. Instrumental frames, historical frames and frames internal to the process of integration (the topical politics shaped by the institutional and policy order of the EU itself and made within that order) are all much less important. State and party actors use all three most important frames more often than others do *plus* instrumental frames other than economism. Economic interest groups use economic frames more often. Media and journalists use constitutional frames more often.

Frames in policy fields The identity frame is dominant in immigration and most important in troops deployment and European integration. The constitutional frame is most important in European integration, *and* in agriculture and education. Instrumental frames other than economism are important in immigration and agriculture. Historical frames are important in troops deployment (50%) *and* education (25%), although there are too few cases here to make general statements. *Frames internal to the process of European integration are unimportant in the Netherlands.* In monetary politics the general sequence of frames is reversed: economic frames are most important (59,2%), then constitutional frames (17,8%), and finally identity frames (13,2%).

Evolution of frames The dynamics of frames is limited in the Dutch case. The most important frame (identity, values and norms) is highest in 2000 (30,7%) and lowest in 2002 (21,2%). The second frame (constitution and governance) is highest in 2001 (31,1%) and lowest in 2002 (20,4%). The third frame (economy) is highest in 2002 (37,2%) and lowest in 1990 (17,8%). All this points at a recent upturn of *economism* (interests) at the cost of *nationalism* (passions) and *constitutionalism* (principles). This upturn is confirmed by recent moves in the European course of Dutch governments. Instrumental frames other than economism diverge between 17,8% in 1990 and 2,7% in 2001. Historical frames diverge between 16,2% in 2001 and 4,7%

in 2000. Internal frames, related to topical politics of the EU, diverge between 6,9% in 2000 (the Treaty of Nice) and 1,2% in 1995.

Important viewpoints of frames Viewpoint *number one* in the Netherlands concerns *efficiency and competence*, an item in the frame of constitution-making and governance. In the *top five* three viewpoints concern the *economic* frame. In the *top ten* five viewpoints concern the *economic* frame. The *top twenty* is more *balanced* with six identity viewpoints, six economic viewpoints and five constitutional viewpoints. In the *top twenty-seven* *identity* viewpoints are the winner (eleven scores), while both historical and internal viewpoints are the losers (both one score). Most results confirm the *pragmatic* approach to European integration of Dutch elites and citizens since 1945.

The number one *negative ethical* viewpoint of the activity and identity of the EU in the Netherlands concerns *costs*, an item which is part and parcel of the economic frame. Four other viewpoints here belong to the constitutional frame, three to the identity frame, and one to the economic frame.

The number one *negative factual* viewpoint of the activity and identity of the EU in the Netherlands concerns a lack of *efficiency and competence*, an item in the constitutional frame. Five other viewpoints here are part of the constitutional frame as well, four viewpoints are part of the identity frame.

The number one *positive ethical* viewpoint of the activity and identity of the EU in the Netherlands concerns the presence of *efficiency and competence*, an item in the constitutional frame. Three other viewpoints belong to the economic frame, two to the identity frame, two to the constitutional frame, and one to the instrumental frame other than economism.

The number one *positive factual* viewpoint of the activity and identity of the EU in the Netherlands concerns *community of values*, an item in the identity frame. Four other viewpoints here belong to the economic frame, two to the constitutional frame, and one to the identity frame.

2 CONCLUSIONS

2a Levels of Europeanisation in the Netherlands

Europeanisation may be vertical, consisting of direct references to the European Union or to other European-level actors. Europeanisation may also be horizontal, consisting of references to other European member states. Europeanisation needs to be compared to other trends in the public sphere, namely nationalisation (references to other domestic actors) and internationalisation or globalisation (references to non-European actors abroad).

A number of results reveals *vertical* Europeanisation. These include:

- The importance of countries with EU seats as location of claims: on average 13,8 %, compared to 52,1% of claims from the Netherlands itself; in 2002 17,9%, compared to 53,2% of claims from the Netherlands.
- The importance of claimants with a European scope in monetary politics: on average 20,5%, compared to 38% of Dutch claimants; in 2002 20,8%, compared to 50% of Dutch claimants.
- The importance of claimants with a European scope in European integration: on average 30,1%, compared to Dutch claimants of 30,4% (so nearly equal); in 2002 26,3%, compared to 32,5% of Dutch claimants.
- The relatively large share of addressees with a EU scope: on average 21,9%, compared to 43,8% of Dutch addressees and 4,1% of USA addressees; in 2002 25,2%, compared to 40,5% of Dutch addressees and 3,1% of USA addressees.
- The dominant share of addressees with a EU scope in European integration (50,6%) and monetary politics (38,3%) (such addressees are also important in agriculture: 24,6%).
- The dominance of issues with a EU scope (41,3%, compared to 28,7% of domestic issues, 5,6% UN issues and 1,2% USA issues).
- The dominance of issues with a EU scope in European integration (92%), monetary politics (76,3%) and agriculture (43,2%). And finally
- the relatively large share of object actors of claims (those whose interests are at stake) with a EU scope, namely 20,1% compared to 35,4% of object actors with a domestic scope and 8,6% of multilateral object actors.

Another number of results concerns *horizontal* Europeanisation:

- The importance of other member states as location of claims (20,7% plus 1,2% claims from upcoming enlargement countries), compared to 1,5% of claims from other European countries and 7,9 % of claims from states elsewhere in the world.
- The ranking of the French president Chirac as the leading spokesperson in Dutch newspapers.
- The limited presence of issues with a specific member state scope (an low total average of 12,5% plus 1% of issues concerning upcoming enlargement countries and 1% issues concerning other European countries (CIS)).
- The low but meaningful presence of German issues in monetary politics (2,4%), French issues in agriculture (5,8%), German issues in immigration (3%), Spanish issues in pensions (55), British issues in education (1,2%).
- The absence of references to issues related to specific member states in European integration.
- The limited presence of object actors with a member state scope in general (11,6%, plus 1,5% from upcoming enlargement countries and 3,9% from other European countries (CIS). And finally
- the low but meaningful presence of German object actors in monetary politics (6,2%), British object actors in agriculture (3,4%), German object actors in immigration (2%), Spanish object actors in pensions (9,1%, British object actors in education (1,2%) and object actors from Austria, Finland and Sweden in European integration (15,6%).

By and large, we may conclude that vertical Europeanisation of the Dutch public sphere is much stronger than horizontal Europeanisation.

2b Trends in the Europeanisation of public claim-making

Europeanisation is essentially a development in time. Generally, it is to be expected that a shift of competence, power, choice and conflict from the level of the national state to the level of European institutions will be followed by Europeanisation of the public sphere of society and politics within the member states. One would expect then more Europeanisation of traditional fields of European regulation such as monetary policy and agricultural policy than of new fields of European regulation such as education policy and social policy for the elderly, while policy fields which are partly global and partly part of the traditional core area of national state control, such as defence policy (troops deployment) and policies of border control (immigration policy), will be intermediate as far as Europeanisation of the public sphere is concerned. Does the Dutch case confirm any of these expectations and forecasts?

A number of results concern Europeanisation of policy fields:

- The increase of claims from countries with EU seats from 6,1% in 1990 to 17,9% in 2002 (compared to the smaller increase of claims from the Netherlands itself from 47,3% in 1990 to 53,2% in 2002).
- The increase of claims from other pre-1995 EU members (such as Belgium) *next to* the decrease of claims from the big three member states Germany, France and the United Kingdom.
- The increase of claimants with a EU scope in monetary politics from 5,3% in 1990 to 20,8% in 2002.
- The increase of claimants with a EU scope in agriculture from 15% in 1990 to 18,8% in 2002 *next to* the decrease of claimants with a Dutch scope here in most years.
- The increase of claimants with a EU scope in European integration from 7,9% in 1990 to 26,3% in 2002 *next to* the decrease of claimants with a Dutch scope here from 42,1% in 1990 to 32,5% in 2002.
- The *decrease* of claimants with a EU scope in immigration from 3,8% in 1990 to 3,4% in 2002.
- The increase of claimants with a UK scope in troops deployment from 1,8% to 9,7% in 2002 (the single example of Europeanisation in this field, indeed of horizontal Europeanisation).
- The absence of any trend of Europeanisation over the years in the fields of pensions and education.
- The increase of addressees with a EU scope from 8,4% in 1990 to 25,2 in 2002 (with a peak in 2000), compared to *decrease* of addressees with Dutch, multilateral and USA scopes.
- The increase of claims in the period 1990-2002 in monetary politics, immigration, pensions and European integration, compared to the decrease of claims in agriculture, troops deployment and education (a mixed result).
- The increase of issues with a EU scope from 17,1% in 1990 to 51,7% in 2002, compared to the *decrease* of issues with a Dutch scope from 33,1% in 1990 to 27,5% in 2002 (likewise issues with a bilateral and multilateral scope

decreased, while issues with a specific member state scope, such as Germany, remained stable yet by and large marginal).

- The increase of issues with a EU scope in monetary politics (from 26,3% in 1990 to 88,9% in 2002!), agriculture (from 57,5% in 1990 to 81,3% in 2002), pensions (from 0% in 1990 to 16,7% in 2002) and European integration (from 36,8% in 1990 to 98,8% in 2002), compared to erratic trends in immigration and complete absence of European issues in troops deployment and education.
- The increase of object actors with a EU scope, from 8% in 1990 to 26,7% in 2002, compared with a stable dominant share of object actors with a Dutch scope and stable marginal shares of member states, whether large or small.

In sum, monetary politics, agriculture and European integration are the fields that display strong and coherent Europeanisation in the period 1990-2002, in particular of vertical Europeanisation. There is, however, no sharp distinction here between troops deployment and immigration on the one hand and pensions and education on the other. There are occasional indicators of Europeanisation in each of these fields, but there is no general trend of Europeanisation in each of them. In some cases, specific member states are crucial, such as Spain the field of pensions and retirement schemes.

2c Support of, and opposition to European integration and European institutions

According to the self-image of Dutch diplomacy and political leadership, the conventional wisdom of diplomats and leaders of other member states, as well as the empirical comparative research of scholars, the Dutch course of European integration is steady, consensual and marked by an absence of intractable conflicts and bitter contestations in Dutch society and politics. However, many participants and observers have raised the question whether this relative state of harmony will continue in the light of the growing penetration of European law in all member states, the relative decline of old small member states like the Netherlands in an enlarged European Union and the growth of political dissatisfaction and populism in Western politics at the backdrop of globalisation, new unemployment, slow economic growth in Western Europe and the rise of terror as a threat of the social fabric of European nations. So, what does the Dutch case study tell us about continuity and breaks in the Dutch pattern of broad support of elites and constituencies and low opposition?

A number of results suggests a change in the pattern of support and opposition in the Netherlands compared to the old regime of harmony:

- The evaluation by claimants of actors with a EU scope is moderately negative (-0,26 on a scale ranging from -1 to +1), although their evaluation of actors with a Dutch scope is even more negative (-0,34). The scores of actors with a European scope in a wide sense (old and new EU, European but not-EU) are all negative, with rather high scores of Spain (-0,75), Italy and the United Kingdom (-0,57) and a higher negative score of Germany (-0,48) than of France (-0,43). The evaluation of supranational actors, Switzerland and Japan are positive. The evaluation of actors with a US scope is slightly negative (-0,04), yet far less negative than of European member states.

- Overall evaluation of European integration (again on a scale ranging from full opposition of -1 to full support of +1) decreased from 0,40 in 1990 to 0,29 in 2002. Evaluation of monetary policy decreased in the same period from 0,59 to 0,17, while evaluation of agricultural policy remained constant but low (from 0,17 in 1990 to 0,15 in 2002). In immigration policy, evaluation decreased from 0,50 to 0,34, while evaluation remained constant and zero in troops deployment policy. In pensions policy, evaluation decreased from 1 to 0,14, while evaluation remained rather constant and zero in education policy.
- All actor types evaluate European integration moderately positive, ranging from +0,33 (state and party actors), +0,22 (civil society actors), and +0,19 (media and journalists) to +0,10 (economic interest groups). Within the category of state and party actors the government score is a telling one (+0,38). Within the category of civil society actors, there is a number of negative scores (churches, campaign organizations) and neutral ones (educational associations, students, migrants associations, solidarity and human rights associations, welfare and environmental associations). Within the category of economic interest groups, the score of employers' associations is striking (+0,43). The positive evaluation of employers compared to the negative one of economic experts as well as the positive evaluation of the government compared to the less positive one of journalists are both remarkable.
- Among Dutch political parties, there is generally strong support for European integration without much internal polarisation. The scores are +1 (Socialists), +0,56 (Greens), +0,33 (Christian democrats), +0,29 (conservative liberals), +0,27 (social democrats) and +0,26 (social liberals). However, support is decreasing in the case of the social democrats from +0,40 in 1990 to +0,14 in 2002), the Christian democrats (from +0,67 to -0,21), the social liberals (from +0,50 to +0,40) and the greens (from 1 to +0,75).
- Overall evaluation of the object actor's interests and resources by claimants (-1 in the case of worsening, +1 in the case of improvement) is close to neutral in the Netherlands, namely +0,19. It is mildly positive with respect to the government (+0,29), and close to neutral with respect to the EU (+0,20) and multilateral actors (+0,19). Negative scores here involve Germany, Italy, other pre-1995 EU members, Turkey, Russia and the Middle East..

Summing up, we conclude, firstly, that the level of support of European integration and its institutions is still strong since the 1990s; secondly, that opposition is growing as part of a process of politicisation of European integration and related Dutch state policies; and thirdly, that the support of the government and employers' associations is relatively strong, while support of political parties is decreasing.

2.4 Who profits? The winners and losers of Europeanisation of public claim-making

The Dutch political tradition is marked by collegiality among state elites, accommodation between state elites and elites in the national economy and culture, and occasional outbursts of protest against elite corruption and weakness. The 1960s is the period of collapse of Dutch corporatism (the so-called pillarisation) and rise of participation of emancipated citizens and social movements. The elites

responded by opening up the political domain and turning to strategies of active communication in the public sphere. Generally, domestic politics such as politics of welfare state reform remained driven by the rules and understandings of consensual democracy (such as the social pacts between the government, trade unions and employers' associations), while European politics remained the business of high politics and high finance. Does our research confirm the elitist nature of Dutch politics of European policy-making or does it indicate gradual extension and renewal of participants at the backdrop of the interweaving of foreign and domestic politics in the process of European integration? Does it reveal a gap between a political class and ordinary citizens (a local democratic deficit of sorts) or penetration of European politics in the centre of national and local politics? Is the public sphere a closed one or does European membership since 1957 engender a modicum of internationalisation?

A number of results throw light on the impact of European integration on political (and social) integration or differentiation in the Netherlands:

- State and party actors are by far the most frequent claimants (66,7%), followed by civil society actors (13,5%), media and journalists (9,6%) and, finally economic interest groups (8,4%). The dominance of state and party actors is more prominent in troops deployment (84,5%), European integration (75,4%), immigration (69,5%), agriculture (65,8%), and monetary politics (60,9%) than in pensions (50%) and education (48,3%), the pair of fields of traditional national politics. The role of civil society actors is important in education (38,2%), immigration (20,4%) and pensions (17,5%). The role of economic interest groups is important in pensions (27,5%), agriculture (22,6%) and monetary policy (15%). The role of media and journalists is important in monetary politics (16,9%) and European integration (14,6%). So European integration seems to be the privileged domain of state and party actors, in some respects joined by media and journalists, while two of the most advanced fields of European integration bring in economic interest groups.
- Most claimants in Dutch newspapers are actors with a Dutch domestic extension (720). 53,7% of these are state and party actors, 19,8% are civil society actors, 14,5% are media and journalists, while 11,2% are economic interest groups. Claimants with a EU scope are numerous (170). 96,5% of these are state and party actors. Claimants with a German scope come in third place (65), again including mostly state and party actors (70,8%). So the Dutch public sphere is part and parcel of an open society in which state and party actors (still) dominate international communication and mobilisation.
- Protest is not a frequent form of action in European integration (0,7%) and monetary politics (0,6%), although it is a bit less marginal in immigration (7,7%) and agriculture (5,5%). Actors with a national scope (2,8%) and a local scope (2,4%) use protest, but actors with a European Union scope do not (nor do actors with a bilateral, multilateral and supranational scope). So the access and contribution of civil society actors to domestic politics are still much wider than their access and contribution to two-level politics of European integration, while domestic politics is much more contentious than European politics.

In sum, we conclude that European politics is one of those domains of Dutch politics where traditional elitism is still flourishing and where – to put it differently – most

citizens and voluntary associations are spectators. This goes in tandem with a lack of manifest and society-wide conflict on European issues as well as substantive and growing coverage of these issues by printed media. European politics, law and administration do penetrate the public sphere of the Netherlands. Yet in many ways state actors and certain economic interest groups are much more involved than the rest. This phenomenon of political inequality must be taken into account in any plausible argument about the Dutch mode of the European democratic deficit. However, other data may well point into the other direction of democratic legitimacy (electoral support of large Europeanist parties over decades, majority approval of European membership and net benefits of European integration in public opinion polls over decades, lack of manifest and violent conflicts between the government and civil society about European issues over decades, and so on).

Part II: Commented Tables

1. Article-level

Table 1.1: Number of articles coded per year, total, full sample, European sample

	Full sample	European sample	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
1990	14,7%	8,5%	12,3%	166
1995	16,1%	8,9%	13,3%	179
2000	40,1%	28,5%	35,6%	480
2001		33,4%	13,0%)	176
2002	29,1%	20,7%	25,8%	348
Total	100,0% (N=822)	100,0% (N=527)	100,0%	1349

The newspapers in the Dutch sample are De Volkskrant (centre-left), Het Algemeen Dagblad (centre-right), De Telegraaf (tabloid) and De Leeuwarder Courant (regional paper, Friesland). The full sample includes both national and European claims. The European sample entails only claims with a European scope. 1990 and 1995 concerns De Volkskrant and Het Algemeen Dagblad. 2000 concerns all four papers. 2001 and 2002 concern De Volkskrant and Het Algemeen Dagblad.

Table 1.2: Articles by paper

	Frequency	Percentage
De Volkskrant	649	48,1
Het Algemeen Dagblad	541	40,1
Leeuwarder Courant	90	6,7
De Telegraaf	69	5,1
Total	1349	100,0

Comparisons between Dutch newspapers with respect to Europeanisation should be made between Het Algemeen Dagblad and De Volkskrant (the centre of the Dutch media space) and between De Leeuwarder Courant and De Telegraaf. Prima facie, the degree of Europeanisation of the latter papers (regional, tabloid) seems less advanced.

Table 1.3: Section from which articles were coded by paper

	De Volkskrant	Het Algemeen Dagblad	Leeuwarder Courant	De Telegraaf	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
Mixed international/national news	25,0%	15,7%	40,0%	37,7%	22,9%	309
Regional/local news			7,8%		,6%	7
Commentary pages	11,7%	3,0%	6,7%		7,3%	98
Business / Economy	21,0%	36,0%	10,0%	46,4%	27,6%	372
International news section	23,7%	21,3%	17,8%	13,0%	21,8%	294
National news section	18,3%	22,9%	17,8%	2,9%	19,3%	261
Other		,6%			,2%	3
No differentiation		,6%			,2%	3
Section unknown	,3%				,1%	2
Total	100,0% (N=649)	100,0% (N=541)	100,0% (N=90)	100,0% (N=69)	100,0%	1349

In the selection and coverage of news by Dutch papers the economy comes first, the national news comes last, while mixed international and national news and international news are intermediate. The centre-left paper and the regional paper rank mixed news first, while the centre-right paper and the tabloid rank economic news first.

Table 1.4a: Source of article by paper

	De Volkskrant	Het Algemeen Dagblad	Leeuwarder Courant	De Telegraaf	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
Own coverage: foreign correspondent's report	26,7%	27,4%	15,6%	59,4%	27,9%	376
Own coverage: article by national office editor or journalist	54,1%	62,8%	30,0%	36,2%	55,1%	743
National press agency	7,7%	3,9%	37,8%	1,4%	7,9%	106
Other EU press agency	6,5%	3,7%	14,4%	1,4%	5,6%	76
Non-EU press agency	1,2%	,7%	1,1%	1,4%	1,0%	14
Other national media source	,2%				,1%	1
Other EU media source	,8%	,2%	1,1%		,5%	7
Non-EU media source	,3%				,1%	2
Other source	2,6%	1,3%			1,8%	24
Total	100,0% (N=649)	100,0% (N=541)	100,0% (N=90)	100,0% (N=69)	100,0%	1349

The Dutch tabloid relies relatively stronger on its network of foreign correspondents. The regional paper relies relatively stronger on the national press agency, in particular the GPD (a joint venture of regional papers). The centre-right paper comes first as to coverage by its own journalists and office editors.

Table 1.4b: Source of article by year

	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
Own coverage: foreign correspondent's report	21,1%	23,5%	32,7%	31,3%	25,0%	27,9%	376
Own coverage: article by national office editor or journalist	57,2%	61,5%	50,0%	54,5%	58,0%	55,1%	743
National press agency	8,4%	5,6%	9,0%	5,7%	8,3%	7,9%	106
Other EU press agency	10,8%	2,8%	6,5%	2,8%	4,9%	5,6%	76
Non-EU press agency	1,8%	1,7%	0,8%		1,1%	1,0%	14
Other national media source		,6%				,1%	1
Other EU media source		2,2%	,4%		,3%	,5%	7
Non-EU media source	,6%	,6%				,1%	2
Other source		1,7%	,6%	5,7%	2,3%	1,8%	24
Total	100,0% (N=165)	100,0% (N=179)	100,0% (N=481)	100,0% (N=176)	100,0% (N=348)	100,0%	1349

Dutch newspapers rely steadily on own coverage. National press agencies (ANP, GPD) are slightly more important than press agencies in other European member states.

Table 1.5: Articles with and without claims

	Frequency	Percentage
No	79	5,9
Yes, but only already coded ones	5	,4
Yes, includes new claims	1265	93,8
Total	1349	100,0

2. Claim-level

General

Table 2.1: Number of claims coded per year: total, full sample, European sample

	Articles from full sample	Article from reduced European sample	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
1990	18,0%	11,0%	15,2%	341
1995	15,9%	8,8%	13,1%	294
2000	40,8%	33,1%	37,8%	846
2001	0	31,0%	12,1%	271
2002	25,4%	16,1%	21,8%	487
Total	100,0% (N=1364)	100,0% (N=875)	100,0%	2239

The number of claims in the Dutch samples is roughly 1.6 times larger than the number of articles.

Location

Table 2.2.a: Country where claim was made per year

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total Percentage	Total Freq.
Germany (incl. GDR)	8,2%	6,0%	3,1%	4,6%	4,8%	66
France	7,8%	4,1%	2,5%	2,3%	3,7%	50
UK	2,9%	5,5%	4,0%	1,4%	3,4%	46
Italy		,5%	,7%	1,4%	,7%	10
Spain	,8%	1,4%	,4%	1,7%	1,0%	13
Netherlands	47,3%	57,6%	51,4%	53,2%	52,1%	711
Other pre-1995 EU members	2,4%	,9%	6,1%	6,4%	4,7%	64
Austria, Finland, Sweden	,8%		2,9%	,3%	1,4%	19
EU seats	6,1%	6,9%	17,3%	17,9%	13,8%	188
Switzerland			,9%	,3%	,4%	6
Upcoming enlargement countries	1,2%	,5%	1,4%	1,4%	1,2%	17
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)	2,4%	5,1%	,4%	,6%	1,5%	21
Turkey		,5%			,1%	1
Russia (incl. USSR)	2,9%	,5%	,7%	,9%	1,1%	15
USA	7,8%	6,0%	1,4%	2,6%	3,6%	49
Japan	,8%	,5%	,5%	,3%	,5%	7
Middle East	5,3%		,7%	2,3%	1,8%	25
UN seats		,9%	1,4%	,6%	,9%	12
NATO seats	,8%	,9%	,5%		,5%	7
Rest of the world	2,4%	2,3%	3,6%	1,7%	2,7%	37
Total	100,0% (N=245)	100,0% (N=217)	100,0% (N=556)	100,0% (N=346)	100,0%	1364

More than half of the claims in Dutch newspapers are made in the Netherlands. The Dutch share is rather constant. A growing number of claims is made in countries with

EU seats, not to the detriment of claims made in the Netherlands but rather of claims made in other member states and the United States. This suggests Europeanisation of foreign news but not necessarily of Dutch news. Moreover, it suggests an increased focus on “Europe” to the detriment of the United States (vertical convergence from above). The most important countries of origin with respect to claims making are Germany, France and the United Kingdom as well as the United States. Italy and Spain are much less important. They are in a league with the Middle East and Russia. The aggregated set of other pre-1995 member states of the EU (including Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and some southern countries) constitutes a major source/site of claims. It indicates Europeanisation in the sense of horizontal convergence through cross-national diffusion.

Table 2.2.b: Country where claim was made by issue field

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration: entry and exit	Troops deployment	Retirement and pension schemes	Education	European Integration	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
Germany (incl. GDR)	8,2%	1,9%	8,4%	1,1%		,8%	8,0%	4,8%	66
France	2,9%	6,5%		4,8%	5,0%	1,2%	5,7%	3,7%	50
UK	6,8%	1,9%	3,0%	5,9%	2,5%	1,2%	2,6%	3,4%	46
Italy	1,9%	,6%	1,2%	,5%		,4%	,3%	,7%	10
Spain	1,4%	,6%	2,4%		7,5%	,4%	,3%	1,0%	13
Netherlands	38,6%	61,9%	59,9%	35,8%	77,5%	94,2%	26,6%	52,1%	711
Other pre-1995 EU members	1,0%	8,4%	5,4%	1,1%		,8%	10,3%	4,7%	64
Austria, Finland, Sweden	,5%		,6%	1,1%			4,3%	1,4%	19
EU seats	24,2%	15,5%	1,8%		2,5%	,4%	31,2%	13,8%	188
Switzerland			,6%		2,5%		1,1%	,4%	6
Upcoming enlargement countries	,5%	,6%		,5%			4,0%	1,2%	17
Other European countries (excl. CIS countries)		,6%	5,4%	5,3%			,3%	1,5%	21
Turkey				,5%				,1%	1
Russia (incl. USSR)		,6%		2,7%			2,6%	1,1%	15
USA	8,7%	,6%	2,4%	10,7%		,4%	1,4%	3,6%	49
Japan	3,4%							,5%	7
Middle East			3,0%	10,2%			,3%	1,8%	25
UN seats				6,4%				,9%	12
NATO seats				3,2%			,3%	,5%	7
Rest of the world	1,9%		6,0%	10,2%	2,5%	,4%	,6%	2,7%	37
Total	100,0% (N=207)	100,0% (N=155)	100,0% (N=167)	100,0% (N=187)	100,0% (N=40)	100,0% (N=259)	100,0% (N=349)	100,0%	1364

In the Dutch field of monetary politics the countries with EU seats and Germany *together* are almost as important as source of claims as the Netherlands itself. In European integration the countries with EU seats are more important than the Netherlands. They are also important in agriculture. However, they are totally unimportant in troops deployment. In European integration and in agriculture other pre-1995 EU member states are more important than Germany. The Dutch source of claims is largest in education, retirement and pensions, *and* agriculture and immigration. It is lowest in troops deployment and monetary politics. The United States is most important in respectively troops deployment, monetary politics and immigration. Other European countries (members of neither the EU nor the CIS) are important in immigration and troop deployment. The low volume of claims in the field of retirement and pensions qualifies each interpretation of this column of the table.

Table 3.1: Region in own country where claim as made by issue field

	Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	Agriculture: subsidy, livestock, quota, disease control	Immigration: entry and exit	Troops deployment	Retirement and pension schemes	Education	European Integration	Total percentage	Total Frequency
capital city	43,7%	7,3%	16,0%	14,9%	45,2%	19,3%	43,0%	23,8%	169
government seat	23,8%	51,0%	57,0%	67,2%	32,3%	38,1%	40,9%	43,7%	311
other four largest cities ¹	23,8%	14,6%	12,0%	6,0%	12,9%	18,4%	11,8%	15,3%	109
other locations	8,8%	27,1%	15,0%	11,9%	9,7%	24,2%	4,3%	17,2%	122
Total	100,0% (N=80)	100,0% (N=96)	100,0% (N=100)	100,0% (N=67)	100,0% (N=31)	100,0% (N=244)	100,0% (N=93)	100,0%	N=711

The capital city of the Netherlands is Amsterdam. The government seat is The Hague. Other large cities are Rotterdam, Utrecht, Eindhoven and Tilburg. Capital city and government seat together are the largest source of claims. The government seat is the most important national source of claims, except for monetary politics, retirement and pensions, and European integration. Amsterdam is the residence of the Dutch central bank and many main offices of Dutch corporations (including banks and insurance firms). Small towns in the countryside constitute a major source of claims in agriculture. The volumes of claims with respect to troops deployment and pensions are relatively low.

¹ Rotterdam, Utrecht, Eindhoven, Tilburg

Actors (claim makers)

Table 4.1: Actors of claims by issue field

		Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	Agriculture: Subsidy, livestock quota, disease control	Immigration: entry and exit	Troops deployment	Retirement and pension schemes	Education	European Integration	Total	
State and party actors	politicians	1,0%	,0%	4,2%	,5%	2,5%	,0%	3,4%	1,7%	23
	former states(women)	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,1%	,0%	,0%	1,1%	,4%	6
	government/executive	33,3%	48,4%	36,5%	56,7%	25,0%	29,3%	52,4%	42,5%	580
	legislative	1,4%	9,0%	11,4%	7,5%	10,0%	10,0%	10,0%	8,4%	115
	judiciary	,0%	,6%	4,2%	,0%	,0%	1,2%	,6%	1,0%	13
	police and internal security agencies	,5%	1,3%	6,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,0%	13
	military	,0%	,0%	1,2%	15,0%	,0%	,0%	,6%	2,3%	32
	central banks	21,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,9%	3,4%	47
	social security executive organizations	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	2,5%	,0%	,0%	,1%	1
	other state executive agencies	1,0%	4,5%	4,2%	,5%	10,0%	3,5%	4,0%	3,2%	44
	political parties	2,4%	1,9%	1,8%	3,2%	,0%	4,2%	2,3%	2,6%	36
Total		60,9%	65,8%	69,5%	84,5%	50,0%	48,3%	75,4%	66,7%	910

Economic interest groups	unions and employees	,0%	,0%	,6%	,5%	10,0%	4,6%	,0%	1,3%	18
	employers organizations and firms	1,9%	2,6%	3,0%	,0%	15,0%	4,6%	1,1%	2,6%	35
	farmers and agricultural organizations	,0%	19,4%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,6%	2,3%	32
	economists and financial experts	13,0%	,6%	,6%	,0%	2,5%	,0%	,0%	2,2%	30
Total		15,0%	22,6%	4,2%	,5%	27,5%	9,3%	1,7%	8,4%	115
Media and journalists	media and journalists	16,9%	5,8%	4,8%	8,0%	5,0%	4,2%	14,6%	9,6%	131
Other civil society actors	churches and religious organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,1%	,0%	,4%	,6%	,4%	5
	educational professionals and organizations	,0%	,0%	2,4%	,0%	,0%	22,0%	,0%	4,5%	61
	other scientific and research professionals and institutions	2,9%	1,9%	2,4%	1,1%	12,5%	8,5%	2,6%	3,7%	51
	students, pupils, and their parents	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	5,4%	,0%	1,0%	14
	other professional organizations and groups	,0%	,6%	,6%	1,1%	2,5%	1,2%	2,0%	1,1%	15

	consumer organizations and groups	1,4%	,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,3%	4
	migrant organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	10,2%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,2%	17
	pro- and anti-European campaign organizations & groups	,5%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,1%	1
	solidarity and human rights organizations	,0%	,0%	1,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,2%	3
	welfare organizations	,0%	,0%	,6%	,0%	,0%	,4%	,0%	,1%	2
	racist and extreme right organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,1%	1
	peace movement organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,0%	,5%	,0%	,4%	,0%	,1%	2
	women's organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	1,2%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,1%	2
	environmental organizations and groups	,0%	,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,3%	,1%	2
	other civil society organizations and groups	,5%	,0%	,6%	,0%	2,5%	,0%	,3%	,3%	4

Total		5,3%	3,9%	20,4%	3,7%	17,5%	38,2%	5,7%	13,5%	184
General/unknown/Unspecified	whole politics	,5%	1,9%	,0%	2,1%	,0%	,0%	2,0%	1,1%	15
	The general public	1,0%	,0%	,0%	,5%	,0%	,0%	,3%	,3%	4
	unknown/unspecified actors	,5%	,0%	1,2%	,5%	,0%	,0%	,3%	,4%	5
Total		1,9%	1,9%	1,2%	3,2%			2,6%	1,8%	24
Total all actors		207	155	167	187	40	259	349	1364	
		100,0% (N=207)	100,0% (N=155)	100,0% (N=167)	100,0% (N=187)	100,0% (N=40)	100,0% (N=259)	100,0% N=349	100,0% %	1364

State and party actors are the most frequent claimants in the Netherlands, followed by civil society actors, media and journalists, and, finally, economic interest groups. Economic interest groups are the second largest groups of claimants in the fields of retirement and pensions, agriculture and monetary politics. Other civil society actors are second in education and immigration. Media and journalists are second in European integration and monetary politics. Officials of the government (executive branch), legislative branch and central banking are the most important state and party actors. Employers' associations and firms are the most important interest group, followed by farmers associations, economic experts, and trade unions. Associations of educational professionals, scientists and immigrants are most important in the rest of civil society. In the field of monetary politics the government is most frequent, the central bank comes second, while economists come third. In agriculture this ranking entails the government, farmers associations, and finally the legislative branch. In immigration the ranking entails the government, the legislative branch and migrants' associations.

Table 4.2: Actor type by issue field

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops deployment	Retirement and pensions	Education	European Integration	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
Unorganized collectivity	5,8%	2,6%	7,2%	1,6%	2,5%	,8%	1,7%	2,9%	40
Named representative(s) of an unorganised collective	1,0%	1,3%	3,0%	1,1%		,8%	,6%	1,1%	15
Organization or institution	29,5%	36,1%	31,7%	32,1%	30,0%	31,7%	23,5%	29,8%	406
Anonymous spokesperson(s)	6,3%	1,9%	9,6%	8,0%	5,0%	2,7%	5,4%	5,5%	75
Named spokesperson(s)	57,5%	58,1%	48,5%	57,2%	62,5%	64,1%	68,8%	60,7%	828
Total	100,0% (N=207)	100,0% (N=155)	100,0% (N=167)	100,0% (N=187)	100,0% (N=40)	100,0% (N=259)	100,0% (N=349)	100,0%	1364

Named spokespersons and organizations are the most frequent claim makers in the Netherlands. In the domains of immigration and monetary politics unorganised groups play a minor role.

Table 4.3: Twenty-five most often mentioned spokespersons

	Frequency	Percentage
Chirac, Jacques	14	1,0
Brinkhorst, Laurens-Jan	13	1,0
Hermans, Loek	13	1,0
Ritzen, Jo	12	,9
Kok, Wim	11	,8
Duisenberg, Wim	11	,8
Zalm, Gerrit	10	,7
Adelmund, Karin	10	,7
Prodi, Romano	9	,7
Kohl, Helmut	8	,6
Van den Broek, Hans	8	,6
Bush, George sr.	8	,6
Van Aartsen, Jozias	7	,5
Van Mierlo, Hans	7	,5
Balkenende, Jan Peter	7	,5
Cohen, Job	6	,4
Annan, Kofi	6	,4
Bolkestein, Frits	6	,4
Michel, Louis	6	,4
Schröder, Gerhard	5	,4
Solbes, Pedro	5	,4
Van der Hoeven, Maria	5	,4
Garschagen, Oscar	5	,4
Wellink, Nout	5	,4
Bogaerts, Geert-Jan	4	,3
Others	319	47.1
Total	520	100

The leading spokesperson in Dutch newspapers is not a Dutchman but a Frenchman, to wit, the president of France. The second spokesperson is a Dutch minister of agriculture in 1998-2002. Third and fourth places are taken by ministers of education. Mr. Kok

(minister of finance in the period 1989-1993 and prime minister in the period 1993-2002) is the fifth most often mentioned spokesperson. In this table the domain of education is over-represented. Table 4.3b shows the ranking of spokespersons for cases with a European scope.

Table 4.3b Most often mentioned spokespersons for cases with a European scope, European sample days included

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	454	32,1	32,1	32,1
Duisenberg, Wim	28	2,0	2,0	34,1
Kok, Wim	24	1,7	1,7	35,8
Prodi, Romano	22	1,6	1,6	37,3
Zalm, Gerrit	16	1,1	1,1	38,5
Brinkhorst, Laurens-Jan	15	1,1	1,1	39,5
Schröder, Gerhard	14	1,0	1,0	40,5
Chirac, Jacques	13	,9	,9	41,4
Bogaerts, Geert-Jan	13	,9	,9	42,4
Fischler, Franz	12	,8	,8	43,2
Blair, Tony	12	,8	,8	44,1
Solbes, Pedro	11	,8	,8	44,8
Bolkestein, Frits	9	,6	,6	45,5
Verheugen, Günter	9	,6	,6	46,1
Kohl, Helmut	9	,6	,6	46,7
Van Aartsen, Jozias	9	,6	,6	47,4
Schüssel, Wolfgang	7	,5	,5	47,9
Michel, Louis	7	,5	,5	48,4
Patten, Chris	7	,5	,5	48,9
Santer, Jacques	7	,5	,5	49,4
Wellink, Nout	7	,5	,5	49,9
Haider, Jörg	7	,5	,5	50,4
Van Mierlo, Hans	6	,4	,4	50,8
Van den Broek, Hans	6	,4	,4	51,2

Lubbers, Ruud	6	,4	,4	51,6
Delors, Jacques	6	,4	,4	52,1

The number one spokesperson in the Dutch newspapers with respect to the EU is Mr. Duisenberg, the first president of the European Central Bank and a Dutchman, former president of the Dutch Central bank and minister of finance (PVDA, social democrats). Number two is Mr. Kok, prime minister of the Netherlands in 1993-2002, former minister of finance and former leader of the largest trade union (PVDA, social democrats). Mr. Zalm is minister of finance from 1993 till 2002 and again since 2003 (VVD, conservative liberals). Mr. Brinkhorst is minister of economic affairs since 2002 and a former minister of agriculture from 2000 till 2002 (D66, social liberals). Mr. Bogaerts is long-time correspondent of EU affairs in Brussels for De Volkskrant (center-left paper). Mr. Bolkestein is European commissioner since 1999 and the leader of the VVD during the 1990s (also a former minister of trade). Mr. Van Aertsen is the leader of the VVD in Dutch parliament since 2003 and former minister of agriculture (1993-1999) and of foreign affairs (1999-2002). Mr. Van Mierlo was representative of the Dutch government in the Convention on the Future of Europe (2001-2002). He is a former minister of foreign affairs (1993-1999) and former leader and founder of D66 (social liberals). Mr. Van den Brink was European commissioner (1993-1999) and minister of foreign affairs (1982-1993)(CDA, Christian democrats). Mr. Lubbers was prime minister of the Netherlands from 1982 till 2003.

Table 4.4: Actor scope by broad actor categories

	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society actors	General unknown/unspecified	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
Supranational: UN	100,0%					100,0%	20
Other supranational	91,7%			8,3%		100,0%	24
EU	96,5%	1,2%		1,8%	,6%	100,0%	170
Other European supranational	75,0%			25,0%		100,0%	4
Multilateral	21,1%	36,8%		21,1%	21,1%	100,0%	19
Bilateral	66,7%	16,7%		16,7%		100,0%	6
Germany	70,8%	9,2%	10,8%	7,7%	1,5%	100,0%	65
France	86,5%		5,4%	2,7%	5,4%	100,0%	37
UK	73,7%	7,9%	10,5%	7,9%		100,0%	38
Italy	85,7%			14,3%		100,0%	7
Spain	55,6%	11,1%		22,2%	11,1%	100,0%	9
Netherlands	53,7%	11,2%	14,5%	19,8%	,8%	100,0%	723

Other pre-1995 EU-members	78,8%	3,8%	9,6%	7,7%		100,0%	52
Austria, Finland, Sweden	94,4%	5,6%				100,0%	18
Switzerland	66,7%			16,7%	16,7%	100,0%	6
Upcoming enlargement countries	72,2%	11,2%		11,1%	5,6%	100,0%	18
Other European countries ex CIS	82,4%			17,6%		100,0%	17
Turkey	100,0%					100,0%	1
Russia	94,1%				5,9%	100,0%	17
USA	81,8%	7,3%	9,1%		1,8%	100,0%	55
Japan	71,4%	28,6%				100,0%	7
Middle East	71,4%		9,5%	9,5%	9,5%	100,0%	21
Rest of the world	65,4%		3,8%	23,1%	7,7%	100,0%	26
Total	66,9% (N=910)	8,2% (N=112)	9,6% (N=131)	13,5% (N=184)	1,7% (N=23)	100,0%	1360

The majority of claim makers in Dutch newspapers is formed by actors with a domestic organizational extension (720). Actors with a EU scope are numerous (170). Actors with a German scope come in third place (65). Actors with a domestic scope are plural: they include state and party actors (54%), civil society actors (20%), media and journalists (14%) and economic interest groups (11%). Actors with a German scope as most actors with a bilateral scope are equally plural. Actors with a EU scope, however, are nearly all state and party actors.

Table 4.5a-9: Actor scope by year, separate for each policy field

A Monetary politics

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
Other supranational	5,3%	5,3%		1,4%	2,0%	4
EU	5,3%	7,9%	30,3%	20,8%	20,5%	42
Multilateral			6,6%	1,4%	2,9%	6
Germany	26,3%	18,4%	3,9%	8,3%	10,2%	21
France		10,5%	1,3%		2,4%	5
UK		13,2%	6,6%	1,4%	5,4%	11
Italy		2,6%		4,2%	2,0%	4
Netherlands	31,6%	26,3%	34,2%	50,0%	38,0%	78
Other pre-1995 EU-members	5,3%		2,6%	1,4%	2,0%	4
Austria, Finland, Sweden			1,3%	1,4%	1,0%	2
Other European countries, ex CIS	5,3%				,5%	1
Russia	5,3%					1
USA	5,3%	13,2%	7,9%	8,3%	8,8%	18
Japan	10,5%	2,6%	5,3%		3,4%	7
Rest of the world				1,4%	,5%	1
Total	100,0% (N=19)	100,0% (N=38)	100,0% (N=76)	100,0% (N=72)	100,0%	205

In the Dutch field of monetary politics claimants with a domestic scope form the largest minority (38%), followed by claimants with a EU scope, those with a German scope, and those with a US scope. Actors with a Dutch scope, a EU scope and a US scope are all increasing, while actors with a German scope are decreasing. These changes are not linear. This seems to confirm the turn from horizontal to vertical Europeanisation. The drop of German actor scope suggests that German hegemony in monetary matters is taken over by the EU as a whole.

B Agriculture

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
Other supranational	7,5%				1,9%	3
EU	15,0%	8,0%	3,4%	18,8%	10,3%	16
Multilateral	2,5%	4,0%			1,3%	2
Germany	7,5%		1,7%	9,4%	4,5%	7
France			15,5%	6,3%	7,1%	11
UK			3,4%	3,1%	1,9%	3
Spain	2,5%				,6%	1
Netherlands	60,0%	88,0%	67,2%	56,3%	66,5%	103
other pre-1995 EU-members	2,5%		5,2%	3,1%	3,2%	5
Upcoming enlargement countries			1,7%		,6%	1
other European countries ex CIS			1,7%		,6%	1
Russia				3,1%	,6%	1
USA	2,5%				,6%	1
Total	100,0% (N=40)	100,0% (N=25)	100,0% (N=58)	100,0% (N=32)	100,0%	155

In the Dutch field of agriculture claimants with a domestic scope form the majority (66,5%), followed by actors with a EU scope and actors with a French scope. Actors with a Dutch scope seem to decrease in most years, while actors with a EU scope seem to increase in most years.

C Immigration

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
Supranational: UN		5,9%			,6%	1
Other supranational			3,1%		1,2%	2
EU	3,8%	5,9%		3,4%	2,4%	4
Multilateral	3,8%				,6%	1
Bilateral			3,1%		1,2%	2
Germany	19,2%	5,9%	4,7%	5,1%	7,2%	12
UK	3,8%		3,1%		1,8%	3
Italy			3,1%		1,2%	2
Spain			4,7%	1,7%	2,4%	4
Netherlands	26,9%	58,8%	57,8%	69,5%	57,2%	95
Other pre-1995 EU-members		5,9%	7,8%	6,8%	6,0%	10
Switzerland			1,6%		,6%	1
European countries, ex CIS	23,1%	5,9%		1,7%	4,8%	8
Russia	3,8%				,6%	1
USA			1,6%		,6%	1
Middle East	15,4%	11,8%		1,7%	4,2%	7
Rest of the world			9,4%	10,2%	7,2%	12
Total	100,0% (N=26)	100,0% (N=17)	100,0% (N=64)	100,0% (N=59)	100,0%	166

In the Dutch field of immigration claimants with a domestic scope are dominant (95%), followed by claimants with a German scope. There are no clear trends here. 1990 seems to be an exceptional year with respect to the low Dutch actor scope.

D Troops deployment

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
Supranational: UN	1,8%	9,6%	21,3%	6,5%	9,7%	18
Other supranational	1,8%	5,8%	10,6%		4,8%	9
Other European supranational	3,6%				1,1%	2
Multilateral	5,4%		2,1%	6,5%	3,2%	6
Bilateral	1,8%		2,1%		1,1%	2
Germany		1,9%		3,2%	1,1%	2
France	3,6%	3,8%			2,2%	4
UK	1,8%	1,9%	10,6%	9,7%	5,4%	10
Netherlands	23,2%	44,2%	31,9%	45,2%	34,9%	65
Upcoming enlargement countries	1,8%				,5%	1
Other European countries ex CIS		11,5%			3,2%	6
Turkey		1,9%			,5%	1
Russia	8,9%	3,8%			3,8%	7
USA	28,6%	11,5%		22,6%	15,6%	29
Middle East	14,3%		8,5%	3,2%	7,0%	13
Rest of the world	3,6%	3,8%	12,8%	3,2%	3,2%	11
Total	100,0% (N=56)	100,0% (N=52)	100,0% (N=47)	100,0% (N=31)	100,0%	186

In the Dutch field of troops deployment claimants with a domestic scope form the largest minority (35%), followed by actors with a USA scope and actors with a UN scope.

E Pensions

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
Supranational: UN			11,1%		2,5%	1
Other supranational		10,0%			2,5%	1
EU				11,1%	5,0%	2
Multilateral				5,6%	2,5%	1
France				5,6%	2,5%	1
Spain				16,7%	7,5%	3
Netherlands	100,0%	90,0%	77,8%	61,1%	75,0%	30
Rest of the world			11,1%		2,5%	1
Total	100,0% (N=3)	100,0% (N=10)	100,0% (N=9)	100,0% (N=18)	100,0%	40

In the Dutch field of pensions and retirement claimants with a domestic scope are dominant (75%), followed by actors with a Spanish scope (probably related to the substantial number of pensioned elderly from the Netherlands living in Spain) and actors with a EU scope. Actors with a Dutch scope are steadily decreasing. The low volume of claims here qualifies each interpretation of this table.

F Education

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
Other supranational		3,1%			,4%	1
EU			,9%		,4%	1
Bilateral	1,6%		,9%		,8%	2
Germany				1,9%	,4%	1
France	1,6%			1,9%	,8%	2
UK			2,7%		1,2%	3
Netherlands	95,2%	96,9%	93,7%	96,3%	95,0%	246
Other pre-1995 EU-members			1,8%		,8%	2
USA	1,6%				,4%	1
Total	100,0% (N=62)	100,0% (N=32)	100,0% (N=111)	100,0% (N=54)	100,0%	259

In the Dutch field of education claimants with a domestic scope are dominant (95%), followed by actors with a British scope. There are no clear trends here. Education remains almost completely national.

G European integration

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
Other supranational	10,5%				1,1%	4
EU	7,9%	23,3%	37,8%	26,3%	30,1%	105
Other European supranational	2,6%		,5%		,6%	2
Multilateral	5,3%	2,3%			0,9%	3
Germany	5,3%	16,3%	5,3%	3,8%	6,3%	22
France		2,3%	3,7%	7,5%	4,0%	14
UK	2,6%	7,0%	,5%	3,8%	2,3%	8
Italy			,5%		,3%	1
Spain				1,3%	,3%	1
Netherlands	42,1%	39,5%	25,0%	32,5%	30,4%	106
Upcoming enlargement countries	7,9%	4,7%	3,2%	6,3%	4,6%	16
Other pre-1995 EU-members		2,3%	9,6%	15,0%	8,9%	31
Austria, Finland, Sweden			8,0%	1,3%	4,6%	16
Switzerland			2,7%		1,4%	5
Other European countries ex CIS	2,6%				,3%	1
Russia	7,9%		1,6%	1,3%	2,0%	7
USA	5,3%		1,6%		1,4%	5
Middle East				1,3%	,3%	1
Rest of the world		2,3%			1,3%	1
Total	100,0% (N=38)	100,0% (N=43)	100,0% (N=188)	100,0% (N=80)	100,0%	349

In the Dutch field of European integration claimants with a domestic scope form the largest minority (30,4%), virtually *on a par* with actors with a EU scope (30,1%). The former actors seem to decrease in most years, while the latter seem to increase in most years. The German actor scope in 1995 is striking. It may be related to the pivotal role of Germany in bargaining about EMU and Eastern enlargement.

Action forms

Table 5.1a: Forms of action by issue field

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops deployment	Retirement and pensions	Education	European Integration	Total Percentage	Total Frequency
Political decision	14,6%	17,8%	10,1%	15,7%	15,8%	7,7%	9,8%	12,0%	148
Executive action		2,7%	8,8%	12,2%		1,2%	,3%	3,5%	43
Judicial action		2,7%	1,9%			,8%	,3%	,8%	10
Non-specified statement	53,2%	43,2%	47,8%	35,5%	42,1%	46,8%	45,8%	45,4%	559
Other verbal statement	22,2%	17,1%	10,7%	18,6%	31,6%	30,2%	30,0%	23,4%	288
Meeting	9,4%	11,0%	13,8%	18,0%	10,5%	11,3%	12,5%	12,5%	154
Direct-democratic action							,7%	,2%	2
Protest action	,6%	5,5%	6,9%			2,0%	,7%	2,2%	27
Total	100,0% (N=171)	100,0% (N=146)	100,0% (N=159)	100,0% (N=172)	100,0% (N=38)	100,0% (N=248)	100,0% (N=297)	100,0%	1231

In the Netherlands the most popular forms of actions are respectively non-specified statements, other verbal statements, meeting and political decisions. Important others forms are political decisions in the domains of monetary politics, agriculture, troops deployment, retirement and pensions, and European integration; political decisions and meetings in all domains, and direct-democratic actions in agriculture and immigration.

Table 5.1b: Forms of action by broad actor categories

	State and party actors	economic interest groups	other civil society actors	general/unknown/unspecified	Total percentage(frequency)
political decision	15,6%	,9%	,5%	17,4%	12,0% (N=148)
executive action	4,2%	,0%	1,6%	8,7%	3,5% (N=43)
judicial action	,8%	,9%	,5%	4,3%	,8% (N=10)
non-specified statement	44,3%	54,8%	44,0%	52,2%	45,4% (N=559)
other verbal statement	19,7%	29,6%	39,1%	13,0%	23,4% (N=288)
meeting	15,1%	7,0%	4,9%	,0%	12,5% (N=154)
direct-democratic action	,1%	,0%	,0%	4,3%	,2% (N=2)
protest action	,2%	7,0%	9,2%	,0%	2,2% (N=27)
Total	100,0% (N=909)	100,0% (N=115)	100,0% (N=184)	100,0% (N=23)	100,0% (n=1231)

Most actions in the Netherlands are non-specified statements and other verbal statements (78,8%). Other forms of actions concern meetings (12,5%) and political decisions (12%). State and party actors turn to meetings and political decisions more often than economic interest groups and other civil society actors. Civil society actors and economic interest groups more often turn to protest action.

Table 5.1c: Forms of action by actor scope

	Political decision	executive action	Judicial action	Non-specified statement	other verbal statement	Meeting	direct-democratic action	protest Action	Total Perc.	Total Freq.
Supranational: United Nations	15,0%	15,0%		50,0%	20,0%				100,0	20
Other supranational	16,7%			25,0%	37,5%	20,8%			100,0	24
European Union	15,9%	,6%		49,4%	21,8%	12,4%			100,0	170
Other European supranational	50,0%			25,0%		25,0%			100,0	4
Multilateral	15,8%	15,8%		57,9%	10,5%				100,0	19
Bilateral	16,7%	16,7%	16,7%	33,3%	16,7%				100,0	6
National	10,7%	3,1%	,8%	44,0%	24,9%	13,4%	,2%	2,8%	100,0	923
Regional	10,0%	15,0%	10,0%	50,0%	10,0%	5,0%			100,0	20
Local	17,1%	7,3%		61,0%	7,3%	4,9%		2,4%	100,0	41
Unclassifiable				100,0%					100,0	4
	148	43	10	559	288	154	2	27	1231	
Total	12,0% (N=148)	3,5% (N=43)	,8% (N=10)	45,4% (N=559)	23,4% (N=288)	12,5% (N=154)	,2% (N=2)	2,2% (N=27)	100,0%	1231

Claimants with a Dutch scope turn to non-specified statements, other verbal statements and meetings. Actors with a EU scope turn to non-specified statements, other verbal statements, meetings as well as political decisions. Actors with a local scope turn to non-specified statements, political decisions, executive actions and other verbal statements.

Addressees

Table 6.1: Presence of addressee by issue field

	Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	Agriculture: subsidy, livestock, quota, disease control	Immigration: entry and exit	Troops deployment	Retirement and pension schemes	Education	European Integration	Total percentage (N)
no indirect object	37,7%	23,9%	28,1%	21,9%	30,0%	24,3%	23,5%	26,4% (N=360)
Addressee	48,8%	67,1%	59,9%	70,6%	60,0%	62,2%	63,6%	61,9% (N=844)
supported actor	4,3%	3,9%	6,0%	5,3%	5,0%	6,6%	7,2%	5,8% (N=79)
opponent	9,2%	5,2%	6,0%	2,1%	5,0%	6,9%	5,7%	5,9% (N=81)
Total	100,0% (N=207)	100,0% (N=155)	100,0% (N=167)	100,0% (N=187)	100,0% (N=40)	100,0% (N=259)	100,0% (N=349)	100,0% (N=1364)

Most claims in the Netherlands are addressing some actor or set of actors, ranging from more than 70% in the field of troops deployment to nearly 49% in monetary politics. A substantive number of claims refers to the alleged support or opposition of other actors that are named, ranging from 13,5% in the field of education to 7,4% in troops deployment. More than a quarter of all claims do not have an indirect object.

Table 6.2a: Addressees by issue field

		Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	Agriculture: Subs., livest. quotas, disease control	Immigration: entry and exit	Troops deployment	Retirement and pension schemes	Educa-tion	European Integration	Total
	politicians	,8%	,8%	3,3%	2,7%	3,6%	1,0%	5,2%	2,7% (N=27)
	Former states(wo)men	1,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,5%	,4%	0,4% (N=4)
	government/ executive	50,4%	59,3%	60,0%	50,7%	42,9%	43,4%	68,2%	55,8% (N=560)
	legislative	4,7%	5,9%	5,0%	4,1%	7,1%	6,6%	7,9%	6,1% (N=61)
	judiciary	,0%	,0%	3,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	0,4% (N=4)
	police and internal security agencies	,0%	,0%	,8%	,0%	,0%	1,0%	,0%	0,3% (N=3)
	military	,0%	,0%	1,7%	30,8%	,0%	,0%	,7%	4,9% (N=49)
	central banks	21,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	2,6%	3,5% (n=35)
	social security executive organizations	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	10,7%	,0%	,0%	0,3% (n=3)
	other state executive agencies	1,6%	2,5%	1,7%	,0%	,0%	4,6%	2,2%	2,2% (n=22)
	political parties	1,6%	,8%	5,0%	2,1%	,0%	,5%	1,1%	1,6% (N=16)
percentage of total (N)		82,2% (N=106)	69,5% (N=82)	80,8% (N=97)	90,4% (N=132)	64,3% (N=18)	57,7% (N=113)	88,4% (N=236)	78,1% (N=784)

economic interest groups	Unions and employees	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	7,1%	3,1%	,0%	,8% (N=8)
	employers organizations and firms	3,1%	3,4%	,8%	,0%	10,7%	4,1%	,4%	2,1% (N=21)
	farmers and agricultural organizations	,0%	17,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,5%	,4%	2,3% (N=23)
	economists and financial experts	8,5%	,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,2% (N=12)
Percentage of total (N)		11,6% (N=15)	22,0% (N=26)	,8% (N=1)	,0% (N=0)	17,9% (N=5)	7,7% (N=15)	,7% (N=2)	6,4% (N=64)
media and journalists	Media and journalists	,8%	,8%	,0%	,7%	,0%	1,5%	1,9%	1,1% (n=11)
Percentage of total (N)		,8% (n=1)	,8% (N=1)	,0% (N=0)	,7% (N=1)	,0% (N=0)	1,5% (n=3)	1,9% (N=5)	1,1% (N=11)
other civil society actors	churches and religious organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	1,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,2% (N=2)
	educational professionals and organizations'	,0%	,0%	,8%	,0%	,0%	24,0%	,4%	4,9% (N=49)
	other scientific and research professionals and institutions	,0%	1,7%	,0%	,7%	,0%	3,1%	,0%	,9% (N=9)
	students, pupils, and their parents	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	5,6%	,0%	1,1% (N=11)
	other professional organizations and groups	,0%	1,7%	,0%	,0%	3,6%	,0%	,4%	,4% (n=4)
	consumer organizations and groups	3,1%	,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,5% (N=5)

	migrant organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	10,0%	,0%	,0%	,5%	,0%	1,3% (N=13)
	pro- and anti-European campaign organizations and groups	,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,1% (n=1)
	solidarity and human rights organizations	,0%	,0%	,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,1% (n=1)
	Peace movement organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,1% (N=1)
	organizations and groups of the elderly	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	7,1%	,0%	,0%	,2% (N=2)
	terrorist groups	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,4%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,2% (N=2)
	rebel forces/guerrilla	,0%	,0%	,0%	2,1%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,3% (N=3)
	other civil society organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	1,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	,3% (N=3)
Total		3,9% (N=5)	4,2% (N=5)	15,8% (N=19)	4,1% (N=6)	10,7% (N=3)	33,2% (N=65)	1,1% (N=3)	10,6% (n=106)
general/unknown/unspecified	whole polities	1,6%	3,4%	2,5%	4,8%	7,1%	,0%	7,9%	3,9% (N=39)
Percentage of total (N)		1,6% (N=2)	3,4% (N=4)	2,5% (N=3)	4,8% (N=7)	7,1% (N=2)	,0% (N=0)	7,9% (N=21)	3,9% (N=39)
Total	T	100,0% (N=129)	100,0% (N=118)	100,0% (N=120)	100,0% (N=146)	100,0% (N=28)	100,0% (N=196)	100,0% (N=267)	100,0% (N=1004)

In the Netherlands most addressees of claimants are state and party actors (more than 78%), followed at a great distance by civil society actors (10,6%), economic interest groups (6,4%), and media and journalists (1,1%). Within the category of state and party actors the government is most frequently referred to, for instance in the field of European integration (more than 68%) and in immigration (60%). Other important addressees here are the legislative branch in all domains, politicians in European integration, the military in troops deployment, central banks in monetary policy, social security organizations in retirement and pension schemes, and political parties in immigration. In the category of economic interest groups, there are relatively more references to unions in the field of retirement and pension schemes (though few), to employers associations in that field, to farmers' associations

in agriculture, and to economists in monetary policy. In the category of other civil society actors educational associations are more often referred to in the field of education, as migrant associations are in immigration, and organizations of the elderly in retirement and pension schemes.

Table 6.2b: Addressees by year

		1990	1995	2000	2002	Total Percentage (N)
State and party actors	politicians	2,2%	3,8%	1,7%	3,8%	2,7% (N=27)
	former states(wo)men	,0%	1,9%	,2%	,0%	,4% (N=4)
	government/executive	56,7%	49,7%	55,9%	58,6%	55,8% (N=560)
	legislative	4,5%	9,4%	6,9%	3,8%	6,1% (N=61)
	judiciary	,0%	1,3%	,5%	,0%	,4% (N=4)
	police and internal security agencies	,0%	,0%	,2%	,8%	,3% (N=3)
	military	6,7%	9,4%	2,5%	4,6%	4,9% (N=49)
	central banks	1,7%	2,5%	4,7%	3,4%	3,5% (N=35)
	social security executive organizations	,0%	1,3%	,2%	,0%	,3% (N=3)
	other state executive agencies	3,9%	,0%	2,7%	1,5%	2,2% (N=22)
	political parties	2,2%	,0%	1,2%	2,7%	1,6% (N=16)
Percentage of total (N)		78,1% (N=139)	79,2% (N=126)	77,0% (N=311)	79,1% (N=208)	78,1% (N=784)
Economic interest groups	unions and employees	2,8%	,0%	,7%	,0%	,8% (N=8)
	employers organizations and firms	3,4%	1,9%	1,7%	1,9%	2,1% (N=21)
	farmers and agricultural organizations	3,4%	3,8%	2,7%	,0%	2,3% (N=23)
	economists and financial experts	,6%	,6%	1,5%	1,5%	1,2% (N=12)
Percentage of total (N)		10,1% (N=18)	6,3% (N=10)	6,7% (N=27)	3,4% (N=9)	6,4% (N=64)
Media and journalists	media and journalists	1,7%	1,3%	1,0%	,8%	1,1% (N=11)
Percentage of total (N)		1,7% (N=11)	1,3% (N=2)	1,0% (N=4)	,8% (N=2)	1,1% (N=11)
Other civil society actors	churches and religious organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,2%	,4%	,2% (N=2)
	educational professionals and organizations'	1,7%	4,4%	6,9%	4,2%	4,9% (N=49)

	other scientific and research professionals and institutions	1,1%	1,9%	,5%	,8%	,9% (N=9)
	students, pupils, and their parents	1,7%	,6%	1,0%	1,1%	1,1% (N=11)
	other professional organizations and groups	,0%	,6%	,5%	,4%	,4% (N=4)
	consumer organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,9%	,5% (N=5)
	migrant organizations and groups	1,1%	1,3%	1,2%	1,5%	1,3% (N=13)
	pro- and anti-European campaign organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,2%	,0%	,1% (N=1)
	solidarity and human rights organizations	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	,1% (N=1)
	peace movement organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	,1% (N=1)
	organizations and groups of the elderly	,0%	,0%	,0%	,8%	,2% (N=2)
	terrorist groups	,0%	,0%	,0%	,8%	,2% (N=2)
	rebel forces/guerrilla	,6%	,6%	,2%	,0%	,3% (N=3)
	other civil society organizations and groups	,0%	,6%	,2%	,4%	,3% (N=3)
Percentage of total (N)		6,2% (N=11)	10,1% (N=16)	11,1% (N=45)	12,9% (N=34)	10,6% (N=106)
General/unknown/unspecified	whole polities	3,9%	3,1%	4,2%	3,8%	3,9% (N=39)
Percentage of total (N)		3,9% (N=7)	3,1% (N=5)	4,2% (N=17)	3,8% (N=10)	3,9% (N=39)
	Total	100,0% (N=178)	100,0% (N=159)	100,0% (N=404)	100,0% (N=263)	100,0% (N=1004)

The prominent place of addressed state and party actors in the Dutch pattern of claim making is very stable. The share of addressed economic interest groups decreased, despite of an upturn in 2000. The share of addressed media and journalists also decreased. The share of other civil society actors as addressees of claims increased. Within the category of state and party actors, the stable share of the government, the increasing shares of politicians and the legislative branch, and the low share of central banks are striking. In the category of economic interest groups the most striking finding is the over-all decline of all actors as addressees. In the category of other civil society actors, there is an increase of the share of addressed educational associations.

Table 6.3a: Mean evaluation by category of addressees

		Mean	N
State and party actors	politicians	-,6296	27
	former states(wo)men	-,5000	4
	government/executive	-,3946	560
	legislative	,0656	61
	judiciary	-,5000	4
	police and internal security agencies	,3333	3
	military	,0204	49
	central banks	-,2000	35
	social security executive organizations	,3333	3
	other state executive agencies	-,1818	22
	political parties	-,5625	16
Total		-,3253	784
Economic interest groups	unions and employees	-,6250	8
	employers organizations and firms	-,2381	21
	farmers and agricultural organizations	,0870	23
	economists and financial experts	-,3333	12
Total		-,1875	64
Media and journalists(total)	media and journalists	-,3636	11
Other civil society actors	churches and religious organizations and groups	-1,0000	2
	educational professionals and organizations'	-,1224	49
	other scientific and research professionals and institutions	,1111	9
	students, pupils, and their parents	-,2727	11
	other professional organizations and groups	-1,0000	4
	consumer organizations and groups	,0000	5
	migrant organizations and groups	-,4615	13
	pro- and anti-European campaign organizations and groups	-1,0000	1
	solidarity and human rights organizations	-1,0000	1
	peace movement organizations and groups	-1,0000	1

	organizations and groups of the elderly	,0000	2
	terrorist groups	-1,0000	2
	rebel forces/guerrilla	-1,0000	3
	other civil society organizations and groups	-,3333	3
Total		106	
General/unknown/unspecified	whole polities	-,2051	39
	Total	-,3068	1004

In the Netherlands the evaluation by claimants of addressed media and journalists is slightly more unfavourable (-0,36 on a scale from +1 for full criticism to -1 for full support) than such evaluation of state and party actors (-0,32), while economic interest groups (-0,19) and other civil society actors (-0,27) are evaluated in the least unfavourable sense as addressed actors. In the category of state and party actors, the most striking results are the negative nature of the assessment of respectively politicians (- 0,63), political parties, former states (wo)men *and* the judiciary. In the category of economic interest groups, evaluation of trade unions is most negative (- 0,62). In the category of other civil society actors there are seven full negative scores, including professional associations, churches and terrorist groups. But the low number of absolute cases has to be taken into account here.

Table 6.3b: Mean evaluation by broad addressee scope

Recoded main indirect object actor scope	Mean	N
Supranational: UN	,2222	18
Other supranational	,3333	12
EU	-,2648	219
Other European supranational	-,3333	3
Multilateral	-,1579	38
Bilateral	-,5000	12
Germany	-,4872	39
France	-,4286	21
UK	-,5714	21
Italy	-,5714	7
Spain	-,7500	4
Netherlands	-,3417	439
Other pre-1995 EU-members	-,3077	26
Austria, Finland, Sweden	-,1176	17
Switzerland	,3333	3
Upcoming enlargement countries	-,2000	10
Other European countries ex CIS	-,8000	10
Turkey	-,5000	6
Russia	-,2500	8
USA	-,0488	41
Japan	,3333	3

Middle East	-,5357	28
Rest of the world	-,5294	17
Total	-,3084	1002

In the Netherlands the evaluation by claimants of actors with a domestic scope is moderately unfavorable (-0,34), while the evaluation of actors with a German scope is more negative (-0,49) and the evaluation of actors with a EU scope is less negative (-0,26). The scores of actors with a European scope in a wide sense (non-EU, old and new EU) are all negative (-0,8 for ex CIS countries), while the scores of supranational actors, Switzerland and Japan are positive. The assessment of the USA as addressee is neutral. The assessment of the Middle East is rather negative. Evaluation of French actors is slightly less negative than evaluation of German actors (which is against the public self-image of Dutch politicians and diplomats). The evaluation of American actors is far more positive than of European actors (and of EU less negative than of separate European countries). This suggests that EU policies are already politicized.

Table 6.4a: Addressee scope by issue field

	Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	Agriculture: Subsidy, livestock, quota, disease control	Immigration: entry and exit	Troops deployment	Retirement and pension schemes	Education	European Integration	Total percentage	Total frequency (N)
Supranational: UN	,0%	,0%	,8%	11,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,8%	18
Other supranational	2,3%	,8%	,0%	2,1%	,0%	,5%	1,5%	1,2%	12
EU	38,3%	24,6%	3,3%	,7%	3,6%	,0%	50,6%	21,9%	219
Other European supranational	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,1%	,3%	3
Multilateral	4,7%	1,7%	5,8%	8,3%	7,1%	,5%	3,0%	3,8%	38
Bilateral	,8%	,8%	3,3%	2,1%	,0%	,5%	,7%	1,2%	12
Germany	8,6%	2,5%	6,7%	1,4%	3,6%	1,0%	4,5%	3,9%	39
France	3,1%	6,8%	,0%	,0%	3,6%	,5%	2,6%	2,1%	21
UK	7,8%	1,7%	,0%	,7%	,0%	1,5%	1,9%	2,1%	21
Italy	2,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,5%	1,1%	,7%	7
Spain	,8%	,0%	1,7%	,0%	3,6%	,0%	,0%	,4%	4
Netherlands	16,4%	58,5%	53,3%	28,3%	78,6%	93,4%	14,6%	43,8%	439
Other pre-1995 EU members	2,3%	1,7%	5,8%	,0%	,0%	,5%	4,9%	2,6%	26
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1,6%	,0%	,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	5,2%	1,7%	17
Switzerland	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,1%	,3%	3
Upcoming enlargement countries	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	3,7%	1,0%	10
Other European countries ex CIS	,0%	,0%	5,0%	2,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,0%	10
Turkey	,0%	,0%	3,3%	,7%	,0%	,0%	,4%	,6%	6
Russia	,0%	,0%	,0%	4,1%	,0%	,0%	,7%	,8%	8
USA	7,8%	,8%	2,5%	15,9%	,0%	,5%	1,1%	4,1%	41
Japan	2,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,3%	3

Middle East	,0%	,0%	2,5%	16,6%	,0%	,0%	,4%	2,8%	28
Rest of the world	,8%	,0%	5,0%	4,8%	,0%	,5%	4,5%	2,7%	27
Total	100,0% (N=128)	100,0% (N=118)	100,0% (N=120)	100,0% (N=145)	100,0% (N=28)	100,0% (N=196)	100,0% (N=267)	100,0% (N=1002)	

The three most important addressed actors in the Netherlands are domestic actors, EU actors and USA actors. In the fields of European integration and monetary politics the EU is the most important actor (respectively 50,6% and 38,3%). In agriculture EU actors are often referred to (24,6%). As to single countries, Germany, the United Kingdom and the USA are the most frequent addressees of claim makers in monetary politics. France is dominant in agriculture. Germany is dominant in immigration. The USA is dominant in troops deployment (and more important than the UN, yet overtaken by the Middle East set of countries). Germany, France *and* Spain are equally important in retirement and pension schemes. No foreign country is important in education, while Germany is dominant in European integration. Other pre-1995 EU members as well as Austria, Finland and Sweden are referred to in monetary politics, immigration, and European integration (respectively 4,9% and 5,2%). The low volume of claims in the domain of pensions should qualify each interpretation of this column of the table. With respect to addressee scope, monetary politics indicates horizontal Europeanisation, whereas European integration suggests vertical Europeanisation (while both issues have a low Dutch addressees scope). Note that the United States addressee scope is in total larger than the German one.

Table 6.4b: Addressee scope by year

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total frequency
Supranational: UN	,0%	5,7%	1,2%	1,5%	1,8%	18
Other supranational	2,8%	1,3%	,7%	,8%	1,2%	12
EU	8,4%	17,0%	27,5%	25,2%	21,9%	219
Other European supranational	1,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,3%	3
Multilateral	5,6%	4,4%	2,7%	3,8%	3,8%	38
Bilateral	,6%	,6%	1,5%	1,5%	1,2%	12
Germany	4,5%	3,1%	2,2%	6,5%	3,9%	39
France	,6%	2,5%	2,7%	1,9%	2,1%	21
UK	1,1%	1,9%	3,0%	1,5%	2,1%	21
Italy	,0%	,0%	,2%	2,3%	,7%	7
Spain	,0%	,0%	,5%	,8%	,4%	4
Netherlands	48,9%	47,8%	42,2%	40,5%	43,8%	439
Other pre-1995 EU-members	,6%	1,3%	3,5%	3,4%	2,6%	26
Austria, Finland, Sweden	,0%	,0%	4,2%	,0%	1,7%	17
Switzerland	,0%	,0%	,7%	,0%	,3%	3
Upcoming enlargement countries	1,1%	1,3%	,5%	1,5%	1,0%	10
Other European countries ex CIS	1,7%	3,1%	,0%	,8%	1,0%	10
Turkey	,0%	,6%	,7%	,8%	,6%	6
Russia	3,4%	,6%	,0%	,4%	,8%	8
USA	7,9%	6,9%	2,0%	3,1%	4,1%	41
Japan	,0%	,0%	,7%	,0%	,3%	3
Middle East	8,4%	,0%	1,2%	3,1%	2,8%	28
Rest of the world	2,8%	1,9%	1,7%	,8%	1,7%	17
Total	100,0% (N=178)	100,0% (N=159)	100,0% (N=403)	100,0% (N=262)	100,0%	1002

The composition of addressees in Dutch claim making has been dynamic since 1990. There is a slight decrease of the share of actors with a domestic scope (from 50% to 44%). There is a major increase of European actors (from 8,4% to 25,2% with a peak in 2000). Both the share of multilateral actors and USA actors decreased. (In the case of the USA there has been a peak during the Gulf War.) In 1990 Germany was dominant. In 2002 *all* member states are important. This table nicely indicates the process of Europeanisation.

Table 6.4c: Addressee scope by broad addressee category

	state and party actors	economic interest groups	media and journalists	other civil society actors	general/unknown/unspecified	Total percentage	N
Supranational: UN	2,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,8%	18
Other supranational	1,4%	1,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,2%	12
EU	25,9%	3,2%	,0%	,0%	35,9%	21,9%	219
Other European supranational	,4%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,3%	3
Multilateral	2,7%	7,9%	9,1%	6,6%	10,3%	3,8%	38
Bilateral	1,5%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,2%	12
Germany	4,1%	1,6%	9,1%	,9%	10,3%	3,9%	39
France	2,0%	,0%	,0%	1,9%	7,7%	2,1%	21
UK	1,9%	3,2%	,0%	2,8%	2,6%	2,1%	21
Italy	,8%	,0%	,0%	,9%	,0%	,7%	7
Spain	,4%	1,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	4
Netherlands	39,0%	74,6%	54,5%	73,6%	7,7%	43,8%	439
Other pre-1995 EU-members	2,8%	3,2%	,0%	1,9%	,0%	2,6%	26
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1,9%	,0%	,0%	,0%	5,1%	1,7%	17
Switzerland	,4%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,3%	3
Upcoming enlargement countries	,9%	1,6%	18,2%	,0%	,0%	1,0%	10
Other European countries ex CIS	,9%	,0%	,0%	2,8%	,0%	1,0%	10
Turkey	,3%	,0%	,0%	3,8%	,0%	,6%	6
Russia	,9%	,0%	,0%	,0%	2,6%	,8%	8
USA	5,1%	,0%	,0%	,0%	2,6%	4,1%	41
Japan	,3%	1,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,3%	3
Middle East	2,6%	,0%	9,1%	1,9%	12,8%	2,8%	28
Rest of the world	1,7%	,0%	,0%	2,8%	2,6%	1,7%	17
Total	100,0% (N=783)	100,0% (N=63)	100,0% (N=11)	100,0% (N=106)	100,0% (N=39)	100,0% %	1002

State and party actors are important in the Dutch set of addressed actors, particularly in the set of actors with a domestic scope (39%) and of actors with a EU scope (25,9%). Economic interest groups dominate as addressed actors with a domestic scope (74,6%). Media and journalists are important as addressed actors with a domestic scope (54,5%), and, less so, as addressed actors in the rest of the world,

Germany and multilateral settings. Other civil society actors dominate as addressed actors with a domestic scope (73,6%). With the exception of multilateralism, the supranational scope (also EU) is completely absent in the category of other civil society actors. Surely, Europeanisation has not yet spread beyond state and party actors and economic interest groups.

Issues and aims

Table 7.1: Policy field by year

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total Perc.	Total Freq.
Monetary politics	7,8%	17,5%	14,0%	20,8%	15,1%	207
Agriculture	16,3%	11,5%	10,4%	9,2%	11,4%	155
Immigration	10,6%	7,8%	11,7%	17,1%	12,2%	167
Troops deployment	23,3%	24,0%	8,5%	9,0%	13,7%	187
Retirement and pensions	1,2%	4,6%	1,6%	5,2%	2,9%	40
Education	25,3%	14,7%	20,0%	15,6%	19,0%	259
European Integration	15,5%	19,8%	33,8%	23,1%	25,6%	349
Total	100,0% (N=245)	100,0% (N=217)	100,0% (N=556)	100,0% (N=346)	100,0%	1364

The composition of claims in the Netherlands has been dynamic since 1990. Claims in the fields of European integration and monetary politics increased strongly, while claims with respect to immigration and retirement and pensions increased weakly. Claims with respect to agriculture, troops deployment, and education decreased strongly. European integration engendered a peak of claims in 2000. The volume of claims with respect to pensions is relatively low. Note that education (a national domain) is quite large in the sample (25% in 1990), while troops deployment (a supranational domain) is getting smaller in later sample years. This bias may distort any conclusion with respect to Europeanisation. Annual fluctuations of policy field issues are quite large, due to events in the real world.

Table 7.2a-g: Issues within policy fields by year, in % within year

A Monetary politics

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
General Unspecific	15,8%	13,2%	2,6%	,0%	4,8%	10
Interest Rate Adjustments	42,1%	36,8%	35,9%	11,1%	28,0%	58
EMU Convergence criteria and stability pact	,0%	23,7%	9,0%	29,2%	17,9%	37
EMS/ERM	10,5%	7,9%	3,8%	,0%	3,9%	8
Exchange rate intervention	10,5%	5,3%	12,8%	2,8%	7,7%	16
Independence Central Banks	5,3%	,0%	1,3%	1,4%	1,4%	3
Eurozone-outsiders: rel. with pre-ins (ERM2) & CC	,0%	,0%	2,6%	1,4%	1,4%	3
Common currency (ECU, EURO)	,0%	13,2%	14,1%	51,4%	25,6%	53
Dynamics of Euro campaigns	,0%	,0%	10,3%	2,8%	4,8%	10
Other Specific	15,8%	,0%	7,7%	,0%	4,3%	9
Total	100,0% (N=19)	100,0% (N=38)	100,0% (N=78)	100,0% (N=72)	100,0%	207

The issues with respect to monetary politics in the Dutch newspapers since 1990 are interest rate adjustments (decreasing), introduction of a common currency (increasing with a peak in 2000), and the rules of EMU (idem). Exchange rate intervention is a fluctuating issue, while Euro campaigns are a growing issue. Independence of central banks and the problem of insiders and outsiders in the EMU zone are both non-issues. The strikingly low presence of the issue of central bank independence must be connected to the fact that central bank independence became a cornerstone in the Dutch Banking Law of 1948.

B Agriculture

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
Reform of the system of subsidies	50,0%	20,0%	3,4%	21,9%	21,9%	34
Subsidies and enlargement of the European Union	,0%	,0%	1,7%	43,8%	9,7%	15
Subsidies and international trade	32,5%	8,0%	3,4%	,0%	11,0%	17
BSE	,0%	,0%	41,4%	6,3%	16,8%	26
Foot and Mouth Disease	,0%	,0%	,0%	6,3%	1,3%	2
Other diseases	7,5%	12,0%	25,9%	21,9%	18,1%	28
Quotas for livestock and dairy production	7,5%	56,0%	22,4%	,0%	19,4%	30
Other Specific	2,5%	4,0%	1,7%	,0%	1,9%	3
Total	100,0% (N=40)	100,0% (N=25)	100,0% (N=58)	100,0%	100,0%	155

The issues with respect to agriculture in Dutch newspapers since 1990 are subsidy reform and quotas (the material interests of farmers) and BSE and other diseases (food security of consumers). Most of these issues are event-driven (events such as European council meetings or breakouts of diseases). There are *no* non-issues in

this domain. Fluctuations are large, such as the trend of trade-related subsidy issues (from 32% in 1990 to 0% 2002)

C Immigration

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
General evaluation or policy direction	11,5%	11,8%	6,2%	3,4%	6,6%	11
Institutional framework, responsibilities, procedures, costs	11,5%	5,9%	13,8%	8,5%	10,8%	18
Entry and border controls	11,5%	17,6%	6,2%	15,3%	11,4%	19
Expulsions/deportations	11,5%	23,5%	18,5%	32,2%	22,8%	38
Migration programs and quotas	26,9%	29,4%	18,5%	15,3%	19,8%	33
Role of third parties in preventing migration	,0%	,0%	3,1%	,0%	1,2%	2
Visa and consular policy	23,1%	,0%	,0%	3,4%	4,8%	8
Actions relating to smuggling and illegal entries	,0%	11,8%	21,5%	6,8%	12,0%	20
Other specific issues	3,8%	,0%	12,3%	15,3%	10,8%	18
Total	100,0% (N=26)	100,0% (N=17)	100,0% (N=65)	100,0% (N=59)	100,0%	167

The issues with respect to immigration in Dutch newspapers are expulsions, migration programs and quotas, and actions relating to smuggling and illegal entries. The new Dutch law on immigration policy was made in 2001. Immigration policy is a sensitive issue in Dutch politics since the 1990s, even more so since the rise of populist parties during the general elections of 2002. The non-issues here are the role of third parties in preventing immigration and – to a lesser extent – visa and consular policies. These policies were important in 1990 and unimportant in 2002, while policies with respect to expulsions and smuggling generate the opposite trend (from unimportant to important).

D Troops deployment

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
Mil. aggression on foreign sovereign territory	56,1%	1,9%	4,3%	29,0%	23,5%	44
Mil. invasion of foreign sovereign territory	10,5%	1,9%	10,6%	9,7%	8,0%	15
Covert aggressive operations vs. hostile regimes/groups	5,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,6%	3
Peace-keeping	1,8%	75,0%	63,8%	61,3%	47,6%	89
Rescue/protect civilians facing aggression	3,5%	9,6%	12,8%	,0%	7,0%	13
Crisis, civil emergency, catastrophic events	,0%	,0%	2,1%	,0%	,5%	1
Non-military humanitarian purposes	,0%	,0%	2,1%	,0%	,5%	1
Military alliances	3,5%	3,8%	,0%	,0%	2,1%	4

Other specific reference to deployment of troops	19,3%	7,7%	4,3%	,0%	9,1%	17
Total	100,0% (N=57)	100,0% (N=52)	100,0% (N=47)	100,0% (N=31)	100,0%	187

The issues with respect to troops deployment in Dutch newspapers since 1990 are peace-keeping, military aggression on foreign sovereign territory, invasion of such territory, and the rescue and protection of civilians beyond borders facing aggression. In 1995 a major failure of humanitarian interventionism occurred in the town of Srebrenica (Bosnia-Herzegovina), in which the Dutch army played a large role. This event triggered a permanent debate in Dutch politics and society. The Dutch government supported the NATO-intervention in Kosovo in the spring of 1999. The non-issues here are crises, civil humanitarian operations and covert military operations. Sub-issues in this domain are event-driven, except for peace-keeping, by far the most important category.

E Pensions

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
General	,0%	,0%	11,1%	5,6%	5,0%	2
Demographic changes: ageing population	,0%	10,0%	11,1%	50,0%	27,5%	11
Retirement ages	,0%	20,0%	33,3%	27,8%	25,0%	10
Income levels in retirement, Poverty in retirement	33,3%	10,0%	,0%	,0%	5,0%	2
State pension scheme	,0%	20,0%	,0%	,0%	5,0%	2
Private pension scheme	66,7%	40,0%	11,1%	5,6%	20,0%	8
Other / Specific	,0%	,0%	33,3%	11,1%	12,5%	5
Total	100,0% (N=3)	100,0% (N=10)	100,0% (N=9)	100,0% (N=18)	100,0%	40

The issues with respect to retirement and pension schemes in Dutch newspapers since 1990 are ageing, years of retirement, and private pensions. The non-issues here in certain years are income levels and state pensions, probably due to credible government promises and plans. The low volume (40) can be explained by the fact that Dutch authorities (politicians, CEO's of large corporations, investment funds, experts) regard the pension system as sound and sustainable. The first coalition cabinet of social democrats and liberals of Mr. Kok (1993-1999) took precautionary measures to protect general old-age pensions and the pay-as-you-go system. Since the stagnation of the Dutch economy and of international capital markets in 2000, both authorities and pensioners are increasingly worried about the future of pension guarantees and the terms of policy reform here. The low volume of claims qualifies each interpretation of this table.

F Education

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
General unspecific	8,1%	9,4%	,9%	1,9%	3,9%	10
Structural issues	3,2%	3,1%	9,9%	3,7%	6,2%	16

Resource allocation and salaries	45,2%	9,4%	33,3%	27,8%	32,0%	83
Private education	,0%	,0%	,9%	5,6%	1,5%	4
Administrative power allocation	1,6%	,0%	5,4%	3,7%	3,5%	9
Curriculum	4,8%	12,5%	18,0%	11,1%	12,7%	33
Information and communication technologies	,0%	3,1%	2,7%	,0%	1,5%	4
Scholarships and fees	27,4%	21,9%	6,3%	1,9%	12,4%	32
Problems at school	3,2%	12,5%	6,3%	14,8%	8,1%	21
other specific issues	6,5%	28,1%	16,2%	29,6%	18,1%	47
Total	100,0% (N=62)	100,0% (N=32)	100,0% (N=111)	100,0% (N=54)	100,0%	259

The issues with respect to education in Dutch newspapers since 1990 are resource allocation to types and levels of schools and teachers' salaries, revisions of curricula, and fees (in particular for students in higher education). The non-issues here are private education and information and communication technologies. There are few fully private schools in the Netherlands since the law on equal public subsidy for both public and private (religious) schools in 1917. ICT is a broadly accepted and celebrated element of the world in which the Dutch are living. Dutch education policy in this period is marked by scale enlargement, budget cuts, modernisation of secondary education, selective new investment (occupational training, internet), and the rise of black schools (mainly populated by children of recent immigrant groups) and Islam schools. The EU plays its most prominent role since the spring of 1999. The so-called Declaration of Bologna of European ministers of education led to the introduction of a Bachelor-Masters scheme on Dutch universities.

G European integration

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
General European integration, not specific	5,3%	25,6%	,5%	5,0%	5,2%	18
National vs. European Identity, shared values	,0%	,0%	8,0%	1,3%	4,6%	16
Role of a specific country and balance of power in the EU	10,5%	14,0%	34,6%	8,8%	23,5%	82
+Relationship EU - nat.®. levels / future constitution	,0%	2,3%	1,1%	13,8%	4,0%	14
Institutional structure &relationship between EU institutions.	2,6%	11,6%	8,5%	,0%	6,3%	22
Defining EU' s core tasks/balance of different policy areas	2,6%	4,7%	2,7%	1,3%	2,6%	9
Relationship between EU institutions and public	,0%	9,3%	1,6%	1,3%	2,3%	8
Enlargement	2,6%	9,3%	14,9%	43,8%	19,5%	68
Budget: financing the EU and spending EU funds	,0%	,0%	5,9%	7,5%	4,9%	17
other specific EU integration	,0%	2,3%	6,4%	1,3%	4,0%	14
Associational agreements/ treaties EU - non-EU countries	2,6%	4,7%	2,7%	3,8%	3,2%	11
Personnel issues within EU/discussions about candidacies	,0%	9,3%	11,7%	12,5%	10,3%	36
Non-EU forms of European integration	73,7%	7,0%	1,6%	,0%	9,7%	34
total	100,0 %	100,0 %	100,0 %	100,0 %	100,0%	349

The issues with respect to European integration in Dutch newspapers since 1990 are the role of specific countries (such as Austria in 2000) and the balance of power in the EU; Eastern enlargement; and personal issues with respect to the success of Dutch candidates (Duisenberg, Bolkestein) or their failure (Kok, Trojan), whether politicians of high civil servants. The non-issues are the relationship between European institutions and the public; the definition of the EU' s core competences, and associational agreement of the EU. The budget of the EU is becoming more important over the years, partly because of the growing willingness of Dutch governments and ministers of finance to complain about net fiscal losses of the Dutch member states. The general nature of European integration as well as the identity of the EU are minor issues in the newspapers. The peak with respect to non-EU forms of European integration in 1990 concerns German unification. The peak with respect to general European integration in 1995 concerns the EMU. Nota bene: the N's are missing here.

Table 7.3a: Issue scope by policy field

	Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	Agriculture: Subsidy, livestock, quota, disease control	Immigration: entry and exit	Troops deployment	Retirement and pension schemes	Education	European Integration	Total percentage	Total Frequency
supranational: UN	,0%	,0%	,6%	39,6%	2,5%	,0%	,0%	5,6%	76
Other supranational	1,0%	3,2%	,6%	9,1%	,0%	,0%	3,2%	2,6%	36
EU	76,3%	43,2%	9,6%	1,1%	10,0%	,4%	92,0%	41,3%	569
Other European supranational	,0%	,0%	,0%	,5%	,0%	,0%	4,9%	1,2%	18
Multilateral	3,9%	,6%	10,2%	28,3%	5,0%	1,5%	,0%	6,7%	85
Bilateral	1,0%	5,2%	31,1%	21,4%	,0%	,4%	,0%	7,6%	103
Germany	2,4%	,0%	3,0%	,0%	2,5%	,8%	,0%	1,0%	13
France	,5%	5,8%	,0%	,0%	2,5%	,8%	,0%	1,0%	13
UK	1,4%	1,9%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,2%	,0%	,7%	9
Italy	,0%	,0%	1,2%	,0%	,0%	,4%	,0%	,2%	3
Spain	,0%	,6%	1,8%	,0%	5,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	6
Netherlands	2,9%	38,1%	34,7%	,0%	70,0%	93,1%	,0%	28,7%	392
Other pre-1995 EU-members	,0%	1,3%	2,4%	,0%	,0%	,8%	,0%	,6%	8
Austria, Finland, Sweden	,0%	,0%	,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,1%	1
Switzerland	,0%	,0%	,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,1%	1
Other European countries ex CIS	,0%	,0%	3,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	5
Russia	,5%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,1%	1
USA	7,2%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	,0%	1,2%	16
Japan	2,9%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	6
Rest of the world	,0%	,0%	,6%	,0%	2,5%	,4%	,0%	,2%	3
Total	100,0% (N=207)	100,0% (N=155)	100,0% (N=167)	100,0% (N=187)	100,0% (N=40)	100,0% (N=259)	100,0% (N=349)	100,0%	1364

In our sample of Dutch newspapers since 1990 *most* issues have a EU scope (41,3%). Other main issue scopes are the Netherlands itself (28,7%), bilateral and multilateral actors (7,6% and 6,7%), and supranational actors (the UN 5,6%, other supranational actors 2,6%). This indicates the open and European nature of the public sphere of the Netherlands. Issues with an EU scope are most frequent in the fields of European integration (90,5%), monetary politics (76,3%), and agriculture (43,2%). These are least frequent (non-issues) in the fields of education and troops deployment, while intermediate in retirement and pension schemes, and immigration. Issues with a domestic scope are most frequent in education and retirement and pensions, absent in troops deployment and European integration, intermediate in agriculture and immigration, and low in monetary politics. Bilateral and multilateral issues are most frequent in troops deployment and immigration; low in monetary politics, agriculture, and retirement and pensions (due to bilateralism); and almost absent in education and European integration. Supranational issues are most frequent in troops deployment and low in all other domains. (The score of retirement and pension schemes is somewhat higher (2,5%) yet unreliable because of the small volume in the sample.) The degree of EU scope as compared to Dutch scope is striking in monetary politics, agriculture and European integration. The United States is only important in monetary politics; France is only important in agriculture.

Table 7.3b: Issue scope by year

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
Supranational: UN	,0%	17,5%	5,2%	2,6%	5,6%	76
Other supranational	6,5%	2,8%	1,6%	1,4%	2,6%	36
EU	17,1%	36,9%	48,2%	51,7%	41,7%	569
Other European supranational	6,9%	,0%	,0%	,3%	1,3%	18
Multilateral	18,8%	4,6%	,0%	6,4%	6,2%	85
Bilateral	11,0%	4,1%	9,0%	4,9%	7,6%	103
Germany	1,2%	,9%	,2%	2,0%	1,0%	13
France	,4%	,5%	1,6%	,6%	1,0%	13
UK	,0%	,5%	1,3%	,3%	,7%	9
Italy	,0%	,0%	,5%	,0%	,2%	3
Spain	,4%	,0%	,4%	,9%	,4%	6
Netherlands	33,1%	28,1%	27,9%	27,5%	28,7%	392
Other pre-1995 EU-members	,0%	,0%	1,3%	,3%	,6%	8
Austria, Finland, Sweden	,0%	,0%	,2%	,0%	,1%	1
Switzerland	,0%	,0%	,2%	,0%	,1%	1
Other European countries ex CIS	2,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	5
Russia	,4%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,1%	1
USA	1,2%	3,2%	,5%	,0%	0,9%	16
Japan	,8%	,5%	,5%	,0%	,4%	6
Rest of the world	,0%	,5%	,2%	,3%	,2%	3
Total	100,0% (N=245)	100,0% (N=217)	100,0% (N=556)	100,0% (N=346)	100,0%	1364

As to the change of the scope of issues in Dutch claim making since 1990, three important developments can be signalled. Firstly, the share of issues with a EU scope increased from 15,9 % in 1990 to 51,7% in 2002. The increase has been rather constant. Secondly, the share of issues with a domestic scope decreased steadily from 33,1% in 1990 to 27,5% in 2002. Finally, issues with a bilateral scope and a multilateral scope decreased from respectively 11% and 18,8% in 1990 to 4,9% and 6,4% in 2002. Issues with a supranational scope are much less prominent (8,2%), though they became more frequent than issues with a one country focus (even including the USA (1,2%)) The table suggests Europeanisation of foreign news next to a stable share of issues in national news.

Table 7.4 a-g: Issue scope by year, separate for each policy field

A Monetary politics

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
Other supranational	5,3%	,0%	1,3%	,0%	1,0%	2
EU	26,3%	57,9%	85,9%	88,9%	76,3%	158
Multilateral	15,8%	5,3%	2,6%	1,4%	3,9%	8
Bilateral	,0%	2,6%	,0%	1,4%	1,0%	2
Germany	10,5%	5,3%	,0%	1,4%	2,4%	5
France	,0%	2,6%	,0%	,0%	,5%	1
UK	,0%	2,6%	2,6%	,0%	1,4%	3
Netherlands	15,8%	2,6%	,0%	2,8%	2,9%	6
Russia	5,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,5%	1
USA	10,5%	18,4%	3,8%	4,2%	7,2%	15
Japan	10,5%	2,6%	3,8%	,0%	2,9%	6
Total	100,0% (N=19)	100,0% (N=38)	100,0% (N=78)	100,0% (N=72)	100,0%	207

In the field of monetary politics in Dutch newspapers issues with a EU scope increased sharply from 26,3% in 1990 to 88,9% in 2002. These issues are dominant. They seem to have crowded out issues with a supranational scope, bilateral or multilateral scope and one-country scope, except for the resilience of issues with a USA scope (from 10,5% in 1990 to 4,2% in 2002). This table is one of the most revealing indicators of top-down Europeanisation of the public sphere in the Netherlands, since it goes in tandem with a fall of issues with a Dutch scope.

B Agriculture

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
Other supranational	12,5%	,0%	,0%	,0%	3,2%	5
EU	57,5%	28,0%	19,0%	81,3%	43,2%	67
Multilateral	,0%	4,0%	,0%	,0%	,6%	1
Bilateral	,0%	,0%	12,1%	3,1%	5,2%	8
France	,0%	,0%	15,5%	,0%	5,8%	9
UK	,0%	,0%	3,4%	3,1%	1,9%	3
Spain	2,5%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,6%	1
Netherlands	27,5%	68,0%	46,6%	12,5%	38,1%	59
Other pre-1995 EU-members	,0%	,0%	3,4%	,0%	1,3%	2
Total	100,0% (N=40)	100,0% (N=25)	100,0% (N=58)	100,0% (N=32)	100,0%	155

In the field of agriculture in Dutch newspapers issues with a EU scope increased from 57,5% in 1990 to 81,3% in 2002 with two large dips in 1995 and 2000. Issues with a domestic scope decreased from 27,5% in 1990 to 12,5% in 2002. Both trends are determined by sub-issues. The other issue scopes are almost irrelevant. There is no obvious explanation of the oscillation of issues with a EU scope. Table 7.4b I on EU actors with respect to sub-issues of agriculture contains additional information here.

Table 7.4bb: Sub-issues and actor scope in agriculture

	Other supra-national	EU	Multilateral	Bilateral	France	UK	Spain	Netherlands	Other pre-1995 EU-members	Total
Reform of the system of subsidies	,0%	73,5%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	2,9%	23,5%	,0%	100,0% (N=34)
Subsidies and enlargement of the European Union	,0%	100,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0% (N=15)
Subsidies and international trade	29,4%	58,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	11,8%	,0%	100,0% (N=17)
BSE	,0%	15,4%	,0%	15,4%	34,6%	7,7%	,0%	23,1%	3,8%	100,0% (N=26)
Foot and Mouth Disease	,0%	50,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	50,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0% (N=2)
Other diseases	,0%	25,0%	,0%	14,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	57,1%	3,6%	100,0% (N=28)
Quotas for livestock and dairy production	,0%	10,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	90,0%	,0%	100,0% (N=30)
Other Specific	,0%	66,7%	33,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0% (N=3)
Total	3,2% (N=5)	43,2% (N=67)	,6% (N=1)	5,2% (N=8)	5,8% (N=9)	1,9% (N=3)	,6% (N=1)	38,1%	1,3%	100,0% (N=155)

In the Dutch news on agriculture actors with a EU scope are dominant in the sub-issues of subsidy reform (73,5%), subsidies in the setting of eastern enlargement (100%), subsidies in the setting of international trade (58,8%) and the Foot and Mouth disease (50%). Actors with a Dutch scope are dominant in the sub-issues of quota's (90%) and other diseases than Foot and Mouth (57,1%), Actors with a UK scope are dominant in the sub-issue of Foot and Mouth Disease (50%), while actors with a French scope

are important in the sub-issue of BSE (34,6). The impact of France and the UK means that news from the country of origin of certain epidemic diseases spills over to domestic news (and politics) in the Netherlands. This indicates horizontal convergence through cross-national diffusion of problems and conflicts.

C Immigration

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
Supranational: UN	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,7%	,6%	1
Other supranational	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,7%	,6%	1
EU	,0%	41,2%	3,1%	11,9%	9,6%	16
Multilateral	19,2%	17,6%	3,1%	11,9%	10,2%	17
Bilateral	38,5%	23,5%	44,6%	15,3%	31,1%	52
Germany	3,8%	,0%	1,5%	5,1%	3,0%	5
Italy	,0%	,0%	3,1%	,0%	1,2%	2
Spain	,0%	,0%	3,1%	1,7%	1,8%	3
Netherlands	19,2%	17,6%	33,8%	47,5%	34,7%	58
Other pre-1995 EU-members	,0%	,0%	4,6%	1,7%	2,4%	4
Austria, Finland, Sweden	,0%	,0%	1,5%	,0%	,6%	1
Switzerland	,0%	,0%	1,5%	,0%	,6%	1
Other European countries ex CIS	19,2%	,0%	,0%	,0%	3,0%	5
Rest of the world	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,7%	,6%	1
Total	100,0% (N=26)	100,0% (N=17)	100,0% (N=65)	100,0% (N=59)	100,0%	167

In the field of immigration in Dutch newspapers issues with a domestic scope *increased* from 19,2% in 1990 to 47,5%, a *unique* result in our study. Issues with a bilateral and multilateral scope decreased from respectively 38,5% and 19,2% in 1990 to 15,3% and 11,9% in 2002. Issues with a EU scope increased from 0% in 1990 to 11,9% in 2002, yet the change has been erratic, perhaps due to a change of immigration waves in the early 1990s.

D Troops deployment

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
Supranational: UN	,0%	73,1%	59,6%	25,8%	39,6%	74
Other supranational	3,5%	9,6%	12,8%	12,9%	9,1%	17
EU	,0%	3,8%	,0%	,0%	1,1%	2
Other European supranational	1,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,5%	1
Multilateral	64,9%	5,8%	,0%	41,9%	28,3%	53
Bilateral	29,8%	7,7%	27,7%	19,4%	21,4%	40
Total	100,0% (N=57)	100,0% (N=52)	100,0% (N=47)	100,0% (N=31)	100,0%	187

In the field of troops deployment in Dutch newspapers issues with a supranational, multilateral and bilateral scope are dominant. Issues with a UN scope or another supranational scope increased since 1990, while other issue scopes decreased. Issues with a EU scope are *absent* in this field, except for the year 1995 (the Yugoslavian crisis).

E Pensions

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
Supranational: UN	,0%	,0%	11,1%	,0%	2,5%	1
EU	,0%	,0%	11,1%	16,7%	10,0%	4
Multilateral	,0%	10,0%	,0%	5,6%	5,0%	2
Germany	,0%	,0%	,0%	5,6%	2,5%	1
France	,0%	,0%	,0%	5,6%	2,5%	1
Spain	,0%	,0%	,0%	11,1%	5,0%	2
Netherlands	100,0%	90,0%	66,7%	55,6%	70,0%	28
Rest of the world	,0%	,0%	11,1%	,0%	2,5%	1
Total	100,0% (N=3)	100,0% (N=10)	100,0% (N=9)	100,0% (N=18)	100,0%	40

In the field of retirement and pension schemes in Dutch newspapers issues with a domestic scope decreased from 100% in 1990 to 55,6% in 2002, while issues with a EU scope increased from 0% in 1990 to 16,7% in 2002. Issues with a multilateral and Spanish scope also increased to both 5% in 2002. The low volume of claims should qualify each interpretation of this table.

F Education

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
EU	,0%	,0%	,9%	,0%	,4%	1
Multilateral	1,6%	,0%	2,7%	,0%	1,5%	4
Bilateral	,0%	,0%	,9%	,0%	,4%	1
Germany	,0%	,0%	,0%	3,7%	,8%	2
France	1,6%	,0%	,0%	1,9%	,8%	2
UK	,0%	,0%	2,7%	,0%	1,2%	3
Italy	,0%	,0%	,9%	,0%	,4%	1
Netherlands	95,2%	96,9%	90,1%	94,4%	93,1%	241
Other pre-1995 EU-members	,0%	,0%	1,8%	,0%	,8%	2

USA	1,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	1
Rest of the world	,0%	3,1%	,0%	,0%	,4%	1
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	259

In the field of education in Dutch newspapers issues with a domestic scope remained dominant since 1990 (93,1%), despite of slight decrease since the peak year 1990. Issues with a EU scope are nearly non-existent. This implies that issues of education policy in the Netherlands, such as university reform, are in many ways decoupled from issues of European integration.

G European integration

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total Frequency
Other supranational	21,1%	2,3%	1,1%	,0%	3,2%	11
EU	36,8%	97,7%	98,9%	98,8%	98,8%	321
Other European supranational	42,1%	,0%	,0%	1,3%	4,9%	17
Total	100,0% (N=38)	100,0% (N=43)	100,0% (N=188)	100,0% (N=80)	100,0%	349

In the field of European integration in Dutch newspapers issues with a European scope increased rapidly from 36,8% in 1990 to 98,8% in 2002. This is combined with the increase of issues with some other European supranational scope, the disappearance of issues with some other supranational scope and the total absence of issues with a domestic or one-country scope. The issue of German unification – crucial in 1990 – may well explain this trend.

Table 8.1: Position regarding European integration by policy field and year

	Year	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	1990	,59	22	,590
	1995	,38	52	,796
	2000	,10	104	,600
	2001	,24	72	,702
	2002	,17	93	,636
	Total	,22	343	,674
Agriculture: Subs., livestock, quotas, disease control	1990	,17	35	,747
	1995	,20	10	,789
	2000	,36	45	,570
	2001	,07	44	,695
	2002	,15	39	,709
	Total	,19	173	,685
Immigration: entry and exit	1990	,50	2	,707
	1995	,14	7	,378
	2000	,52	21	,512
	2001	,13	16	,806
	2002	,40	15	,632
	Total	,34	61	,629
Troops deployment	1990	,00	1	.
	1995	,00	2	,000
	2000	,00	1	.
	2001	,89	9	,333
	2002	,00	1	.
	Total	,57	14	,514
Retirement and pension schemes	1990	1,00	1	.
	2000	,00	2	,000
	2001	,25	4	,500
	2002	,14	7	,690

	Total	,21	14	,579
Education	1990	,00	1	.
	2000	,00	1	.
	2001	1,00	1	.
	2002	,00	2	1,414
	Total	,20	5	,837
European Integration	1990	,45	75	,684
	1995	,45	80	,710
	2000	,41	359	,649
	2001	-,06	113	,827
	2002	,30	161	,773
	Total	,33	788	,730
Total	1990	,40	137	,691
	1995	,39	151	,730
	2000	,34	533	,637
	2001	,10	259	,774
	2002	,24	318	,720
	Total	,29	1398	,705

The total evaluation of European integration by claimants in Dutch newspapers is moderately favorable, ranging from + 0,40 in 1990 to + 0.24 in 2002. The trend of steadily decreasing positive evaluation in the general picture is also visible in the domains of monetary politics, immigration, and retirement and pensions. There are no trends in the claim makers assessment of agriculture (slightly favorable), troops deployment and education. The results for 2001 require further analysis. In most cases standard deviations are high (>0,500). This indicates a large spread of evaluations.

Table 8.2: Position regarding European integration by actor type

Summary actor type	Actor type	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
state and party actors	politicians	,11	37	,774
	former states(wo)men	,13	15	,834
	government/executive	,38	651	,703
	legislative	,31	111	,698
	judiciary	,14	7	,378
	police and internal security agencies	,57	7	,535
	military	,33	3	,577
	central banks	,26	88	,514
	social security executive organisations	1,00	1	.
	other state executive agencies	,07	44	,661
	political parties	,19	37	,660
Subtotal		,33	1001	,690
economic interest groups	unions and employees	,60	5	,548
	employers organizations and firms	,43	21	,676
	farmers and agricultural organizations	,00	30	,743
	economists and financial experts	-,10	30	,712
Subtotal		,10	86	,736
Total media	media and journalists	,19	195	,711
other civil society actors	churches and religious organizations and groups	-,67	3	,577
	educational professionals and organizations	,00	6	,632
	other scientific and research professionals and institutions	,33	46	,701
	students, pupils, and their parents	,00	1	.
	other professional organizations and groups	,55	11	,688
	consumer organizations and groups	,33	3	,577

	migrant organizations and groups	,00	4	,816
	pro- and anti-European campaign organizations and groups	-,20	5	1,095
	solidarity and human rights organizations	,00	3	1,000
	welfare organizations	,00	2	,000
	environmental organizations and groups	,00	2	,000
	other civil society organizations and groups	,14	7	1,069
subtotal		,22	93	,750
general/unknown/ unspecified	the general public	,00	5	1,000
	unknown/unspecified actors	1,00	1	.
	whole polities	,24	17	,831
subtotal		,22	23	,850
Total		,29	1398	,705

All actor types in the Netherlands evaluate European integration moderately positive, ranging from + 0,33 (state and party actors), + 0,22 (civil society actors), and + 0,19 (media and journalists) to + 0,10 (economic interest groups). Within the category of state and party actors the score of the government (+0,38) is a telling one. Within the category of civil society actors, there is a number of negative scores (churches, campaign organizations) and neutral scores (educational associations, students, migrant associations, solidarity and human rights associations, welfare and environmental associations). However, these scores are based on low volumes. Within the category of economic interest groups, the high score of employers' associations (+0,43) is striking. The positive evaluation of employers compared to the negative one of economic experts as well as the positive evaluation of the government compared to the less positive one of journalists are both notable.

Table 8.3: Position regarding European integration by actor scope

recoded first actor scope	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Supranational: UN	-,67	3	,577
Other supranational	,33	15	,816
EU	,41	426	,631
Other European supranational	,40	5	,548
Multilateral	-,07	30	,828
Bilateral	,50	4	1,000
Germany	,42	86	,677
France	,38	47	,644
UK	,01	68	,855
Italy	-,13	15	,834
Spain	,33	6	,816
Netherlands	,20	499	,707
Other pre-1995 EU-members	,22	69	,661
Austria, Finland, Sweden	,20	40	,648
Switzerland	,00	8	,926
Other European countries ex CIS	1,00	3	,000
Turkey	,63	8	,518
Russia	-,14	7	,900
USA	,67	9	,500
Middle East	-,50	2	,707
Rest of the world	,62	42	,697
Total	,29	1392	,706

Actors with a domestic scope, a EU scope, a German scope, an other pre-1995 EU member scope, and a UK scope (to name the most important ones) evaluate European integration quite favorably in Dutch newspapers, except for those with a UK-scope:

respectively, +0,20, +0, 41, +0,42, +0,22, and +0,1. Negative scores are attributed to actors with a UN scope, a Middle East scope, a Russian scope, an Italian scope, and a multilateral scope. German actors are slightly more positive than EU actors.

Table 8.4: Position regarding European integration by party affiliation and by year

Party (NL)	cyear2	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
PvdA	1990	,43	14	,646
	1995	,25	4	,957
	2000	,59	27	,572
	2001	-,40	15	,737
	2002	,14	7	,900
	Total	,27	67	,770
VVD	1990	,00	1	.
	1995	,50	6	,548
	2000	,18	17	,529
	2001	,22	9	,833
	2002	,36	22	,658
	Total	,29	55	,629
CDA	1990	,67	18	,485
	1995	,00	1	.
	2000	,67	6	,516
	2001	,33	3	,577
	2002	-,21	14	,699
	Total	,33	42	,687
D66	1995	,50	4	,577
	2000	,21	14	,699
	2001	,00	7	,816
	2002	,40	10	,699
	Total	,26	35	,701
GroenLinks	1990	1,00	1	.
	2000	,63	8	,518
	2001	,00	3	1,000

	2002	,75	4	,500
	Total	,56	16	,629
SP	2000	1,00	1	.
	2002	1,00	1	.
	Total	1,00	2	,000
PvdA/VVD/D66	1995	,00	1	.
	2000	-,09	11	,701
	2001	-,08	13	,641
	2002	-,50	2	,707
	Total	-,11	27	,641
PvdA/CDA	1990	,00	1	.
	Total	,00	1	.
LPF	2002	,00	3	,000
	Total	,00	3	,000
CDA/VVD/LPF	2002	-,60	5	,548
	Total	-,60	5	,548

The total scores of evaluation of European integration by Dutch parties range from +1 (SP), +0,56 (Groenlinks), +0,33 (CDA), +0,29 (VVD) and +0,27 (PvdA) to +0,26 (D66). The over-all positive sign makes a lot of sense, particularly in the case of the Dutch greens (Groenlinks), yet one would expect a negative sign for the Socialist Party (against EU neoliberalism and federalism), as well as roughly similar scores for Christian democrats (CDA) and social democrats (PvdA). The high positive score of the VVD is remarkable, since its leader in the 1990s made a conservative-liberal case against further European integration. This development seems at work in the lower scores of coalition cabinets with the VVD than coalition cabinets without the VVD. The LPF is a new right-wing populist party which is remarkably neutral in this sample. The decrease of evaluation by the Christian democrats (CDA), social democrats (PvdA), social liberals (D66) and greens (Groenlinks) is in accordance with the general dynamics of the Dutch politics of European integration in the 1990s (decreasing idealism and permissive consensus). The net increase of evaluation by the conservative liberals (VVD) from 1990 till 2002 in this table is rather unexpected. Bear in mind that the volumes (N scores) are too low to permit strong statements here.

Nota bene All tables 8.x will be checked for coder-bias in 2001.

Object actors

Table 9.1: Presence of object actor by policy field

	Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	Agriculture: Subsidy, livestock, quota, disease control	Immigration: entry and exit	Troops deployment	Retirement and pension schemes	Education	European Integration	Total
presence of object actor (N)	145	118	155	184	33	243	270	1148

Table 9.2a Object actor type by policy field

		Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	Agriculture: Subsidy, livestock, quota, disease control	Immigration: entry and exit	Troops deployment	Retirement and pension schemes	Education	European Integration	Total percentage	Total frequency
State and party actors	politicians	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	3,0%	,7%	8
	former states (wo)men	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	3,0%	,0%	,7%	,3%	3
	government/executive	6,9%	4,2%	2,6%	8,2%	,0%	3,3%	29,3%	10,5%	121
	legislative	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	2,2%	,5%	6
	military	,0%	,0%	,0%	43,5%	,0%	,0%	,7%	7,1%	82
	central banks	9,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	3,7%	2,1%	24
	other state executive agencies	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	,7%	,3%	3
	Political parties	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,7%	,2%	2
	Total	16,6% (N=24)	4,2% (N=5)	2,6% (N=4)	51,6% (N=95)	3,0% (N=1)	3,7% (N=9)	41,1% (N=111)	21,7%	249
Economic interest groups	unions and employees	,0%	,0%	,6%	,0%	27,3%	,4%	,4%	1,0%	12
	Employers organizations and firms	4,8%	4,2%	,0%	,0%	6,1%	,8%	1,1%	1,7%	19
	farmers and agricultural organizations	,0%	71,2%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,1%	7,6%	87
	Economists and financial experts	3,4%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,1%	,7%	8
	Total	8,3% (N=12)	75,4% (N=89)	,6% (N=1)	,0% (N=0)	33,3% (N=11)	1,2% (N=3)	3,7% (N=10)	11,0%	126
Media and journalists	,7% (N=1)	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4% (N=1)	,2%	2	

Other civil society actors	churches and religious organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	1,3%	,0%	,0%	,4%	,0%	,3%	3
	educational professionals and organizations	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	32,9%	,0%	7,0%	80
	other scientific and research professionals and institutions	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,6%	,0%	,3%	4
	students, pupils, and their parents	,0%	1,7%	,6%	,0%	,0%	57,2%	,4%	12,5%	143
	other professional organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,1%	1
	consumer organizations and groups	3,4%	3,4%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	,0%	,9%	10
	migrant organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	87,1%	,0%	9,1%	1,2%	,0%	12,3%	141
	organizations and groups of the elderly	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	33,3%	,0%	,0%	1,0%	11
	women's organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	6,1%	,0%	,0%	,2%	2
	rebel forces/ guerilla	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,3%	3
other civil society organizations and groups	,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	,2%	2	

	Total	4,1% (N=6)	5,1% (N=6)	89,7% (N=139)	1,6% (N=3)	48,5% (N=16)	93,8% (N=228)	,7% (N=2)	34,8%	400
General/unknown/unspecified	whole polities	13,8%	7,6%	5,2%	44,6%	3,0%	,8%	48,1%	22,0%	252
	whole economies	51,0%	5,1%	,0%	,0%	6,1%	,4%	1,9%	7,7%	88
	the general public	5,5%	2,5%	1,9%	2,2%	6,1%	,0%	4,1%	2,7%	31
	Total	70,3% (N=102)	15,3% (N=18)	7,1% (N=11)	46,7% (N=86)	15,2% (N=5)	1,2% (N=3)	54,1% (N=146)	32,3%	371
Total		100,0% (N=145)	100,0% (N=118)	100,0% (N=155)	100,0% (N=184)	100,0% (N=33)	100,0% (N=243)	100,0% (N=270)	100,0% %	1148

This table addresses the question of *cui bono? Whose interests are promoted or harmed in European integration and its specific policy domains?* In the Dutch field of monetary politics central banks and the government (two state and party actors) are most often referred to as objects of claimants whose interests are involved (respectively 9,7% and 6,9%). Other important actors here are employers' associations and economists (two economic interest groups) and consumer associations (a civil society actor). In agriculture the most important actors as objects of claims are farmers' associations (71,2%) and consumer associations (3,4%). In immigration the most important actors are immigrants associations (87,1%). In troops deployment the military are the most important actor (43,5%). In retirement and pension schemes associations of the elderly (33,3%), unions (27,3%) and associations of women (6,1%) are the most important actors. In education students (57,2%) and educational associations (32,9%) are most important. In European integration the government is the most important actor (29,3%). Diffusion of articulation via whole polities is most strong in the domains of European integration and troops deployment. Diffusion via whole economies is most important in monetary politics, education and agriculture. The general public does not play an important role as object of claim makers, except for monetary politics (5,5%).

Table 9.2b: Object actor type by year

		1990	1995	2000	2002	Total per-centage	Total frequency
State and party actors	politicians	,5%	,5%	1,3%	,0%	,7%	8
	former states (wo)men	,0%	,5%	,4%	,0%	,3%	3
	government/executive	11,3%	6,9%	14,3%	6,6%	10,5%	121
	Legislative	,0%	,0%	1,1%	,3%	,5%	6
	Military	12,3%	15,8%	4,3%	1,7%	7,1%	82
	central banks	1,4%	,5%	2,2%	3,5%	2,1%	24
	other state executive agencies	,5%	,0%	,4%	,0%	,3%	3
	political parties	,0%	,0%	,4%	,0%	,2%	2
	Total	25,9% (N=55)	24,3% (N=49)	24,7% (N=110)	12,2% (N=35)	21,7%	249
Economic interest groups	unions and employees	,0%	2,0%	,9%	1,4%	1,0%	12
	employers organizations and firms	,5%	,5%	2,0%	2,8%	1,7%	19
	farmers and agricultural organizations	10,8%	10,4%	6,5%	4,9%	7,6%	87
	economists and financial experts	,0%	,0%	1,3%	,7%	,7%	8
	Total	11,3% (N=24)	12,9% (N=26)	10,8% (N=48)	9,7% (N=28)	11,0%	126
Media and journalists	media and journalists	,0%	,0%	,2% (N=1)	,3% (N=1)	,2% (N=2)	2
Other civil society actors	churches and religious organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,0%	,3%	3
	educational professionals and organizations	9,9%	2,0%	8,3%	6,3%	7,0%	80
	other scientific and research professionals and institutions	,5%	,0%	,7%	,0%	,3%	4
	students, pupils, and their parents	10,8%	12,4%	14,8%	10,1%	12,5%	143

	other professional organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,2%	,0%	,1%	1
	consumer organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,7%	2,4%	,9%	10
	migrant organizations and groups	9,9%	7,9%	12,8%	16,3%	12,3%	141
	organizations and groups of the elderly	,5%	1,5%	,4%	1,7%	1,0%	11
	women's organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,0%	,7%	,2%	2
	rebel forces/guerilla	,0%	,5%	,4%	,0%	,3%	3
	other civil society organizations and groups	,0%	,0%	,2%	,3%	,2%	2
	Total	31,6% (N=67)	24,3% (N=49)	38,6% (N=172)	38,9% (N=112)	34,8%	4000
General/unknown/unspecified	whole polities	22,6%	21,3%	20,2%	24,7%	22,0%	225
	whole economies	8,0%	13,9%	3,1%	10,1%	7,7%	88
	the general public	,5%	3,5%	2,5%	4,2%	2,7%	31
	Total	31,1% (N=66)	38,6% (N=78)	25,8% (N=115)	38,9% (N=112)	32,3%	371
Total		100,0% (N=212)	100,0% (N=202)	100,0% (N=446)	100,0% (N=288)	100,0%	1148

This table continues with the question of *cui bono*? As to state and party actors in the Netherlands, the government is the single most important object of claim makers (10,5%). As to interest groups, farmers' associations are the single most important object. As to other civil society actors students and immigrants' associations are most important objects (respectively 12,5% and 12,3 %). Over-all, civil society actors are the most important object of claims (34,8%), followed by state and party actors (21,7%), and economic interest groups (11%), while media and journalists are virtually absent here (0,2%). Whole polities are more important objects (22%) than whole economies (7,7%) and the general public (2,7%). In most cases the changes over the years have been limited. We selected the domain of immigration for its sovereignty aspects. Yet the object actor "whole polity" is lacking here. It is present in European integration and troops deployment.

Table 9.3a: Evaluation by object actor scope

		Mean	N
State and party actors	politicians	-,50	8
	former states(women)	-,67	3
	government/executive	-,05	121

	legislative	-,17	6
	military	,16	82
	central banks	-,13	24
	other state executive agencies	,33	3
	political parties	-1,00	2
	Total	-,02	249
Economic interest groups	unions and employees	,08	12
	employers organizations and firms	,11	19
	farmers and agricultural organizations	,13	87
	economists and financial experts	,25	8
	Total	,13	126
Media and journalists	media and journalists	1,00	2
Other civil society actors	churches and religious organizations and groups	-,67	3
	educational professionals and organizations	,43	80
	other scientific and research professionals and institutions	,00	4
	students, pupils, and their parents	,37	143
	other professional organizations and groups	-1,00	1
	consumer organizations and groups	,00	10
	migrant organizations and groups	-,07	141
	organizations and groups of the elderly	,27	11
	women's organizations and groups	,50	2
	rebel forces/guerilla	-,33	3
	other civil society organizations and groups	,50	2
	Total	,20	400
General/unknown/unspecified	whole polities	,32	252
	whole economies	,48	88
	the general public	,23	31
	Total	,35	371
Total		,19	1148

The alleged effects of claims in the Netherlands on whole economies, whole polities, the general public as well as civil society actors are positive (respectively +0,48, +0,32, +0,23 and +0, 20). The effects of claims on certain civil society actors are quite positive, such as in the case of educational associations (+0,43) and students (+0,37). Yet the effects of claims on some other separate actors are surprisingly neutral, for example in the case of the government (-0,05), the military (+0,16), farmers' associations (+0,13), and immigrants' associations (-0,17). Strongly negative evaluations seem missing in the discourse of Dutch newspapers. Negative scores involve politicians, former statespersons, the legislative branch, central banks, political parties, churches, professionals, and rebel forces. However, these scores are based on low volumes. The importance of civil society actors in the Dutch case

suggests that they are used as legitimisation of policies by politicians and policy makers.

9.3b: Evaluation by object actor scope

Object actor scope	Mean	N
Supranational: UN	,35	26
Other supranational	,09	11
EU	,20	230
Other European supranational	,80	5
Multilateral	,19	98
Bilateral	,50	4
Germany	-,18	28
France	,05	19
UK	,11	18
Italy	-,11	9
Spain	-,40	5
Netherlands	,29	404
Other pre-1995 EU-members	-,42	12
Austria, Finland, Sweden	,05	44
Switzerland	,40	5
Other European countries ex CIS	,27	45
Turkey	-,27	11
Russia	-,15	13
USA	,25	28
Japan	1,00	3
Middle East	-,13	55
Rest of the world	,28	69
Total	,19	1142

The general evaluation of the impact of claims with respect to the European setting of society and politics on the interest of main actors is close to neutral in the Netherlands (+0,19). It is mildly positive with respect tot the interest of the government (+0,29) and close to neutral with respect to the interests of the EU (+0,20) and multilateral actors (+0,19). Actors with a USA scope are valued higher than those with a EU scope. Negative scores involve Germany, Italy, other pre-1995 EU members, Turkey, Russia and the Middle East. These scores are based on low volumes.

9.4a: Object actor scope by policy field

	Monetary politics: currency and interest rate	Agriculture: Subsidy, livestock, quota, disease control	Immigration: entry and exit	Troops deployment	Retirement and pension schemes	Education	European Integration	Total percentage	Total frequency
Supranational: UN	,0%	,0%	,0%	13,6%	3,0%	,0%	,0%	2,3%	26
Other supranational	,7%	,0%	,0%	3,8%	,0%	,0%	1,1%	1,0%	11
EU	39,3%	31,4%	2,0%	1,6%	6,1%	,8%	46,8%	20,1%	230
Other European supranational	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,9%	,4%	5
Multilateral	2,8%	1,7%	41,3%	4,3%	6,1%	,4%	7,1%	8,6%	98
Bilateral	,7%	,0%	,7%	,5%	,0%	,4%	,0%	,4%	4
Germany	6,2%	2,5%	2,0%	,0%	,0%	,8%	4,1%	2,5%	28
France	4,8%	2,5%	,0%	1,1%	3,0%	,8%	1,5%	1,7%	19
UK	5,5%	3,4%	,7%	1,1%	,0%	1,2%	,0%	1,6%	18
Italy	2,8%	,0%	,7%	,0%	,0%	,4%	1,1%	,8%	9
Spain	,0%	,8%	,0%	,0%	9,1%	,0%	,4%	,4%	5
Netherlands	23,4%	52,5%	12,7%	14,7%	66,7%	93,0%	5,2%	35,4%	404
Other pre-1995 EU-members	,0%	1,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,8%	3,0%	1,1%	12
Austria, Finland, Sweden	,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	3,0%	,0%	15,6%	3,9%	44
Switzerland	,0%	,0%	,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,5%	,4%	5
Upcoming enlargement countries	,0%	0,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	5,9%	1,5%	17
Other European countries ex CIS	,7%	,0%	12,7%	12,5%	,0%	,0%	,7%	3,9%	45
Turkey	,0%	,0%	3,3%	1,6%	,0%	,0%	1,1%	1,0%	11
Russia	,7%	,0%	2,7%	2,7%	,0%	,0%	1,1%	1,1%	12
USA	9,0%	,8%	,7%	6,5%	,0%	,4%	,0%	2,5%	28
Japan	2,1%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,3%	3
Middle East	,0%	,0%	8,0%	22,8%	,0%	,0%	,4%	4,8%	55
Rest of the world	,0%	1,7%	12,0%	13,0%	3,0%	,8%	1,5%	4,6%	52

Total	100,0% (N=145)	100,0% (N=118)	100,0% (N=150)	100,0% (N=184)	100,0% (N=33)	100,0% (N=243)	100,0% (N=269)	100,0%	1142
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In the Dutch field of monetary politics the most important actors with a specific scope as *objects* of claims are the EU (39,3%), the Netherlands (23,4%) and the USA (9%). In agriculture the most important actors are the Netherlands (52,5%), the EU (31,4%) and the UK (3,4%). In immigration the most important actors are multilateral actors (41,3%), the Netherlands and pre-1995 EU members (both 12,7%). In troops deployment the most important actors are the Middle East (22,8%), the Netherlands (14,7%) and the UN (13,6%). In retirement and pension schemes the most important actors are the Netherlands (66,7%), Spain (9,1%) and the EU (6,1%). In education the most important actor is the Netherlands (93%). In European integration the most important actors are the EU (46,8%), Austria/Finland/Sweden (15,6%) and the rest of the world (7,4%). This table underlines the meaning of a distinction between policy domains, as to the Europeanisation of articulation of interests. Monetary politics, and agriculture are street lengths ahead in terms of such Europeanisation. The table also underlines the continuing weight of domestic articulation of interests. Such articulation is surprisingly limited in European integration as well as in the fields of immigration and troops deployment (probably due to internationalisation of politics and administration here). It is still dominant in the fields of education, retirement and pensions, *and* agriculture. This last result (52,5% actors with a domestic scope as objects of claims) may indicate renationalisation of mobilisation and communication.

9.4b Object actor scope by year

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total percentage	Total frequency
Supranational: UN	,0%	9,9%	1,1%	,3%	2,3%	26
Other supranational	2,8%	1,0%	,5%	,3%	1,0%	11
EU	8,0%	19,3%	22,0%	26,7%	20,1%	230
Other European supranational	2,4%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,4%	5
Multilateral	12,7%	3,5%	8,6%	9,0%	8,6%	98
Bilateral	,5%	,5%	,0%	,7%	,4%	4
Germany	3,8%	3,0%	1,1%	3,1%	2,5%	28
France	,9%	5,4%	,7%	1,0%	1,7%	19
UK	,0%	,5%	3,2%	1,0%	1,6%	18
Italy	,0%	,5%	,7%	1,7%	,8%	9
Spain	,5%	,0%	,0%	1,4%	,4%	5
Netherlands	34,4%	35,1%	36,1%	35,1%	35,4%	404
Other pre-1995 EU-members	,0%	,5%	2,3%	,3%	1,1%	12
Austria, Finland, Sweden	,0%	,5%	9,3%	,7%	3,9%	44
Switzerland	,0%	,0%	1,1%	,0%	,4%	5
Upcoming enlargement countries	,9%	1,5%	1,4%	2,1%	1,5%	17
Other European countries ex CIS	6,1%	8,4%	1,4%	3,1%	3,9%	45
Turkey	,5%	,5%	,7%	2,1%	1,0%	11
Russia	4,7%	,0%	,2%	,7%	1,1%	13
USA	7,1%	4,0%	,9%	,3%	2,5%	28
Japan	,0%	1,0%	,2%	,0%	,3%	3
Middle East	12,3%	1,0%	1,6%	6,9%	4,8%	55
Rest of the world	2,4%	4,0%	6,8%	3,1%	4,6%	69
Total	100,0% (n=212)	100,0% (n=202)	100,0% (n=440)	100,0% (n=288)	100,0%	1142

The most important actors with some scope as objects of claims (articulation of interests) in the Dutch discourse on (European) politics and society are the Netherlands (35,4%) *and* the EU (20,1%). The rest is much less important, except for multilateral actors (8,6) and the Middle East (4,8%). The standing of the Netherlands as object of articulation of interests is remarkably constant since 1990, while the standing of the EU has increased substantively from 8% in 1990 to 26,7% in 2002. This is one of the tables which clearly indicate the phenomenon of Europeanisation of the public sphere in member states themselves.

Frames

Table 10.a: Presence of frame by policy field

presence of frame	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration: entry and exit	Troops deployment	Retirement and pension schemes	Education	European Integration	Total percentage	Total frequency
No frame	55,9%	68,6%	68,9%	62,5%	100,0%	20,0%	48,7%	54,4%	769
frame	44,1%	31,4%	31,1%	37,5%	,0%	80,0%	51,3%	45,6%	645
Total	100,0% (n=345)	100,0% (n=175)	100,0% (n=61)	100,0% (n=16)	100,0% (n=14)	100,0% (n=5)	100,0% (n=798)	100,0%	1414

In more than half of the Dutch cases (54,4%) there are *no* clear frames. In the field of retirement and pension schemes the lack of frames of actors is overwhelming (100%). In other field such absence is no less striking: nearly 70% in agriculture and immigration. More than 60% in troops deployment. Nearly 56% in monetary politics. However, most actors in the Netherlands do use frames with respect to European integration in general (51,3%).

Table 10.1.b: Presence of frame by broad actor type

presence of frame	state and party actors	Economic interest groups	media and journalists	other civil society actors	general/unknown/unspecified	Total percentage	Total frequency
,00 (no)	59,2%	62,5%	33,3%	39,8%	50,0%	54,4%	769
1,00 (yes)	40,8%	37,5%	66,7%	60,2%	50,0%	45,6%	645
Total	100,0% (N=1014)	100,0% (N=88)	100,0% (N=195)	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	1414

In the Netherlands a majority of state and party actors and of economic interest groups do *not* conceive the European setting of society and politics in terms of frames. A majority of media and journalists as well as civil society actors do use frames. Perhaps most striking is the popularity of frames among media and journalists (66,7%).

Table 10.2a: Frame type by policy field

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration: entry and exit	Troops deployment	Education	European Integration	Total percentage	Total frequency
identity, normative and value frames	13,2%	23,6%	42,1%	33,3%	25,0%	31,8%	27,0%	174
constitutional and governance frames	17,8%	27,3%	15,8%	16,7%	25,0%	30,6%	26,7%	172
economic frames	59,2%	25,5%	15,8%	,0%	25,0%	12,7%	24,8%	160
other instrumental frames	2,0%	20,0%	26,3%	,0%	,0%	10,3%	9,5%	61
historical frames	5,3%	3,6%	,0%	50,0%	25,0%	9,0%	7,9%	51
frames internal to the integration process	2,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	5,6%	4,2%	27
Total	100,0% (n=152)	100,0% (N=55)	100,0% (N=19)	100,0% (N=6)	100,0% (N=4)	100,0% (N=409)	100,0%	645

The most important frames of (European) society and politics in the Netherlands are the frame of identity and values and norms (27%), the frame of constitution-making and governance (26,7%), and the economic frame (24,8%). The third place of the economic frame is a surprising result in an old “nation of shopkeepers”. Instrumental frames, historical frames and frames internal to the process of integration are all much less important. The identity frame is rather dominant in immigration and most important in troops deployment and European integration. The constitutional frame is most important in European integration, *and* in agriculture and education. The economic frame is dominant in monetary politics (59,2%!). It is also quite important in agriculture and education. Instrumental frames other than “economism” are important in immigration and agriculture. Historical frames are important in troops deployment (50%) *and* education (25%), although there is too few cases here to formulate general statements. Frames related to the topical political struggle on and of the EU are unimportant in the Netherlands. In the domain of monetary politics the general sequence of frames is reversed: economic frames are most important (59,2%), then constitutional frames (17,8%), and finally identity frames (13,2%).

Table 10.2b: Frame type by year

	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	Total percentage	Total frequency
identity, normative and value frames	24,7%	28,6%	30,7%	24,3%	21,2%	27,0%	174
constitutional and governance frames	24,7%	28,6%	28,5%	31,1%	20,4%	26,7%	172
economic frames	17,8%	22,6%	22,0%	21,6%	37,2%	24,8%	160
other instrumental frames	17,8%	7,1%	7,2%	2,7%	14,6%	9,5%	61
historical frames	12,3%	11,9%	4,7%	16,2%	5,1%	7,9%	51
frames internal to the integration process	2,7%	1,2%	6,9%	4,1%	1,5%	4,2%	27
Total	100,0% (n=73)	100,0% (n=84)	100,0% (n=277)	100,0% (n=74)	100,0% (n=137)	100,0%	645

The dynamics of framing of (European) politics and society in Dutch newspapers is limited, yet present. The most important general frame (identity, values and norms) is highest in 2000 (30,7%) and lowest in 2002 (21,2%). The second frame (constitution and governance) is highest in 2001 (31,1%) and lowest in 2002 (20,4%). The third frame (economy) is highest in 2002 (37,2%) and lowest in 1990 (17,8%). All this indicates a recent upturn of “economism” at the cost of “nationalism” and “constitutionalism”. This upturn is confirmed by recent moves in the European course of Dutch governments. Instrumental frames other than “economism” range between 17,8% in 1990 and 2,7% in 2001. Historical frames range between 16,2% in 2001 and 4,7% in 2000. Internal frames, related to the topical politics of the EU, range between 6,9% in 2000 (the Treaty of Nice) and 1,2% in 1995.

Table 10.2c: Frame type by broad actor type

	state and party actors	economic interest groups	media and journalists	other civil society actors	general/unknown/unspecified	Total percentage	Total frequency
identity, normative and value frames	28,7%	24,2%	20,8%	33,9%	8,3%	27,0%	174
constitutional and governance frames	24,6%	24,2%	34,6%	25,0%	25,0%	26,7%	172
economic frames	24,9%	42,4%	18,5%	28,6%	25,0%	24,8%	160
other instrumental frames	11,4%	,0%	7,7%	3,6%	16,7%	9,5%	61
historical frames	7,7%	6,1%	9,2%	5,4%	16,7%	7,9%	51
frames internal to the integration process	2,7%	3,0%	9,2%	3,6%	8,3%	4,2%	27
Total	100,0% (N=414)	100,0% (N=33)	100,0% (N=130)	100,0% (N=56)	100,0% (N=12)	100,0%	645

In the Netherlands economic interest groups use economic frames more often than other actors do. Media and journalists use constitutional frames more often than others. State and party actors use all three most important frames (identity, constitution, economy) just as others do *plus* instrumental frames other than “economism”.

Table 10.3: Twenty-five most often mentioned frames

	Frequency
efficiency, competence	42
democracy	32
economic growth	24
costs	24
Inflation	22
credibility (in citizens perspective)	21
community of values	19
economic stability	19
prices	17
European – a country’s relation with USA	16
own (national) economy	16
national identity	14
institutional reforms>enlargement	13
collectivism	11
peace	11

rule of law	11
unity	10
bureaucracy	10
history of the EU/founding fathers and principles	10
free trade	9
security	9
other	9
nationalism	8
racism/xenophobia	8
(social) justice	8
responsibility	8
equality among countries/member states/regions	8
national interest	8

Viewpoint number one of the EU in the Netherlands concerns an item in the frame of constitution-making and governance (efficiency, competence). In the top five three viewpoints concern the economic frame. In the top ten five viewpoints concern the economic frame. The top twenty is more balanced with six identity viewpoints, six economic viewpoints and five constitutional viewpoints. In the top twenty-seven identity viewpoints are the winner (eleven scores), while historical viewpoints and internal viewpoints are the losers (both one score). Most results confirm the pragmatic approach to European integration of Dutch elites and citizens since 1945.

Table 10.4a: What the EU should not be/lead to: ten most often mentioned frames

	Frequency	Percent
Costs	9	13,6
Nationalism	7	10,6
Inflation	7	10,6
Racism/xenophobia	5	7,6
Fragmentation	4	6,1
Bureaucracy	4	6,1
Fascism/nazism	3	4,5
Federalism	3	4,5
Other	2	3,0
Corruption	2	3,0

The number one negative ethical viewpoint of the activity and identity of the EU here and now in the Netherlands is an item which is part and parcel of the economic frame (costs). Four other viewpoints belong to the constitutional frame, three to the identity frame, and one to the economic frame.

Table 10.4b: What the EU is not/does not lead to: ten most often mentioned frames

	Frequency	Percent
efficiency, competence	15	12,8
credibility (in citizens perspective)	10	8,5
inflation	6	5,1
national identity	5	4,3
democracy	5	4,3
transparency	5	4,3
sovereignty	4	3,4
racism/xenophobia	3	2,6
(social) equality	3	2,6
unity	3	2,6

The number one negative factual viewpoint of the EU in the Netherlands is an item in the constitutional frame (lack of efficiency and competence). Five other viewpoints are part of the constitutional frame, four other viewpoints are part of the identity frame.

Table 10.4c: What the EU is/leads to: ten most often mentioned frames

	Frequency	Percent
community of values	16	7,7
economic growth	13	6,3
peace	9	4,3
costs	9	4,3
prices	7	3,4
other	7	3,4
democracy	6	2,9
inflation	6	2,9
collectivism	5	2,4
credibility (in citizens perspective)	5	2,4

The number one positive factual viewpoint of the EU in the Netherlands concerns an item in the identity frame (community of values). Four other viewpoints belong to the economic frame, two to the constitutional frame, and one to the identity frame.

Table 10.4d: What the EU should be/should lead to: ten most often mentioned frames

	Frequency	Percent
efficiency, competence	22	13,0
democracy	19	11,2
economic growth	11	6,5
economic stability	11	6,5
(social) justice	6	3,6
equality among countries/member states/regions	6	3,6
credibility (in citizens perspective)	6	3,6
own (national) economy	6	3,6
security	5	3,0

The number one positive ethical viewpoint of the EU in the Netherlands is an item in the constitutional frame (efficiency, competence). Three other viewpoints belong to the economic frame, two to the identity frame, two to the constitutional frame and one to the instrumental frame other than “economism”.