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## **Table of contents**

<b>Part I: Analytic Summary.....</b>	<b>5</b>
Introduction.....	5
Hypotheses.....	7
The Europeanisation of the UK public sphere.....	7
Europe as a political cleavage in UK politics.....	14
Collective representations of European integration in the UK public sphere.....	20
<b>Part II: Commented Tables.....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>Article level.....</b>	<b>27</b>
Table 1.1 Number of articles coded per year: European sample, full sample...	27
Table 1.2 Articles by paper.....	28
Table 1.3 Section from which articles were coded by paper.....	28
Table 1.4a Source of article by paper.....	29
Table 1.4b Source of article by year.....	29
Table 1.5 Articles with and without claims.....	30
<b>Claim-level: General.....</b>	<b>30</b>
Table 2.1 Number of claims coded per year: European sample, full sample, total.....	30
<b>Claim-level: Location.....</b>	<b>31</b>
Table 2.2a Country where claim was made by year.....	31
Table 2.2b Country where claim was made by issue field.....	32
Table 3.1 Region in own country where claim was made by issue field.....	33
<b>Claim-level: Actors.....</b>	<b>33</b>
Table 4.1 Actors of claims by issue field.....	34
Table 4.2 Actor type by issue field.....	36
Table 4.3a Twenty-five most often-mentioned spokespersons (including journalists).....	37
Table 4.3b Twenty-five most often-mentioned spokespersons (excluding journalists).....	38
Table 4.4 Recoded actor scope by broad actor categories.....	39
Table 4.5a Monetary policy: actor scope by year.....	41
Table 4.5b Agriculture: actor scope by year.....	43
Table 4.5c Immigration: actor scope by year.....	44
Table 4.5d Troops deployment: actor scope by year.....	45
Table 4.5e Retirement and pension schemes: actor scope by year.....	46
Table 4.5f Education: actor scope by year.....	47
Table 4.5g European integration: actor scope by year.....	48
Section summary.....	49
<b>Claim-level: Action forms.....</b>	<b>50</b>
Table 5.1a Forms of action by issue field.....	50
Table 5.1b Forms of action by broad actor categories.....	51
Table 5.1c Forms of action by actor scope.....	52

<b>Claim-level: Addressees.....</b>	<b>53</b>
Table 6.1	Presence of addressee by issue field.....53
Table 6.2a	Addressees by issue field.....54
Table 6.2b	Addressees by year.....56
Table 6.3a	Mean evaluation by category of addressee.....56
Table 6.3b	Mean evaluation by broad addressee scope.....58
Table 6.4a	Addressee scope by issue field.....60
Table 6.4b	Addressee scope by year.....61
Table 6.4c	Addressee scope by broad addressee categories.....62
Table 6.4d	Addressee scope by year – European integration only.....63
Table 6.4e	Addressee scope by year – monetary politics only.....64
Section summary.....	65
<b>Claim-level: Issues and aims.....</b>	<b>66</b>
Table 7.1	Issue field by year.....66
Table 7.2a	Monetary politics: issues within issue field by year.....67
Table 7.2b	Agriculture: issues within issue field by year.....68
Table 7.2c	Immigration: issues within issue field by year.....68
Table 7.2d	Troops deployment: issues within issue field by year.....69
Table 7.2e	Retirement and pension schemes: issues within issue field by year...70
Table 7.2f	Education: issues within issue field by year.....70
Table 7.2g	European integration: issues within issue field by year.....72
Table 7.3a	Issue scope by policy field.....73
Table 7.3b	Issue scope by year.....75
Table 7.4a	Monetary politics: issue scope by year.....76
Table 7.4b	Agriculture: issue scope by year.....77
Table 7.4c	Immigration: issue scope by year.....78
Table 7.4d	Troops deployment: issue scope by year.....79
Table 7.4e	Retirement and pension schemes: issue scope by year.....80
Table 7.4f	Education: issue scope by year.....81
Section summary.....	82
<b>Claim-level: Evaluations of European integration.....</b>	<b>83</b>
Table 8.1	Position regarding European integration by policy field and year.....84
Table 8.2	Position regarding European integration by actor type.....85
Table 8.3	Position regarding European integration by actor scope.....87
Table 8.4	Position regarding European integration by party affiliation and year.....88
Section summary.....	89
<b>Claim-level: Object actors.....</b>	<b>90</b>
Table 9.1	Presence of object actor by policy field.....90
Table 9.2a	Object actor type by policy field.....91
Table 9.2b	Object actor type by year.....93
Table 9.3a	Evaluation by object actor type.....94
Table 9.3b	Evaluation by object actor scope.....95
Table 9.3c	Evaluation by object actor scope, European integration only.....96
Table 9.4a	Object actor scope by policy field.....97
Table 9.4b	Object actor scope by year.....99

Table 9.4c	Object actor scope by year, European integration only.....	100
Table 9.4d	Object actor scope by year, monetary politics only.....	101
Section summary.....		101
<b>Claim-level: Frames.....</b>		<b>102</b>
Table 10.1a	Presence of frame by policy field.....	102
Table 10.1b	Presence of frame by broad actor type.....	103
Table 10.2a	Frame type by policy field.....	103
Table 10.2b	Frame type by year.....	104
Table 10.2c	Frame type by broad actor type.....	105
Table 10.3	Twenty-five most often mentioned frames.....	107
Table 10.4a	What the EU should not be/lead to: ten most often mentioned frames.....	108
Table 10.4b	What the EU is not/does not lead to: ten most often mentioned frames.....	109
Table 10.4c	What the EU is/leads to: ten most often mentioned frames.....	109
Table 10.4d	What the EU should be/should lead to: ten most often mentioned frames.....	110
<b>References.....</b>		<b>111</b>

## Part I: Analytic summary

### **Introduction**

This national report addresses three main research questions. First, it investigates the patterns of Europeanisation evident in the UK public sphere, identifying how European integration has initiated a restructuring of public space in the UK both across policy fields and over time, from 1990 to 2002. We then focus in more depth on the issue of European integration alone, exploring how the field can be characterised in relation to other policy fields and the kinds of political actors that feature in claims-making on European integration. Secondly, the question is considered of whether new Europe-related cleavages have developed in UK politics and are apparent in the UK public sphere. In order to determine if and how Europe-related cleavages have opened up, actors' positions towards European integration are analysed. The final section of the analysis examines the terms in which European issues are discussed in the UK public sphere, discussing the ways in which different political actors frame European integration.

If the public sphere is thought of as a vast network of communicative linkages, one purpose of this research is to determine for the UK to what extent those links increasingly extend horizontally across European states and vertically to the European level. Following Koopmans and Erbe's (2003) work on the Europeanisation of the German public sphere, we argue that Europeanisation can take place both vertically, with national public debates increasingly referring to EU-level institutions and policies, or horizontally, with national public debates increasingly referring to actors and policies from other European countries. Our data allows us to identify, for the UK public space, precisely who makes claims addressed at which actors and institutions, on whose behalf. This means that we are able to locate where Europeanisation is particularly apparent in the British public sphere, as well as identifying any sites of the public sphere where we would expect Europeanisation to be evident but that appear to be resisting Europeanisation pressures.

Analysis of the public sphere tells us not only about political communication, but also about the visibility of political mobilisation and participation. Public spheres are not purely communicative networks, but also sites where power conflicts between

political actors and institutions are played out, as well as channels for citizen participation and the expression of collective identities. Furthermore, they are sites which many non-governmental actors in particular find it challenging to gain access to. A particular focus of this report is whether Europeanisation appears in the UK public sphere as an elite-driven, top-down process, or whether we also see evidence of Europeanisation ‘from below’, through increasing participation by civil society actors in the UK public sphere. In relation to this question of ‘Europeanisation from below’, we examine whether civil society mobilisation in specific policy fields is increasingly taking place at a European level, targeted at European actors or on behalf of European interests, as well as establishing whether mobilisation is visibly taking place about the issue of European integration itself. This helps in determining whether Imig and Tarrow’s (2001) claim that ‘public debates and citizens’ participation in the policy process are still mainly situated on the nation-state level and directed at national authorities’ still rings true, or whether we do in fact appear to be witnessing a Europeanisation of civil society mobilisation.

The public sphere also acts as a forum for citizen information and participation. In the final part of our analysis, we investigate the collective representations of the EU and European integration that circulate in the British public domain. Mass media coverage plays a major part in constantly creating and recreating the ‘public face of Europe’ in national contexts. If certain European issues are concentrated on in the British public sphere whereas others are hardly discussed, or certain symbolic framings are used repeatedly in coverage of the EU and European integration, this has consequences for how Europe is collectively constructed in the national public domain. In particular, it potentially impacts on UK public attitudes to and beliefs about Europe, holding implications for the popular legitimacy of the EU. Examining the collective representations of the EU that are prevalent in national public spheres is highly relevant in the current political context, given that concern has been expressed at EU level about the gap between European elite and citizen acceptance of European integration. For example, a key aim of the 2003 Convention on the Future of Europe was to bring Europe closer to its citizens.

## **Hypotheses**

Our guiding hypotheses, from the original project proposal (Koopmans and Statham 2002), are that the degree and form of Europeanisation evident in the UK public sphere are likely to vary according to certain key factors. Specifically, Europeanisation will vary *by policy field, across time* and *by actor type*. First, we expect to find differences in the patterns of Europeanisation across policy domains, since each is characterised by a particular multi-level opportunity structure that defines the distribution of decision-making and implementation competences and capacities across the European, national and subnational levels. Secondly, we believe that Europeanisation is likely to vary across time. Generally, we would expect increased levels of Europeanisation as a consequence of advancing European integration, particularly in those policy fields where the EU has gained greater competences over the time span covered in our data (1990-2002).

Thirdly, we contend that there will be important differences between the abilities of different collective actors to respond to Europeanisation. If European institutions have gained increased capacity to act in certain policy fields, that implies potential new opportunities for political actors to influence the policy process. This could be by attempting to gain access to the European level directly or by putting pressure on national decision makers to raise their concerns at the EU level. European integration produces ‘winners’ and ‘losers’; while for some collective actors it may give rise to improved opportunities to influence policy, for others ‘the increasing importance of the EU may also impose new constraints that make it more difficult for collective actors to exert influence on the policy process’ (Koopmans and Statham 2002: 15). In particular, those groups that have been strong in national policy arenas – such as labour unions – may be slow to recognise and adjust to the growing European dimension of politics.

## **The Europeanisation of the UK public sphere**

Rather than speaking of a general Europeanisation of the UK public sphere, we expect that the extent to which Europeanisation has occurred varies significantly according to policy field. Clearly, policy fields where the EU has considerable competences vis-à-vis the national level can be expected to exhibit greater levels of Europeanisation than policy fields where the EU has fewer or no powers. This means that for the policy

fields sampled in our study, it would be expected that monetary politics and agriculture would exhibit fairly high levels of Europeanisation. With the acceleration of monetary union in the 1990s, culminating in the launch of single currency notes and coins in all eurozone countries on 1 January 2001, the EU has gained far greater responsibilities for monetary policymaking. Via the Common Agricultural Policy, the EU also has major policymaking and decisionmaking responsibilities for agriculture, which is the most integrated of all the EU's sectoral policies (Nugent 1999: 413). In policy fields where the EU has fewer responsibilities, as in immigration and troops deployment, we can suppose that a limited degree of Europeanisation is likely, and where the EU has little or no relevance, as in retirement and pensions politics or education, hardly any Europeanisation is likely to have taken place.

Examining Europeanisation by issue field, there are three principal indicators that suggest that one issue field is more 'Europeanised' than another: first, a greater presence of EU-level actors, whether as claimants, targets of other actors' demands, or constituencies affected by claims; second, a greater presence of actors from other European countries, again whether as claimants, targets or affected parties; and third, a greater proportion of issues within that field being discussed within a European frame of reference. These three indicators are discussed in turn below.

### *Vertical Europeanisation*

Taking the first indicator, the extent to which EU-level institutions and actors feature in the UK public sphere ('vertical Europeanisation') varies by policy field. As claims-makers, EU-level actors have most presence in the field of European integration (19.7%), some presence in the fields of monetary politics, agriculture, and immigration (7-9%), and little or no presence in the fields of troops deployment, pensions, education (0-1.7%). As addressees of claims, the highest proportions of EU-level actors are found in the fields of European integration and agriculture, with some demands also being addressed to EU actors in the fields of monetary politics and immigration, but few or no demands targeted at EU actors in the fields of troops deployment, pensions or education. As the parties affected by claims ('object actors'), EU actors appear in much higher proportions in the field of European integration than in any other issue field in the study. The other policy fields where EU object actors are present in any significant numbers are monetary politics (21.2%



of all object actors in this field), agriculture (13.8%) and immigration (8.0%). Virtually no EU actors are defined as being affected by claims in the fields of troops deployment, pensions or education.

A broad trend in our data, therefore, is for the field of European integration to be most Europeanised, followed by medium levels of Europeanisation in the fields of monetary politics and agriculture, medium to low levels of Europeanisation in the field of immigration, and minimal levels of Europeanisation for troops deployment, pensions politics and education. However, analysis of the data shows that for some of the policy fields Europeanisation varies structurally *within* policy fields as well as between them. In particular, within those issue fields that have high levels of EU involvement – European integration, monetary politics and agriculture – we find important structural differences in the patterns of Europeanisation, i.e. that some components of political claims appear to be more Europeanised than others are.

Taking the first ‘pair’ of policy fields – monetary politics and agriculture – as an example, differences in Europeanisation are apparent both within and between the two fields, although broadly speaking they exhibit the middle-ranking to high levels of Europeanisation that we would expect from fields where EU institutions and actors have a high level of involvement. While EU-level actors are more likely to feature as object actors in claims made about monetary politics issues than in claims made about agricultural issues, EU actors are less likely to have claims addressed at them in monetary politics than in agriculture. This lower proportion of EU-level targets of claims in the field of monetary politics may well be a function of the UK remaining outside the eurozone, since the power to make decisions over UK monetary politics resides largely at national level and EU-level actors such as the European Central Bank lack the power to bring about claimants’ desired outcomes.

Immigration emerges as an interesting case showing a partial Europeanisation of political actors in all roles: as claims-makers, targets of claims, and constituencies affected by claims. In contrast, there is little Europeanisation in the field of troops deployment, despite steps towards an EU capability in this issue field. As a case of Europeanisation, therefore, it is more appropriate to consider the immigration field on its own, rather than paired with troops deployment. The one main feature the two

domains do share is their high levels of transnationalisation. However, the multi-level structures differ somewhat for the two fields; while for troops deployment, there is considerable supranationalisation and multilateral coalitions have a strong presence, for immigration multilateral and bilateral actors and institutions have more importance. In sum, immigration is sometimes defined as a European problem, although this trend should not be exaggerated since the levels of Europeanisation remain moderate to low. In contrast, troops deployment appears in the UK public sphere as having little European involvement, with a European dimension to troops deployment politics hardly visible. An important caveat, however, is that our study includes articles only on the sub-issue of troops deployment, rather than on the wider issue of defence. It could be that an analysis of the wider defence field would show more Europeanisation, including discussions of the development of a European defence capability vis-à-vis Nato and the US.

As expected, virtually no EU actors feature in public debates over education or pensions in the UK public sphere. Claims-making analysis of these two fields confirms our suspicion that little or no Europeanisation has taken place in these policy domains, which remain concerns primarily defined at nation-state level.

#### *Horizontal Europeanisation*

Taking the second indicator - the extent to which actors from other EU countries feature in the UK public sphere ('horizontal Europeanisation') – differences again emerge between policy fields. Unsurprisingly, actors from the EU's large states, France and Germany, are more likely to feature in the UK public sphere than are actors from other EU member countries such as Italy or Spain. Political actors from the upcoming enlargement countries figured as parties affected by claims made in the UK public sphere, but very little either as claims-makers themselves or as the targets of others' claims. This reflects the fact that as applicant countries, the enlargement states were affected by political decisions made about European integration, but themselves had little capability to make political demands and few or no powers to satisfy demands made by other actors in this field.

The presence of actors from other EU countries frequently appears to depend on a particular country's historical importance in a policy field. For example, the fact that

French actors often appear in claims-making about agricultural issues and troops deployment can be ascribed to France's powerful agricultural sector and continuing military importance, while the strong showing by German actors in the field of monetary politics reflects the magnitude of the German economy. As claims-makers, the presence of actors from other EU states shows a similar pattern to that for EU actors: highest for European integration, some presence in the fields of monetary politics, agriculture and immigration, little presence in the area of troops deployment (except for French actors) and almost zero for pensions and education. A country's historical importance in the policy field appears to have a particular effect on whether *actors* feature as the targets of claims in that field, with French actors called upon in agriculture & troops deployment, German actors a focus of several claimants' demands in monetary politics, and both French and German actors called upon in immigration politics.

Where claimants identified actors from other EU countries as affected by their demands, actors from Germany and France featured little, while actors from upcoming enlargement countries featured to a small extent. In sum, while French and German actors feature as claimants and as the targets of claims, they appear to be less often defined as the parties affected by claims. It should be noted that the figures refer to the 'ultimate' or most important object actor of the claim, often the EU or the UK, and it may be that France and Germany feature more as second and third affected parties. Nonetheless, the finding bears out the need to specify exactly in what ways any Europeanisation of the public sphere is happening, rather than claiming that a general 'Europeanisation of the public sphere' is taking place. Our data indicates that both vertical and horizontal Europeanisation vary by policy field, but also that there is variation between whether EU and other European actors feature as claims-makers, as the addressees at whom claims are directed or as the actors affected by claims in the UK public sphere.

#### *Policy fields discussed as European concerns*

The third indicator of Europeanisation is the extent to which issues in each policy field are discussed within a European frame of reference. This proportion was highest for monetary politics and agriculture, although a greater proportion of claims about monetary politics were discussed within a European context than was the case for

agricultural politics, testifying to the recent importance of the EU in monetary politics and policymaking. Immigration was more likely to be discussed within a European context than troops deployment, although both issues were often discussed in frames of reference that extend beyond the nation-state. Taken together with the low incidence of EU-level actors in claims-making about troops deployment, this finding reiterates that troops deployment is rarely defined as an EU concern in the UK print media, despite steps towards an EU capability in this area. Finally, the policy fields that remain under the control of national political institutions – pensions and education – are discussed almost entirely within a UK national context. The findings related to all three indicators of Europeanisation by policy field suggest virtually no Europeanisation of education or pensions politics, as would be expected given the lack of EU involvement in these areas.

#### *Europeanisation across time, 1990-2002*

Across time, Europeanisation could be said to be taking place if there is an increasing presence of EU-level or other European actors making claims, having demands made on them, or being defined by other actors as the parties affected by claims, and also if there is a trend for issues to be discussed increasingly within a European frame of reference.

We gain more insight into the question of vertical Europeanisation over time if we break the findings down by policy field. Taking the field of European integration first, the share of EU actors in making claims in this field has increased over time. However, there was no discernible rise in the proportion of EU-level addressees of claims over the years sampled, and there was also no significant rise in the proportions of EU actors defined as affected by other actors' claims. While the actors affected by claims about European integration were less likely to be UK national actors in 2000 and 2002 compared with earlier years, this 'denationalisation' was not accompanied by a corresponding rise in EU-level actors. To summarise, while the proportion of EU-level actors making claims about European integration issues in the British public sphere has increased over time, the proportions of EU-level actors appearing as the targets and the affected parties of claims have not undergone a corresponding rise. Nonetheless, we can conclude that there has been an increasing

incidence of EU-level actors' claims about European integration issues achieving coverage in the UK public domain.

In contrast, when the field of monetary politics is examined a clear trend of vertical Europeanisation across time is evident. Higher proportions of EU-level actors appear as actors making claims, as targets of claims and as parties affected by claims in 2000 and 2002 than in 1990 or 1995. This testifies to the recent importance of the EU in monetary politics, with the bringing about of Economic and Monetary Union and the consequent establishment of the eurozone and the European Central Bank.

Unfortunately the numbers of claims for agriculture and immigration are not sufficient to make any well-founded arguments about the Europeanisation of these issue fields over time. However, even this examination of the fields of European integration and monetary politics indicates that the extent to which Europeanisation takes place over time varies by policy field.

#### *Collective actors featuring in debates about European integration*

The public sphere is a channel via which citizens can be both informed and mobilised. In other words, while the mass media act as a source of information for citizens about political issues, they also act as a means by which citizen participation is expressed and becomes evident. Using our data we can address the question of whether, in the UK public sphere, we see evidence of a Europeanisation 'from below', via a European civil society or via national interest groups or civil society organisations making claims with a European dimension.

Relative to other policy fields, European integration is represented in the public sphere as a domain where claims are made by elites, addressed at elites and in the main, affect elites. State and political party actors dominate as claims-makers, targets and beneficiaries of claims, and the presence of interest groups and other civil society actors is consistently low in European integration when compared with other issue fields. To give more detail, few claims are made by interest group and civil society actors in the European integration field, whether national, EU or transnational. This is in part inevitable, since in public communication in any policy field, elite actors and institutions – as the key decision makers in public policy - will always play a larger part than interest groups and civil society actors. However, when the proportion of

interest groups and civil society actors is compared across policy domains, it can be seen that fewer claimants make demands on non-state organisations in the field of European integration than in any of the other six issue fields. Furthermore, the proportion of interest group and civil society actors defined as being affected by the outcomes of claims in the field of European integration is lower than for any other issue field under investigation. In sum, a particularly low level of civil society mobilisation over European integration, when compared to other policy fields, is evident in the UK public domain. Given recent concern from European politicians about the ‘democratic deficit’ and increased gap between European elites and citizens, and the role that civil society actors are often viewed as playing in bridging that gap, this finding is a salient one.

In the few cases where interest groups and civil society actors do appear in the UK public sphere as claims-makers, as the targets of other actors’ claims or as the parties affected by claims about European integration, they are typically UK national actors. Very few claims by EU-level interest groups or civil society actors appear in the UK public sphere, and in no issue field do EU-level interest groups or civil society actors feature as a significant proportion of addressees. Although there has undoubtedly been an explosion in the numbers of Brussels-based NGOs, which some scholars have taken as evidence of a growing European civil society, their activities have no visibility in the UK public sphere.

### **Europe as a political cleavage in UK politics**

Among all EU member countries featuring in the Europub study, it would be expected that the UK would be the state in which new political cleavages would be most likely to be created by European integration. Several sets of factors contribute to this expectation. For one, the emerging political system at the EU level is not particularly compatible with the UK system. While UK politics is characterised by features such as a centralised government, an adversarial, bipartisan political system, the concentration of executive power, a majoritarian electoral system and a pluralist system of interest representation, none of these can be said to typify the EU level of governance. The Westminster system of parliamentary democracy finds few echoes either at the EU level or in the political systems of many other EU member states, meaning that we can also hypothesise a mismatch between British political culture

and that of the EU and other European states. A key work on Europeanisation by Green Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2001) suggests that a crucial factor structuring the relationship between member states and the EU is 'goodness of fit', or institutional compatibility as Geddes (2003) terms it. If there were a good fit between UK politics and institutions and the EU system, there would be few adaptational pressures on the UK. However, the apparent bad fit between the UK and EU systems is likely to lead to stronger adaptational pressures on the UK and, we might surmise, a higher degree of contention about European integration within UK politics than in the politics of most other European states.

This political misfit between the UK and EU systems is matched by a misfit in economic models between the UK and much of continental Europe. Economically, British governments have had significant influence in the EU, having been instrumental in pushing the Single Market programme under the Thatcher government, and in the vanguard of urging market liberalisation under New Labour (the so-called 'Lisbon agenda'). Nonetheless, as Wallace (1997: 688) points out, 'the British socio-economic model remains different from 'Rhineland capitalism' and its social market features'.

Given this potential for difficulties in Britain's relationship with the EU, it comes as little surprise that 'no other issue in domestic politics has so dramatically and repeatedly exposed major faultlines within governments, or thrown into sharp relief deep divisions within and between the major political parties' (Gowland and Turner 2000: xi). Our data on the positions different actors take towards European integration bears the existence of these deep divisions out, providing us with information about the cleavages that have developed in regard to European integration within UK politics. While the mean government position is much more positive than average towards European integration, this contrasts markedly with the more negative than average position of the legislative. This lack of consensus between government and legislative suggests a high degree of institutional conflict within the British public sphere over Europeanisation. Furthermore, political party actors had a mean evaluation of European integration that was more negative than either that of the government or of the legislative, indicating that sharp differences exist between UK elite actors' evaluations of the benefits and drawbacks of European integration. The

conflicting positions of UK elite actors towards European integration apparent from our study are a legacy of the divisiveness of the 'Europe' issue for political elites in Britain.

Historically, Geddes notes that the main divisions on Europe in British politics have not been between parties but within them (Geddes 2003: 275). In recent years, however, the division between general pro-Europeanism in the Labour Party and general Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party appears to have become more established. In the most recent years sampled for this project, the gulf in attitudes to Europe between the two main parties has stabilised, with both parties making evaluations of European integration in 2002 that were roughly similar to the evaluations made in 2001. Europe has become an established axis of party political competition within the UK public sphere, with a huge gap apparent between the overall positions of the UK's two main parties on European integration.

Some changes are evident in the overall positions of the parties towards European integration over time. Our data shows the net Conservative Party position on Europe becoming more negative in the years after 1990, suggesting a hardening in Conservative Euroscepticism. This is unsurprising given that the early and mid-1990s saw the emergence of warring Eurosceptic and Europhile factions within the party. Heightened Conservative divisions on Europe became apparent in this period, one symptom of which was the formation of both intra- and extra-parliamentary groups to campaign against or for European integration. For example, 1992 saw the relaunch of the previously dormant group Conservatives Against a Federal Europe, as well as the formation of Bill Cash MP's European Foundation research organisation. 'Black Wednesday', when the pound crashed out of the ERM on 16 September 1992, was disastrous for the Tories' reputation for economic management and catalysed yet more Conservative infighting over Europe. The Conservative position was particularly negative towards European integration in 2000, which can perhaps be ascribed to Tory campaigning against the euro, such as the 'Keep the Pound' campaign which William Hague began to wage in late 1999.

In contrast, by 2000 Labour representatives were making significantly more positive claims regarding European integration than had been the case in 1990 or in 1995, i.e.



once Labour had become the party of government. However, the overall Labour position on Europe was slightly less Euro-enthusiastic in 2001 and 2002 than in 2000, which may reflect the downplaying of Europe as an issue in the run-up to the 2001 general election. Nonetheless Labour's position on European integration over the period 2000-2002 was significantly more positive than the average across all UK parties. Furthermore, there have been few problems of party unity on Europe for the Labour administration. While several Labour MPs are opposed to some aspects of European integration such as the single currency, this has not been problematic since Labour's large parliamentary majority means that there is not a significant potential for splits within the Parliamentary Labour Party on European issues, very different from the situation John Major's government faced for much of the 1990s.

The political opportunity structure approach views 'the levels and forms of political mobilisation by collective actors as being shaped by the set of opportunities and constraints which are offered by the institutional structure and political culture of the political systems in which they operate' (Statham and Guiraudon 2003). With advancing European integration, Europeanisation gives rise to altered sets of opportunities and constraints for different types of political actors in the UK. That this is the case is suggested by the fact that the positions of UK interest groups on Europe are broadly more positive towards European integration than those of the political elite. UK employers' organizations and firms made highly positive net evaluations of European integration, as did the trade unions. Business and the trade unions have been divided over the euro issue, with the CBI taking no public position on UK entry since there is no membership consensus on the issue, and many individual trade unions, including the largest union UNISON, declaring themselves against the single currency. Nonetheless, as the data makes apparent, UK business has traditionally been positive towards European integration and the single market, and since the late 1980s the trade union movement has also been broadly in favour of European integration, perceiving political opportunities at European level not available to them on the national level. While economic interest groups in the UK may differ in their evaluations of aspects of the integration process, such as monetary union, their general judgment remains that European integration is in their interests.

In contrast, civil society actors other than economic interest groups evaluated European integration on balance more negatively than average. This negative evaluation is due to the claims made by several pro- and anti-EU pressure groups, which have attempted to influence the British debates over European integration issues in recent years. More pressure groups exist to campaign against European integration (or some aspect of it, such as British entry into the single currency) than campaign against it, which may account for the fact that on balance in the print media sampled here, the campaign groups' mean evaluation of European integration was more negative than average. This emergence of a number of organisations campaigning on the issue of European integration itself is an indicator of Europe having become a cleavage in UK politics. While numerous campaign organisations have also been established in other EU member states where Euroscepticism has been rife, i.e. Sweden and Denmark, the existence of this civil society activism on European issues is likely to set the UK apart from the other EU states investigated in the Europub study, where few or no Eurosceptic campaign groups exist.

Neither the evaluations of European integration by the UK's economic interest groups nor those by its civil society organisations are similar to the positions of UK state and party actors on European issues. This indicates a wide spectrum of positions expressed regarding the benefits and drawbacks of European integration in the UK public sphere, which in turn suggests a high degree of conflict over European integration in the public domain in Britain. This is reinforced by the finding that interventions in the UK public sphere by actors from the EU or from other EU countries are likely to be pro-European integration. In contrast, the competing claims made by national actors in the UK public domain are more likely to involve a range of attitudes on whether European integration is desirable, and on balance give more negative evaluations of European integration than average.

It would be mistaken to take this high level of conflict over Europe in Britain as evidence of a fully functioning public debate on the benefits and drawbacks of European integration. While British involvement in Europe has been a bitterly contested issue for the political elite, Europe is an issue to which the majority of the UK public are at most indifferent. The British public perceives itself to have low levels of knowledge of the EU; indeed, the British claim the lowest levels of

knowledge of the EU of any public in any EU member state, as recorded in successive Eurobarometer surveys in spring 2001, 2002 and 2003<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, Risse and van de Steeg's claim that 'one could even argue that the lively debates in France, Britain and Denmark over whether or not to join Euroland at least show that people care about Europe' (Risse and van de Steeg 2003: 14) is highly questionable in the UK case. As Geddes (2003: 234) points out, 'the intensity of elite level debates about European integration within the political parties and in parliament has not been matched by a similar fascination about European integration and its implications among the general public'. Increased political conflict over Europe in the UK public sphere does not necessarily imply increased levels of public learning about or interest in the European project.

In sum, our data clearly show that Europe is a dimension of political conflict in the UK public sphere, with considerable differences in support for European integration between government, legislative, political parties, interest groups and civil society organisations. In particular, Europe is an axis of party political competition, with a gulf in the positions taken towards European integration by the two main parties, the Labour Party being broadly positive and the Conservative Party broadly negative. We find clear evidence of competing views being expressed on European integration in UK public debates. A small number of interest groups and civil society organisations also make their voices heard about Europe in the public domain, but in the main, the visible conflict has largely been between elite actors in the parliamentary arena. Furthermore, although Britain's history of being an 'awkward partner' within the EU is often overstated – for example, the UK pushed for the Single Market, and has attempted to drive forward EU economic reform in recent years – it is accurate to say that the fundamental value of European integration itself continues to be disputed within the British political arena, which is unlikely to be the case for other EU member states in the Europub study. Testament to this are the facts that the UK has one main political party that is hostile to further European integration and advocates a vision of the EU as an economic trading area, rather than an economic and political union, and that there are many pressure groups campaigning for and against European

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Standard Eurobarometer 59: Public Opinion in the European Union. European Commission, released July 2003. Available at: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb59/eb59\\_rapport\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb59/eb59_rapport_final_en.pdf).

integration in the UK, which also sets the British case apart from other EU countries in the research project.

### **Collective representations of European integration in the UK public sphere**

Our data gives wide-ranging information on how Europe is framed, debated and contested in the UK public sphere. This summary addresses first, what European issues are most often discussed in the British public domain, and secondly, how the EU and Europe are framed by claimants, i.e. what collective representations of the EU are in circulation in the UK public sphere. We argue that if claimants tend to focus on certain European issues to the exclusion of others, or particular kinds of frames recur time and again while others are absent, this has significant repercussions for the collective representations of the EU and European integration that persist in the British public sphere. If we take the mass media as a crucial interface between political institutions and the citizens they purport to represent, then claims-making by journalists and by other political actors is a key component in constantly recreating the public image of the EU and its institutions that is available to the UK public. Media coverage may well be instrumental in influencing the extent to which UK citizens think about EU issues at all and setting the agenda for the specific issues they think about, although not necessarily in influencing the views they hold about the EU.

We suspect that the ways in which European integration is represented in the British public sphere will be very different from those in other countries in the EuroPub study. One crucial way in which they are likely to differ is that British politicians have tended to view Europe in pragmatic rather than idealistic terms, meaning that Europe is likely to be discussed less in terms of ideals than in terms of its practical consequences for Britain. Our data indicates that questions of the values and norms underlying European integration, or the collective identities it potentially affects, are little discussed as actual issues in the UK public domain. Just 1% of all claims made about European integration in the four years sampled focused on questions of national and European identity and values. However, while values, norms and identities are rarely discussed as substantive European integration issues, they are quite often used as a means of framing other European integration issues. An example of this would be the claim from French PM Chirac that he desires a ‘united Europe of states, rather than a United States of Europe’, in the course of making the case for which he argues

that ‘everyone will keep their strengths and their identities. Nations will not disappear’. The main issue under discussion is not national identities, but the future relationship between EU nation-states and the supranational level; yet Chirac frames his desire for a united Europe of states in terms of national identity. These kinds of claims, where the substantive issue about which the claim is made is rarely national and European identities and values, but the issue is framed in terms of identities and values, were present in just under a fifth (17.9%) of all claims containing frames relating to European integration in our data.

This finding can be discussed in the light of an argument made by Helen Wallace in a discussion of the ideas, norms and values associated with the European integration project, which she terms ‘the symbolic dimension to integration’. Wallace argues that ‘in France and Germany, the symbolic resonance of European integration is more positive than negative, reflected in the prevailing wisdoms and discourse of politicians and publics, and broadly shared by economic and social actors’ (Wallace 1997: 685). She claims that the British pattern is quite different, with the ‘symbolic dimension to integration’ being ‘either absent or negative for large sections of British opinion’ (Wallace 1997: 686). This lack of debate over the ‘symbolic dimensions’ of European integration in Britain is important in respect to public consciousness of Europe. If Europe is hardly discussed in terms of identities, norms or values, but the nation-state is, this has potentially large implications for the social construction of Europe in the UK. However, our finding is that while there is little debate about the substantive issue of a European identity or European integration’s effects on identities, norms and values, other substantive issues – such as the future of Europe, or the roles of individual nation-states within the EU – are quite frequently discussed in terms of these identity-related aspects. Contrary to expectations, British public debates over European integration do not entirely marginalize questions of identity and values. Instead, while the ‘symbolic dimensions’ of European integration are hardly considered as a central issue in political actors’ claims in the UK public sphere, actors do nonetheless at times invoke identities, norms and values when discussing other central issues, meaning that the symbolic dimensions of European integration are far from absent from UK public debates.

The finding that discussion of European collective identities, norms and values as substantive issues is scarce in the UK public sphere begs the question of which European issues *are* most discussed in Britain, and which frames are employed in discussing them. The European integration issues that feature most in the UK public sphere in the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2002 are first, the relationship between the EU supranational and the national or regional levels, including debates about a future constitution, and second, the role of specific countries in the EU and the balance of power between them. Almost a third of claims about European integration related to each of these broad topics respectively. In regard to the first, the principal sub-issues claimants focused on were the extension of EU powers, in particular the issue of giving up national vetoes; the future of Europe, especially a European Constitution and the Convention on the Future of Europe; the European Charter of Fundamental Rights; and finally, a federal Europe and the drive towards political union. These issues have been of particular concern to sections of the British political elite, since they raise questions of the future of the nation-state and of national sovereignty.

Of the near-third of claims about European integration that dealt with the question of the role of certain nation-states within the EU and the balance of power between them, the majority focused on the issue of Britain's relationship with Europe. This finding – that a considerable proportion of claims about European integration are made about Britain's relationship with the EU – is reinforced by another finding from our data on how European integration is framed, namely that in the British debate, European integration is frequently framed in terms of its effects on the nation-state. The question focused on is typically 'what implications does European integration have for Britain?' rather than 'what should European integration be, or not be?' The burning questions about Europe in the UK public sphere over all the years sampled tended to be about the impact of European integration on the future of the UK nation-state, rather than European integration *per se*. Furthermore, European integration in the UK print media is discussed more in terms of interests than in terms of identities or norms. If we accept the argument that mass media coverage helps in defining collective identities – repeatedly identifying some constituencies as 'us', and some as the 'other' – this may indicate that 'Europe' is rarely mentioned as a collective identity, whereas the nation and the national interest continue to have a strong presence.

A final note about European issues discussed in the UK public sphere is that EU enlargement emerges as a significant issue only in 2002, which was also when enlargement country actors began to feature as claims-makers and addressees in the UK media. The number of claims made about enlargement still ranked far behind the issues of the relation between EU and national levels and nation-states' trajectories within the EU in 2002, but nonetheless the EU's eastward expansion became higher up the print media agenda in 2002 than in previous years.

We turn now to look at how European integration was framed in the UK over the time period is sampled – in other words, the ideas, interests and identities that claimants invoked when making political demands about the European Union. The case for sovereignty having been a particularly thorny issue in UK public debates about Europe has been made by other scholars; for example, Geddes (2003: 238) identifies 'the slippery concept of sovereignty' as being one of the two key focuses of debates about Europe in Britain, the other being 'the relation between socio-economic policies pursued in Britain and those pursued in other member states.' However, our data suggests that the ways in which the EU is framed in the UK public sphere are complex and should not be reduced to just two, fairly narrow 'core debates'. The dominant ways of framing European integration were in terms of its implications for constitutional and governance issues (29.0% of all frames), including sovereignty, and in terms of its economic implications (27.7% of all frames). Nonetheless, there was also a significant presence of other political ('instrumental') frames (17.9%), and of frames relating European integration to identities, norms and values (also 17.9%). Representations of the EU and the European integration process by actors making political claims in the UK public sphere were therefore more diverse than one might expect, given that the UK debate is often characterised as focusing on sovereignty and to a lesser extent, on the economic aspects of integration.

*Constitutional and governance* concerns were repeatedly raised in the UK public sphere, both in relation to what the European polity is (specifically, whether the EU is or is shaping up to be a federal polity, its 'democratic deficit', and whether it constitutes a centralised 'superstate'), and in terms of the effects of the EU on the nation-state (in particular, whether it leads to a loss of sovereignty or a pooling of it).

While the ‘sovereignty’ frame did appear frequently in our dataset, other frames relating to constitutional and governance issues also made a strong showing, in particular ‘federalism’, ‘democracy’ and ‘centralisation’. Very few claimants took ambivalent stances on whether European integration led to federalism, democracy, centralisation or sovereignty; instead, polarisation was apparent, with the majority of claimants taking strong stances in arguing either one way or the other. This reinforces the earlier finding that Europe has been an axis of political conflict between different actors in the UK public sphere; actors’ positions on European integration are frequently polarised, as are the positions they take on whether European integration is good or bad for constitutional and governance matters.

Political elites have been particularly concerned with the constitutional and governance aspects of European integration, but our data indicates that this witnessed a slight decline in the later years of our study (2000, 2001 and 2002). Over time, there was a decrease in political actors’ usage of the traditional constitutional-governance frames used to discuss European integration, such as sovereignty, democracy and federalism. This suggests that the British debate has become slightly broadened beyond a focus on these constitutional and governance issues, traditionally key concerns for the British political elite with respect to European integration, in recent years.

Frames relating European integration to *economics* were found in the data almost as frequently as those relating it to constitutional and governance issues. The most often used economic frames were ‘national economy’, ‘unemployment’, ‘foreign investments’, ‘economic stability’ and ‘taxes’. We would argue that this strong presence of economic frames is at least in part due to EMU having been a major (and still unresolved) issue for the UK over the time period under consideration. There has been considerable debate in the UK about whether joining the single currency would be beneficial or detrimental to the UK economy, as evidenced by particular frames used. Politicians and campaigners on both pro- and anti- sides of the debate have sought to argue the economic case for or against euro membership. In particular, the Labour government has attempted to construct single currency membership as an economic issue, through the Treasury’s ‘five economic tests’ that must be met for British euro entry to be favoured. The economic frames foregrounded by claimants in



the print media in the years sampled are almost all frames that have been frequently used to argue for or against euro membership, such as that euro membership will secure foreign investments, or lead to unemployment. The only exception is taxes, and this frame is largely present because of the UK debates over tax harmonisation around the time of the Nice Treaty. These findings indicate that the frames actors use in debating European integration appear to be influenced by the European issues that are particularly high up the political agenda at that time. If EMU membership had not been such a contentious issue – probably the most debated European issue in the UK - over the time period taken for this study, it is probable that a lower incidence of economic frames would have been found.

*Other political and identity- or value-related* frames were also employed by actors in the UK public sphere in making claims about European integration. ‘Instrumental’ frames, in particular ‘national interest’, ‘acceptance of the EU by citizens’ and ‘influence in international relations’ made up nearly a fifth of frames in the dataset (17.9%). A similar proportion was made up by frames relating European integration to principles, identities and values (17.9% of all frames in the sample), particularly ‘equality among countries, member states or regions’, ‘free trade’, ‘national identity’ and ‘peace’. These findings testify that a diversity of framings of European integration exists in UK public debates. Nonetheless, frames relating European integration to political issues (constitutional and governance), or to economic concerns, were more prevalent in the UK public sphere than were frames that portray European integration in terms of values, identities or norms. Where political principles are mentioned in relation to European integration, the majority either seek to frame Europe in terms of the very British tenets of national sovereignty and democracy, or in opposition to the very un-British concept of federalism.

It is also clear from the data that different types of political actor frame European integration in different ways in the UK public sphere. Use of constitutional-governance frames was especially prevalent among state and party actors (32.5% of all frames used by state/party actors). These actors often framed European integration in terms of its implications for sovereignty, the question of federalism, and its effects on democracy. Unsurprisingly, the highest use of economic frames was found among economic interest groups (67.5% of all frames used by interest groups). Nonetheless,

economic frames also made up the highest proportion of frames used by media actors and by other civil society actors, with state and party actors less likely than other actor types to frame European integration in terms of its economic implications.

To sum up, while our data shows a wider diversity of frames used to discuss European integration in the UK public domain than might have been anticipated, the most dominant ways of framing European integration were in terms of its constitutional and governance implications and in terms of its economic aspects. There was also some framing of European integration in relation to identities, norms and values. Notably, while these ‘symbolic dimensions’ of European integration were drawn upon by several political actors in the UK public sphere when making claims about the EU or the integration process, they were rarely argued about as issues in their own right. Instead, the main European integration issues debated in the British public domain were the relationship between the EU supranational and the national or regional levels, including debates about a future constitution, and second, the role of specific countries in the EU and the balance of power between them, including Britain’s trajectory within the EU. Eastward enlargement also featured as an issue of public debate in 2002, though not in previous years.

## Part II. Commented Tables

### Article level

Print media coverage of reported political acts was used as the data source for our research. Table 1.1, below, shows the numbers of articles that were coded for the UK newspapers for the five years sampled in the study. For the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2002, sample schemes were devised that sampled some newspaper issues for articles about all seven issue fields ('full sample days') and other newspaper issues for articles about European integration, or in one of the other six fields but with a European dimension, only ('European sample days'). This additional 'European sample' was intended to enable more data to be gathered that related to the core objectives of the research, i.e. examining whether and how political claims-making has become 'Europeanised'. For 2001, we collected 'European sample' data only; time and resources were limited, meaning that it was not feasible to code a full sample of issues for 2001 as for the other four years, but nonetheless we sought to be able to trace trends in debates over European issues over a three-year period from 2000-2002.

**Table 1.1 Articles coded per year (in %)**

		Articles coded	Full sample	European sample
Year	1990	16.0	18.4	11.5
	1995	13.4	15.4	9.7
	2000	31.7	31.2	32.7
	2001	9.5	0.0	27.2
	2002	29.4	35.1	18.9
<b>Total</b>		100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>N</b>		1596	1040	556

In order to control for bias, we coded political claims-making from four newspaper sources for the year 2000. The newspapers selected were a right-wing broadsheet (*The Times*), a left-wing broadsheet (*The Guardian*), a tabloid newspaper (*The Sun*) and a regional newspaper (*The Scotsman*). For the years 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2002, articles from the left-wing and right-wing broadsheets only were coded. Table 1.2 shows the numbers of articles coded for each paper in total.

**Table 1.2 Number of articles coded per paper (in %)**

		% of all articles coded	N
<b>Newspaper</b>	<b>Guardian</b>	41.5	662
	<b>Times</b>	50.6	807
	<b>Sun</b>	2.5	40
	<b>Scotsman</b>	5.5	87
<b>Total</b>		100.0	1596
<b>N</b>		1596	

More relevant articles were identified and coded for the right-leaning broadsheet (The Times) than for the left-leaning broadsheet (The Guardian).

**Table 1.3 Section of paper from which articles were coded (in %)**

	Guardian	Times	Sun	Scotsman	Total
<b>Mixed international and national news</b>	3.2	0.9	0.0	0.0	1.8
<b>Commentary pages</b>	8.9	4.8	5.0	2.3	6.4
<b>Business/Economy section</b>	17.8	20.1	2.5	14.9	18.4
<b>International news section</b>	17.7	26.8	0.0	0.0	20.9
<b>National news section</b>	37.5	44.7	0.0	0.0	38.0
<b>Section unknown</b>	15.0	2.7	92.5	82.8	14.4
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>N</b>	662	807	40	87	1596

Articles for all four newspapers were selected from the online news database Lexis-Nexis. Whether the section of the newspaper in which the articles originally appeared could be identified or not depended on whether this information had been included in the Lexis-Nexis database. For the Sun and the Scotsman, it was possible to identify from the database if an article appeared in the commentary section or in the business section of the newspaper. However, for these newspapers there was no information available on whether articles appeared in the national, international or mixed international and national news section. For the Guardian, this information was available in articles for the later years coded (1995, 2000, 2001 and 2002) but not for the year 1990, which explains the 15.0% of Guardian articles that appear as ‘section unknown’ in Table 1.3.

**Table 1.4a Source of article by year (in %)**

	<b>Guardian</b>	<b>Times</b>	<b>Sun</b>	<b>Scotsman</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>Own coverage: foreign correspondent's report</b>	26.4	23.3	5.0	11.5	23.5	375
<b>Own coverage: article by national office editor or journalist</b>	70.2	76.3	95.0	88.5	74.9	1196
<b>Other EU press agency</b>	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Non-EU press agency</b>	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Other EU media source</b>	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	2
<b>Non-EU media source</b>	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	3
<b>Other source</b>	2.3	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.1	18
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1596
<b>N</b>	662	807	40	87	1596	

As the results in Table 1.4a indicate, the majority of articles in all the newspapers were written by national office editors or journalists. However, articles in the broadsheets were much more likely to have been written by a foreign correspondent (26.4% and 23.3% of articles for the Guardian and the Times respectively) than were articles in the tabloid or the regional newspaper. This may relate to different numbers of foreign correspondents for these newspapers; the Sun has foreign correspondents only in Washington and New York, while the Scotsman has none, using stringers or its Edinburgh-based foreign staff for international news coverage. Very little use of press agencies or other media sources was evident for any newspaper.

**Table 1.4b Source of article by year (in %)**

	<b>1990</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>Own coverage: foreign correspondent's report</b>	24.7	30.8	16.8	33.1	23.6	23.5	175
<b>Own coverage: article by national office editor or journalist</b>	72.5	67.8	81.2	66.9	75.3	74.9	1196
<b>Other EU press agency</b>	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Non-EU press agency</b>	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Other EU media source</b>	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	2
<b>Non-EU media source</b>	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.2	3
<b>Other source</b>	2.4	0.5	1.6	0.0	0.6	1.1	18
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1596
<b>N</b>	255	214	506	151	470	1596	

Table 1.4b shows a particularly high level of articles from foreign correspondents in 2001, which can be explained by the fact that for this year we coded only articles in the field of European integration or with a European scope.

**Table 1.5 Articles with and without claims (in %)**

		% of articles
<b>Claims present</b>	<b>No claims</b>	7.3
	<b>Already coded claims</b>	2.4
	<b>New claims</b>	90.3
	<b>Total</b>	100.0
	<b>N</b>	1596

As table 1.5 shows, the vast majority of articles (90.3%) contain political claims.

### **Claim-level: General**

Table 2.1, below, shows the numbers of political claims that were coded for each year in the study. Higher numbers of claims were coded in 2000 and 2002 than in other years because there were higher numbers of articles in those years (see table 1.2, above). As already mentioned, for the year 2001 we chose to code only claims with a European dimension, which means that there are no ‘full sample’ claims coded for that year.

**Table 2.1 Number of claims coded per year (in %)**

		Full sample	European sample	Total	N
<b>Year</b>	<b>1989<sup>2</sup></b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1
	<b>1990</b>	15.8	11.0	14.3	437
	<b>1995</b>	15.9	10.4	14.2	434
	<b>2000</b>	28.9	37.2	31.6	968
	<b>2001</b>	0.0	21.0	6.8	208
	<b>2002</b>	39.3	20.4	33.2	1018
	<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	3066
	<b>N</b>	2076	990	3066	

<sup>2</sup> One claim was made in 1989, although the article the claim was made in appeared in January 1990. This is due to the rule that political claims found in articles can be included in the dataset if they have been made up to 2 weeks before the publication of the news article.

**Table 2.2a Country where claim was made by year (in %)**

	1989	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Germany (incl. GDR)</b>	0.0	3.7	3.6	3.3	2.3	3.0	63
<b>France</b>	0.0	3.0	4.8	3.2	3.4	3.5	73
<b>UK</b>	100.0	61.6	64.4	72.5	67.2	67.4	1399
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.6	2.1	0.5	0.0	0.6	12
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.0	1.0	0.5	10
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.8	0.2	0.4	9
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	1.2	1.2	3.0	1.3	1.8	37
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.3	0.6	13
<b>EU seats</b>	0.0	6.4	6.0	6.0	6.4	6.2	129
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	4
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.9	0.9	0.5	1.5	1.0	21
<b>Other European countries (excl. CIS)</b>	0.0	0.3	3.3	0.5	0.0	0.7	15
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.9	0.9	0.0	0.2	0.4	8
<b>Russia (incl. USSR)</b>	0.0	1.8	1.5	0.2	1.1	1.0	21
<b>USA</b>	0.0	10.1	6.0	1.7	7.1	5.8	121
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.2	5
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	4.0	0.6	0.3	1.8	1.5	32
<b>UN seats</b>	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	6
<b>NATO seats</b>	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.2	0.0	0.2	4
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	4.9	2.1	5.7	4.5	4.5	94
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	2076
<b>N</b>	1	328	331	600	816	2076	

As table 2.2a shows, over two thirds of all claims (67.4%) sampled were made in the UK. There is a broad trend for a higher proportion of claims to be made in the UK in the later years in the study (2000, 2002) than in the earlier years (1990, 1995). Other locations where a significant proportion of claims were made were the EU seats in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg (6.2% of all claims, all years), the USA (5.8%) and major EU member states France and Germany (3.5% and 3.0% respectively).

**Table 2.2b Country where claim was made by issue field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
Germany (incl. GDR)	4.7	2.9	3.8	1.4	1.0	0.7	6.9	3.0	63
France	2.7	8.2	5.1	4.8	0.0	1.5	4.6	3.5	73
UK	70.7	71.9	53.2	31.1	94.8	95.0	51.3	67.4	1399
Italy	0.4	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	0.6	12
Spain	0.2	0.0	1.9	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	10
Netherlands	0.4	1.2	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.4	9
Other pre-1995 EU members	3.1	1.2	1.9	1.1	0.0	0.4	3.9	1.8	37
Austria, Finland, Sweden	1.1	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.6	0.6	13
EU seats	9.3	9.9	5.1	1.7	0.0	0.2	18.1	6.2	129
Switzerland	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.2	4
Upcoming enlargement countries	0.4	0.6	1.3	0.6	0.0	0.0	4.6	1.0	21
Other European countries (excl. CIS)	0.2	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.7	15
Turkey	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.4	8
Russia (incl. USSR)	0.0	0.0	2.6	4.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	21
USA	3.1	2.3	6.4	23.2	3.1	0.6	1.6	5.8	121
Japan	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	5
Middle East	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	32
UN seats	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	6
NATO seats	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	4
Rest of the world	2.4	1.8	14.7	12.7	0.0	1.7	1.0	4.5	94
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2076</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>354</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>545</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>2076</b>	

As Table 2.2b shows, the vast majority of claims made about pensions and education politics were made in the UK (94.8% and 95.0% respectively), indicating the strongly national focus of these issue fields. Troops deployment emerges as the most internationalised issue field with just under a third of all claims (31.1%) made in Britain; 23.2% of all claims in this field were made in the USA, reflecting the importance of America in international conflicts. A significant number of claims were made at EU political seats in the fields of European integration, monetary politics, agriculture, and notably also immigration (18.1%, 9.3%, 9.9% and 5.1% respectively), indicating a stronger role for the European political level in these fields. Germany is particularly important as a location of claims-making in monetary politics, and France especially important in agricultural politics, reflecting the traditional importance of these two countries in the respective policy fields.



As Table 3.1, below, shows, in general there is a strong centralisation in UK political claims-making, with activities centred in London, both the capital city and the seat of government. The degree of centralisation varies between issue fields. Most centralised are monetary politics and European integration (with 89.6% and 89.1% respectively of all claims made in the UK made in London), then pensions (86.6%), immigration (85.5%), and troops deployment (82.7%). Of our seven issue fields, the two that showed the least centralisation, with over a third of UK claims being made outside London, were education (62.0% of claims made in London) and agriculture (58.5% of claims made in London).

**Table 3.1 UK region where claim was made, by issue field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
London	89.6	58.5	85.5	82.7	86.8	62.0	89.1	75.6	1058
Other four largest cities <sup>3</sup>	0.6	0.0	2.4	0.0	1.1	3.1	0.0	1.5	21
Other UK locations	9.7	41.5	12.0	17.3	12.1	34.9	10.9	22.9	320
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1399
N	318	123	83	110	91	518	156	1399	

### **Claim-level: Actors**

Evidence from political claims-making analysis can determine which types of collective actors feature in the public domain. Table 4.1, overleaf, shows the kinds of collective actors that make claims in each of the seven issue fields taken for the study. Particularly noteworthy in regard to the question of national coverage of European issues is the column showing which actors appear making claims about European integration in the UK public sphere. A higher than average proportion of the European integration field is composed of state and party actors.

<sup>3</sup> The four largest cities in the UK after London are Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds and Newcastle upon Tyne (source: Office of National Statistics, [www.statistics.gov.uk](http://www.statistics.gov.uk))

**Table 4.1 Actors of claims by issue field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
<b>State and party actors</b>	48.7	53.8	67.9	82.5	41.7	47.9	75.7	59.7	1240
Politicians	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.2	1.6	0.6	13
Former states(wo)men	0.9	0.0	0.6	3.4	0.0	0.7	1.6	1.3	26
Government/ executive	24.7	35.7	40.4	55.4	16.7	24.4	55.6	36.1	749
Legislative	2.7	5.3	4.5	6.8	8.3	6.8	6.6	5.6	117
Judiciary	0.0	0.0	6.4	0.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.2	25
Police/internal security agencies	0.2	0.0	7.7	1.4	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.9	19
Military	0.0	0.6	0.6	10.2	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.9	39
Central banks	14.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.3	3.1	65
Other state exec. agencies	0.4	7.0	0.6	0.6	3.1	5.5	0.3	2.5	51
Political parties	4.9	5.3	7.1	4.0	12.5	7.9	8.2	6.6	136
<b>Economic interest groups</b>	27.6	24.0	3.2	0.8	24.0	12.5	2.6	13.1	272
Unions/employees	2.0	6.4	0.0	0.8	5.2	10.8	0.3	4.2	88
Employers orgs/firms	12.4	3.5	3.2	0.0	13.5	1.7	1.3	4.5	93
Economists/financial experts	13.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.2	0.0	1.0	3.2	67
Farmers/agricultural orgs	0.0	14.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	24
<b>Media/journalists</b>	15.8	6.4	12.2	10.2	6.3	4.2	13.8	10.0	208
<b>Other civil society</b>	7.8	14.6	14.7	5.6	28.1	34.5	6.6	16.3	338
Churches, religious orgs/ groups	0.0	0.0	0.6	1.7	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.4	9
Educational professionals/orgs	0.2	1.2	0.6	0.6	0.0	26.4	0.0	7.2	150
Other sci./research professionals	1.6	7.6	1.9	1.4	4.2	2.0	3.3	2.6	53
Students, pupils, parents	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	0.0	.8	16
Other professional orgs	1.1	1.2	2.6	0.0	6.3	0.6	0.7	1.1	22
Consumer orgs/groups	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	3
Migrant orgs/groups	0.0	0.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	11
Pro-/anti-European campaign orgs	4.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	1.4	29
Solidarity and human rights orgs	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1
Welfare orgs	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.3	7
Peace movement orgs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1
Groups of the elderly	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.5	0.0	0.0	0.6	13
Environmental orgs	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	4
Terrorist groups	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1
Rebel forces/guerrilla	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	3
Other civil society orgs	0.2	1.8	0.6	0.6	2.1	1.1	0.0	0.7	15
<b>General/unknown/ unspecified actors</b>	0.2	1.2	1.9	0.8	0.0	0.9	1.3	0.9	18
The general public	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.2	5
Unknown/ unspecified	0.2	1.2	1.9	0.6	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.6	13
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	2076
<b>N</b>	450	171	156	354	96	545	304	2076	

Over three quarters (75.7%) of actors making claims about European integration are state and party actors, a proportion higher than in any other issue field except troops deployment with 82.5%. European integration, like troops deployment, appears as a policy field where the vast majority of actors making claims are political elites.

Turning to look at claims from interest groups and other civil society actors, few claims by interest groups regarding European integration are apparent in the UK public sphere. Claims by economic interest groups such as business organisations or trade unions make up just 2.6% of all claims about European integration in the years sampled. The proportion for other civil society actors making claims about European integration is slightly higher at 6.6%. Of this 6.6%, 3.3% are research institutions and thinktanks such as the Institute for Economic Affairs, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Foreign Policy Centre and the Institute for Public Policy Research. A further 2.6% are pro- and anti-European campaign organisations, such as Britain in Europe and the Conservative Group for Europe (pro), and the European Foundation, ‘Metric Martyrs’ and the European Research Group (anti).

Many pressure groups have emerged in the UK to campaign for and against European integration, or a specific stage of the integration process such as EMU or the Nice Treaty. A higher proportion of claims by pro- and anti-European campaign organisations is found in the policy field of monetary politics (4.7%) than in European integration (2.6%), reflecting the fact that the single currency has been a larger focus of pro- and anti-European campaigners’ efforts in recent years than have European integration issues generally<sup>4</sup>.

Overall, though, European integration was not an issue field where interest groups or other civil society actors played a major role in print media coverage over the four years sampled here. If the seven issue fields are ranked in order with the policy field with most interest group and civil society actors’ claims first and that with least interest group and civil society claims last, European integration comes sixth of our seven issue fields, with a proportion higher only than the elite-dominated issue field of troops deployment. Given recent concern from EU politicians about the

‘democratic deficit’ and increased gap between European elites and citizens, and the role that civil society actors are often viewed as playing in bridging that gap, the finding that little civil society mobilisation on the subject of European integration is evident in the public domain is a salient one.

**Table 4.2 Actor type by issue field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops deployment	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total
Unorganised collective	1.9	1.7	2.1	0.0	2.1	3.1	1.3	2.1
Named representative/s of unorganised collective	0.0	5.1	8.5	2.0	4.2	7.6	1.3	4.2
Organisation or institution	15.9	33.9	19.1	15.7	31.3	20.4	6.5	19.3
Anonymous spokesperson/s	5.1	3.4	6.4	9.8	2.1	2.7	6.5	4.5
Named spokesperson/s	77.1	55.9	63.8	72.5	60.4	66.2	84.4	69.9
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>N</b>	157	59	47	51	48	225	77	664

As table 4.2 indicates, a large share of collective actors making claims in the UK public sphere is named personally (69.9%). The issue field where the most political actors are named personally is European integration (84.4%), which may suggest that media coverage covers European integration as communicated by specific people rather than by institutions or anonymous spokespeople. Agriculture and retirement and pensions politics are the issue fields where the lowest proportion of political actors are named personally in public debates. In both these policy fields, organisations and institutions are more often cited as actors in political debates than is the case for the other fields (33.9% for agriculture, 31.3% for retirement and pensions politics).

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<sup>4</sup> However, it should be noted that with the advent of the European Constitution as a live issue in UK politics in 2003 this pattern is likely to have altered after the end of the present study.

**Table 4.3a Twenty-five most often-mentioned spokespersons (including journalists)**

Name	% of actors	N
Blair, Tony	1.5	32
Morris, Estelle	1.3	26
McAvoy, Doug	1.0	20
Brown, Gordon	0.9	19
Blunkett, David	0.9	18
Straw, Jack	0.7	14
Chirac, Jacques	0.7	14
Hart, David	0.7	14
Prodi, Romano	0.6	13
George, Eddie	0.6	12
Major, John	0.6	12
Hurd, Douglas	0.6	12
Dunford, John	0.5	11
MacGregor, John	0.5	11
Bush, George Jr	0.5	10
Cook, Robin	0.5	10
Shephard, Gillian	0.4	9
Wheatcroft, Patience*	0.4	9
Kohl, Helmut	0.4	9
Clarke, Kenneth	0.4	9
Portillo, Michael	0.4	8
Elliott, Larry*	0.4	8
Brittan, Leon	0.4	8
Duisenberg, Wim (24=)	0.3	7
Green, Damian (24=)	0.3	7
Maude, Francis (24=)	0.3	7
Riddell, Peter* (24=)	0.3	7
Thatcher, Margaret (24=)	0.3	7
Hague, William (24=)	0.3	7
Clarke, Charles (24=)	0.3	7
Other actors	50.8	1055
No actor name mentioned	32.0	664
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2076</b>

\* = journalist

Table 4.3a shows the twenty-five most often mentioned spokespeople across all seven issue fields, including claims by journalists in news, comment and analysis articles that were coded, while Table 4.3b shows the twenty-five most often mentioned spokespeople excluding journalists' claims. Both tables indicate that the vast majority of the twenty-five most often mentioned spokespeople are British political actors. Just five non-UK actors feature: French president Jacques Chirac (6<sup>th</sup> position in the list), German ex-Chancellor Helmut Kohl (17<sup>th</sup>), European Commission President Romano Prodi (9), US President George Bush (13<sup>th</sup>), and European Central Bank President Wim Duisenberg (24<sup>th</sup>). This suggests that the most prominent speakers in the UK public sphere are in the main national actors.

Actors from the education field feature particularly prominently as spokespeople, both ministers (Estelle Morris, David Blunkett, John MacGregor, Gillian Shephard, Damian Green, Charles Clarke) and union or teachers' association leaders (Doug McAvoy, David Hart, John Dunford). This finding reflects the high number of articles found and claims made in the education issue field.

**Table 4.3b Twenty-five most often-mentioned spokespersons (excluding journalists)**

Name	% of actors	N
Blair, Tony	1.5	32
Morris, Estelle	1.3	26
McAvoy, Doug	1.0	20
Brown, Gordon	0.9	19
Blunkett, David	0.9	18
Straw, Jack	0.7	14
Chirac, Jacques	0.7	14
Hart, David	0.7	14
Prodi, Romano	0.6	13
George, Eddie	0.6	12
Major, John	0.6	12
Hurd, Douglas	0.6	12
Dunford, John	0.5	11
MacGregor, John	0.5	11
Bush, George Jr	0.5	10
Cook, Robin	0.5	10
Shephard, Gillian	0.4	9
Kohl, Helmut	0.4	9
Clarke, Kenneth	0.4	9
Portillo, Michael	0.4	8
Brittan, Leon	0.4	8
Duisenberg, Wim (22=)	0.3	7
Green, Damian (22=)	0.3	7
Maude, Francis (22=)	0.3	7
Thatcher, Margaret (22=)	0.3	7
Hague, William (22=)	0.3	7
Clarke, Charles (22=)	0.3	7
Other actors	52.0	1079
No actor name mentioned	32.0	664
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2076</b>

Table 4.4, below, shows the proportions of claims made by different types of political actors from various political levels, from supranational and European levels down to national and subnational. It can be seen that an extremely high proportion of the claims made by EU-level actors come from state and political party representatives (94.9%) compared with EU-level interest group and civil society actors (4.4%). This is in line with a general tendency for the majority of claims reported from other countries to come from state and party actors – for example, 89.6% of German actors mentioned are state/party actors, as are 86.9% of US actors and 81.4% of French actors. These figures are high compared with the proportion of UK actors making claims that are state and party actors (49.5%), indicating that claims by non-UK actors appearing in the UK public sphere are more likely to be by state and party actors than is the case for claims by UK actors.

**Table 4.4 Actor scope by broad actor categories (in %)**

	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society actors	Unknown/unspecified	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	11
<b>Other supranational</b>	68.4	5.3	0.0	26.3	0.0	100.0	19
<b>EU</b>	94.9	1.5	0.0	2.9	0.7	100.0	136
<b>Other EU supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	29.2	54.2	2.1	14.6	0.0	100.0	48
<b>Bilateral</b>	33.3	33.3	0.0	33.3	0.0	100.0	6
<b>Germany</b>	89.6	3.0	4.5	3.0	0.0	100.0	67
<b>France</b>	81.4	5.7	2.9	10.0	0.0	100.0	70
<b>UK</b>	49.5	15.8	13.5	20.8	0.4	100.0	1385
<b>Italy</b>	60.0	10.0	20.0	0.0	10.0	100.0	10
<b>Spain</b>	66.7	0.0	22.2	11.1	0.0	100.0	9
<b>Netherlands</b>	77.8	11.1	0.0	11.1	0.0	100.0	9
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	58.6	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3	100.0	29
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	80.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	100.0	10
<b>Switzerland</b>	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	1
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	82.4	5.9	0.0	5.9	5.9	100.0	17
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	10
<b>Turkey</b>	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	9
<b>Russia</b>	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	22
<b>USA</b>	86.9	2.5	4.1	4.9	1.6	100.0	122
<b>Japan</b>	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	2
<b>Middle East</b>	84.0	0.0	8.0	8.0	0.0	100.0	25
<b>Rest of the world</b>	76.9	0.0	1.9	17.3	3.8	100.0	52
<b>Total</b>	59.9	12.9	10.1	16.3	0.8	100.0	2069
<b>N</b>	1240	266	208	338	17	2069	

While interest associations and many other civil society organisations are well entrenched at the European level, it seems that their claims appear only rarely in the UK public sphere. Where economic interest groups' claims are reported, they tend to be UK business, UK unions, or the City of London, with interest groups making 15.8% of all claims made by UK actors. In those cases where economic interest group claims do come from beyond the UK's borders, they stem mainly from multinational companies and banks.

A further indicator of Europeanisation is the extent to which EU actors feature in the UK public sphere. Our data shows that the presence of EU actors varies significantly by policy field (Tables 4.5a-g, below). Unsurprisingly, of the seven policy fields EU-level actors were most likely to feature in claims about European integration, with nearly a fifth (19.7%) of all claims in this issue field being made by EU actors. Of the remaining six policy fields, between 7% and 9% of claims made about issue fields monetary politics, agriculture and immigration were made by EU actors (9.7%, 7.1% and 8.3% respectively). While EU actors would be expected to be present in the two issue fields where the EU has significant capabilities – monetary politics and agriculture – the finding that EU actors are second only to UK national actors in making claims about immigration is of interest, although admittedly the proportion of EU actors (8.3%) lags far behind that of UK actors (53.2%).



**Table 4.5a Monetary politics – actor scope by year (in %)**

	1989	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	3.0	1.7	1.4	1.6	7
<b>EU</b>	0.0	8.8	4.5	9.3	13.0	9.7	43
<b>Other EU supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	5.9	1.5	7.0	2.9	4.7	21
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	.2	1
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	5.9	3.0	5.8	3.6	4.7	21
<b>France</b>	0.0	0.0	3.0	2.3	1.4	1.8	8
<b>UK</b>	100.0	73.5	75.8	64.0	71.0	69.4	309
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	2.9	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.7	3
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.2	1
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.2	1
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.2	0.7	2.2	10
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	0.9	4
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	1.5	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.4	2
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	1
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	0.0	0.0	3.0	2.9	1.4	2.0	9
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.4	2
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.7	0.4	2
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	445
<b>N</b>	1	68	66	172	138	445	

For monetary politics, it is unsurprising that less than 10% of actors appearing in the UK public sphere making claims about currency and interest rate issues are EU actors, since Britain remains outside the single currency and the key monetary policy decisions in the UK are still taken at national level. For agriculture, however, there appears to be a disjunct between the high importance of EU actors in agricultural policymaking and the relatively low appearance of EU actors making claims about agricultural issues in the UK public sphere. The key agricultural policy decisions are taken at EU level, as is borne out by a comment made by the chair of the House of Commons Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs as part of a recent interview that ‘the EU is agricultural policy’. Nonetheless, a lower proportion of EU actors make claims about agricultural issues than make claims in the field of immigration, although the EU has far fewer powers over immigration policy than over agricultural policy. This finding may in part be a function of the agricultural issues

taken; for example, the foot and mouth epidemic was handled nationally, which may have increased the proportions of national actors relative to EU actors in the data.

Europeanisation can be taking place vertically, with more reference to the EU in the UK public sphere, but also horizontally, with more reference to other European countries in the UK public sphere. One indicator of the former would be an increased proportion of EU actors appearing in the national public sphere, while one indicator of the latter would be a higher proportion of actors from other EU states appearing in the UK public sphere. Actors from the EU's key large states – Germany and France – appear in the policy fields to a lesser extent than do EU actors. Nonetheless a similar pattern emerges to that for EU actors, in that claims made by actors from other large EU states appear in the fields of European integration (7.9% German actors, 5.6% French actors), and to a lesser extent, in monetary politics, agriculture and immigration. For monetary politics, 4.7% of actors making claims were German, and 1.8% French; given the importance of the French agricultural sector, for agriculture 8.8% of actors were French, and 3.5% German. As Table 4.5d shows, however, actors from other EU states make relatively few claims in the field of troops deployment (with the exception of France, given its importance in defence terms, with 4.0% of actors who made claims in the UK public sphere about troops deployment being French nationals). Similarly, in the fields of education and pensions (Tables 4.5e and 4.5f, below) UK national actors dominate claims-making, with virtually no role played by EU actors or actors from elsewhere in Europe.

**Table 4.5b Agriculture – actor scope by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.6	1
<b>EU</b>	5.3	0.0	6.8	10.5	7.1	12
<b>Other EU supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.6	1
<b>Germany</b>	10.5	0.0	0.0	3.5	3.5	6
<b>France</b>	5.3	0.0	11.9	10.5	8.8	15
<b>UK</b>	65.8	100.0	69.5	71.9	72.4	123
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	5.1	0.0	1.8	3
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	1.2	2
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.6	1
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	13.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	5
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.6	1
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	170
<b>N</b>	38	16	59	57	170	

**Table 4.5c Immigration – actor scope by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	9.1	3.2	1.0	1.9	3
<b>Other supranational</b>	6.3	0.0	3.2	0.0	1.3	2
<b>EU</b>	0.0	18.2	9.7	8.2	8.3	13
<b>Other EU supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.6	1
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	9.1	0.0	4.1	3.2	5
<b>France</b>	0.0	0.0	3.2	7.1	5.1	8
<b>UK</b>	68.8	45.5	58.1	50.0	53.2	83
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	9.1	9.7	0.0	2.6	4
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	1.9	3
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.6	1
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	1.3	2
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.6	1
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.0	3.2	1.0	1.3	2
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1	2.6	4
<b>USA</b>	0.0	9.1	0.0	7.1	5.1	8
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	25.0	0.0	9.7	9.2	10.3	16
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	156
<b>N</b>	16	11	31	98	156	

**Table 4.5d Troops deployment – actor scope by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	4.2	8.1	1.2	2.3	8
<b>Other supranational</b>	1.2	5.6	5.4	0.0	2.0	7
<b>EU</b>	4.8	1.4	0.0	0.6	1.7	6
<b>Other EU supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	1.2	4.2	2.7	6.7	4.5	16
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.3	1
<b>Germany</b>	1.2	1.4	0.0	1.8	1.4	5
<b>France</b>	2.4	7.0	2.7	3.7	4.0	14
<b>UK</b>	22.9	21.1	51.4	37.4	32.2	114
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Spain</b>	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.8	1.1	4
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	2.8	0.0	0.0	0.6	2
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.3	1
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	3
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	9.9	0.0	0.0	2.0	7
<b>Turkey</b>	3.6	2.8	0.0	0.6	1.7	6
<b>Russia</b>	7.2	8.5	2.7	1.8	4.5	16
<b>USA</b>	31.3	26.8	2.7	28.2	26.0	92
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	14.5	2.8	5.4	5.5	7.1	25
<b>Rest of the world</b>	4.8	1.4	18.9	9.2	7.6	27
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	354
<b>N</b>	83	71	37	163	354	

**Table 4.5e Pensions – actor scope by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>EU</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other EU supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.6	5.2	5
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	1.0	1
<b>Germany</b>	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1
<b>France</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>UK</b>	50.0	100.0	97.2	86.0	91.7	88
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	0.0	0.0	2.8	0.0	1.0	1
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	96
<b>N</b>	2	15	36	43	96	

**Table 4.5f Education – actor scope by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.4	2
<b>EU</b>	0.0	1.3	0.6	0.0	0.4	2
<b>Other EU supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	1.3	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.7	4
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.2	1
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	2.5	0.0	1.3	0.9	5
<b>France</b>	0.0	2.5	0.0	2.6	1.5	8
<b>UK</b>	98.8	86.3	94.2	95.6	94.3	513
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.2	1
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	0.0	2.5	0.6	0.0	0.6	3
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	3.8	0.6	0.4	0.9	5
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>N</b>	80	80	156	228	544	

Examining the issue field of European integration (Table 4.5g, overleaf), a higher proportion of EU-level actors featured as claims-makers in the UK public sphere in 2000 and 2002 (21.6% and 23.6% respectively) than was the case in 1990 and 1995 (17.1% and 13.9% respectively). This increase in the share of EU actors in claims-making about European integration in the UK public sphere suggests that, in terms of actors at least, a form of Europeanisation of the public domain is taking place. As for the issue of whether this increase in appearance of EU actors making claims in the UK media is accompanied by a decrease in the proportion of UK actors doing so, no clear trend is apparent. For each year in the sample, the proportion of UK actors making claims about EU integration was in the region of half of all actors doing so, ranging from a low of 43.8% in 2002 through to a high of 57.8% in 2000.

**Table 4.5g European integration – actor scope by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>EU</b>	17.1	13.9	21.6	23.6	19.7	60
<b>Other EU supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	1.4	0.0	1.1	0.7	2
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Germany</b>	14.6	16.7	4.9	1.1	7.9	24
<b>France</b>	9.8	5.6	5.9	3.4	5.6	17
<b>UK</b>	46.3	52.8	57.8	43.8	51.0	155
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	2.8	0.0	1.1	1.0	3
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.3	1
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.7	2
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	7.3	2.8	1.0	7.9	4.3	13
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	2.0	3.4	1.6	5
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.3	1
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	1.4	0.0	9.0	3.0	9
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.7	2
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	1.4	1.0	1.1	1.0	3
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.7	2
<b>USA</b>	4.9	0.0	1.0	1.1	1.3	4
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.3	1
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	304
<b>N</b>	41	72	102	89	304	

The large states that have traditionally been the drivers of the integration process, France and Germany, are the principal other EU states whose actors' claims about European integration are reported in the UK print media. German actors represent 7.9% of all actors making claims in all four years, and French actors 5.6%. Finally, claimants from the enlargement countries that join the Union in 2004 only featured in the UK public sphere to any significant extent in 2002, making 9.0% of all claims on European integration issues in that year.



### **Section summary**

The extent to which EU-level institutions and actors make claims in the UK public sphere ('vertical Europeanisation') varies by policy field. As claims-makers, EU-level actors have most presence in the field of European integration (19.7%), some presence in the fields of monetary politics, agriculture, and immigration (7-9%), and little or no presence in the fields of troops deployment, pensions, education (0-1.7%). The extent to which actors from other European states appear as claimants in the UK public sphere ('horizontal Europeanisation') frequently appears to depend on a particular country's historical importance in a policy field. For example, French actors often appear in claims-making about agricultural issues and troops deployment, which can be ascribed to France's powerful agricultural sector and continuing military importance, while the strong showing by German actors in the field of monetary politics reflects the magnitude of the German economy. Split by policy field, the extent to which actors from other EU states make claims in the UK public domain shows a similar pattern to that for EU actors making claims: highest for European integration, some presence in the fields of monetary politics, agriculture and immigration, little presence in the area of troops deployment (except for French actors) and almost zero for pensions and education.

Investigating claims-making on European integration issues alone, we find that a high proportion of the European integration field is composed of state and party actors, compared with the proportions found in other policy fields. Over three quarters (75.7%) of actors making claims about European integration are state and party actors, a proportion higher than in any other issue field except troops deployment with 82.5%. European integration, like troops deployment, appears as a policy field where the vast majority of actors making claims are political elites. Bearing this out, a low proportion of claims regarding European integration in the UK public sphere are made by economic interest groups. Other civil society actors play a small role in the policy field, making 6.6% of all claims about European integration. These claims-makers are in the main either research institutions and thinktanks (3.3%), or pro- and anti-European campaign organisations (2.6%). Pro- and anti-European campaign organisations also feature as claims-makers in the policy field of monetary politics (4.7%), reflecting the fact that the single currency has been a key focus of pro- and anti-European campaigners' efforts in recent years.

## Claim-level: Action forms

**Table 5.1a Forms of action by issue field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
<b>Political decision</b>	7.7	15.0	21.2	15.1	17.8	9.0	7.6	11.4	213
<b>Executive action</b>	0.3	1.3	4.4	9.4	0.0	1.1	0.4	2.5	46
<b>Judicial action</b>	0.0	1.3	8.0	0.0	2.2	1.9	0.4	1.4	26
<b>Non-specified statement</b>	58.6	49.4	40.1	49.4	45.6	56.7	48.9	52.4	978
<b>Media strategies</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other verbal statement</b>	26.1	16.9	15.3	15.4	24.4	18.8	25.2	20.4	382
<b>Meeting</b>	6.9	15.0	6.6	10.4	8.9	11.3	16.0	10.8	201
<b>Direct-democratic action</b>	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.2	3
<b>Protest action</b>	0.3	1.3	4.4	0.3	1.1	1.1	0.8	1.0	19
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1868
<b>N</b>	379	160	137	318	90	522	262	1868	

As Table 5.1a shows, when UK media coverage of each policy field is analysed, non-specified statements appear as the most dominant forms of action (52.4% of total).

This arises since many news articles quote collective actors' statements without providing any further information on the type of statement given (e.g. whether it was via a press release or conference, and so on). In the European integration issue field, a higher proportion of 'meetings' is found (16.0%) than for the other six policy fields, which may reflect the fact that this is an issue field where much coverage happens around the events of EU summits and other intergovernmental meetings. Few protest events were reported in any of the seven fields, constituting just 1.0% of all forms of action reported, and the majority of those were pro-migrant demonstrations in the field of immigration.

Comparing forms of action across the issue fields, we find a higher proportion of executive actions in troops deployment than in other issue fields, and a higher proportion of political decisions and judicial actions in immigration than in other issue fields. The former reflects the decisionmaking role of national governments in troops deployment, and the latter is due to the powers of the Home Office and the courts in making and adjudicating on asylum and immigration decisions.

**Table 5.1b Forms of action by broad actor categories (in %)**

	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Other civil society actors	Unknown/unspecified	Total	N
<b>Political decision</b>	16.0	3.3	1.8	0.0	11.4	213
<b>Executive action</b>	3.5	0.0	0.6	0.0	2.5	46
<b>Judicial action</b>	1.4	0.0	2.4	5.6	1.4	26
<b>Non-specified statement</b>	45.7	69.1	63.9	38.9	52.4	978
<b>Media strategies</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other verbal statement</b>	20.1	17.6	24.0	22.2	20.4	382
<b>Meeting</b>	13.1	8.8	4.4	0.0	10.8	201
<b>Direct-democratic action</b>	0.1	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.2	3
<b>Protest action</b>	0.2	1.1	3.0	22.2	1.0	19
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1868
<b>N</b>	1240	272	338	18	1868	

As table 5.1b indicates, verbal statements – whether the exact form (press release, public speech, etc) is specified or not – appear as the predominant form of claims-making for all types of political actors in the public domain. It is unsurprising that state actors appear as making political decisions more frequently than economic interest groups or civil society actors, since this is a key part of their political role. Similarly, civil society actors appear as making protest actions more frequently than other types of actor, as would be expected.

As Table 5.1c (overleaf) shows, when the action forms for actors at different political levels, in particular EU and UK national, are compared, several differences emerge. The proportion of ‘political decisions’ made by EU actors was higher than for UK actors (19.1% vs 10.9%). ‘Meetings’ formed a higher proportion of EU actors’ claims than for actors at any other level of politics (16.2% of EU actors’ claims, compared with 10.8% of national actors’ claims). These findings are likely to reflect the earlier discovery that EU-level actors whose claims are reported in the UK public sphere are more likely to be state and party actors than are UK national actors. Given that claims-making from EU actors in the UK print media is primarily from these elite actors, it comes as no surprise that elite forms of action – political decisions, and summit meetings – make up a higher proportion of claims made by EU actors than by UK actors.

**Table 5.1c Forms of action by actor scope (in %)**

	Political decision	Exec. action	Judicial action	Non-specified statement	Media strategies	Other verbal statement	Meeting	Direct-democ. action	Protest action	Total	N
<b>Supranational UN</b>	18.2	18.2	0.0	45.5	0.0	9.1	9.1	0.0	0.0	100.0	11
<b>Other supranational</b>	26.3	0.0	0.0	36.8	0.0	31.6	5.3	0.0	0.0	100.0	19
<b>EU</b>	19.1	1.5	0.0	39.0	0.0	23.5	16.2	0.0	0.7	100.0	136
<b>Other EU supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	4.3	0.0	0.0	76.6	0.0	14.9	4.3	0.0	0.0	100.0	47
<b>Bilateral</b>	16.7	16.7	16.7	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	6
<b>National</b>	10.9	2.4	1.1	52.2	0.0	21.5	10.8	0.2	0.8	100.0	1488
<b>Regional</b>	10.2	1.7	0.0	57.6	0.0	11.9	13.6	0.0	5.1	100.0	59
<b>Local</b>	9.5	4.2	8.4	60.0	0.0	8.4	6.3	0.0	3.2	100.0	95
<b>Unclassifiable</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	85.7	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	7
<b>Total</b>	11.4	2.5	1.4	52.4	0.0	20.4	10.8	0.2	1.0	100.0	1868
<b>N</b>	213	46	26	978	0	382	201	3	19	1868	

Of the few protest events that were reported, higher proportions were made by regional and local actors than by actors at national, EU and supranational levels. This suggests that no transnationalisation or Europeanisation of protest actions is evident in our issue fields. Instead, where protests are reported, they are typically by actors at political levels below the nation-state, from regions or localities.

### Claim-level: Addressees

**Table 6.1 Presence of addressee by issue field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
No addressee	38.8	46.2	33.3	48.6	27.9	39.1	23.4	37.7	197
Addressee	54.4	42.3	58.3	37.1	62.8	49.8	59.6	51.6	270
Supported actor	3.9	5.8	2.8	11.4	7.0	4.3	8.5	5.4	28
Opponent actor	2.9	5.8	5.6	2.9	2.3	6.8	8.5	5.4	28
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
N	103	52	36	35	43	207	47		523

Table 6.1 shows for each issue field the proportion of claims that had a specific addressee as their target, as well as the proportions expressing support for certain actors and criticising certain actors. Claimants in the fields of pensions, European integration and immigration were the most likely to make demands on specific addressees, while claimants in the fields of troops deployment and agriculture were much less likely to do so. The fields with a higher proportion of addressees specified may be those where decisions are most contested, while in the fields with lower proportions of addressees specified decisions are largely communicated, actors less often calling upon any other actor to bring about political change.

**Table 6.2a Addressees by issue field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>86.7</b>	<b>78.1</b>	<b>80.4</b>	<b>94.5</b>	<b>70.8</b>	<b>67.3</b>	<b>89.9</b>	<b>80.9</b>	<b>1060</b>
Politicians	0.4	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.4	0.5	6
Former states(wo)men	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.6	8
Government/ executive	56.1	67.6	65.4	75.6	58.5	48.9	77.3	62.2	815
Legislative	0.8	3.8	2.8	2.5	6.2	6.8	4.8	4.0	53
Judiciary	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.5	0.8	10
Police/ internal security agencies	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	2
Military	0.0	0.0	1.9	14.4	0.0	0.0	0.5	2.4	32
Central banks	25.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.9	64
Other state executive agencies	0.8	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1	0.0	1.9	25
Political parties	1.6	2.9	5.6	1.5	6.2	4.1	4.8	3.4	45
<b>Economic interest groups</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>24.6</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>70</b>
Unions/employees	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.6	4.9	0.0	1.7	22
Employers orgs/firms	2.7	5.7	1.9	0.0	20.0	0.5	1.0	2.4	32
Economists/financial experts	2.4	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.7	9
Farmers/agricultural orgs	0.0	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	7
<b>Media/journalists</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Other civil society</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>27.0</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>149</b>
Churches and religious orgs/ groups	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	1
Educational professionals/orgs	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	21.6	0.0	6.3	82
Other sci./ research professionals	0.0	4.8	0.9	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.8	10
Students, pupils, and their parents	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	1.0	13
Other professional orgs/groups	0.0	1.9	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	4
Consumer orgs/groups	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	8
Migrant orgs/groups	0.0	0.0	7.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	8
Pro-/anti-European campaign orgs/groups	5.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	1.2	16
Welfare orgs	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	2
Orgs/groups of the elderly	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	2
Terrorist groups	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	3
Rebel forces/guerrilla	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	6
Other civil society orgs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	1
<b>General/unknown/ unspecified</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>21</b>
Whole politics	1.2	1.9	4.7	1.0	0.0	0.3	3.9	1.6	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1310</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>1310</b>	

Using Table 6.2a, on the previous page, we can identify the types of actors targeted by claims about European integration in the UK public sphere, compared with the types of actor upon whom demands are made in other issue fields. Almost 90% (89.9%) of the addressees of claims regarding European integration are state or party actors, and 77.3% of these addressees were government or executive actors, the highest proportion found in any of the seven issue fields. In the European integration policy field, very few claims were addressed to non-state organisations, such as economic interest groups or civil society actors. Just 1.9% of claims in this issue field were addressed to economic interest groups, and just 1.4% were targeted at civil society actors, the latter being the lowest figure for any of the seven issue fields under investigation. Just as for the actors making claims (see discussion of Table 4.1, above), with regard to the actors on whom demands are made in the issue field of European integration, the presence of interest groups and civil society actors is extremely low when compared with other policy fields. In British print media coverage, European integration emerges as a policy field dominated by demands made by elite actors and addressed to elite actors, where space for claims by interest groups and civil society actors has been scarce.

Table 6.2b, overleaf, indicates that the types of actors addressed by political claimants remain relatively stable over time. For the later years (1995, 2000, 2002), around 80% of addressees are state and party actors, around 5% economic interest groups and around 13% civil society organisations. The year 1990 appears as a slight exception, where state and party actors and economic interest groups are more often the targets of political claims than in subsequent years, while civil society actors are less often addressees of claims than in the later years in the study.

**Table 6.2b Addressees by year (in %)**

	1989	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>86.1</b>	<b>80.2</b>	<b>78.0</b>	<b>81.0</b>	<b>80.9</b>	<b>1060</b>
Politicians	0.0	0.9	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.5	6
Former states(wo)men	0.0	0.9	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.6	8
Government/ executive	100.0	70.0	58.1	55.0	66.4	62.2	815
Legislative	0.0	7.8	4.8	2.9	2.6	4.0	53
Judiciary	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.8	1.3	0.8	10
Police/ internal security agencies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.2	2
Military	0.0	3.0	8.1	0.5	0.7	2.4	32
Central banks	0.0	0.0	4.4	7.7	5.3	4.9	64
Other state executive agencies	0.0	0.9	0.8	4.0	1.3	1.9	25
Political parties	0.0	2.6	3.2	5.3	2.4	3.4	45
<b>Economic interest groups</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>70</b>
Unions/employees	0.0	2.6	0.8	1.3	2.0	1.7	22
Employers orgs/firms	0.0	3.5	4.0	1.6	1.8	2.4	32
Economists/financial experts	0.0	0.9	0.0	1.3	0.4	0.7	9
Farmers/agricultural orgs	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.5	7
<b>Media/journalists</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Other civil society</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>13.7</b>	<b>12.2</b>	<b>12.6</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>149</b>
Churches and religious orgs/ groups	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	1
Educational professionals/orgs	0.0	4.3	9.7	6.1	5.5	6.3	82
Other sci./ research professionals	0.0	0.4	0.8	0.5	1.1	0.8	10
Students, pupils, and their parents	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.3	2.0	1.0	13
Other professional orgs/groups	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.3	4
Consumer orgs/groups	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	1
Migrant orgs/groups	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.1	0.6	8
Pro-/anti-European campaign orgs/groups	0.0	0.0	0.8	2.9	0.7	1.2	16
Welfare organisations	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.2	2
Orgs/groups of the elderly	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.2	2
Terrorist groups	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.2	3
Rebel forces/guerrilla	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	6
Other civil society orgs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	1
<b>General/unknown/ unspecified</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>21</b>
Whole polities	0.0	0.0	1.2	2.6	1.8	1.6	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1310</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>1310</b>	



**Table 6.3a Mean evaluation by category of addressee**

<b>Addressee</b>	<b>Mean evaluation</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>-0.34</b>	<b>1059</b>
Politicians	0.00	6
Former states(wo)men	-0.50	8
Government/ executive	-0.34	814
Legislative	-0.34	53
Judiciary	-0.20	10
Police/ internal security agencies	-0.50	2
Military	0.00	32
Central banks	-0.27	64
Other state executive agencies	-0.52	25
Political parties	-0.71	45
<b>Economic interest groups</b>	<b>-0.31</b>	<b>70</b>
Unions/employees	-0.50	22
Employers orgs/firms	-0.34	32
Economists/financial experts	0.22	9
Farmers/agricultural orgs	-0.29	7
<b>Media/journalists</b>	<b>-0.60</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Other civil society</b>	<b>-0.26</b>	<b>149</b>
Churches and religious orgs/ groups	0.00	1
Educational professionals/orgs	-0.17	82
Other sci./ research professionals	0.40	10
Students, pupils, and their parents	-0.08	13
Other professional orgs/groups	-0.25	4
Consumer orgs/groups	0.00	1
Migrant orgs/groups	-0.25	8
Pro-/anti-European campaign orgs/groups	-1.00	16
Welfare organisations	-1.00	2
Orgs/groups of the elderly	0.50	2
Terrorist groups	-1.00	3
Rebel forces/guerrilla	-1.00	6
Other civil society orgs	1.00	1
<b>General/unknown/unspecified</b>	<b>-0.05</b>	<b>21</b>
Whole polities	-0.05	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>-0.33</b>	<b>1309</b>

As shown in Table 6.3a, addressees are evaluated on balance in a negative way (-0.33 overall mean position of claimant towards addressee). Political party addressees were particularly likely to be criticized (-0.71), which may reflect the adversarial nature of British politics and party political competition.

Table 6.3b is of most use in comparing the evaluation of EU-level addressees with UK national addressees (for all other addressee scopes, the numbers of cases are quite low). EU addressees were less negatively evaluated than UK addressees (a mean evaluation of  $-0.24$  for EU addressees, against  $-0.39$  for UK addressees), indicating that EU-level actors are less often the targets of criticism in the UK public sphere than their UK counterparts are.

**Table 6.3b Mean evaluation by broad addressee scope**

Addressee scope	Mean evaluation	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.19	26
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.13	16
<b>EU</b>	-0.24	201
<b>Other European supranational</b>	1.00	1
<b>Multilateral</b>	-0.28	39
<b>Bilateral</b>	-0.50	4
<b>Germany</b>	-0.30	20
<b>France</b>	-0.16	32
<b>UK</b>	-0.39	789
<b>Italy</b>	-0.50	2
<b>Spain</b>	0.00	1
<b>Netherlands</b>	1.00	1
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.00	9
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	-1.00	5
<b>Switzerland</b>	-1.00	1
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	-0.10	10
<b>Other European countries (excluding CIS)</b>	-0.43	14
<b>Turkey</b>	-1.00	2
<b>Russia</b>	0.00	7
<b>USA</b>	-0.23	56
<b>Japan</b>	-0.50	4
<b>Middle East</b>	-0.56	27
<b>Rest of the world</b>	-0.32	41
<b>Total</b>	-0.33	1308

If the addressees of claims are increasingly EU actors (vertical Europeanisation), or actors from other EU countries (horizontal Europeanisation), it indicates that some Europeanisation is taking place. Again, it is important to break this down by issue field and type of actor in order to draw precise conclusions as to how such Europeanisation may be happening.

As shown in Table 6.4a, overleaf, claims-makers were most likely to make demands on EU actors in the fields of European integration (49.3% of all addressees EU actors) and agriculture (30.5%). Some demands were also directed to EU actors in the fields of monetary politics (19.6%) and immigration (10.5%). That the proportion of EU—level addressees was not higher in the monetary politics field may well be a function of the UK remaining outside the single currency, and fewer demands consequently being made on EU-level actors such as the European Central Bank than would be the case for the eurozone countries. In those fields where the EU has had little involvement, few or no demands were made on EU-level actors, with just 3.0% of troops deployment addressees being EU actors, and none in education or retirement politics.

In regard to horizontal Europeanisation, we find a pattern similar to that for actors making claims, in that several French actors are targeted by claimants in the fields of agriculture, immigration and troops deployment (7.6%, 5.7% and 2.5% of addressees in each respective field), and German actors are the addressees of some claims in the fields of monetary politics and immigration (3.5% and 3.8% of addressees respectively). Actors from EU states other than France and Germany are only very rarely the targets of demands by other actors in the UK public sphere.

**Table 6.4a Addressee scope by issue field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.4	0.0	0.3	0.0	2.0	26
<b>Other supranational</b>	1.2	0.0	1.0	4.5	0.0	0.5	0.5	1.2	16
<b>EU</b>	19.6	30.5	10.5	3.0	0.0	0.0	49.3	15.4	201
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Multilateral</b>	1.6	1.0	4.8	11.4	4.6	0.5	0.5	3.0	39
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	4
<b>Germany</b>	3.5	0.0	3.8	0.5	0.0	1.1	1.0	1.5	20
<b>France</b>	0.8	7.6	5.7	2.5	0.0	1.6	2.4	2.4	32
<b>UK</b>	68.2	56.2	52.4	9.0	95.4	94.3	34.8	60.3	789
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	2
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	1.6	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.4	0.7	9
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.4	5
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.1	1
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	4.3	0.8	10
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.4	0.0	0.0	6.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	14
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.2	2
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	7
<b>USA</b>	0.8	2.9	5.7	20.4	0.0	0.3	1.4	4.3	56
<b>Japan</b>	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	4
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	1.0	12.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	27
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.4	1.0	10.5	11.4	0.0	1.1	0.5	3.1	41
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1308
<b>N</b>	255	105	105	201	65	370	207	1308	

Examining the possible Europeanisation over time of the actors called upon to effect political change, the role that major political crises and events play in the Europeanisation of political communication becomes apparent. For example, in 2002, as Table 6.4b illustrates, a lower proportion of claims-makers made demands on EU actors than in 2000 (15.0% of addressees were EU actors in 2002, compared with 18.4% in 2000). However, this lower proportion of EU actors is largely due to the rise in demands made on multilateral actors – the US-led coalition in the War on Terror. This suggests that the space there is for Europeanisation in the public sphere is affected by other conflicts raging over the time periods sampled. When there is a

major crisis, there is likely to be less space for coverage of European issues, and in the years sampled, the EU had no significant involvement in the conflicts that occurred<sup>5</sup>.

**Table 6.4b Addressee scope by year (in %)**

	1989	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	1.3	4.0	1.1	2.0	2.0	26
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.4	4.0	1.1	0.2	1.2	16
<b>EU</b>	0.0	11.3	15.3	18.4	15.0	15.4	201
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	1
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	2.2	2.8	1.1	5.1	3.0	39
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.3	4
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	0.9	2.0	1.1	2.0	1.5	20
<b>France</b>	0.0	2.6	2.0	2.7	2.4	2.4	32
<b>UK</b>	100.0	58.3	55.2	66.5	58.9	60.3	789
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.2	2
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	1
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.7	0.7	9
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.2	0.4	5
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.4	0.8	0.0	1.5	0.8	10
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.4	5.2	0.0	0.0	1.1	14
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.2	2
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	2.2	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.5	7
<b>USA</b>	0.0	7.8	6.0	0.8	4.4	4.3	56
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.2	0.3	4
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	7.4	0.4	0.0	2.0	2.1	27
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	3.9	1.6	2.4	4.2	3.1	41
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1308
<b>N</b>	1	230	248	376	453	1308	

Table 6.4c, overleaf, shows the scope of the different types of actor addressed by claimants' political demands. Nearly two fifths (17.8%) of state and party actors called upon by claimants were EU-level actors, second in proportion only to UK state and party actors, who constituted over half (56.1%) of all state and party addressees. In contrast, just 2.9% of economic interest groups on which demands were made were EU-level actors, and no demands were made on EU-level civil society actors at all in the UK public sphere across the seven issue fields and four years sampled. This

<sup>5</sup> This pattern would be expected to alter if further analysis were done for the year 2003, given the splits between European states over support for the US in the Iraq war early in the years, and the controversy over 'Old Europe' versus 'New Europe' identified by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

indicates that while EU elites do figure significantly as addressees of claims made in the UK public sphere, the same is not true for EU-level interest groups and civil society actors, upon whom few or no demands are made in the UK public space. Where interest groups and civil society organisations are the targets of other actors' political claims, over 80% are UK national organisations. While EU elites are called upon by a considerable proportion of claimants, EU interest groups and civil society actors hardly feature as addressees in the UK public sphere. While many scholars have identified a growing European civil society, with the establishment of a great number of EU-level interest groups and NGOs, it seems that the emergence of a European civil society was in the years sampled hardly visible in the UK public sphere.

**Table 6.4c Addressee scope by broad addressee category (in %)**

	State/ party	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society	Unknown/ unspecified	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	2.0	26
<b>Other supranational</b>	1.4	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	16
<b>EU</b>	17.8	2.9	0.0	0.0	47.6	15.4	201
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Multilateral</b>	2.2	8.6	0.0	5.4	9.5	3.0	39
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.2	1.4	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.3	4
<b>Germany</b>	1.6	1.4	0.0	0.7	4.8	1.5	20
<b>France</b>	2.7	0.0	0.0	1.4	4.8	2.4	32
<b>UK</b>	56.1	80.0	100.0	84.5	19.0	60.3	789
<b>Italy</b>	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	2
<b>Spain</b>	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.7	9.5	0.7	9
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	5
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	10
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	1.1	14
<b>Turkey</b>	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	2
<b>Russia</b>	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	7
<b>USA</b>	5.0	2.9	0.0	0.7	0.0	4.3	56
<b>Japan</b>	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	4
<b>Middle East</b>	2.3	0.0	0.0	1.4	4.8	2.1	27
<b>Rest of the world</b>	3.3	1.4	0.0	3.4	0.0	3.1	41
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1308
<b>N</b>	1059	70	10	148	21	1308	

It has already been pointed out that Europeanisation varies immensely by policy field. Hence Table 6.4b, above, can only give us an aggregate picture of which political actors demands were made on in the years sampled. Looking at the fields of European integration and monetary politics more in-depth gives us a more nuanced picture of the potential Europeanisation of addressees in these policy fields in the four years sampled (Tables 6.4d and 6.4e, below)

**Table 6.4d Addressee scope by year – European integration issue field only (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.5	1
<b>EU</b>	46.4	56.1	42.7	53.2	49.3	102
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	1
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.0	1.0	2
<b>France</b>	3.6	1.8	2.7	2.1	2.4	5
<b>UK</b>	39.3	35.1	41.3	21.3	34.8	72
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	1.3	4.3	1.4	3
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	5.3	2.1	2.4	5
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.5	1
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	3.5	0.0	14.9	4.3	9
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.5	1
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.5	1
<b>USA</b>	3.6	1.8	1.3	0.0	1.4	3
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	1
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
<b>N</b>	28	57	75	47	207	

Examining the proportion of claims about European integration directed at EU actors, the proportion in each of the years was somewhere in the region of 50% (from a low of 42.7% in 2000, to a high of 56.1% in 1995). No discernible trend of Europeanisation across time is apparent. The proportion of European integration claims directed at UK national actors was lower in 2002, at 21.3%, than in other years in the sample (for example, 41.3% of actors on which demands were made regarding European integration in 2000 were national actors). This is largely likely to be due to the entry of the upcoming enlargement countries as political actors on which demands

are made in 2002, in which year 14.9% of all claims about European integration were addressed at them.

**Table 6.4e Addressee scope by year – Monetary politics issue field only (in %)**

	1989	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	1.2	3
<b>EU</b>	0.0	11.9	10.0	22.4	28.1	19.6	50
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.4	1
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	4.7	1.6	4
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	4.8	4.0	2.0	4.7	3.5	9
<b>France</b>	0.0	0.0	2.0	1.0	0.0	0.8	2
<b>UK</b>	100.0	76.2	80.0	64.3	59.4	68.2	174
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	1
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1	0.0	1.6	4
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	1
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	0.0	2.4	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	2
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.0	1.2	3
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.4	1
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	255
<b>N</b>	1	42	50	98	64	255	

For monetary politics (Table 6.4e above) the proportions of addressees who are EU-level actors were significantly higher in 2000 and 2002 (22.4% and 28.1% respectively) than in 1990 and 1995, where proportions were around the 10% mark (11.9% and 10.0% respectively). Similarly, the proportions of addressees who are UK national actors were significantly lower in 2000 and 2002 (64.3% and 59.4% respectively) than in 1990 and 1995 (76.2% and 80.0% respectively). This change is likely to be a result of the increasing Europeanisation of public debates over monetary politics, in terms of increasing demands made on EU actors. This rise in demands made on EU actors means that they come to occupy a greater space in monetary politics than was previously the case, decreasing the likelihood that UK actors are the targets of claims made in the public sphere. This trend should not be over exaggerated; UK actors remain those on whom most claims are targeted in the field of monetary politics, constituting an average of 68.2% of all addressees across all four



years. Nonetheless, it can be inferred from the data that in the two most recent years in the study, a higher proportion of demands were addressed to EU actors than was the case in previous years sampled.

### **Section summary**

As addressees of claims, the highest proportions of EU-level actors are found in the fields of European integration and agriculture, with some demands also being addressed to EU actors in the fields of monetary politics and immigration, but few or no demands targeted at EU actors in the fields of troops deployment, pensions or education. This indicates a high level of ‘vertical Europeanisation’ of the targets of claims in the issue fields European integration and agriculture, a lower level of Europeanisation in monetary politics and immigration, and virtually no Europeanisation in troops deployment, pensions or education.

Breaking this down, EU actors are less likely to have claims addressed at them in monetary politics than in agriculture. This lower proportion of EU-level targets of claims in the field of monetary politics may well be a function of the UK remaining outside the eurozone, since the power to make decisions over UK monetary politics resides largely at national level and EU-level actors such as the European Central Bank lack the power to bring about claimants’ desired outcomes.

Examining the question of ‘horizontal Europeanisation’ – actors from other European countries featuring as the targets of claims made in the UK public sphere – again, Europeanisation varies hugely by policy field. The factor of a country’s historical importance in the policy field appears to have a particular effect on whether actors feature as the targets of claims in that field, with French actors called upon in agriculture & troops deployment, German actors a focus of several claimants’ demands in monetary politics, and both French and German actors called upon in immigration politics.

Finally, our data shows that while EU elites are called upon by many claimants, EU interest groups and civil society actors hardly feature as addressees in the UK public sphere. Although a multitude of European-level interest groups and NGOs exist in

Brussels, these actors are not visible in UK debates over the seven issues taken in this study.

**Claim-level: Issues and aims**

**Table 7.1 Issue field by year (in %)**

	1989	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Monetary politics</b>	100.0	20.7	19.9	29.5	16.9	21.7	450
<b>Agriculture</b>	0.0	11.6	4.8	10.0	7.0	8.2	171
<b>Immigration</b>	0.0	4.9	3.3	5.2	12.0	7.5	156
<b>Troops deployment</b>	0.0	25.3	21.5	6.2	20.0	17.1	354
<b>Pensions</b>	0.0	0.6	4.5	6.0	5.3	4.6	96
<b>Education</b>	0.0	24.4	24.2	26.2	27.9	26.3	545
<b>European Integration</b>	0.0	12.5	21.8	17.0	10.9	14.6	304
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	2076
<b>N</b>	1	328	331	600	816	2076	

Education accounts for the highest proportion of claims made in any of the seven issue fields (26.3% of all claims), as Table 7.1 shows. Relatively few claims were made concerning retirement and pension schemes (4.6% of all claims), immigration (7.5%) or agriculture (8.5%). It can be argued that for pensions fewer claims are found because it was a fairly uncontentious issue in the UK over the time period sampled. For immigration and agriculture, the lower numbers of claims probably relate to a number of factors. First is the fact that we sampled subsets of these issue fields (entry and exit for immigration, excluding claims regarding migrant integration and welfare; subsidies, quotas and diseases for agriculture) rather than the entire field. Furthermore, coverage of agricultural issues tends to be episodic, rising sharply at times of crisis such as BSE (accounting for the higher numbers of claims in 1990) or foot-and-mouth. Immigration has been higher up political, media and public agendas in the UK in recent years, accounting for the rise in claims in 2002.

**Table 7.2a Monetary politics issues by year (in %)**

	1989	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>General Unspecific</b>	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.4	2
<b>Interest Rate Adjustments</b>	100.0	30.9	57.6	31.1	34.8	36.2	163
<b>EMU Convergence criteria/stability pact</b>	0.0	0.0	9.1	4.5	16.7	8.2	37
<b>EMS/ERM</b>	0.0	44.1	0.0	1.1	1.4	7.6	34
<b>Exchange rate intervention</b>	0.0	2.9	4.5	16.4	4.3	8.9	40
<b>Independence of Central Banks</b>	0.0	5.9	0.0	0.6	0.7	1.3	6
<b>Eurozone outsiders: relations with pre-ins &amp; candidate countries</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.7	0.4	2
<b>Common currency (ECU, EURO)</b>	0.0	14.7	27.3	32.8	31.2	28.7	129
<b>Dynamics of Euro campaigns</b>	0.0	0.0	1.5	12.4	9.4	8.0	36
<b>Other specific</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.2	1
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	450
<b>N</b>	1	68	66	177	138	450	

Table 7.2a suggests that the issue of the common European currency has been particularly prominent in monetary politics coverage in the mass media in the later years in our study (1995, 2000 and 2002). In 2000 and 2002, the issue of political campaigning over the euro itself also featured as an issue, with claims being made regarding the possibility of a referendum on the single currency. The EMS/ERM was a issue of high importance in 1990, but not in the later years in the study.

**Table 7.2b Agricultural issues by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Reform of the system of subsidies</b>	13.2	12.5	16.7	31.6	20.5	35
<b>Subsidies &amp; EU enlargement</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.5	1.2	2
<b>Subsidies &amp; international trade</b>	15.8	0.0	5.0	3.5	6.4	11
<b>BSE</b>	50.0	87.5	55.0	24.6	46.8	80
<b>Foot and Mouth Disease</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	24.6	8.2	14
<b>Other diseases</b>	15.8	0.0	23.3	5.3	13.5	23
<b>Quotas for livestock &amp; dairy production</b>	5.3	0.0	0.0	7.0	3.5	6
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	171
<b>N</b>	38	16	60	57	171	

Table 7.2b needs to be interpreted with care since the numbers of claims concerned are relatively low. The share of agricultural claims made about reforming agricultural subsidies was much higher in 2002 (31.6%) than in previous years. This suggests that the subsidies issue has been higher up political agendas in 2002 than was previously the case.

**Table 7.2c Immigration issues by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>General evaluation or policy direction</b>	6.3	9.1	6.5	16.3	12.8	20
<b>Institutional framework, responsibilities, procedures, costs</b>	12.5	9.1	6.5	8.2	8.3	13
<b>Entry and border controls</b>	6.3	45.5	3.2	18.4	16.0	25
<b>Expulsions/deportations</b>	43.8	0.0	22.6	18.4	20.5	32
<b>Migration programs and quotas</b>	6.3	0.0	25.8	13.3	14.1	22
<b>Role of third parties in preventing migration</b>	0.0	18.2	9.7	2.0	4.5	7
<b>Visa and consular policy</b>	25.0	0.0	3.2	11.2	10.3	16
<b>Actions relating to smuggling and illegal entries</b>	0.0	9.1	19.4	11.2	11.5	18
<b>Other specific issues</b>	0.0	9.1	3.2	1.0	1.9	3
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	156
<b>N</b>	16	11	31	98	156	

For immigration (Table 7.2c, above) the numbers of claims are again low, particularly for 1990 and 1995. Comparing sub-issues across all years, we see a distribution of claims across several sub-issues, in particular expulsions and deportations, entry and border controls, general evaluations and assessments of policy direction, and migration programs and quotas.

**Table 7.2d Troops deployment issues by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
General unspecific reference to deployment of troops	0.0	1.4	5.4	.6	1.1	4
Deployment of troops for military aggression on foreign sovereign territory	61.4	35.2	0.0	83.4	59.9	212
Deployment of troops for military invasion of foreign sovereign territory	20.5	0.0	2.7	3.7	6.8	24
Deployment of troops in covert aggressive operations against hostile regimes/groups	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.9	2.3	8
Deployment of troops for peace-keeping	2.4	54.9	35.1	1.2	15.8	56
Deployment of troops to rescue/protect civilians facing aggression	0.0	0.0	16.2	0.0	1.7	6
Deployment of troops in crises or civil emergencies	0.0	0.0	0.0	.6	.3	1
Deployment of troops for non-military humanitarian purposes	0.0	0.0	5.4	0.0	.6	2
Deployment of troops in the context of military alliances	10.8	8.5	2.7	0.0	4.5	16
Other specific reference to deployment of troops	4.8	0.0	32.4	5.5	7.1	25
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>354</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>354</b>	

The majority of claims in the field of troops deployment (Table 7.2d, above) were made regarding the sub-issue of military aggression on foreign sovereign territory. In 1990, these claims relate mainly to the first Gulf War; in 1995, to conflict in Bosnia (where peacekeeping was also a significant issue); and in 2002, to the second Gulf War.

**Table 7.2e Pensions issues by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Demographic changes: ageing population</b>	0.0	0.0	2.8	7.0	4.2	4
<b>Retirement ages</b>	0.0	26.7	5.6	16.3	13.5	13
<b>Income levels in retirement, Poverty in retirement</b>	50.0	20.0	30.6	11.6	20.8	20
<b>State versus private pension schemes</b>	0.0	6.7	2.8	9.3	6.3	6
<b>State pension scheme</b>	50.0	0.0	33.3	7.0	16.7	16
<b>Private pension scheme</b>	0.0	33.3	19.4	37.2	29.2	28
<b>Other / Specific</b>	0.0	13.3	5.6	11.6	9.4	9
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	96
<b>N</b>	2	15	36	43	96	

For pensions and politics, the numbers of claims are quite low (Table 7.2e, above). Issues about which higher proportions of claims were made were private pension schemes, income levels in retirement, state pensions and retirement ages.

**Table 7.2f Education issues by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>General unspecific</b>	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	2
<b>Structural issues</b>	6.3	0.0	1.3	2.6	2.4	13
<b>Resource allocation and salaries</b>	37.5	27.5	20.4	19.7	23.7	129
<b>Private education</b>	2.5	7.5	5.7	7.9	6.4	35
<b>Administrative power allocation</b>	12.5	10.0	5.7	7.9	8.3	45
<b>Curriculum</b>	16.3	17.5	0.0	13.2	10.5	57
<b>Information and communication technologies</b>	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.9	0.7	4
<b>Scholarships and fees</b>	6.3	0.0	6.4	3.9	4.4	24
<b>Problems at school</b>	3.8	5.0	15.3	21.1	14.5	79
<b>Other specific issues</b>	12.5	32.5	43.9	22.8	28.8	157
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	545
<b>N</b>	80	80	157	228	545	

For education (Table 7.2f, above) other specific issues (28.8%) included school standards and the Scottish Qualification Authority Higher exam results crisis of 2000, which accounts for the particularly high proportion of claims made about ‘other specific’ issues in that year. Significant numbers of claims were also made about resource allocation and salaries issues (23.7%, all years), although this issue appears to have declined as a focus of political claims over time. Other crucial issues were problems at school, such as bullying and violence (14.5%), in the later years in the study in particular, and the curriculum (10.5%).

Regarding European integration (Table 7.2g, overleaf), claims appearing in media coverage of have tended to focus on two main issues: first, the relationship between the EU supranational and the national or regional levels, including debates about a future constitution and second, the role of specific countries in the EU and the balance of power between them. Taking the first main issue, almost a third (28.9%) of all European integration-related claims were made about the relationship between the EU and national levels. Breaking this down, the principal issues claimants focused on were the extension of EU powers, in particular the issue of giving up national vetoes; the future of Europe, especially a European Constitution and the Convention on the Future of Europe; the European Charter of Fundamental Rights; and finally, a federal Europe and the drive towards political union.

Looking at the second main issue, nearly a third of all claims (27.6%) made about European integration in the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2002 focused on the question of the role of certain nation-states within the EU and the balance of power between them. The majority of these focused on the issue of Britain’s relationship with Europe, which was the main issue of almost two fifths (17.1%) of all claims made about European integration in the four years sampled.

The two main issues make up a lower proportion of European integration claims in 2002 than was the case in previous years (both 18.0% in 2002, compared with 37.3% and 31.4% respectively in 2000). However, this can be ascribed to the fact that EU enlargement emerged as a significant issue in UK media coverage of public debates over European integration in 2002. Since over one third (39.3%) of claims made about European integration issues in 2002 were made about the issue of enlargement,

the proportion of claims made about the two ‘core issues’ in UK debates discussed above decreased in 2002.

**Table 7.2g European integration issues by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>General European integration, not specific</b>	12.2	6.9	4.9	2.2	5.6	17
<b>National vs. European Identity, shared values</b>	0.0	2.8	0.0	1.1	1.0	3
<b>Role of a specific country and balance of power in the EU</b>	24.4	36.1	31.4	18.0	27.6	84
<b>Relationship EU – national &amp; regional levels / future constitution</b>	36.6	26.4	37.3	18.0	28.9	88
<b>Institutional structure &amp; relationship between EU institutions</b>	12.2	4.2	1.0	10.1	5.9	18
<b>Defining EU’s core tasks/ balance between different policy areas</b>	4.9	5.6	3.9	2.2	3.9	12
<b>Relationship between EU institutions and public</b>	0.0	2.8	2.0	4.5	2.6	8
<b>Enlargement</b>	2.4	9.7	3.9	39.3	15.5	47
<b>Budget: Financing the EU and spending EU funds</b>	0.0	5.6	1.0	0.0	1.6	5
<b>Other specific EU integration</b>	2.4	0.0	14.7	2.2	5.9	18
<b>Associational agreements/ treaties between EU and non-EU countries</b>	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1
<b>Personnel issues within EU/ discussions about candidacies</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.7	2
<b>Non-EU forms of European integration</b>	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	304
<b>N</b>	41	72	102	89	304	

This jump in claims about EU enlargement in the UK public sphere in 2002 contrasts with previous years, where less than 10% of claims made about European integration focused on the enlargement issue. Data for 2001, not included here, indicates that enlargement was still not a major issue in 2001, which shows a similar pattern to previous years, with less than 10% of claims about European integration mentioning enlargement. It is therefore possible to conclude that among the five years’ coverage sampled in this study, enlargement only became a subject of public debate to any notable extent in the UK in 2002, i.e. following the Laeken Declaration of December



2001 and prior to EU accession negotiations at the Copenhagen summit in December 2002.

There appears to be little public debate around the values and norms underlying European integration or the collective identities it potentially affects and reforms. Just 1% of all claims made about European integration in the four years sampled focused on questions of national and European identity and values. Nonetheless, it is possible that other European integration issues may be framed in terms of common European principles, identities or values, as discussed in section 10, below.

**Table 7.3a Issue scope by policy field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.6	22.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	82
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.2	2.3	0.0	6.2	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.6	33
<b>EU</b>	64.9	46.2	20.5	2.0	3.1	0.4	100.0	34.7	719
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.4	0.6	5.1	42.7	3.1	0.7	0.3	8.2	169
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.2	7.0	21.2	24.9	1.0	0.2	0.0	6.6	136
<b>Germany</b>	0.4	0.6	2.6	0.0	1.0	0.7	0.0	0.6	12
<b>France</b>	0.0	4.1	3.8	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	1.1	22
<b>UK</b>	29.6	36.8	34.6	0.0	90.6	94.1	0.0	40.9	847
<b>Italy</b>	0.4	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	5
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	2
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.4	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	3
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	1.6	2.3	4.5	0.8	0.0	0.4	0.0	1.1	23
<b>Japan</b>	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	3
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	1.1	0.0	2.6	0.3	1.0	0.6	0.0	0.7	14
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	2073
<b>N</b>	450	171	156	354	96	542	304	2073	

Table 7.3a shows the frames of reference – ranging from supranational down to national – within which issues in each policy field are discussed. The first, obvious, point to make is that rather than speaking of a general Europeanisation of the UK public sphere, we can say that the extent to which issues are discussed within a European frame of reference varies significantly according to the policy field. Clearly, policy fields where the EU has considerable competences vis-à-vis the national level can be expected to be discussed within a European context more than policy fields where the EU has less or no powers. This means that for the policy fields sampled here, it would be expected that monetary politics and agriculture would exhibit fairly high levels of EU-related issues. Where the EU has some limited responsibilities, as in immigration and troops deployment, we can suppose that some issues are likely to be discussed within a European context, and where the EU has little or no relevance, as in retirement and pensions politics or education, hardly any issues are likely to be EU-related.

We would expect the proportions of issues having a European scope to increase over time, as the European integration process moves forward. However, table 7.3b (overleaf) gives a contradictory picture in regard to Europeanisation over time. No clear trend is apparent. We can speculate that the proportion of issues with a European scope was particularly high in 2000 due to the prominence of the euro issue and the Nice Treaty discussions; it may also be that the proportion was particularly low in 1995 because no significant EU-related events took place in that year. The findings may suggest that whether issues are discussed in an EU context is to some extent event- and controversy-driven; in years when EU issues are particularly high up the political agenda, and/or when important events in the development of European integration take place, there will be increased levels of discussion of these issues in the public sphere. The importance of the supranational issue scope primarily depends on the involvement of the UN and Nato in international conflicts in any given year. Hence we find higher proportions of supranational issue scopes in 1990 and 1995, when the UN was involved in the first Gulf War and the UN and Nato were implicated in peacekeeping in Bosnia respectively, than in 2002, when the UN was involved little in the second Gulf War pursued by the US/UK-led coalition.

**Table 7.3b Issue scope by year (in %)**

	1989	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	9.5	10.9	2.0	0.4	4.0	82
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	1.5	5.1	1.5	0.2	1.6	33
<b>EU</b>	0.0	30.2	32.3	46.1	29.2	34.7	719
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	6.7	1.8	1.2	16.4	8.2	169
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	12.2	5.1	4.2	6.6	6.6	136
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	1.2	0.6	0.0	0.7	0.6	12
<b>France</b>	0.0	0.3	0.6	1.3	1.3	1.1	22
<b>UK</b>	100.0	36.3	40.5	41.2	42.5	40.9	847
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.2	5
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	1
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	2
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	1
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.1	3
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	0.0	1.2	1.2	0.7	1.3	1.1	23
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.1	3
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.7	0.7	0.7	14
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	2073
<b>N</b>	1	328	331	597	816	2073	

As Table 7.3a has already shown, almost two third of monetary politics issues (64.9%) had an EU scope, and just under half of agricultural issues (46.2%). To understand more about changes in the degree to which these issues are discussed in a European frame of reference over time, see tables 7.4a and 7.4b overleaf. It should be pointed out that for both issue fields a number of sub-issues were sampled, rather than the entire policy field. For monetary politics, these issues were currency and interest rates, while for agriculture, they were subsidies, livestock quotas and disease control (including BSE and foot-and-mouth). That a greater proportion of claims about monetary politics were discussed within a European context than was the case for agricultural politics testifies to the recent importance of the EU in monetary politics and policy, with the bringing into being of Economic and Monetary Union and the accompanying establishment of the eurozone and the European Central Bank.

**Table 7.4a Monetary politics issue scope by year (in %)**

	1989	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.2	1
<b>EU</b>	0.0	64.7	37.9	74.6	65.9	64.9	292
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.4	2
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	1
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	2.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	2
<b>France</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>UK</b>	100.0	27.9	54.5	21.5	28.3	29.6	133
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	1.5	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.4	2
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	1.5	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.4	2
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	0.0	0.0	3.0	2.3	0.7	1.6	7
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.7	0.7	3
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	2.9	1.1	5
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	450
<b>N</b>	1	68	66	177	138	450	

**Table 7.4b Agriculture issue scope by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	5.3	0.0	0.0	3.5	2.3	4
<b>EU</b>	26.3	12.5	58.3	56.1	46.2	79
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	6.3	0.0	0.0	0.6	1
<b>Bilateral</b>	13.2	0.0	8.3	3.5	7.0	12
<b>Germany</b>	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	1
<b>France</b>	2.6	0.0	10.0	0.0	4.1	7
<b>UK</b>	39.5	81.3	23.3	36.8	36.8	63
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	10.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	4
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	171
<b>N</b>	38	16	60	57	171	

As Tables 7.4c and 7.4d (overleaf) illustrate, of the two issue fields where some degree of EU competence has been agreed – immigration and troops deployment – immigration can be seen to be more Europeanised than troops deployment, in terms of a greater proportion of claims referring to immigration within a European frame of reference (20.5%) than is the case for troops deployment (2.0%). This might be thought surprising given that European defence has often been a contentious issue in the UK, but this can be traced back to the fact that troops deployment is a subset of defence politics, rather than a policy field in its own right. Claims about troops deployment were restricted to the deployment of troops across borders, for a variety of purposes, so general claims about European defence were not included here, and

claims about a European rapid reaction force were included only if they referred to the actual deployment of the force.

**Table 7.4c Immigration issue scope by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	0.6	1
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>EU</b>	0.0	45.5	12.9	23.5	20.5	32
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	18.8	9.1	0.0	4.1	5.1	8
<b>Bilateral</b>	50.0	27.3	6.5	20.4	21.2	33
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1	2.6	4
<b>France</b>	0.0	0.0	6.5	4.1	3.8	6
<b>UK</b>	31.3	18.2	51.6	31.6	34.6	54
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	9.7	0.0	1.9	3
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.6	1
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.6	1
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.6	1
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	0.6	1
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.1	4.5	7
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	6.5	2.0	2.6	4
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	156
<b>N</b>	16	11	31	98	156	

Both immigration and troops deployment are issues discussed in contexts beyond the national. A substantial amount of immigration issues<sup>6</sup> involve two or more nation-states, with over a fifth of issues (21.2%) discussed in bilateral terms. The most debated of these bilateral issues have been the Sangatte refugee camp in Calais, involving Britain and France (2002), and Vietnamese boat people emigrating to Britain (1990). Some reference is also made to the experiences of other large EU states with immigration, such as France (3.6%), Germany (2.6%) and Italy (1.9%), as

<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that only immigration claims focusing on entry and exit to states were included in the study. Issues relating to immigrants once in a country, such as welfare benefits or the UK Home Office's dispersal policy, was excluded.

well as to the USA (4.5%). However, virtually no immigration issues (0.6%) were discussed within a supranational context.

**Table 7.4d Troops deployment issue scope by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	37.3	50.7	29.7	1.8	22.9	81
<b>Other supranational</b>	3.6	23.9	5.4	0.0	6.2	22
<b>EU</b>	3.6	1.4	2.7	1.2	2.0	7
<b>Other European supranational</b>	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1
<b>Multilateral</b>	22.9	4.2	13.5	78.5	43.8	155
<b>Bilateral</b>	31.3	19.7	48.6	18.4	24.9	88
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>France</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>UK</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.8	3
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	354
<b>N</b>	83	71	37	163	354	

Troops deployment is the most transnationalised of all the issue fields, involving multilateral, bilateral and supranational issues. Which political levels are most heavily implicated can be seen to depend on the involvement of supranational or multilateral forces in conflicts at particular times. Over two fifths of all claims made about troops deployment were made within a multinational frame of reference. Further analysis of the troops deployment issues (see Table 7.4d) indicates that multinational issues were particularly high up the agenda in 2002, when 78.5% of all claims for the year were within a multinational context. This is due to the high number of claims made about the US-led coalition in the War on Terror, in particular discussions of war in Afghanistan and impending war in Iraq. More than a fifth of

claims about troops deployment discussed the issue in bilateral terms. The main issues discussed here were the deployment of UK troops to Sierra Leone (2000), conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (2002), and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990). Supranational troops deployment issues rose in 1995, when UN and Nato forces were heavily involved in the Bosnia conflict. In 1990 and 2000, around a third of troops deployment issues (37.3% and 29.7% respectively) were discussed with recourse to a UN frame of reference, given UN attempts at conflict resolution at the time of the first Gulf War (1990) and the UN international observer force in Israel/Palestine (2000). However, in 2002 the share of UN-related issues fell to just 1.8%, reflecting the supranational body's exclusion from decisionmaking in the war in Afghanistan and prior to the second Iraq war.

**Table 7.4e Pensions issue scope by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>EU</b>	0.0	13.3	0.0	2.3	3.1	3
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	3.1	3
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	1.0	1
<b>Germany</b>	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1
<b>France</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>UK</b>	50.0	86.7	97.2	88.4	90.6	87
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	2.8	0.0	1.0	1
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	96
<b>N</b>	2	15	36	43	96	



**Table 7.4f Education issue scope by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	3.9	0.0	1.1	6
<b>EU</b>	1.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.4	2
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	1.3	1.9	0.0	0.7	4
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.2	1
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	2.5	0.0	0.9	0.7	4
<b>France</b>	0.0	2.5	0.0	3.1	1.7	9
<b>UK</b>	98.8	87.5	92.9	95.6	94.1	510
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.2	1
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other European countries (not CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	0.0	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.4	2
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.6	3
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	542
<b>N</b>	80	80	154	228	542	

The policy fields of retirement/pensions politics and education have remained under the control of national political institutions, and it comes as no surprise that these issues are discussed almost entirely within the UK national context (see Tables 7.4e and 7.4f, above). 90.6% of all claims about retirement and pensions are made about UK national issues, and the proportion is even higher for education, with 94.1% of all claims relating to national issues. When the proportion of issues with a European scope is examined, it can be seen that 3.1% of retirement and pensions issues were discussed within a European frame of reference. These few 'European' retirement issues related to claims by the heritage body The National Trust that seasonal staff should retire at age 65 in the light of EU employment legislation, and by the National Farmers Union that retiring farmers should receive cash lump sums under CAP regulations. Even fewer education issues (0.4%) were discussed within a European frame of reference, the only European issues being a claim by the European

Commission that the UK government should waive some fees for foreign students studying in Britain, and a claim by the UK government that British pupils must learn more foreign languages if they are to survive in the single European market.

It would also be expected that issues would come to be discussed more within a European context over time, as the EU has gained further competences or become further entrenched in a policy field. To comment on Europeanisation of the various policy fields over time, the numbers of claims involved need to be large enough to be able to state trends with some authority. Those policy fields where this can be done are monetary politics, troops deployment and education (see Tables 7.4a, 7.4d and 7.4f, above). In the case of monetary politics, the question of Economic and Monetary Union was high up the political agenda during the first year sampled in the study (64.7% of monetary politics issues were discussed in a European context in 1990). The proportion was just 37.9% in 1995, when the single currency and EMU were less contentious issues, and there was heightened contention in the UK over interest rates, with the Chancellor raising interest rates in February 1995 for the third time in five months. However, this figure almost doubled to 74.6% by 2000, when the euro had already been launched on the currency markets and the last phases of EMU for the eurozone countries were imminent.

No significant rise in European issues discussed in troops deployment over the years taken in the study can be discerned, the proportions of European issues remaining low (1.4% in 1995, 1.2% in 2002). For education, there has been no Europeanisation of the policy field over time in terms of the issues referred to in print media coverage, with only 2 claims in a European context out of the 542 claims made about education across all 4 years.

### **Section summary**

This section examined the extent to which issues in each policy field are discussed within a European frame of reference. Increasing discussion of issues in a particular field within a European context would suggest a Europeanisation of that field. The proportion of issues discussed within a European context was highest for monetary politics and agriculture, although the proportion for monetary politics was greater than

for agricultural politics, testifying to the recent importance of the EU in monetary politics and policymaking. Immigration was more likely to be discussed within a European context than troops deployment, although both issues were often discussed in frames of reference that extend beyond the nation-state (for immigration, particularly in multilateral and bilateral terms; for troops deployment, particularly in terms of the supranational and multilateral levels). Taken together with the low incidence of EU-level actors in claims-making about troops deployment, this finding reiterates that troops deployment is rarely defined as an EU concern in the UK print media, despite steps towards an EU capability in this area. Finally, the policy fields that remain under the control of national political institutions – pensions and education – are discussed almost entirely within a UK national context. The findings related to all three indicators of Europeanisation by policy field suggest virtually no Europeanisation of education or pensions politics, as would be expected given the lack of EU involvement in these areas.

#### **Claim-level: Evaluations of European integration**

Table 8.1, overleaf, shows actors' positions towards European integration, broken down by policy domain and over time. As a general rule, actors took more positive positions towards European integration in 1990 than they did in the later years in the study. It should be noted that trends across time can only be stated with any confidence for the policy fields of monetary politics, agriculture and European integration, since for the other policy fields the numbers of cases are too small.

**Table 8.1 Position towards European integration, by policy field and year**

	1990		1995		2000		2001		2002		Total	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
<b>Monetary politics</b>	0.19	98	0.06	77	0.08	307	0.05	62	0.04	145	0.08	689
<b>Agriculture</b>	0.00	16	0.00	6	-0.01	67	0.00	21	-0.02	51	-0.01	161
<b>Immigration</b>	0.00	2	0.00	7	0.29	7	0.14	14	0.06	50	0.09	80
<b>Troops deployment</b>	0.25	4	0.00	1	-0.67	3	0.00	9	0.00	4	-0.05	21
<b>Pensions</b>	1.00	1	0.00	2	0.00	1	0.00	1	0.00	1	0.17	6
<b>Education</b>	0.00	1	N/A	0	0.00	2	N/A	0	0.00	1	0.00	4
<b>European Integration</b>	0.32	68	0.13	113	0.18	239	0.02	101	0.08	172	0.14	693
<b>Total</b>	0.23	190	0.10	206	0.11	626	0.03	208	0.05	424	0.10	1654

Analysis of the positions taken by different types of actors towards European integration gives a measure of what degree of consensus or conflict exists between political actors in the UK public sphere over European issues. Table 8.2, overleaf, shows the mean positions towards European integration for all actors making claims in the UK public sphere, for UK actors alone and for non-UK actors. Significant differences exist between UK actors and non-UK actors. UK state and party actors as a whole take less positive attitudes to European integration than do all state and party actors making claims in the UK public sphere, with a mean position of  $-0.01$  against the ‘all actors’ position of  $0.13$ .

While the positions of economic interest groups such as unions and employers’ organizations are similar for UK and non-UK actors, at  $0.12$  and  $0.13$  respectively, the positions of other civil society organizations towards European integration are much more negative for UK than for non-UK civil society. This is largely due to the presence of a significant number of pressure groups campaigning for and against European integration in the UK. The pressure groups campaigning against European

integration, or some aspect of that process such as the single currency, have greater visibility in the UK public sphere than do their pro-European counterparts, which explains why the average position of pro- and anti-European campaign organizations towards European integration was quite negative (-0.09 for UK campaign groups, against an average for all UK actors of -0.01).

**Table 8.2 Position towards European integration, by actor type**

Actor type	All actors		UK actors only		Non-UK actors only	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>0.13</b>	<b>1119</b>	<b>-0.01</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>632</b>
<b>Politicians</b>	-0.09	22	-0.14	7	-0.07	15
Former states(wo)men	-0.05	20	-0.13	16	0.25	4
Government/ exec.	0.22	762	0.12	282	0.29	480
Legislative	0.06	77	-0.16	44	0.36	33
Judiciary	0.00	9	N/A	0	0.00	3
Police/ internal security agencies	0.00	5	N/A	0	0.00	5
<b>Military</b>	0.00	2	1.00	1	-1.00	1
Central banks	0.11	81	0.07	14	0.12	67
Other state executive agencies	0.00	10	0.00	6	0.00	4
Political parties	-0.28	131	-0.29	111	-0.25	20
<b>Economic interest groups</b>	<b>0.12</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>0.13</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>0.12</b>	<b>59</b>
Unions/employees	0.15	26	0.17	24	0.00	2
Employers orgs/ firms	0.26	65	0.24	41	0.29	24
Economists/ financial experts*	0.00	62	-0.04	27	0.03	29
Farmers/ agricultural orgs	-0.07	15	0.00	10	-0.25	4
<b>Media/ journalists</b>	<b>-0.04</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>-0.07</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>0.23</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Other civil society</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>-0.01</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>0.26</b>	<b>23</b>
Churches and religious orgs	0.00	2	0.00	2	N/A	0
Educational professionals/ orgs	0.00	1	0.00	1	N/A	0
Other sci./ research professionals	0.13	31	0.15	20	0.09	11
Other professional organisations and groups	0.50	6	0.33	3	N/A	0
Consumer orgs/ groups	0.00	2	0.00	2	0.67	3
Migrant orgs/ groups	0.00	1	N/A	0	0.00	1
Pro-/anti-European campaign orgs	-0.05	58	-0.09	55	0.67	3
Solidarity and human rights orgs	0.00	1	N/A	0	0.00	1
Welfare orgs	0.00	1	0.00	1	N/A	0
Environmental orgs/ groups	0.00	4	0.00	4	N/A	0
Other civil society orgs/ groups	0.20	5	0.00	1	0.25	4
<b>General/ unknown /unspecified</b>	<b>-0.25</b>	<b>8</b>	N/A	0	<b>-0.25</b>	<b>8</b>
Whole polities	0.00	1	N/A	0	0.00	1
The general public	-0.40	5	N/A	0	-0.40	5
Unknown/unspecified actors	0.00	2	N/A	0	0.00	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>1654</b>	<b>-0.01</b>	<b>903</b>	<b>0.22</b>	<b>744</b>

\*There were 7 'economists/financial experts' where country and scope were unknown, which are therefore missing from the UK/non-UK classification

The average position towards European integration for all UK actors was  $-0.01$ . While UK state and party actors' aggregate position towards European integration was the same as the average for all UK actors, at  $-0.01$ , this figure obscures the significant differences that exist between evaluations by different types of state and party actors. The mean government position, at  $0.12$ , was much more positive than average towards European integration. This contrasts sharply with the overall position towards European integration of the legislative, at  $-0.16$ . This lack of consensus between government and legislative suggests a high degree of institutional conflict within the British public sphere over Europeanisation. This indication of conflict is reinforced by the finding that on balance, political party actors evaluated European integration far more negatively than average, with a mean evaluation of  $-0.29$ . There are clearly sharp differences between the evaluations of elite actors of the benefits and drawbacks of European integration, reflecting the fact that European integration has been a deeply divisive issue within UK politics since the inception of the European project.

Turning to UK non-state actors, the mean evaluation that economic interest groups had of European integration was  $0.13$ , more positive than the average of  $-0.01$  for all UK actors. However, this obscures considerable differences in the evaluations of different kinds of economic interest groups. UK employers' organizations and firms were highly positive towards European integration, with a mean evaluation of  $0.24$ , as were the unions, with a mean evaluation of  $0.17$ . These positive evaluations may seem surprising given recent splits within business and the trade unions over the euro issue; for example, the main employers' organization, the CBI, has taken no public position on UK euro entry since its membership is divided on the issue, and while the TUC has been pro-euro, many individual trade unions, including the largest union UNISON, have been against the single currency. However, it should be remembered that UK business has traditionally been positive towards European integration and the single market, and since the late 1980s the trade union movement has also been broadly in favour of European integration, perceiving political opportunities at European level not available to them on the national level.

Table 8.3 shows that in the UK public sphere, EU actors make claims with evaluations of European integration that are far more favourable, at 0.25, than those made by UK actors and institutions, at -0.01 (against an average evaluation for all actors of 0.10; see Table 8.3 below). Other EU member and applicant states also appear in the UK public sphere as making more positive evaluations of European integration than average (0.35 for Italian actors, 0.33 for German actors, 0.20 for French actors, 0.18 for enlargement country actors). Interventions in the UK public sphere by actors from the EU or from other EU countries, therefore, are likely to be pro-European integration. In contrast, the competing claims made by national actors in the UK public domain are more likely to involve a range of attitudes on whether European integration is desirable, and on balance give more negative evaluations of European integration than average.

**Table 8.3 Position towards European integration, by actor scope**

Actor scope	All actors	
	Mean	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.00	3
<b>Other supranational</b>	-0.08	12
<b>EU</b>	0.25	312
<b>Other European supranational</b>	N/A	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.09	35
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.25	4
<b>Germany</b>	0.33	104
<b>France</b>	0.20	90
<b>UK</b>	-0.01	903
<b>Italy</b>	0.35	17
<b>Spain</b>	0.00	7
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.00	9
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.33	60
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.00	21
<b>Switzerland</b>	-1.00	1
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.18	22
<b>Other European countries (excluding CIS)</b>	0.00	4
<b>Turkey</b>	0.00	5
<b>Russia</b>	0.13	8
<b>USA</b>	0.00	17
<b>Japan</b>	0.50	2
<b>Middle East</b>	N/A	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.13	8
<b>Total</b>	0.10	1647

More detail on how Europe is contested within UK politics can be gained by looking at the positions towards European integration taken by the main political parties (Table 8.4, below). While some Conservative MPs are pro-European, and several Labour MPs are opposed to some aspects of European integration such as the single currency, there is a huge gulf between the overall positions of the parties on European integration, which has widened in the more recent years in the study. The Conservative Party appears to have hardened its position on Europe in the years after 1990, while by 2000 (once Labour had become the party of government) Labour representatives were making significantly more positive claims regarding European integration than had been the case in 1990 or in 1995. It appears that in the most recent years sampled – 2001 and 2002 – the gulf in attitudes to Europe between the two main parties has stabilised, with both parties making evaluations of European integration in 2002 that were roughly similar to the evaluations made in 2001 (for the Tories, -0.32 in 2002 compared with -0.24 in 2001; for Labour, 0.15 in 2002 compared with 0.13 in 2001). In other words, Europe has become an axis of party political competition within UK politics, and the broad pro-Europe/anti-Europe split between the two main parties has become a settled division in recent years.

**Table 8.4 Position towards European integration, by party affiliation (UK only) and year**

	1990		1995		2000		2001		2002		Total	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
<b>Conservative Party</b>	0.02	45	-0.30	63	-0.50	60	-0.24	21	-0.32	19	-0.28	208
<b>Labour</b>	0.00	17	0.00	3	0.38	112	0.13	30	0.15	62	0.25	224
<b>Liberal Democrats</b>	0.80	5	N/A	0	0.67	3	N/A	0	0.25	4	0.58	12
<b>Scottish National Party</b>	N/A	0	N/A	0	0.20	5	N/A	0	N/A	0	0.20	5
<b>Green Party</b>	N/A	0	N/A	0	0.00	1	N/A	0	0.00	1	0.00	2
<b>Other UK political party</b>	N/A	0	N/A	0	0.00	1	N/A	0	N/A	0	0.00	1
<b>Total</b>	0.07	67	-0.29	66	0.09	182	-0.02	51	0.05	86	0.01	452



### **Section summary**

Data on the positions different actors take towards European integration provides us with information about the cleavages that have developed in regard to European integration within UK politics. While the mean government position is much more positive than average towards European integration, this contrasts markedly with the more negative than average position of the legislative. This lack of consensus between government and legislative suggests a high degree of institutional conflict within the British public sphere over Europeanisation. Furthermore, political party actors had a mean evaluation of European integration that was more negative than either that of the government or of the legislative, indicating that sharp differences exist between UK elite actors' evaluations of the benefits and drawbacks of European integration. A huge gulf is apparent between the overall positions of the UK's two main parties on European integration, and this gap has widened in the more recent years in the study. Europe has become an axis of party political competition within UK politics, and the broad pro-Europe/anti-Europe split between the two main parties has become a settled division in recent years. The conflicting positions of UK elite actors towards European integration apparent from our study are a legacy of the divisiveness of the 'Europe' issue for political elites in Britain.

In contrast to the positions of political elites, UK employers' organizations and firms made highly positive net evaluations of European integration, as did the trade unions. However, civil society actors other than economic interest groups evaluated European integration on balance more negatively than average. This negative evaluation is due to the claims made by several pro- and anti-EU pressure groups, which have attempted to influence the British debates over European integration issues in recent years. More pressure groups exist to campaign against European integration (or some aspect of it, such as British entry into the single currency) than campaign against it, which may account for the fact that on balance in the print media sampled here, the campaign groups' mean evaluation of European integration was more negative than average.

Neither the evaluations of European integration by the UK's economic interest groups nor those by its civil society organisations are similar to the positions of UK state and party actors on European issues. This indicates a wide spectrum of positions

expressed regarding the benefits and drawbacks of European integration in the UK public sphere, which in turn suggests a high degree of conflict over European integration in the public domain in Britain. This is reinforced by the finding that interventions in the UK public sphere by actors from the EU or from other EU countries are likely to be pro-European integration. In contrast, the competing claims made by national actors in the UK public domain are more likely to involve a range of attitudes on whether European integration is desirable, and on balance give more negative evaluations of European integration than average.

### **Claim-level: Object actors**

As Table 9.1 demonstrates, over four fifths of claims (81.6%) have an object actor, i.e. a constituency defined as affected by the outcome of a claim, if that claim were realised. Object actors may be affected positively by a claim - for example teachers would be affected positively by the claim of a teachers' union lobbying for higher pay for teachers - or negatively - for example a campaign group's claim that staying out of the euro has been bad for Britain defines Britain as a whole as being negatively affected by the situation to date. Of course a claimant may not define clearly or could define in a contradictory way the effect that their claim will have on certain groups, in which cases the object actor would be coded as neutrally/ambivalently affected by the claim.

**Table 9.1 Presence of object actor by policy field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
<b>No object actor</b>	24.4	24.0	19.2	14.1	11.5	13.8	21.7	18.4	383
<b>Object actor present</b>	75.6	76.0	80.8	85.9	88.5	86.2	78.3	81.6	1693
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	2076
<b>N</b>	450	171	156	354	96	545	304	2076	

**Table 9.2a Object actor type by policy field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
<b>State and party actors</b>	25.9	19.2	22.2	56.3	12.9	8.9	42.4	27.5	466
Government/ exec.	17.6	16.9	17.5	38.2	7.1	6.4	36.6	20.3	343
Legislative	0.0	0.8	0.0	1.6	1.2	0.2	2.1	0.8	13
Judiciary	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.1	2
Police/ internal security agencies	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	5
Military	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.8	2.4	0.0	0.0	2.8	47
Central banks	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	1.5	25
Social security executive orgs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
Other state executive agencies	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.4	7
Political parties	1.2	0.0	2.4	0.7	2.4	0.9	3.4	1.4	23
<b>Economic interest groups</b>	15.9	56.2	7.1	0.3	22.4	0.4	1.7	9.6	162
Unions/employees	0.6	0.0	2.4	0.3	7.1	0.2	0.0	0.8	13
Employers orgs/ firms	14.1	6.9	4.8	0.0	11.8	0.2	1.7	4.6	78
Economists/ financial experts	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	.2	4
Farmers/ agricultural orgs	0.0	49.2	0.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	0.0	4.0	67
<b>Media/ journalists</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	1
<b>Other civil society</b>	2.9	2.3	41.3	4.9	51.8	87.0	0.8	31.6	535
Churches and religious orgs	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	2
Educational professionals/ orgs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	43.8	0.0	12.2	207
Other sci./ research professionals	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
Students, pupils, and their parents	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	42.8	0.0	11.9	201
Other professional orgs/groups	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.4	0.3	5
Migrant orgs/groups	0.0	0.0	38.9	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.0	3.0	51
Pro-/anti-European campaign orgs	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.6	10
Welfare orgs	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
Orgs/groups of the elderly	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	48.2	0.0	0.0	2.5	42
Terrorist groups	0.0	0.0	0.8	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	7
Rebel forces/guerrilla	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	8
<b>General/ unknown/unspecified</b>	55.3	22.3	29.4	38.5	12.9	3.6	54.6	31.2	529
Whole politics	18.5	9.2	19.8	36.5	1.2	2.3	50.0	20.1	341
Whole economies	32.4	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.2	0.2	1.3	6.9	116
The general public	4.4	13.1	9.5	1.6	10.6	1.1	3.8	4.3	72
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1693
<b>N</b>	340	130	126	304	85	470	238	1693	

Across the seven policy fields, when we look at the kinds of actors who are defined as being affected by claims (table 9.2a, above) a similar trend emerges to that for the actors making claims (table 4.1, above). For the field of European integration, the proportion of state and party actors is high when compared with other issue fields (42.4% of all object actors), exceeded only in the field of troops deployment (56.3%). Indeed, when the proportions of government and executive actors specifically are compared for the fields of European integration and troops deployment, they are quite similar (36.6% of all object actors for European integration, compared with 36.6% of all object actors for troops deployment), with the majority of the other state and party actors affected by troops deployment claims being military actors (14.8%). This reinforces the general finding that European integration is a policy field dominated by political elites, in particular by governments and executive authorities. European integration is represented in the public sphere as a policy field where claims are made by elites, addressed at elites and in the main, affect elites.

For European integration, the proportions of economic interest groups and other civil society actors defined as being affected by the outcomes of claims are extremely low, with 1.7% of object actors being economic interest groups against an average of 9.6% for all policy fields, and just 0.8% of object actors in this field being civil society actors, against the average of 31.6%. Once again, this indicates little role for interest groups and civil society actors in public debates over European integration as relayed in the print media, when compared against other issue fields. Many claimants define the constituencies who would be better and worse off as a result of the claim in terms of the national interest. Whole polities (e.g. 'Britain') are designated as being affected particularly by claims about European integration (50.0% of all object actors in this issue field), troops deployment (36.5%) and monetary politics (18.5%). To summarise, over 90% of the parties affected by European integration are defined as whole states and the political elites that govern them (50.0% of object actors 'whole polities', 42.4% state and party actors). Of all issue fields, European integration emerges as most similar to troops deployment, in that the implications of the claims made are represented as being for the executive and for the country at large.

**Table 9.2b Object actor type by year (in %)**

	1989	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>28.2</b>	<b>27.4</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>33.9</b>	<b>27.5</b>	<b>466</b>
Government/ exec.	0.0	22.4	18.6	11.5	25.3	20.3	343
Legislative	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.7	1.0	0.8	13
Judiciary	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	2
Police/ internal security agencies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.6	0.3	5
Military	0.0	1.9	8.0	1.4	1.9	2.8	47
Central banks	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.9	2.5	1.5	25
Social security executive orgs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	1
Other state executive agencies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.7	0.4	7
Political parties	0.0	1.5	0.7	1.2	1.7	1.4	23
<b>Economic interest groups</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>9.7</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>162</b>
Unions/employees	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.8	13
Employers orgs/ firms	100.0	3.9	3.6	9.2	2.3	4.6	78
Economists/ financial experts	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.2	4
Farmers/ agricultural orgs	0.0	5.8	1.5	5.8	3.2	4.0	67
<b>Media/ journalists</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Other civil society</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>27.4</b>	<b>26.3</b>	<b>35.6</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>31.6</b>	<b>535</b>
Churches and religious orgs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	2
Educational professionals/ orgs	0.0	15.8	9.9	13.6	11.0	12.2	207
Other sci./ research professionals	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	1
Students, pupils, and their parents	0.0	8.1	9.9	13.6	12.9	11.9	201
Other professional orgs/groups	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.3	5
Migrant orgs/groups	0.0	2.3	0.4	2.1	4.8	3.0	51
Pro-/anti-European campaign orgs	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.7	0.6	10
Welfare orgs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	1
Orgs/groups of the elderly	0.0	0.8	4.7	4.2	1.2	2.5	42
Terrorist groups	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.4	7
Rebel forces/guerrilla	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.2	0.6	0.5	8
<b>General/ unknown /unspecified</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>41.2</b>	<b>32.1</b>	<b>25.8</b>	<b>31.2</b>	<b>529</b>
Whole polities	0.0	20.5	28.1	19.4	17.5	20.1	341
Whole economies	0.0	11.2	7.7	6.7	5.1	6.9	116
The general public	0.0	3.1	5.5	6.0	3.2	4.3	72
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1693</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>274</b>	<b>433</b>	<b>726</b>	<b>1693</b>	

Table 9.2b shows the actors defined as being affected by political claims, over time.

No clear trends are apparent.

Economic interest groups are the type of actor most likely to have their interests negatively affected by the outcomes of claims (evaluation of  $-0.24$ ; Table 9.3a, below). State and party actors are also more likely to have their interests negatively than positively affected (evaluation of  $-0.12$ ). Civil society actors, and ‘general’ categories of actor such as ‘Britain’, ‘the US economy’, etc, were more likely to be evaluated as positively affected by the claim’s outcome than were other types of actor.

**Table 9.3a Evaluation by object actor type**

<b>Object actor type</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>-0.12</b>	<b>466</b>
Government/ exec.	-0.14	343
Legislative	-0.23	13
Judiciary	0.50	2
Police/ internal security agencies	0.20	5
Military	0.17	47
Central banks	-0.24	25
Social security executive orgs	-1.00	1
Other state executive agencies	-0.43	7
Political parties	-0.22	23
<b>Economic interest groups</b>	<b>-0.24</b>	<b>162</b>
Unions/employees	-0.54	13
Employers orgs/ firms	-0.35	78
Economists/ financial experts	-0.50	4
Farmers/ agricultural orgs	-0.04	67
<b>Media/ journalists</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Other civil society</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>535</b>
Churches and religious orgs	1.00	2
Educational professionals/ orgs	0.02	207
Other sci./ research professionals	0.00	1
Students, pupils, and their parents	0.04	201
Other professional orgs/groups	0.00	5
Migrant orgs/groups	-0.12	51
Pro-/anti-European campaign orgs	-0.30	10
Welfare orgs	0.00	1
Orgs/groups of the elderly	0.21	42
Terrorist groups	-0.71	7
Rebel forces/guerrilla	-0.75	8
<b>General/ unknown /unspecified</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>529</b>
Whole polities	0.06	341
Whole economies	0.04	116
The general public	-0.10	72
<b>Total</b>	<b>-0.04</b>	<b>1693</b>

As table 9.3b, overleaf, shows, EU object actors overall across all policy fields are evaluated as being slightly more positively affected by claims than average (0.03 against an average evaluation of -0.04), while UK actors are evaluated as being marginally more negatively affected than average (-0.05). Since the figures shown in Table 9.3b, below, are aggregates for all policy fields, we may find out more about how object actors are evaluated by examining the figures for the European integration field alone (Table 9.3c, below).

**Table 9.3b Evaluation by object actor scope**

<b>Object actor scope</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.21	28
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.38	8
<b>EU</b>	0.03	201
<b>Other European supranational</b>	N/A	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	-0.08	60
<b>Bilateral</b>	-0.17	12
<b>Germany</b>	-0.07	27
<b>France</b>	-0.14	29
<b>UK</b>	-0.05	981
<b>Italy</b>	-0.50	4
<b>Spain</b>	0.00	4
<b>Netherlands</b>	-0.33	3
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	-0.13	15
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	-0.18	11
<b>Switzerland</b>	N/A	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.13	24
<b>Other European countries (excluding CIS)</b>	-0.16	38
<b>Turkey</b>	0.14	7
<b>Russia</b>	-0.17	18
<b>USA</b>	0.02	58
<b>Japan</b>	0.00	2
<b>Middle East</b>	-0.08	84
<b>Rest of the world</b>	-0.12	75
<b>Total</b>	-0.04	1689

A wider gulf emerges between EU and UK object actors in the specific field of European integration than is the case when an aggregate figure across all policy fields is taken. For European integration, EU actors are defined as being much more positively affected by claims than average (0.18 mean evaluation for EU actors, against an average of 0.04). The upcoming enlargement countries are also defined as being positively affected by claims in this issue field (0.11 mean evaluation). In contrast, claimants define UK actors in the field of European integration as more negatively affected than average (-0.12 mean evaluation for UK actors, against the 0.04 average). The outcomes of claims in the European integration field are most likely to be defined as positive for the EU, positive for enlargement countries, but bad for Britain.

**Table 9.3c Evaluation by object actor scope, European integration only**

<b>Object actor scope</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	N/A	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	N/A	0
<b>EU</b>	0.18	99
<b>Other European supranational</b>	N/A	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.33	3
<b>Bilateral</b>	N/A	0
<b>Germany</b>	0.33	3
<b>France</b>	0.25	4
<b>UK</b>	-0.12	89
<b>Italy</b>	N/A	0
<b>Spain</b>	N/A	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	N/A	0
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	-0.67	3
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	-0.14	7
<b>Switzerland</b>	N/A	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.11	18
<b>Other European countries (excluding CIS)</b>	N/A	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.00	5
<b>Russia</b>	-0.20	5
<b>USA</b>	1.00	1
<b>Japan</b>	N/A	0
<b>Middle East</b>	N/A	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.00	1
<b>Total</b>	0.04	238

Turning to examine Table 9.4a, overleaf, it comes as no surprise that the European integration policy field has a much higher proportion of EU object actors than any other issue field in the study (41.6%, with the next highest proportion for monetary politics at 21.2%). Looking across the remaining six issue fields, the policy fields where EU object actors are present in any significant numbers are monetary politics (21.2% of all object actors in this field), agriculture (13.8%) and immigration (8.0%).

Virtually no EU actors are defined as being affected by claims in the fields of troops deployment, pensions or education. Once again the evidence supports the argument that troops deployment is not defined as an EU concern in the UK print media, despite steps towards an EU capability in this issue field. Furthermore, analysis of object actors affected by claims shows pensions and education once more as highly nationalised issue fields, where almost 95% of object actors (94.1% and 94.9% respectively) are UK national.



**Table 9.4a Object actor scope by policy field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	28
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.8	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.5	8
<b>EU</b>	21.2	13.8	8.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	41.6	11.9	201
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	1.5	1.5	13.6	9.2	3.5	0.4	1.3	3.6	60
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.3	0.0	4.8	1.3	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.7	12
<b>Germany</b>	3.2	3.1	3.2	0.3	1.2	.6	1.3	1.6	27
<b>France</b>	0.3	5.4	5.6	0.3	0.0	1.9	1.7	1.7	29
<b>UK</b>	64.1	68.5	27.2	9.2	94.1	94.9	37.4	58.1	981
<b>Italy</b>	0.6	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	4
<b>Spain</b>	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	4
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.3	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	2
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	2.6	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.3	0.9	15
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	0.7	11
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.3	1.5	0.8	0.7	0.0	0.0	7.6	1.4	24
<b>Other European countries (excl. CIS)</b>	0.6	0.0	1.6	11.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	38
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.4	7
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	4.8	2.3	0.0	0.0	2.1	1.1	18
<b>USA</b>	2.1	2.3	4.0	13.2	0.0	0.4	0.4	3.4	58
<b>Japan</b>	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	2
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	3.2	26.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	84
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.9	1.5	20.0	12.5	0.0	1.3	0.4	4.4	75
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1689
<b>N</b>	340	130	125	304	85	467	238	1689	

In the issue field of European integration, EU and UK actors are the parties most likely to be defined as affected by claims (41.6% and 37.4% of all object actors in this issue field respectively). Of other actors affected by claims, the majority were from other EU member or applicant states, a particularly high proportion of object actors coming from the upcoming enlargement countries (7.6%). It is perhaps surprising that other large EU states such as Germany and France do not figure heavily as parties affected by European integration in our data. This could well be due to the fact that the figures shown here are for the ‘ultimate’ or most important object actor of the claim<sup>7</sup>, often the EU or the UK, and it may be that France and Germany feature more as second and third object actors.

If the proportion of EU or other European object actors in the dataset was higher in the more recent years in the sample than in previous years, this would indicate a ‘Europeanisation’ in terms of increasing reference to EU-level actors as the parties affected by political claims. Table 9.4b (overleaf) shows the scope of object actors for all issue fields in the four years sampled. No trend towards a Europeanisation of object actors seems apparent. The proportion of EU-level object actors is slightly above the average of 11.9% in 1995 and 2000, and slightly below it in 1990 and 2002. However, since these are aggregate proportions across all policy fields, by separating the data by issue field we gain a clearer picture of what Europeanisation may be taking place. Tables 9.4c and 9.4d, overleaf, show the scope of object actors across the four years for the issue fields of European integration and monetary politics.

For the policy field of European integration, in the later years included in the study lower proportions of UK national actors are found than was the case in previous years (39.4% in 2000 and 26.8% in 2002, compared with 46.7% in 1990 and 45.0% in 1995). However, this ‘denationalisation’ of object actors in the European integration field was not accompanied by a corresponding rise in the proportions of EU actors defined as affected by European integration claims. While the proportion of EU object actors found in the 2002 data was higher than in 2000 (43.9% in 2002, compared with 36.4% in 2000), it was still lower than the proportion of EU actors found back in 1990 (46.7%). Therefore, while European integration has come to be discussed less in terms of its effects on UK national actors than on those outside the borders of the polity, this does not mean that it has come to be discussed more in terms of its effects on EU-level actors. Instead, other actors, in particular those from the enlargement states that join in 2004 (who made up 7.6% of all object actors in European integration claims in the 2002 data), are also defined as being affected by European integration in claims made in the UK public domain.

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<sup>7</sup> Definition of ultimate object actor from codebook

**Table 9.4b Object actor scope by year (in %)**

	1989	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.4	5.1	0.7	1.4	1.7	28
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.5	0.0	0.5	8
<b>EU</b>	0.0	10.0	12.8	13.3	11.4	11.9	201
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	4.2	0.4	1.2	5.9	3.6	60
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.9	1.0	0.7	12
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	2.3	1.1	0.9	1.9	1.6	27
<b>France</b>	0.0	0.4	1.1	1.9	2.3	1.7	29
<b>UK</b>	100.0	57.5	53.3	69.5	53.3	58.1	981
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.5	0.0	0.2	4
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.2	4
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.2	3
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.6	0.9	15
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.6	0.7	11
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	0.8	1.5	0.5	2.2	1.4	24
<b>Other European countries (excl. CIS)</b>	0.0	0.8	12.8	0.0	0.1	2.2	38
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.4	1.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	7
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	1.5	1.1	0.0	1.5	1.1	18
<b>USA</b>	0.0	3.9	3.6	1.2	4.5	3.4	58
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.1	2
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	12.4	0.7	0.5	6.6	5.0	84
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	5.0	2.2	3.5	5.6	4.4	75
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1689
<b>N</b>	1	259	274	429	726	1689	

**Table 9.4c Object actor scope by year, European integration only (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>EU</b>	46.7	41.7	36.4	43.9	41.6	99
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	6.7	1.7	0.0	0.0	1.3	3
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	1.7	3.0	0.0	1.3	3
<b>France</b>	0.0	0.0	3.0	2.4	1.7	4
<b>UK</b>	46.7	45.0	39.4	26.8	37.4	89
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.7	1.3	3
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	10.6	0.0	2.9	7
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	6.7	3.0	14.6	7.6	18
<b>Other European countries (excl. CIS)</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	3.3	1.5	2.4	2.1	5
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.1	2.1	5
<b>USA</b>	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.4	1
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.4	1
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	238
<b>N</b>	30	60	66	82	238	

In contrast to the issue field of European integration, the data for monetary politics does indicate vertical Europeanisation in this issue field over time, in terms of more claims referring to EU actors as the main party affected by their demands (Table 9.4d, below). Whereas in 1990 and 1995 EU actors made up 13.6% and 14.8% of all object actors in the European integration issue field respectively, in 2000 and 2002 the proportions were 22.8% and 26.8% respectively. This doubtless reflects the reality of deeper monetary integration as the eurozone countries reached the final phases of Economic and Monetary Union. Even though the UK remained outside the single currency in the years sampled, and seems likely to for the foreseeable future, the interests defined as affected by political claims in the arena of monetary politics took on an increasing EU dimension in the years covered in the study.

**Table 9.4d Object actor scope by year, monetary politics only (in %)**

	1989	1990	1995	2000	2002	Total	N
<b>Supranational: UN</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Other supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>EU</b>	0.0	13.6	14.8	22.8	26.8	21.2	72
<b>Other European supranational</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Multilateral</b>	0.0	1.7	0.0	1.8	1.8	1.5	5
<b>Bilateral</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.3	1
<b>Germany</b>	0.0	3.4	0.0	1.8	6.3	3.2	11
<b>France</b>	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.3	1
<b>UK</b>	100.0	76.3	74.1	60.5	56.3	64.1	218
<b>Italy</b>	0.0	0.0	3.7	0.0	0.0	0.6	2
<b>Spain</b>	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.3	1
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.3	1
<b>Other pre-1995 EU members</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.9	0.0	2.6	9
<b>Austria, Finland, Sweden</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.6	1.2	4
<b>Switzerland</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Upcoming enlargement countries</b>	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1
<b>Other European countries (excl. CIS)</b>	0.0	3.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	2
<b>Turkey</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>USA</b>	0.0	0.0	3.7	2.6	1.8	2.1	7
<b>Japan</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.6	2
<b>Middle East</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Rest of the world</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.9	3
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	340
<b>N</b>	1	59	54	114	112	340	

**Section summary**

As the parties affected by claims ('object actors'), EU actors appear in much higher proportions in the field of European integration than in any other issue field in the study. The other policy fields where EU object actors are present in any significant numbers are monetary politics (21.2% of all object actors in this field), agriculture (13.8%) and immigration (8.0%). Virtually no EU actors are defined as being affected by claims in the fields of troops deployment, pensions or education. In relation to the question of horizontal Europeanisation, where claimants identified actors from other EU countries as parties affected by their demands, actors from Germany and France featured little, while actors from upcoming enlargement countries featured to a small extent.

Examining the question of Europeanisation across time, aggregate figures for all policy fields do not show any significant rise in the proportions of EU actors defined as affected by other actors' claims. However, when specific policy fields are

examined trends become clear. For monetary politics, the data does indicate vertical Europeanisation in this issue field over time, in terms of more claims referring to EU actors as the main party affected by their demands. For European integration there is no similar trend towards vertical Europeanisation over time. While the actors affected by claims about European integration were less likely to be UK national actors in 2000 and 2002 compared with earlier years, this ‘denationalisation’ was not accompanied by a corresponding rise in EU-level actors. These findings suggest once more that the level of ‘vertical Europeanisation’ varies significantly by issue field.

### **Claim-level: Frames**

The presence of frames regarding what the EU is, is not, should be or should not be was highest for the policy field of European integration (40.3%; see Table 10.1a, below). The field of monetary politics also contained a significant proportion of frames regarding the EU (26.7%), largely due to the debates over the single currency.

**Table 10.1a Presence of frame by policy field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
<b>No frame</b>	73.3%	95.7%	82.5%	90.5%	83.3%	100.0%	59.7%	70.6%	1167
<b>Frame present</b>	26.7%	4.3%	17.5%	9.5%	16.7%	0.0%	40.3%	29.4%	487
<b>Total</b>	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	1654
<b>N</b>	689	161	80	21	6	4	693	1654	

Table 10.1b, overleaf, shows the kinds of actors using frames to discuss European issues. The vast majority of claims about European issues (1119 of a total 1654) stem from state and party actors. Where journalists and media actors made claims about European issues, they were more likely to employ frames in doing so (38.1%) than were other types of actors. Civil society actors were also more likely to utilise frames than were state and party actors or economic interest groups (33.9% of claims by civil society actors about European issues contained a frame).

**Table 10.1b Presence of frame by broad actor type (in %)**

	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society	Unknown/unspecified	Total	N
No frame	71.9	76.2	61.9	66.1	87.5	70.6	1167
Frame present	28.1	23.8	38.1	33.9	12.5	29.4	487
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1654
<b>N</b>	1119	168	247	112	8	1654	

**Table 10.2a Frame type by policy field (in %)**

	Monetary politics	Agriculture	Immigration	Troops	Pensions	Education	European integration	Total	N
Identity, normative, value frames	4.9	57.1	21.4	50.0	0.0	0.0	25.1	17.9	87
Constitutional & governance frames	15.2	28.6	14.3	0.0	100.0	0.0	38.7	29.0	141
Economic frames	59.5	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.2	27.7	135
Other instrumental frames	13.0	14.3	42.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.1	17.9	87
Historical frames	2.2	0.0	7.1	50.0	0.0	0.0	5.4	4.3	21
Frames internal to the integration process	4.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	3.3	16
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	487
<b>N</b>	184	7	14	2	1	0	279	487	

The dominant ways of framing European integration in the UK in the years sampled have been in terms of its implications for constitutional and governance issues (29.0% of all frames, all years) and in terms of its economic implications (27.7% of all frames, all years; see Table 10.2a, above, and Table 10.2b, below). Examples of ‘constitutional and governance’ frames that were particularly dominant in UK claims-making are ‘sovereignty’, ‘federalism’, ‘democracy’ and ‘centralisation’, while economic frames frequently found in the data include ‘national economy’, ‘unemployment’, ‘foreign investments’, ‘economic stability’ and ‘taxes’.

Other types of frames were also often employed. What are termed instrumental frames, such as ‘national interest’, ‘acceptance of the EU by citizens’ and ‘influence

in international relations’ made up nearly a fifth of frames in the dataset (17.9%). A similar proportion was made up by frames relating European integration to identities, norms and values – particularly ‘equality among countries, member states or regions’, ‘free trade’, ‘national identity’ and ‘peace’ (17.9% of all frames in the sample).

**Table 10.2b Frame type by year (in %)**

	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	Total	N
<b>Identity, normative, value frames</b>	18.5	26.5	9.3	18.3	23.4	17.9	87
<b>Constitutional &amp; governance frames</b>	35.4	30.9	28.7	28.0	25.2	29.0	141
<b>Economic frames</b>	24.6	14.7	39.3	26.9	22.5	27.7	135
<b>Other instrumental frames</b>	10.8	20.6	18.7	18.3	18.9	17.9	87
<b>Historical frames</b>	3.1	4.4	3.3	2.2	8.1	4.3	21
<b>Frames internal to the integration process</b>	7.7	2.9	0.7	6.5	1.8	3.3	10
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	445
<b>N</b>	65	68	150	93	111	487	

Looking at the 3-year continuously sampled period from 2000 to 2002 allows us to make claims about how the framing of European integration has altered or remained stable over time. The high occurrence of economic frames in 2000 (39.3%) is because of the large number of articles on the single currency issue in this year, which were mainly framed in terms of the economic benefits and losses for Britain. In 2001, there is again a higher proportion of economic frames used (26.9%) than in any other year sampled except 2000, caused by debates over tax harmonisation in that year. The British government’s position, when faced with claims from other European politicians about the desirability of tax harmonisation across EU states, was that such harmonisation was not desirable, and the EU should instead focus on economic reform and the completion of the single market. The usage of economic frames, therefore, appears to have been issue-driven; unsurprisingly, if European issues of economic importance were high up the political agenda in a year sampled, the proportion of economic framing of European integration issues was higher in that year.

The use of ‘principled’ frames relating European integration to identities, norms or values by actors in the public sphere remained fairly constant in the years sampled, with 2000 an aberration due to heightened political claims making over the single



currency issue. In 2001 and 2002, identity-, norm- or value-related frames made up between a quarter and a third of all frames used, as was the case in 1990 and 1995. Neither historical frames nor frames arguing that one aspect of integration causes or does not cause further integration to happen (‘frames internal to the integration process’) played a significant role in any year, always forming a low proportion of frames found. The use of identity, norm and value-related frames and the low occurrence of historical and ‘integration-internal’ frames therefore remained fairly constant across the three-year period.

In another important way, however, the framing of European integration in the British public sphere has not remained stable over the period of study. While the proportion of constitutional and governance frames used is high in all years, it appears to have declined steadily over time, with a high of 35.4% in 1990 down to a low of 22.5% in 2002. This indicates that the terms of the European debate in Britain have altered over time, with a decrease in political actors’ usage of the traditional constitutional-governance frames used to discuss European integration, such as sovereignty, democracy and federalism.

**Table 10.2c Frame type by broad actor type (in %)**

	State and party actors	Economic interest groups	Media and journalists	Other civil society	Unknown/unspecified	Total	N
<b>Identity, normative, value frames</b>	19.7	5.0	14.9	23.7	0.0	17.9	87
<b>Constitutional &amp; governance frames</b>	32.5	10.0	26.6	26.3	0.0	29.0	141
<b>Economic frames</b>	20.4	67.5	30.9	39.5	0.0	27.7	135
<b>Other instrumental frames</b>	19.7	7.5	20.2	7.9	0.0	17.9	87
<b>Historical frames</b>	4.1	5.0	4.3	2.6	100.0	4.3	21
<b>Frames internal to the integration process</b>	3.5	5.0	3.2	0.0	0.0	3.3	16
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	487
<b>N</b>	314	40	94	38	1	487	

Different types of political actor frame European integration in different ways in the UK public sphere (Table 10.2c, above). Use of constitutional-governance frames was especially prevalent among state and party actors (32.5% of all frames used by state/party actors). In particular, these actors often framed European integration in terms of its implications for sovereignty, the question of federalism, and its effects on democracy. Unsurprisingly, the highest use of economic frames was found among economic interest groups (67.5% of all frames used by interest groups). Nonetheless, economic frames also made up the highest proportion of frames used by media actors and by other civil society actors, with state and party actors less likely than other actor types to frame European integration in terms of its economic implications.

In the British debate, European integration is frequently framed in terms of its effects on the nation-state. The question focused on is less ‘what should European integration be, or not be?’ than ‘what implications does European integration have for Britain?’ Of the frames most often employed (Table 10.3, overleaf), many relate to the nation-state, such as sovereignty, the national interest, or the national economy. Again, we see the dominance of constitutional-governance and economic frames in British debates over European integration, with the top seven frames all falling into these two categories.

In the British public sphere, the frame in terms of which European integration was most frequently discussed was sovereignty (see Tables 10.3 and 10.4b, below). This comes as no surprise, since UK eurosceptics have often argued that European integration represents the erosion of national sovereignty; take for example a comment from Baroness Thatcher in our dataset that the Conservative party ‘should go into any forthcoming election pledged to keep the pound sterling – just as it is pledged to keep our freedom and sovereignty’, or Nicholas Ridley’s controversial claim in 1990 that handing over sovereignty to the EC ‘is tantamount to giving it to Adolf Hitler’. Nearly half of all claims mentioning sovereignty were made by Conservative politicians (44.1%). Contrary to expectations, many of these were making counter-arguments against the idea that European integration leads to an erosion of sovereignty, arguing instead that ‘this is not eroding sovereignty, it is using it’ (former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, 1990) or that ‘sovereignty can be

increased by pooling it' (Sir Leon Brittan, 2000). That European integration does not lead to a loss of sovereignty has also been something argued by Labour politicians more recently, for example Foreign Secretary Jack Straw's contention that 'sceptics wrongly view sovereignty like virginity – something easily lost in close relationships, never to be regained' (2001).

**Table 10.3 Twenty-five most often mentioned frames**

Frame	N	%
Sovereignty	36	7.4
Federalism	31	6.4
National interest	29	6.0
National economy	27	5.5
Unemployment	20	4.1
Foreign investments	19	3.9
Democracy	17	3.5
Influence/weight in international relations	16	3.3
Equality among countries/member states/regions	15	3.1
Economic stability	15	3.1
Acceptance of the EU by citizens	14	2.9
Centralization	10	2.1
Taxes	10	2.1
Second World War	10	2.1
Free trade	9	1.8
Relations with the USA	9	1.8
Efficiency, competence	8	1.6
Economic growth	8	1.6
National identity	7	1.4
Strength in global competition	7	1.4
National exports	7	1.4
Prices	7	1.4
Peace (23=)	6	1.2
Transparency (23=)	6	1.2
Costs (23=)	6	1.2
Common currency > political integration (23=)	6	1.2
Other frames	355	72.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>100.0</b>

After sovereignty, federalism was the next most frequent frame found in the UK data (Table 10.3, above; Table 10.4a, below). Defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as an arrangement where states 'constitute a political union while remaining more or less independent with regard to their internal affairs', the idea of a federal Europe has been a particular bugbear for UK politicians. Many UK claimants referred negatively to a 'federal EU superstate'. Where references to federalism were positive, these were usually from German or from EU actors, such as the German CDU party's call to 'build a United States of Europe', or Romano Prodi's claim that there is little to

distinguish between a ‘two-speed Europe’ and a federal Europe, and that this is a welcome development. Negative references to the EU and federalism typically came from UK actors, particularly from Conservative politicians, such as Michael Portillo’s claim that Labour endorse ‘withdrawal, retreat and surrender to European federalism’, or John Major’s argument that the Nice summit should define the limits of EU powers ‘to check a drift towards federalism’. Labour politicians also used the federalist frame negatively, however, such as Tony Blair’s claim that ‘a federal Europe would create a superstate that subsumed nations’ and that the EU should be ‘a superpower, not a superstate’.

Of the frames used that relate European integration to principles, identities and values (17.9% of all frames in the sample), particularly frequent are ‘equality among countries, member states or regions’ (position 9), ‘free trade’ (15), ‘national identity’ (19) and ‘peace’ (23=). Nonetheless, frames relating European integration to constitutional and governance issues, or to economics, are far more prevalent in the UK public sphere than are frames that portray European integration in terms of values, identities or norms. Where political principles are mentioned in relation to European integration, they are typically in support of the very British tenets of national sovereignty and democracy, or in opposition to the very un-British concept of federalism.

**Table 10.4a What the EU should not be/lead to: ten most often mentioned frames**

Frame	N	%
Federalism	10	32.3
Centralization	4	12.9
Taxes	4	12.9
Unemployment	3	9.7
Nationalism (5=)	1	3.2
Racism/xenophobia (5=)	1	3.2
Islam (5=)	1	3.2
Equality among countries/member states/regions (5=)	1	3.2
Bureaucracy (5=)	1	3.2
Acceptance of the EU by citizens (5=)	1	3.2
National interest (5=)	1	3.2
Nation state over-burdened (general) (5=)	1	3.2
Wastefulness (5=)	1	3.2
Cold War (5=)	1	3.2
Total	31	100.0

**Table 10.4b What the EU is not/does not lead to: ten most often mentioned frames**

Frame	N	%
<b>Sovereignty</b>	16	13.6
<b>National economy</b>	8	6.8
<b>Democracy</b>	7	5.9
<b>Unemployment</b>	7	5.9
<b>Acceptance of the EU by citizens</b>	6	5.1
<b>Second World War</b>	6	5.1
<b>Economic stability</b>	5	4.2
<b>Foreign investments</b>	5	4.2
<b>Independence</b>	4	3.4
<b>Efficiency, competence</b>	4	3.4
<b>National interest</b>	4	3.4
<b>Other frames</b>	72	61.0
<b>Total</b>	118	100.0

**Table 10.4c What the EU is/leads to: ten most often mentioned frames**

Frame	N	%
<b>National interest</b>	14	8.4
<b>Foreign investments</b>	13	7.8
<b>Sovereignty</b>	10	6.0
<b>National economy</b>	10	6.0
<b>Federalism</b>	9	5.4
<b>Economic stability</b>	8	4.8
<b>Unemployment</b>	7	4.2
<b>Peace</b>	5	3.0
<b>Democracy (9=)</b>	4	2.4
<b>Influence/weight in international relations (9=)</b>	4	2.4
<b>Cope with transnational social problems (9=)</b>	4	2.4
<b>National exports (9=)</b>	4	2.4
<b>Costs (9=)</b>	4	2.4
<b>Prices (9=)</b>	4	2.4
<b>Other frames</b>	100	59.9
<b>Total</b>	167	100.0

**Table 10.4d What the EU should be/should lead to: ten most often mentioned frames**

Frame	N	%
Free trade (1=)	8	7.4
Equality among countries/member states/regions (1=)	8	7.4
Federalism (1=)	8	7.4
Influence/weight in international relations (1=)	8	7.4
Democracy (5=)	5	4.6
Sovereignty (5=)	5	4.6
Transparency (5=)	5	4.6
National economy (8=)	4	3.7
Taxes (8=)	4	3.7
Efficiency, competence (10=)	3	2.8
National interest (10=)	3	2.8
Other frames	61	56.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>100.0</b>

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